Felon Disarmament Without Actual Injury: Assessing Dangerousness Through Conduct and Criminal History

1. Introduction

In United States v. Lamell Parker, the Sixth Circuit upheld the federal prohibition on firearm possession by a convicted felon as applied to a defendant whose current conduct and criminal history demonstrated dangerousness. The central issue was whether Parker could successfully challenge 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) under the Second Amendment because his previous offenses had not involved significant physical injury to others.

The court rejected that argument. Applying its existing dangerousness framework, it concluded that actual injury is not necessary when a defendant’s conduct creates a significant risk of harm or violent confrontation. Parker’s accessible, loaded handgun, his admitted intoxication, his repeated unlawful firearm possession, and his earlier flight after physically pulling away from an officer collectively defeated his challenge.

The opinion’s principal contribution is an application of existing law, not a new constitutional test: dangerousness may be established through the circumstances of firearm possession and the defendant’s broader criminal record, even without significant physical harm. Because the opinion is designated not recommended for publication, its significance should be understood primarily as an illustration of the framework established in United States v. Williams, rather than as a new published circuit rule.

2. Background and Procedural History

The August 2024 stop

Grand Rapids police stopped Parker for several traffic violations and arrested him for driving without a valid license. A vehicle search uncovered a loaded handgun inside a cross-body bag partially beneath the driver’s seat. Parker subsequently told officers that the firearm belonged to him and that he possessed it for protection. The appellate opinion also relied on his admission that he was under the influence of alcohol and marijuana at the time.

The prosecution and preserved constitutional challenge

A federal grand jury charged Parker with possessing a firearm as a felon under § 922(g)(1). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the statute violated the Second Amendment as applied to him. After the district court denied the motion, Parker entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal that ruling.

The relevant criminal history included:

• A 2023 firearm episode: A traffic stop and vehicle search uncovered a stolen handgun, resulting in convictions for carrying a concealed weapon and possessing a firearm as a felon. The opinion does not establish that Parker stole the handgun or knew it was stolen.
• A 2017 police encounter: While investigating a reported missing purse, an officer stopped Parker because his clothing matched the suspect’s description. After a pat-down, Parker appeared to prepare to flee. When the officer grabbed his shirt, Parker twisted free and ran. Officers later arrested him, and he was convicted of assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer.

The appeal concerned the constitutional denial of Parker’s motion to dismiss. The court did not decide the legality of either vehicle search or review the sentence’s reasonableness.

3. Summary of the Opinion

Reviewing the constitutional question de novo, the Sixth Circuit held that § 922(g)(1) was constitutional as applied to Parker.

The court’s reasoning proceeded through four propositions:

1. The Second Amendment protects firearm possession for self-defense, but its protection is not unlimited.
2. Under United States v. Williams, felons remain among “the people” protected by the Amendment, but the historical tradition permits disarming dangerous individuals.
3. A defendant bringing this kind of as-applied challenge bears the burden of showing that he is not dangerous. Courts may consider his entire criminal record and the circumstances of his conduct.
4. Parker failed to carry that burden because his current offense and prior convictions demonstrated significant danger, notwithstanding his argument that his past offenses had caused no significant physical harm.

The court therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment.

4. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

A. The Supreme Court’s constitutional framework

District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)

The court invoked District of Columbia v. Heller for the proposition that the Second Amendment right “is not unlimited.” That principle establishes the starting point for Parker’s case: recognizing an individual right to possess firearms does not resolve whether a particular restriction is constitutional. The opinion used Heller as a foundational proposition, not as an independent resolution of Parker’s individualized dangerousness.

N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)

N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen supplied the text-and-history framework. The first question is whether the Second Amendment’s plain text covers the individual’s conduct. If it does, the conduct is presumptively protected, and the government must justify its regulation through the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.

The court also cited Bruen’s description of the protected rights of “ordinary, law-abiding citizens.” Importantly, however, it did not treat Parker’s felony status as automatically excluding him from the Amendment’s text. Its controlling circuit precedent instead required examining whether he could constitutionally be disarmed as dangerous.

United States v. Hemani, 608 U.S. 772 (2026)

United States v. Hemani reinforced the protection of keeping and bearing firearms for self-defense, the permissibility of some firearm regulation, and the sequence of the constitutional inquiry. The court relied on it for both presumptive protection at the textual stage and historical justification at the second stage. The opinion did not derive a separate dangerousness test from Hemani.

