Federal Kidnapping Restitution: Discretionary VWPA Authority Can Sustain an Award Despite an Inapplicable MVRA Basis

Case: United States v. Yomere Busbee, No. 23-4227
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
Decision: November 6, 2026
Disposition: Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Precedential status: The opinion is not binding precedent in the Fourth Circuit. Its principal significance lies in applying established restitution and plain-error principles, rather than announcing a new binding rule.

1. Introduction

The Fourth Circuit affirmed Yomere Juan Busbee’s convictions, aggregate 390-month prison sentence, and restitution obligations arising from kidnapping, drug trafficking, and firearm offenses. The most consequential issue concerned whether restitution could stand when federal kidnapping did not qualify as a crime of violence under the statutory provision initially invoked to require compensation.

Busbee was charged in 2020 with six offenses: conspiracy to kidnap four individuals; kidnapping a minor and aiding and abetting that offense; conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine base; possession with intent to distribute controlled substances; possession of a firearm in furtherance of the substantive drug-trafficking offense; and possession of a firearm by a felon. He pleaded guilty to the substantive drug-possession count without a plea agreement. A jury convicted him of the remaining five counts.

The jury specifically found that one kidnapping victim was under 18 and that Busbee was neither a family member nor the minor’s legal custodian. The district court imposed 390 months’ imprisonment, a $600 special assessment, and $500 in restitution for each of the four victims’ estimated treatment costs. It imposed neither a fine nor interest on restitution.

Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief identifying possible challenges while representing that no nonfrivolous appellate issues existed. The court independently identified a potentially meritorious restitution question and ordered supplemental briefing. Ultimately, it concluded that none of the issues warranted reversal.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Issue Court’s resolution
Kidnapping convictions Substantial evidence showed that Busbee confined the victims in a hotel room against their will for hours.
Firearm possession in furtherance of drug trafficking Firearms near controlled substances, together with evidence that Busbee was armed while selling narcotics, supported the conviction.
Evidence of prior violence and prostitution activity The evidence permissibly explained Busbee’s control over other individuals and their compliance with his orders.
Second Amendment challenge Existing circuit precedent foreclosed the arguments.
Sentencing calculations The record supported the challenged sexual-exploitation and leadership enhancements and the attributed drug quantities. The court also identified alternative reasons why a possible sexual-exploitation calculation error would not require resentencing.
Restitution The kidnapping conviction could not support mandatory restitution under the MVRA’s crime-of-violence provision. Nevertheless, discretionary restitution under the VWPA and the absence of demonstrated prejudice defeated relief on plain-error review.

3. Analysis: Precedents and Legal Reasoning

A. The Central Restitution Issue: An Incorrect Mandatory Basis Does Not Necessarily Require Reversal

Statutory authority must come first

The court began with a foundational limitation: federal courts possess no inherent authority to order restitution. As United States v. Ritchie, 858 F.3d 201, 206 (4th Cir. 2017), explains, a restitution award must rest on legislation, and the sentencing court’s discretion remains constrained by that legislation’s substantive and procedural protections.

This requirement prevented the panel from treating the victims’ injuries, however serious, as an independent source of judicial power. The question was not simply whether compensation was deserved, but which statute authorized it and whether that statute’s requirements were satisfied.

Why mandatory restitution was unavailable

The Mandatory Victim Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, requires restitution for specified offenses. The relevant category includes a “crime of violence” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16, provided an identifiable victim suffered physical injury or pecuniary loss.

United States v. Diaz, 865 F.3d 168, 174 (4th Cir. 2017), establishes that the covered-offense requirement and the victim-injury-or-loss requirement operate together. Injury alone cannot make restitution mandatory if the conviction does not fall within the relevant statutory category.

Two additional decisions undermined the mandatory basis for Busbee’s award:

  • United States v. Walker, 934 F.3d 375, 378–79 (4th Cir. 2019), held that federal kidnapping is not a crime of violence under § 924(c).
  • United States v. Petties, 42 F.4th 388, 391 (4th Cir. 2022), noted the Government’s concession that federal kidnapping is not a crime of violence under § 16, the definition directly relevant to the MVRA provision at issue.

The distinction between these authorities matters. United States v. Walker concerned a different statutory setting, while the discussion in United States v. Petties addressed a concession concerning § 16. The panel relied on both and accepted the parties’ agreement that Busbee’s kidnapping conviction could not support restitution under § 3663A.

