Introduction

In Williams v. Pennsylvania State University, No. 23-3180 (3d Cir. Apr. 1, 2025) (not precedential), the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Penn State and several university officials against a former student, Kayla Williams. The appeal arose from a suite of claims tied to Williams’ experiences at Penn State: a Title VI retaliation theory centered on a failing grade issued after she lodged a racism complaint against a professor; a procedural due process challenge to her student-disciplinary suspension; and a First Amendment retaliation theory pegged to (a) her filing of federal litigation and (b) her public criticism of a Title IX proceeding on Twitter.

The panel (Restrepo, Matey, and Chung, JJ.) held that Williams failed to establish a prima facie case of Title VI retaliation; that the university’s student conduct process satisfied procedural due process under the flexible Mathews v. Eldridge standard; that she lacked evidence of causation to support First Amendment retaliation; and that she did not show bad faith sufficient to warrant spoliation sanctions for routine deletion of her university email account. The Court also underscored familiar appellate principles: claims not developed in the opening brief are forfeited, newly raised issues are not considered, and the record on appeal may not be expanded absent exceptional circumstances.

Although designated “not precedential,” the opinion distills and applies several settled doctrines in the student-discipline, retaliation, and e‑discovery contexts, offering practical guidance to universities, students, and litigants in the Third Circuit.

Summary of the Opinion

• Title VI retaliation: No prima facie case where the record showed the student was already failing due to attendance before making the discrimination complaint; the causal link between protected activity and adverse action was missing.
• Procedural due process in campus discipline: Adequate notice, the opportunity to be heard with an advisor present, reasonable opportunities to consult that were declined, and the use of available evidence—even without live testimony from complainants whom the university could not compel to attend—satisfied due process under Mathews v. Eldridge. Allegations of bias by the appellate officer (Gaudelius) failed absent evidence of actual bias or likely bias.
• First Amendment retaliation: Filing suit days before a pre-scheduled hearing and outcome did not show the required causal nexus. Similarly, tweets criticizing Title IX proceedings could not support retaliation without proof decisionmakers were aware of the speech.
• Spoliation: Routine, policy-based deletion of Williams’ email account during litigation did not show bad faith; the asserted categories of emails were not tied to proof of her claims.
• Appellate practice: Claims abandoned in briefing were forfeited; new issues raised for the first time on appeal (or in a reply brief) were not considered; efforts to enlarge the record on appeal were denied absent exceptional circumstances.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Role

Summary Judgment Framework

• Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986): The Court reiterated that summary judgment is proper when no genuine dispute of material fact exists. A dispute is “genuine” only if a reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the nonmovant.
• Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2014): Plenary review applies to a grant of summary judgment.

Title VI Retaliation

• McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973): The familiar burden-shifting framework governs retaliation claims without direct evidence.
• NAACP v. Med. Ctr., Inc., 657 F.2d 1322 (3d Cir. 1981) (en banc): McDonnell Douglas applies in the Title VI context.
• Canada v. Samuel Grossi & Sons, 49 F.4th 340 (3d Cir. 2022): Reiterates elements of a prima facie retaliation case, including the causal connection requirement.
• Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003): Cited for Title VI retaliation elements; the Court found the causal link lacking where the failing grade resulted from pre‑complaint attendance deficiencies.

Procedural Due Process

• Burns v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 544 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2008): A plaintiff must show a protected interest and deprivation without due process.
• Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976): Due process is flexible; the touchstone is an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. The Court used Mathews to assess notice, the chance to consult an advisor, and the practical limits on witness attendance and cross-examination.
• In re Seidman, 37 F.3d 911 (3d Cir. 1994): Administrative decisionmakers are presumed unbiased; a due process claim requires evidence of actual bias or a likelihood of bias. Williams offered none regarding the university appellate officer’s involvement.

First Amendment Retaliation

• Mirabella v. Villard, 853 F.3d 641 (3d Cir. 2017): Elements include protected conduct, adverse action, and a causal link.
• Watson v. Rozum, 834 F.3d 417 (3d Cir. 2016), and Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 2000): Temporal proximity, without more, rarely proves causation. Here, the disciplinary machinery predated the lawsuit, undercutting any inference of retaliatory motive.
• Ambrose v. Township of Robinson, 303 F.3d 488 (3d Cir. 2002): Decisionmakers must be aware of the protected conduct for it to be a substantial or motivating factor. Williams produced no evidence that Title IX decisionmakers knew of her tweets.

