Ferrante v. Adkins: RFA Denials Cannot Rest on “Victim-Blaming”; Courts Must Focus on Need for Protection, Not Fault

1. Introduction

This appeal arises from the Family Division’s denial of a requested relief-from-abuse (RFA) order. Plaintiff Angela Ferrante sought an order against defendant Steven Adkins, alleging that he engaged in stalking and intimidation through repeated online postings, dissemination of her personal information, and direct communications—particularly in spring 2024—after a short romantic relationship ended in 2022.

The key issues were whether plaintiff proved, by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) “abuse” in the form of stalking and (2) a “danger of further abuse” as required by Vermont’s Abuse Prevention Act. A central dispute was whether the trial court impermissibly shifted focus from the statutory protection inquiry to a blame-based narrative—treating defendant’s conduct as “predictable” or effectively “caused” by plaintiff’s speech about him.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Vermont Supreme Court reversed and remanded. It held that the family court abused its discretion by applying an analysis inconsistent with Vermont case law and the remedial purpose of the Abuse Prevention Act. Specifically, the trial court:

• treated plaintiff as “to blame” for defendant’s allegedly stalking behavior;
• discounted plaintiff’s fear and emotional distress by anchoring the analysis in disputed 2022 events rather than evaluating whether a reasonable person would fear for safety based on defendant’s 2024 conduct;
• failed to address substantial evidence of online monitoring, doxxing-like conduct (posting photos/contact information), and efforts to involve plaintiff’s employer; and
• mischaracterized at least one voicemail as merely a service-related inquiry, when the recording contained demeaning statements and implied consequences.

The Court emphasized that RFA proceedings are not about assigning fault for relationship conflict; they are about determining whether the plaintiff is in need of legal protection from intimate abuse.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

Raynes v. Rogers, 2008 VT 52, ¶ 9, 183 Vt. 513

The Court framed its appellate posture through Raynes v. Rogers: RFA decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion, with factual findings upheld if supported by evidence and legal conclusions upheld if supported by findings. This standard is deferential, but not toothless—especially where the trial court’s conclusions conflict with the statutory scheme or controlling principles.

Rogers, 2008 VT 52 (multiple citations, including ¶¶ 8, 10, 13, 15)

The entry order relies heavily on Rogers as the controlling Vermont authority on how courts must think about RFA petitions:

• Remedial purpose and liberal construction (¶¶ 8, 15): The Abuse Prevention Act “must be liberally construed to suppress the evil and advance the remedy,” because it aims to stop escalating cycles of domestic violence with prompt injunctive relief.
• No “provocation” framework (¶ 10): While defendants often claim “justification” based on alleged victim provocation, the court may consider that testimony only in assessing the circumstances—not to decide “who was to blame.”
• The “critical question” (¶ 13): “The critical question is not who was at fault, but who, if anyone, is in need of protection.”
• Rejecting victim-blaming myths (¶ 15): Construing the statute in a way that gives credence to the myth that victims provoke and therefore deserve abuse undermines the Act’s purpose.

In Ferrante, the Supreme Court applied these principles directly: the family court’s emphasis on plaintiff’s supposed “campaign of character assassination” and its view that defendant’s behavior was “entirely predictable” were the very kind of blame-based reasoning Rogers warns against.

Johnson v. Freborg, 995 N.W.2d 374 (Minn. 2023)

The Court cited Johnson v. Freborg for the proposition that “speech relating to sexual assault is a matter of public concern.” The citation appears in a “But see” discussion, functioning less as a holding the Court needed and more as a corrective to the trial court’s disparaging framing of plaintiff’s speech as mere “character assassination.” The point is not that plaintiff’s speech is immune from all consequences, but that a family court should not reflexively treat safety-related speech about sexual violence as inherently blameworthy in an abuse-prevention analysis.

Coleman v. Grand, 523 F. Supp. 3d 244 (E.D.N.Y. 2021)

Coleman v. Grand likewise supported the idea that accusations of abuse and sexual harassment can implicate matters of public concern. This reinforces the Supreme Court’s broader admonition: it was not the family court’s role in an RFA proceeding to adjudicate whether plaintiff should have posted in a private group; its role was to decide whether defendant’s subsequent conduct constituted abuse and whether protection was warranted.

B. Legal Reasoning

The Supreme Court’s reasoning proceeds in three connected steps.