This conclusion concerns a technical statutory classification. It does not suggest that the actual kidnapping was nonviolent or that the victims suffered no compensable harm.

The alternative source: discretionary restitution

The Victim and Witness Protection Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3663, permits discretionary restitution for eligible offenses outside the MVRA’s mandatory scheme. The opinion also notes its coverage of specified Controlled Substances Act offenses. For Busbee’s award, the decisive point was that the district court had invoked § 3663 as well as § 3663A, and the panel found support for discretionary restitution to the kidnapping victims.

United States v. Blake, 81 F.3d 498, 505 (4th Cir. 1996), supplied the governing distinction: restitution under the VWPA rests within the district court’s discretion. That discretion requires consideration of the victims’ losses, the defendant’s financial resources, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and dependents, and other appropriate factors.

The sentencing court’s reference to both statutes therefore mattered. This was not an award for which the appellate court could identify no potentially valid statutory foundation.

Why the presentence report and financial findings mattered

Under United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d 1267, 1277 (4th Cir. 1995), a sentencing court may support restitution by adopting a presentence report containing findings adequate for meaningful appellate review. Together with United States v. Blake, that precedent allowed the panel to examine the adopted report and the court’s findings rather than demand that every supporting fact be repeated orally.

The record addressed the relevant considerations:

  • Each victim had an estimated $500 in treatment costs.
  • The court considered Busbee’s education, employment skills, assets, and liabilities.
  • It considered his voluntary financial support for teenage children living with others.
  • It found him capable of full-time employment at least at minimum wage and of making minimum monthly payments of $50.
  • It declined to impose a fine or interest because his resources did not support those additional obligations.
  • It directed probation to reassess his ability to pay upon release if payment adjustments became necessary.

These findings supported an individualized exercise of discretion. The inability to pay an additional fine did not contradict the finding that Busbee could satisfy a smaller compensatory obligation through installments.

Plain-error review was decisive

Busbee had not objected to restitution in the district court. Consequently, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), rather than ordinary preserved-error review, governed the appeal.

Under Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503, 507–08 (2021), a defendant seeking relief for an unpreserved error must establish an error that is plain and affects substantial rights. Ordinarily, the substantial-rights requirement demands a reasonable probability of a different outcome without the error. Even then, appellate correction is discretionary and requires a serious effect on the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.

The panel assumed that reliance on the MVRA could constitute plain error but held that Busbee had not demonstrated prejudice. The district court also invoked the VWPA, considered the relevant factors, and entered an award supported by the record. Busbee identified nothing showing a reasonable probability that recognizing restitution as discretionary would have changed the result.

United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 580 & n.5 (4th Cir. 2010), reinforced this conclusion. Even assuming an explanation was deficient, the defendant must show that the deficiency prejudiced the sentence. An inadequately expressed rationale does not automatically establish a different likely outcome.

The panel also found no compelling basis to exercise its corrective discretion. It contrasted the modest, finite restitution award with the unexplained lifelong restrictions examined in United States v. McMiller, 954 F.3d 670, 677 (4th Cir. 2020). There, the district court had imposed sweeping restrictions on internet-capable devices and social-networking accounts without an individualized explanation. Here, the award was limited, supported by findings, and payable through manageable installments.

The narrow lesson: An erroneous mandatory-restitution rationale does not necessarily require reversal on plain-error review when a valid discretionary basis also supports the award and the defendant cannot demonstrate a likely different outcome. The opinion does not hold that merely citing both restitution statutes cures every error.

B. Sufficiency of the Evidence: Deference to the Jury and the Firearm–Drug Nexus

The governing appellate standard

Three decisions established the demanding standard for overturning a jury verdict:

  • United States v. Burfoot, 899 F.3d 326, 334 (4th Cir. 2018), requires review of the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and affirmance when substantial evidence supports the verdict.
  • United States v. Robinson, 855 F.3d 265, 268 (4th Cir. 2017), frames the question as whether any rational factfinder could find the essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.
  • United States v. Savage, 885 F.3d 212, 219 (4th Cir. 2018), prohibits appellate reassessment of witness credibility, requires prosecution-favorable resolution of evidentiary conflicts, and characterizes the defendant’s burden as heavy.

These principles distinguish appellate review from a new trial. The panel did not decide which witnesses it would have believed; it asked whether the jury’s conclusions had a legally sufficient evidentiary foundation.

