Firm Resettlement Bar Applies Upon Grant of Mexican Permanent Residence; Private-Actor Gang Threats Do Not Trigger the Restricted-Residence Exception Absent Government-Imposed Constraints

I. Introduction

In David Godoy Matamoros v. U.S. Attorney General (11th Cir. 2026-09-01) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit denied a petition for review challenging the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) dismissal of David Manuel Godoy Matamoros’s appeal from an Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of asylum.

Matamoros, a Honduran national, fled alleged gang-related threats in Honduras and obtained lawful permanent residence in Mexico, where he lived for about seven months before entering the United States without valid documentation. Although an immigration officer found he had a credible fear, the IJ found him removable and denied asylum under the firm resettlement bar. The central dispute on review was whether Matamoros’s Mexican permanent residence rendered him statutorily ineligible for asylum and whether the “restricted-residence” exception under 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15(b) (2020) applied based on fear of the 18 Gang as a private actor in Mexico.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination that:

  • Matamoros was firmly resettled in Mexico because he was granted permanent resident status and was authorized to live and work there; and
  • Matamoros failed to prove the restricted-residence exception because he did not show that the Mexican authorities “substantially and consciously restricted” his residence, as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15(b) (2020).

The court further concluded the BIA used the correct legal standard and that the record did not compel reversal under the substantial-evidence test. The petition was therefore denied.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Dakane v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1271-72 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2005)

The opinion invoked Dakane for the foundational proposition that a noncitizen who has “firmly resettled” in a third country is ineligible for asylum. Dakane frames the bar as categorical once firm resettlement is established, shifting the dispute to whether an exception applies. That logic drove the panel’s approach: because Matamoros conceded he obtained Mexican permanent residence, the case turned on whether he proved an exception—rather than re-litigating whether his fear in Honduras was genuine.

2. Barreto-Claro v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 275 F.3d 1334, 1338-39 (11th Cir. 2001)

The court relied on Barreto-Claro to articulate the policy rationale: firm resettlement reflects that an applicant who has “resettled somewhere else” is “no longer in flight from persecution or in need of refuge” in the United States. This rationale supported a strict reading of the bar as serving an asylum-system allocation function—directing protection to those who lack durable refuge elsewhere.

3. Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341 (11th Cir. 2009)

Kazemzadeh supplied two key review principles applied throughout:

  • the court reviews the BIA’s decision and the IJ’s decision only to the extent expressly adopted; and
  • legal conclusions are reviewed de novo, while factual findings receive substantial-evidence deference.

This matters because Matamoros attempted to recast the BIA’s exception analysis as a legal error; the panel treated it as an application of the regulation to facts and deferred absent a compelled contrary conclusion.

4. Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1027 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc)

Adefemi anchored the “highly deferential” substantial-evidence standard: evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the agency and reasonable inferences are drawn in its favor. This deference was decisive because the record contained mixed country-conditions evidence about crime and corruption in Mexico, but also evidence of governmental efforts to protect refugees and combat gang violence. Under Adefemi, such mixed evidence rarely “compels” reversal.

5. Mazariegos v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 241 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 2001)

The panel used Mazariegos to reject the petitioner’s “alternative narrative” approach: even if the record could support a different finding, the question is whether there is substantial evidence for the finding actually made. This principle prevented Matamoros from winning merely by showing that Mexico has serious crime; he had to show the BIA’s specific finding—no government-imposed substantial restriction—lacked substantial support.

6. Perez-Zenteno v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 913 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2019)

Perez-Zenteno reinforced the same deference principle (viewing evidence favorably to the agency). The court used it to support reliance on evidence that: Mexico generally respected refugee rights, coordinated with refugee organizations, increased refugee recognition, and cooperated with UNHCR—facts cutting against a claim that Mexican authorities “substantially and consciously restricted” Matamoros’s residence.

7. OSI, Inc. v. United States, 285 F.3d 947, 952 n.3 (11th Cir. 2002)

Matamoros invoked out-of-circuit authority to argue that inability to control private persecutors can satisfy the exception. The panel cited OSI, Inc. to underscore that the Eleventh Circuit is not bound by sister-circuit interpretations. Importantly, the court added an alternative holding: even under the petitioner’s urged interpretation, he failed because he never reported threats to Mexican authorities—leaving no basis to conclude the government knew of and failed to address his particular risk.