1) Proper statutory frame: abuse (stalking) and danger of further abuse

The Court re-centered the statutory requirements: plaintiff needed to prove by a preponderance that defendant abused her and that there was a danger of further abuse. The claimed abuse was stalking under 15 V.S.A. § 1101(1)(A)(iv), using the stalking definition in 12 V.S.A. § 5131.

2) The trial court’s fault-based narrative was legally impermissible

The family court did not merely find defendant’s acts unproven; it effectively reasoned that even if defendant “arguably” stalked plaintiff, plaintiff “caused” it by posting about him—making defendant’s conduct “predictable,” and making future abuse dependent on whether plaintiff continued to “attack” defendant’s character. The Supreme Court held that this is inconsistent with Rogers and with the Act’s remedial purpose. In RFA cases, courts must avoid importing a provocation/retaliation logic that treats the victim as responsible for the abuser’s conduct.

3) The court failed to meaningfully analyze the 2024 conduct and its effects

The Supreme Court emphasized that the family court failed to grapple with key evidence: posts containing plaintiff’s photo and personal contact information, alleged efforts to enlist third parties, contacts with (and about) plaintiff’s employer, and direct voicemails with a threatening tone. The family court’s characterization of one voicemail as merely address/service verification was “clearly” erroneous given the recording’s content (maligning plaintiff and warning of “consequences”).

Importantly, the Supreme Court criticized the lower court’s approach to the “reasonable person” and distress/fear elements: instead of evaluating whether a reasonable person would fear for safety based on defendant’s 2024 conduct, the family court discounted plaintiff’s fear by revisiting contested 2022 breakup events and by faulting plaintiff’s intervening speech.

4) Remedy: reversal and remand

Because the trial court’s analysis was infected by improper blame assessment and omitted key parts of the stalking-and-impact evaluation, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with Vermont law.

C. Impact

Although styled as a nonprecedential entry order, Ferrante signals several practical and doctrinal implications for RFA litigation in Vermont:

• Stronger boundary against “victim-blaming” as analysis: Trial courts may consider context, but cannot deny protection on the theory that the petitioner “provoked” or “caused” stalking/harassment by speaking out.
• Online harassment is not peripheral: The Court’s focus on repeated posts, tagging, sharing contact information, and employer-directed communications underscores that modern stalking analyses must confront digital conduct head-on, not treat it as background noise to an in-person violence paradigm.
• Focus on statutory harms (fear/distress and disruption): Evidence such as missed work, sleep disruption, weight loss, changes in routine, and fear arising from monitoring/doxxing behavior is centrally relevant to “substantial emotional distress” and should be expressly addressed.
• Process concerns: The Court noted “significant delays” in hearing and issuing a decision—an implicit reminder that RFA proceedings are intended to provide “immediate relief,” and that delay can undermine the statute’s protective function.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

“Relief-from-abuse (RFA) order”

A civil protective order designed to provide quick, injunctive protection from abuse (including stalking). It is preventative—meant to stop escalation—rather than a vehicle to punish past misconduct.

“Preponderance of the evidence”

The petitioner must show the claim is more likely true than not (i.e., greater than 50% likelihood), not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

“Stalk” and “course of conduct” (12 V.S.A. § 5131)

Stalking requires purposeful conduct directed at a person that the actor knows (or should know) would cause a reasonable person to fear for safety or suffer “substantial emotional distress.” A “course of conduct” is at least two acts over time—potentially a short time—such as monitoring, threatening, surveilling, or interfering with property.

“Substantial emotional distress”

The statute ties distress to objective evidence, including fear of bodily injury or significant modifications to routines—like changes to work or daily routes, lost time at work, job disruption, or other serious life disruption.

“Victim-blaming” (as a legal error in RFA analysis)

In this context, it means treating the petitioner’s behavior—speech, relationship conduct, alleged provocation—as a reason to excuse the respondent’s abusive conduct or to deny protection on the theory that the petitioner “deserved” or “caused” the abuse. Vermont law (as articulated in Rogers and applied here) rejects that approach because the statutory question is protection, not moral fault.

5. Conclusion

Ferrante v. Adkins reinforces a core Abuse Prevention Act principle: courts must decide whether the petitioner is in need of protection, not who is to blame for the parties’ conflict. The Supreme Court found the family court’s analysis impermissibly fault-based and insufficiently attentive to the alleged stalking course of conduct and its real-world impacts. The reversal and remand underscore that RFA adjudication must be faithful to the statute’s remedial purpose—providing prompt, uncomplicated protection from intimate abuse, including modern forms of digital stalking and harassment.