Kidnapping and conspiracy

Federal kidnapping encompasses specified forms of unlawful seizure and confinement when the statute’s federal jurisdictional requirements are satisfied. Physical transportation is not the only conduct described by the statute. Here, the evidence that Busbee held the victims in a hotel room and prevented their departure for hours supported the convictions.

United States v. Tillmon, 954 F.3d 628, 640 (4th Cir. 2019), supplied the related conspiracy principle: an agreement to commit the unlawful act may be proved through circumstantial evidence. A formal or express agreement is therefore unnecessary if the circumstances establish the requisite understanding.

The opinion also identified § 1201(g)’s 20-year minimum for qualifying offenses involving a victim under 18, an offender at least 18, and the absence of a family or legal-custody relationship. The jury’s specific findings addressed the minor-victim and relationship conditions.

Possession of a firearm “in furtherance” of drug trafficking

United States v. Moody, 2 F.4th 180, 192 (4th Cir. 2021), identifies three elements under § 924(c): a drug-trafficking offense, firearm possession, and possession in furtherance of that offense. The third element requires a connection between the weapon and the drug activity, not merely possession of both at some unrelated time.

United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 2002), recognizes that whether a firearm advances drug trafficking is a factual question and that weapons may facilitate trafficking in numerous ways. United States v. Moody identifies relevant circumstances, including accessibility, proximity to drugs or proceeds, firearm type, loaded or stolen status, unlawful possession, and the nature of the drug offense.

United States v. Hardy, 999 F.3d 250, 257 (4th Cir. 2021), further supports an inference of facilitation when drugs and firearms are found at a residence used for drug sales.

Applied here, the evidence went beyond abstract firearm ownership: weapons were near controlled substances, and Busbee was armed while selling narcotics. Those circumstances permitted the jury to find the required trafficking connection. The decision does not make proximity alone conclusive in every case.

C. Prior Acts: Evidence of Control Rather Than Criminal Disposition

The district court admitted testimony about Busbee’s prior physical violence and involvement in prostitution. The panel upheld admission because those acts helped explain his control over others and their compliance with his orders during the charged events.

Rules 401 and 402 establish the baseline: evidence must bear on a consequential fact and be otherwise admissible. Rule 404(b) then prohibits using another act merely to argue that a person has a bad character and therefore probably committed the charged offense.

The cited precedents developed two related routes for evaluating the evidence:

  • United States v. Grimmond, 137 F.3d 823, 831 (4th Cir. 1998), explains that Rule 404(b)’s listed permissible purposes are illustrative, not exhaustive. A legitimate explanatory purpose need not fit a rigid verbal formula.
  • United States v. Underwood, 95 F.4th 877, 891 (4th Cir. 2024), distinguishes extrinsic prior acts, which Rule 404(b) regulates, from intrinsic conduct forming part of the charged criminal activity.
  • United States v. Webb, 965 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2020), identifies intrinsic acts as including conduct within the same series of transactions or necessary to complete the story of the charged crime.
  • United States v. Janati, 374 F.3d 263, 270 (4th Cir. 2004), permits the Government in conspiracy cases to present acts furthering the conspiracy even when the indictment does not specifically describe each act.
  • United States v. Blauvelt, 638 F.3d 281, 292 (4th Cir. 2011), requires extrinsic prior-act evidence to be relevant to a noncharacter issue, necessary, reliable, and not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice. It also supplies abuse-of-discretion review.

The panel’s application was concise. Busbee’s earlier conduct explained why others followed his directions; its significance was therefore relational and explanatory, not simply an assertion of criminal propensity. The opinion discusses both intrinsic-evidence doctrine and Rule 404(b), but does not expressly assign each challenged act to a separate doctrinal category.

The holding is correspondingly limited. It does not make evidence of violence or prostitution categorically admissible. Admission still depends on the evidence’s connection to a genuine issue and the applicable safeguards against unfair prejudice.

D. Sentencing: Factual Deference, Relevant Conduct, and Alternative Grounds

The reasonableness framework

United States v. McCain, 974 F.3d 506, 515 (4th Cir. 2020), establishes deferential abuse-of-discretion review of sentencing reasonableness. United States v. Friend, 2 F.4th 369, 379 (4th Cir. 2021), divides that inquiry into procedural and substantive stages.

Procedural review asks whether the court correctly calculated the Guidelines range, treated the Guidelines as advisory, considered § 3553(a), relied on accurate facts, and adequately explained its sentence. Only after that inquiry does the appellate court assess substantive reasonableness.