Spoliation

• Bull v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 665 F.3d 68 (3d Cir. 2012): Bad faith is pivotal to spoliation sanctions. The routine, policy-driven deletion of Williams’ account did not suffice, and she did not show how the deleted emails would have proved her claims.

Appellate Procedure and Preservation

• In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99 (3d Cir. 2016): Issues not developed in the opening brief are forfeited; new arguments in a reply brief are not considered (see also Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2017)).
• Jenkins v. Superintendent of Laurel Highlands, 705 F.3d 80 (3d Cir. 2013): New issues raised for the first time on appeal are not considered absent exceptional circumstances.
• Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417 (3d Cir. 2013): The record on appeal will not be expanded absent exceptional circumstances.
• Kushner v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 620 F.2d 404 (3d Cir. 1980): Dissatisfaction with one’s own counsel’s litigation choices is not a ground for relief on appeal.

Legal Reasoning

1) Title VI Retaliation

The Court focused on causation. By the time Williams lodged a mid‑semester racism complaint against Professor Prawdzik, she had already accrued unexcused absences that, under the course’s attendance policy, put her at risk of failing. Her brief did not controvert the attendance and missed-work record. In doctrinal terms, this factual sequencing broke the causal chain between protected activity and adverse action, defeating the prima facie showing under McDonnell Douglas. Her separate Title VI discrimination theory against another professor was deemed forfeited for failure to develop argument.

2) Procedural Due Process in Student Discipline

Applying Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court held that Penn State afforded Williams constitutionally adequate process:

• Notice: She received written notice of the nature of the charges (harassment and harming/attempting to harm), incident dates and descriptions, and proposed sanctions well before the hearing.
• Opportunity to be heard: She appeared, spoke on both incidents, and presented her own evidence. She had an advisor in the room and was offered breaks to confer—opportunities she declined.
• Witnesses and cross-examination: The university requested the attendance of A.B. (roommate) and the Lyft driver, but both declined to appear, citing fear. The university had no mechanism to compel participation. Even without live complainants and cross‑examination, the panel considered available materials beyond those individuals’ accounts, including documents submitted by Williams. The due process inquiry is ultimately functional—whether the student received a meaningful opportunity to respond—not whether a particular evidentiary formality was present.
• Impartiality: Williams’ claim that the appellate officer (Dr. Gaudelius) was biased merely because of prior involvement in a distinct Title IX matter failed in the absence of evidence of actual bias or a likelihood of bias. Administrative adjudicators are presumed impartial.

The Court explicitly endorsed the District Court’s “thorough analysis,” emphasizing the flexible, context‑sensitive nature of procedural due process in university settings.

3) First Amendment Retaliation

Williams asserted two protected activities: filing this lawsuit and criticizing a Title IX process on Twitter. The Court found causation lacking on both theories.

• Litigation: A suspension had already been imposed in January 2020 when Williams failed to respond to scheduling emails. By February 13, she had notice of a February 21 hearing. Filing suit on February 19, followed by the scheduled February 21 hearing and a suspension decision on February 28, did not make the timing “unusually suggestive” of retaliatory motive. The relevant causal story was the one that predated the lawsuit: repeated nonresponse, scheduled hearing, and long‑noticed potential sanctions.
• Speech about Title IX: The causation element independently failed for lack of decisionmaker awareness; no record evidence showed that the officials who decided her Title IX matter knew of her tweets.

4) Spoliation

The Court affirmed the denial of spoliation relief. Penn State’s routine, policy‑driven deletion of Williams’ student email account did not demonstrate the bad faith required for spoliation sanctions. Williams’ generalized assertions that certain categories of emails were lost did not show materiality or prejudice to specific claims.