United States v. Rahimi, 602 U.S. 680 (2024)

United States v. Rahimi established that a modern firearm restriction need not precisely duplicate a historical predecessor. A sufficiently analogous regulation may satisfy the Constitution. This principle explains how historical traditions can support contemporary disarmament laws without requiring an identical founding-era statute. In Parker’s appeal, that historical reasoning operated through the circuit’s earlier analysis in United States v. Williams.

B. The controlling dangerousness framework

United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024)

United States v. Williams supplied the decisive framework. After reconsidering § 922(g)(1) following Bruen and Rahimi, the Sixth Circuit held that felons are among “the people” protected by the Second Amendment, but historical tradition permits Congress to disarm dangerous people.

For as-applied challenges, Williams places the burden on the defendant to demonstrate that he is not dangerous and permits consideration of his entire criminal record, not merely the conviction establishing his prohibited status. It also identifies three broad categories of offenses:

Parker’s argument failed principally under the second category: dangerousness can arise from conduct creating a serious risk of confrontation, even if no immediate, direct threat or significant injury actually occurs. These categories guide the inquiry; they do not replace consideration of the defendant’s full record.

C. Decisions informing the application to Parker

United States v. Taylor, 165 F.4th 1029 (6th Cir. 2026)

The court cited United States v. Taylor for the standard of review. A constitutional challenge of this kind receives de novo review, meaning the appellate court independently evaluates the legal question rather than deferring to the district court’s constitutional conclusion.

United States v. Morton, 123 F.4th 492 (6th Cir. 2024)

United States v. Morton permitted the court to look beyond the existence or title of a conviction and consider how an offense was committed. This supported examining Parker’s accessible loaded handgun, his intoxication, and the actual circumstances of his earlier police encounter. The inquiry was therefore conduct-sensitive, not confined to an abstract comparison of statutory offense elements.

United States v. Poe, No. 24-6014, 2025 WL 1342340 (6th Cir. May 8, 2025)

United States v. Poe supported three aspects of the analysis: the danger associated with a loaded handgun, the significance of keeping it within immediate reach, and the inference drawn from repeated unlawful firearm possession. Parker’s prior firearm convictions demonstrated a propensity to carry weapons despite being prohibited from doing so. His current possession was consequently not evaluated as an isolated event.

United States v. Suggs, No. 24-2059, 2025 WL 2978046 (6th Cir. Oct. 22, 2025)

United States v. Suggs reinforced the danger posed by loaded, concealed weapons in the hands of prohibited possessors. It also supported the treatment of unlawful concealed-weapon conduct as relevant to the second Williams category. In Parker’s case, those considerations were accompanied by intoxication and repeated firearm offending.

United States v. Coward, No. 24-1885, 2025 WL 2694156 (6th Cir. Sept. 22, 2025)

The court relied on United States v. Coward to characterize Parker’s concealed-weapon conviction as a dangerous felony falling within the second Williams category. Its role was to connect that prior conviction to a recognized form of safety-endangering conduct, rather than require proof that the concealed firearm had actually injured someone.

United States v. Craft, No. 24-1624, 2025 WL 2888040 (6th Cir. Oct. 10, 2025)

United States v. Craft provided an analogy involving dangerousness based partly on multiple convictions for attempted resisting and obstructing an officer during a traffic stop. Parker’s encounter differed factually, but the comparison supported treating resistance to police as relevant when it creates the possibility of violent escalation.

United States v. Black, No. 23-1622, 2025 WL 1356614 (6th Cir. May 9, 2025) (per curiam)

United States v. Black likewise involved rejection of an as-applied challenge where the defendant had convictions for assaulting, resisting, or obstructing an officer. Its procedural posture matters: that decision applied plain-error review, whereas Parker’s preserved challenge received de novo review. It therefore supplied supporting context rather than an identical procedural model.

5. Analysis of the Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Constitutional coverage does not guarantee immunity from regulation

The court did not reason that felony conviction extinguishes all Second Amendment protection. Following Williams, it accepted that felons fall within the protected “people,” while distinguishing textual coverage from the ultimate permissibility of disarmament. A person may possess a constitutional right yet remain subject to a historically justified restriction.

The opinion did not undertake a fresh historical survey. Instead, it applied Williams’s conclusion that the historical tradition permits disarming dangerous people. The general requirement of historical justification and the defendant’s burden to show nondangerousness thus performed different functions: the former justified the regulatory principle, while the latter governed Parker’s individualized challenge under circuit law.