United States v. Nance, 957 F.3d 204, 212 (4th Cir. 2020), directs consideration of the totality of circumstances in deciding whether the sentence satisfies § 3553(a). United States v. Gillespie, 27 F.4th 934, 945 (4th Cir. 2022), recognizes a presumption of reasonableness for sentences within or below a correctly calculated Guidelines range. Under United States v. Bennett, 986 F.3d 389, 401 (4th Cir. 2021), rebutting that presumption requires showing unreasonableness measured against the statutory factors.

The opinion recites this framework but does not provide the numerical Guidelines range. Its discussion therefore should not be expanded into factual conclusions about an undisclosed range or an independently announced sentencing benchmark.

Standards governing Guidelines findings

United States v. Pena, 952 F.3d 503, 512 (4th Cir. 2020), separates legal conclusions, reviewed afresh, from factual findings, reviewed for clear error. United States v. Slager, 912 F.3d 224, 233 (4th Cir. 2019), requires a definite and firm conviction of mistake before finding clear error. United States v. Barnett, 48 F.4th 216, 220 (4th Cir. 2022), adds that a plausible account of the full record cannot be reversed merely because another interpretation is possible.

For the sentencing enhancements at issue, United States v. Kobito, 994 F.3d 696, 701 (4th Cir. 2021), places the burden on the Government to establish applicability by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Patterson, 957 F.3d 426, 435 (4th Cir. 2020), explains that this means the fact’s existence is more probable than its nonexistence.

Sexual-exploitation enhancement

The district court applied a six-level enhancement under USSG § 2A4.1(b)(5). The commentary defines sexual exploitation by reference to specified federal sexual-offense statutes. The panel discussed provisions addressing sexual acts accomplished through force, threats, coercion, or absence of consent, together with the statutory definition of a sexual act.

The court found no clear error in the conclusion that qualifying conduct occurred. Its opinion does not recount the underlying sexual conduct in detail, so the decision offers limited factual guidance for comparing future enhancement disputes.

The panel also identified alternative reasons why a possible error would not require resentencing. First, removing the challenged enhancement would not reduce the offense level for the grouped kidnapping offenses. Second, the district judge expressly stated that the same sentence would be imposed notwithstanding an erroneous Guidelines calculation.

United States v. Gomez-Jimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 382 (4th Cir. 2014), as corrected (Apr. 29, 2014), supplies the governing harmlessness test: the district court must have reached the same result under the defendant’s preferred calculation, and the sentence must remain reasonable under that calculation. A same-sentence statement is therefore important, but is not by itself an automatic substitute for reasonableness review.

Leadership role

The panel upheld the aggravated-role adjustments under USSG § 3B1.1. It found ample evidence that Busbee directed the kidnapping, supporting § 3B1.1(c), and led a drug-trafficking group involving five individuals, supporting § 3B1.1(a).

The analysis links the enhancements to Busbee’s actual organizational role in the respective offenses. It does not establish that participation in several crimes, without evidence of leadership or control, warrants the same adjustments.

Drug quantities beyond the hotel-room seizure

Busbee argued that sentencing should have counted only drugs seized from his hotel room, excluding additional quantities not introduced at trial. The panel rejected that proposed limitation.

United States v. Peters, 843 F.3d 572, 581 (4th Cir. 2016), makes a conspirator accountable for quantities directly involving that defendant and for other participants’ transactions when those transactions fall within the scope of the jointly undertaken activity, further that activity, and are reasonably foreseeable.

The significance is twofold: sentencing relevant conduct is not necessarily confined to the physical seizure or the trial presentation, but attribution is not unlimited. The scope, furtherance, and foreseeability requirements remain essential protections against automatically assigning every conspiratorial transaction to every defendant.

E. Second Amendment Arguments: Existing Circuit Law Controlled

Counsel questioned whether New York State Rifle & Pistol Assoc., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), supplied a constitutional basis for challenging Busbee’s firearm convictions. The panel resolved that issue briefly rather than undertaking a new historical analysis.

It held that the arguments were foreclosed by United States v. Hunt, 123 F.4th 697, 703 (4th Cir. 2024), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 2756 (2025), and United States v. Canada, 123 F.4th 159, 161 (4th Cir. 2024). Those decisions supplied controlling circuit authority against the asserted firearm-possession challenge.