8. Pangea Legal Servs. v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 512 F. Supp. 3d 966, 969-70 (N.D. Cal. 2021)

In a regulatory footnote, the court addressed amendments to 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15 and noted that DOJ’s amendment was enjoined before taking effect. Citing Pangea Legal Servs., the court confirmed that the 2020 version governed. This mattered procedurally: the case was decided on the text of § 1208.15 (2020), not a later (enjoined) revision that might have altered how resettlement or exceptions are framed.

B. Legal Reasoning

  1. Firm resettlement established by undisputed permanent residence status.
    The court began with the statute: a noncitizen is ineligible for asylum if “firmly resettled in another country prior to arriving in the United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(vi). Under the regulation, the bar applies when the applicant entered another country and received an “offer of permanent resident status” or other permanent resettlement, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15 (2020). Matamoros conceded he had Mexican permanent residence and authorization to live and work. That concession largely resolved the bar’s applicability.

  2. Burden shifted to proving an exception—specifically, government-imposed restriction.
    Matamoros relied on the exception requiring proof that the conditions of residence were “so substantially and consciously restricted by the authority of” the third country that the applicant “was not in fact resettled,” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15(b) (2020). The regulation’s focus is on constraints attributable to the government (housing, employment, property rights, travel documentation, education, public relief, naturalization).

  3. Private-actor threats, without government restriction or involvement, do not satisfy § 1208.15(b) as applied here.
    Matamoros argued that continued danger from 18 Gang in Mexico, combined with limited police capacity, meant his residence was effectively restricted. The BIA rejected the theory on the ground that the regulation “does not provide an exception for crime, harassment, or violence committed by private actors” and that Matamoros failed to show Mexican authorities would actively support harm or restrict his residence in a way that negated resettlement.

    The Eleventh Circuit affirmed as consistent with the text of § 1208.15(b) (2020): the record did not show government-imposed constraints, and Matamoros had not alleged the Mexican authorities themselves restricted his rights. The court emphasized the absence of evidence that Mexican authorities had any “hand” in threats and noted Matamoros admitted he never reported threats to the police—undercutting any claim that the government knew of, condoned, or failed to address the specific danger he faced.

  4. Substantial-evidence deference foreclosed reversal.
    In response to Matamoros’s country-conditions argument that corruption and impunity “enable” criminal groups, the court applied the Kazemzadeh/Adefemi/Mazariegos line: the record contained evidence of Mexican governmental efforts to investigate corruption, combat crime, expand refugee protections, and cooperate with UNHCR. Because the record did not compel the conclusion that authorities substantially restricted Matamoros’s residence (or knowingly failed to protect him), the petition failed.

C. Impact

Although “not for publication,” the decision is instructive in the Eleventh Circuit on how firm resettlement disputes are likely to be handled where: (i) the applicant obtained formal permanent status in a third country, and (ii) the claimed danger in that third country arises from private criminal actors.

  • Practical evidentiary consequence: Applicants seeking the § 1208.15(b) exception should expect to present evidence tying restrictions to governmental action (or a government’s knowing, case-specific failure), rather than generalized criminality.
  • Reporting and notice: The opinion highlights that failure to report threats to local authorities can be fatal to arguments predicated on governmental inability or unwillingness to protect—because it deprives the record of proof of governmental knowledge and response.
  • Country-conditions evidence limits: General evidence of corruption or violence may not overcome substantial-evidence deference where the agency can point to countervailing evidence of enforcement efforts and refugee protections.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Firm resettlement bar
A rule that makes a person ineligible for U.S. asylum if, before coming to the United States, they already obtained a durable legal foothold in another country—such as permanent residence—because they are no longer considered to be without refuge.
Restricted-residence exception (8 C.F.R. § 1208.15(b) (2020))
An exception that can defeat the bar if the third country’s government so significantly and deliberately restricted the person’s ability to live normally (e.g., work, housing, movement, rights) that, despite the formal status, they were not truly resettled.
Substantial evidence review
A deferential appellate standard: the court will uphold the agency if its view is reasonably supported by the record. The petitioner must show the evidence not only supports a different result but compels it.
Private actors vs. state action
“Private actors” (like gangs) are not the government. In this decision’s framing of § 1208.15(b), the key question was not whether gangs are dangerous, but whether the government restricted the applicant’s residence or was sufficiently implicated in the restriction claimed.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit upheld the denial of asylum because Matamoros’s undisputed Mexican permanent residence triggered the firm resettlement bar, and he did not prove that Mexican authorities “substantially and consciously restricted” his residence as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1208.15(b) (2020). The decision reinforces that, in this circuit, generalized danger from private criminal actors—without evidence of government-imposed constraints or a record showing governmental knowledge and response—will typically not satisfy the restricted-residence exception once firm resettlement is established.