Impact

For universities and student conduct administrators

• Due process remains flexible. Institutions that provide clear written notice, a meaningful hearing, and a fair chance to consult an advisor and present evidence will be on solid constitutional footing, even when key witnesses decline to appear and cross‑examination is therefore not practicable.
• Witness compulsion matters. Where universities lack subpoena power or a mechanism to compel attendance, the absence of live testimony by fearful complainants will not, without more, doom the process—provided the panel evaluates available, reliable evidence and affords the accused a meaningful opportunity to respond.
• Role separation and impartiality. Participation by officials in related institutional processes (e.g., prior Title IX roles) does not, standing alone, establish bias. Documented separations among investigators, presenters, hearing panels, and appellate officers help.
• E‑discovery hygiene. Routine retention policies should be contemporaneously documented and consistently applied. When litigation is reasonably anticipated, timely litigation holds are still critical, but absent bad faith, routine deletions are unlikely to trigger sanctions.

For students and counsel

• Preserve the record and respond. Nonattendance at meetings and failure to respond to charge notices can trigger default sanctions and undermine later claims of unfairness.
• Causation is king in retaliation claims. If adverse academic or disciplinary outcomes were already in motion based on pre‑complaint conduct (e.g., documented attendance failures), it will be difficult to show that protected activity caused those outcomes.
• Appellate preservation. Arguments not developed in the opening brief are forfeited; new allegations cannot be added on appeal; evidentiary gaps cannot be filled by attempting to expand the record absent exceptional circumstances.

For litigators

• Title VI retaliation proof must tie adverse action to protected activity with more than timing—especially where the employer/educator can point to preexisting, documented performance or conduct issues.
• In student-discipline due process claims, build the Mathews record: notice breadth and timing, opportunities to consult advisors, what evidence the panel considered, and practical limits on witness attendance.
• Spoliation requires bad faith. Show contemporaneous notice of litigation, a duty to preserve, deviation from policy, and case‑specific prejudice. Generalized assertions about “categories” of lost emails are unlikely to carry the day.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Prima facie case: The minimum set of facts a plaintiff must show to shift the burden to the defendant in a discrimination/retaliation case. Under McDonnell Douglas, if the plaintiff meets this threshold, the burden shifts to the defendant to offer a legitimate, non‑retaliatory reason; the burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show pretext.
• Temporal proximity: How close in time protected activity is to an adverse action. Close timing can suggest retaliation but, by itself, rarely proves it—especially when the adverse action was already foreseeable or underway for independent reasons.
• Procedural due process: The Constitution’s requirement that before the state deprives a person of life, liberty, or property, it must provide certain procedural safeguards. In university discipline, this focuses on fair notice and a meaningful chance to respond; it does not impose rigid trial‑like requirements in all cases.
• Presumption of impartiality: Decisionmakers are presumed unbiased; a challenger must show actual bias or a likely risk of bias.
• Spoliation: Destruction or loss of evidence that should have been preserved. Sanctions typically require a showing of bad faith and prejudice.
• Non‑precedential disposition: An appellate decision designated as not binding on future panels or lower courts under the court’s internal operating procedures. Such opinions can be persuasive but do not establish binding circuit law.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s not‑precedential decision in Williams v. Penn State reinforces several enduring principles:

• Retaliation claims under Title VI live or die on causation; when adverse outcomes are supported by pre‑complaint performance or conduct issues, the causal chain is difficult to establish.
• Procedural due process in campus discipline is flexible. Adequate notice, a meaningful hearing with an opportunity to consult an advisor, and reasoned consideration of available evidence can satisfy due process even without live testimony from complainants or cross‑examination, particularly where the institution cannot compel witness attendance.
• First Amendment retaliation requires proof that decisionmakers knew of the protected speech and acted because of it; timing alone, especially when disciplinary steps predate the protected act, is insufficient.
• Spoliation sanctions require bad faith and prejudice; routine, policy‑based deletions generally do not qualify.
• Appellate outcomes turn on preservation: abandoned claims and new arguments on appeal are out of bounds, and the record is largely closed.

While not binding, Williams offers clear, practical guidance for universities managing student conduct processes, for students navigating those processes, and for litigants assessing the viability of retaliation, due process, and spoliation theories in higher‑education disputes within the Third Circuit.