The court also cited United States v. Askew, 98 F.4th 116, 123 (4th Cir. 2024), which distinguishes a possible right to possess firearms from any supposed right to possess them in furtherance of drug dealing. That distinction independently addresses the misuse of firearms underlying the § 924(c) conviction.

The opinion accordingly applies existing Second Amendment law; it does not announce a new constitutional test.

F. The Anders Procedure: Independent Review Remained Substantive

Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), supplied the procedural framework for counsel’s submission and the court’s independent examination of the record. Counsel identified possible issues despite concluding that none was nonfrivolous. Busbee received notice of his opportunity to submit his own brief but did not do so.

The court’s decision to request supplemental restitution briefing is important. An Anders filing did not end the inquiry or insulate a potentially unlawful financial obligation from scrutiny. The panel investigated the issue before deciding that it did not warrant relief.

After affirmance, counsel remained obligated to notify Busbee in writing of his right to seek Supreme Court review. If Busbee requested a petition that counsel considered frivolous, counsel could seek permission to withdraw, with notice to Busbee.

4. Potential Impact and Limits

For restitution litigation

The opinion illustrates why courts should distinguish mandatory from discretionary restitution explicitly. Where the MVRA does not apply, a sentencing court should identify any alternative statutory authority and make the findings that authority requires.

For defendants, preservation is crucial. Busbee’s failure to object required him to demonstrate a likely different outcome, rather than merely establish that the court referred to an inapplicable mandatory provision. The decision does not determine how an otherwise comparable, properly preserved challenge would be resolved.

For prosecutors and sentencing courts, the adopted presentence report was particularly important. Detailed findings about loss, resources, dependents, and earning ability provided support for the discretionary award. A generic reference to both statutes without supporting findings would present a different case.

For crime-of-violence classifications

The decision reinforces the separation between an offense’s statutory classification and the violence of the defendant’s actual conduct. Exclusion from a particular crime-of-violence definition does not erase victim harm or necessarily eliminate restitution under a different statute.

For evidence and sentencing

The opinion also illustrates established principles allowing evidence of coercive relationships to explain conduct, permitting fact-specific firearm–drug inferences, and attributing relevant drug quantities beyond a single seizure. None of those principles removes the need for a sufficient evidentiary connection or individualized findings.

Limits on future reliance

Because the opinion is unpublished, it may offer persuasive guidance but creates no binding Fourth Circuit rule. Its restitution analysis is especially dependent on the combined presence of an alternative statutory basis, adequate record support, modest installments, and an unpreserved objection.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

Mandatory versus discretionary restitution
Mandatory restitution must be ordered when the governing statute’s conditions are satisfied. Discretionary restitution is authorized, but the judge must decide whether and how to impose it after considering the required factors.
Crime of violence
A technical statutory category, not simply an everyday description of frightening or violent behavior. An offense may fail a statutory definition even when the defendant’s actual conduct was brutal.
Plain error
A demanding standard for issues not raised below. A clear mistake alone generally is insufficient; the defendant must also establish prejudice and justify appellate correction.
Substantial rights
In this setting, the defendant must ordinarily show a reasonable probability that the outcome would have changed without the error.
Intrinsic evidence and propensity evidence
Intrinsic evidence forms part of the charged events or completes their story. Propensity evidence asks the jury to infer guilt merely because the defendant supposedly has a bad character.
Relevant conduct
Conduct that the sentencing rules permit a judge to consider beyond the narrow facts of a particular seizure or count, subject to limits such as scope and foreseeability.
Clear error
A deferential standard for reviewing factual findings. The appellate court must be firmly convinced a mistake occurred, not merely prefer another plausible interpretation.
Harmless Guidelines error
A sentencing-calculation mistake that does not require resentencing because the same reasonable sentence would have been imposed under the correct calculation.
Anders review
A process in which counsel identifies potentially arguable issues despite believing the appeal lacks merit, while the appellate court independently reviews the record.

6. Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit affirmed Busbee’s criminal judgment in full. Its most significant reasoning concerns restitution: although federal kidnapping did not support mandatory restitution under the MVRA provision invoked, the record supported discretionary restitution under the VWPA, and Busbee did not establish reversible plain error.

The opinion’s broader lesson is procedural precision. Statutory authority, individualized findings, and preservation of objections can determine whether an erroneous sentencing rationale requires reversal. As an unpublished decision, it illustrates those established principles without creating binding new precedent.