B. Dangerousness concerns risk, not merely completed harm

Parker’s principal argument treated the absence of significant injury as evidence that he was not dangerous. The court rejected the premise that dangerousness must be demonstrated through injury already inflicted. Conduct can create a serious threat even when the threatened harm never materializes.

The 2017 encounter illustrates this distinction. The court focused on Parker pulling away from the officer and fleeing, reasoning that those actions created the possibility of a violent confrontation and required rapid protective decisions by officers. It did not find that Parker had actually struck the officer or caused an injury.

C. The current offense added individualized evidence

The firearm was loaded and positioned for immediate access. Parker also admitted being under the influence of alcohol and marijuana. These circumstances supported a danger assessment beyond the bare fact that he possessed a firearm while prohibited.

His statement that he carried the gun for protection did not resolve the constitutional question. Although self-defense is central to the protected right, that asserted purpose did not overcome the court’s assessment of his conduct and history. The opinion did not separately determine whether he had faced a specific threat or acted in a legally justified defensive encounter.

D. Repetition strengthened the inference

Parker’s earlier firearm convictions showed that the current offense followed another episode of unlawful possession. The court treated that repetition as evidence of an ongoing propensity to carry firearms despite legal restrictions. Combined with the resistance-related conviction, this produced a cumulative assessment rather than a decision resting on one offense label alone.

E. The reasoning has important limits

The court’s references to loaded firearms and prohibited possessors should not be read as establishing that loaded firearm possession alone always proves constitutionally sufficient dangerousness. Such a reading would risk making individualized review circular: prohibited possession would itself conclusively justify the prohibition. The narrower, record-based holding rests on the combination of accessibility, intoxication, repeated firearm offenses, and confrontation-producing conduct.

Nor did the court decide that every conviction for resisting or obstructing an officer necessarily defeats an as-applied challenge. Its explanation examined Parker’s particular actions and their potential to escalate. The opinion also did not classify that offense under a separate statutory “violent felony” test.

6. Potential Impact

• For future defendants: Showing that prior crimes caused no significant injury will not, by itself, establish nondangerousness. The entire record and the circumstances of firearm possession remain relevant.
• For prosecutors: Concrete evidence of accessibility, intoxication, repeated unlawful possession, and confrontation risk may be important in defending § 922(g)(1) against individualized challenges.
• For district courts: The opinion illustrates why a reasoned dangerousness assessment should identify conduct and risk rather than rely exclusively on the label “felon.”
• For nonviolent-offense challenges: The decision does not eliminate the distinction between dangerous conduct and offenses such as fraud or false statements. It does, however, show why a defendant cannot isolate a comparatively benign predicate conviction while disregarding other relevant conduct.
• For Second Amendment doctrine: The case demonstrates how the Sixth Circuit translates the Supreme Court’s historical-tradition framework into individualized dangerousness determinations without repeating the historical inquiry in every appeal.

Its unpublished designation warrants restraint in describing its precedential effect. The operative doctrinal framework remains the one articulated in United States v. Williams; Parker supplies a fact-specific application.

7. Complex Concepts Simplified

As-applied constitutional challenge

A claim that a law is unconstitutional when enforced against this particular person, even if it may validly apply to others. Parker did not need to establish that every application of § 922(g)(1) was invalid.

Conditional guilty plea

A guilty plea that preserves an agreed legal issue for appeal. Parker admitted guilt while retaining the ability to challenge the denial of his constitutional motion.

De novo review

Independent appellate review of a legal question, without deference to the district court’s legal answer.

Text-and-history analysis

An inquiry asking whether the constitutional text protects the conduct and, if so, whether historical regulatory traditions justify restricting it.

Historical analogue

A sufficiently comparable historical regulation. The modern law need not be an exact copy of an old one.

Predicate offense

The prior conviction supplying the legal basis for prohibited firearm status. Under the framework applied here, dangerousness may depend on more than that conviction.

Dangerousness

The legally relevant risk of harm, not simply proof that someone has already injured another person. Parker’s conduct was evaluated for the threats it created.

8. Conclusion

United States v. Lamell Parker confirms that, under the Sixth Circuit’s existing framework, an as-applied challenge to felon disarmament cannot succeed merely because the defendant’s offenses caused no significant physical injury. Courts may consider the current possession circumstances, repeated firearm violations, and conduct creating a risk of violent confrontation.

The judgment rests on Parker’s cumulative record, not a newly announced rule that all felons fall outside the Second Amendment. Its broader significance lies in illustrating how individualized dangerousness can justify disarmament while preserving the distinction between felony status and constitutionally sufficient grounds for restricting firearm possession.