Federal Drug-Trafficking Conspiracy as an Aggravated Felony and the Evidentiary Requirements for CAT Protection

Case: Edwin Reyes v. Attorney General United States of America
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Opinion filed: November 6, 2026
Disposition: Petition for review denied.

Precedential status: The opinion expressly states that it is not precedential and does not constitute binding precedent under Third Circuit I.O.P. 5.7. Its significance lies in its application of existing statutory rules and precedent, rather than the creation of a new binding rule.

1. Introduction

This case concerns the immigration consequences of a federal drug-trafficking conspiracy conviction and the evidence necessary to obtain protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). It also addresses challenges to the Board of Immigration Appeals’ use of a single temporary appellate judge and the adequacy of the Board’s explanation.

Edwin Reyes, a native of the Dominican Republic, became a lawful permanent resident of the United States in 1998. After his arrest on drug-trafficking charges in June 2017, he cooperated with federal investigators. His assistance included connecting a confidential source with a fentanyl dealer in Hartford, Connecticut, who was later prosecuted with two associates.

Reyes believed that his cooperation exposed him to retaliation. His car and his mother’s home, where he temporarily lived, were struck by gunfire in separate incidents in 2020. The shooters were never identified. The opinion also recounts misconduct during his pretrial release, including fraud, theft from his employer, and living in Texas under a false identity.

In April 2023, Reyes received a 72-month prison sentence after pleading guilty to conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin and fentanyl, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(i). The Department of Homeland Security then initiated removal proceedings, including on the ground that he had committed an aggravated felony.

The immigration judge found Reyes removable, determined that his conviction made him ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal, and denied CAT protection. A single Board member dismissed his administrative appeal. Representing himself, Reyes petitioned the Third Circuit for review, disputing the aggravated-felony classification, the rejection of his CAT claim, and the legality of the Board’s decision-making procedures.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit rejected Reyes’s arguments and denied his petition. Its principal conclusions were:

  • The conviction qualified as an aggravated felony. The statutory definition incorporates felony offenses punishable under the Controlled Substances Act, including Reyes’s federal drug-trafficking conspiracy.
  • The immigration judge did not introduce an additional firearms charge. The reference to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) supplied the incorporated definition of a “drug trafficking crime”; it did not identify a separate offense committed by Reyes.
  • Substantial evidence supported the denial of CAT protection. The agency reasonably found insufficient corroboration and too many unsupported assumptions connecting Reyes’s past cooperation to future torture in the Dominican Republic.
  • The court could not consider newly submitted police reports. Those documents were outside the administrative record on which the removal order rested.
  • The Board’s single-member adjudication and explanation were legally sufficient. The appeal presented straightforward issues, and the Board adequately demonstrated that it had considered the necessary arguments.
  • The temporary Board judge’s participation did not violate the Appointments Clause. The court rejected that constitutional challenge with support from decisions of the Ninth and Seventh Circuits.

Although the opinion recounts the immigration judge’s asylum and withholding determinations, its substantive analysis centers on the aggravated-felony classification, CAT protection, and the procedural and constitutional objections to the Board’s decision.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Scope and Standard of Judicial Review

Patel v. Att'y Gen., 599 F.3d 295, 297 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam). This decision identifies which administrative reasoning the reviewing court examines: the Board’s decision, together with those portions of the immigration judge’s opinion that the Board adopted or substantially relied upon. That rule mattered because the Third Circuit assessed the immigration judge’s detailed CAT findings alongside the Board’s shorter appellate explanation. The court was not confined to reading the Board’s decision in isolation.

Galeas Figueroa v. Att'y Gen., 998 F.3d 77, 93 (3d Cir. 2021). The court cited this case for the distinction between independent review of legal questions and substantial-evidence review of factual findings concerning CAT relief. This distinction structured the entire decision: statutory classification was a legal question, while the likelihood of future harm depended on the administrative factual record.

Nasrallah v. Barr, 590 U.S. 573, 584 (2020). This Supreme Court decision supplied the controlling formulation of substantial-evidence review: agency factual findings remain conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to reach the opposite conclusion. Its importance is practical as well as doctrinal. Reyes needed more than evidence supporting his fear; he needed a record compelling rejection of the agency’s contrary findings.

Timeliness and the Prison Mailbox Rule

Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). Cited in the timeliness footnote, this case supplies the foundation for the prison mailbox rule. The rule recognizes that incarcerated litigants must ordinarily entrust filings to prison officials rather than personally deliver them to a court. Together with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 25(a)(2)(A)(iii), it supported treating Reyes’s petition as timely.

Arango-Aradondo v. I.N.S., 13 F.3d 610, 612 (2d Cir. 1994). This case specifically applied the prison mailbox rule to a petition seeking review of a Board order. It connected the general filing principle in Houston v. Lack to the immigration-review setting presented here.

Riley v. Bondi, 606 U.S. 259, 263, 273 (2025). The court cited this decision for two related propositions: the 30-day deadline in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1) is a nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule, and nonjurisdictional objections may be forfeited if not raised. The Government conceded timeliness, and the panel proceeded to the merits. This citation distinguishes compliance with a filing rule from the court’s underlying authority to adjudicate the petition.

Drug-Trafficking Conspiracy

Quinteros v. Attorney General, 945 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 2019). Reyes relied on this case to challenge the classification of his conspiracy conviction. The court distinguished it because it did not involve a drug-trafficking conspiracy. The decisive point was the statutory route applicable to Reyes: his conviction was itself for a felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act. The panel therefore did not treat Quinteros v. Attorney General as displacing the express incorporation of such offenses into the aggravated-felony definition.

Single-Member Board Review and Adequacy of Explanation

Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 238 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc). This decision rejected a facial challenge to regulations permitting immigration appeals to be decided by a single Board member. It foreclosed the proposition that single-member adjudication is inherently unconstitutional. Reyes consequently needed to identify a problem with the procedure as used in his particular case, rather than rely simply on the absence of a three-member panel.

Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279, 292–97 (3d Cir. 2004). The court cited this decision as leaving open the possibility of an as-applied challenge to single-member review. The panel acknowledged that possibility but found it unhelpful to Reyes: his appellate issues were controlled by statutory language and established precedent, and nothing otherwise suggested that one Board member could not resolve his appeal. The opinion thus preserves the distinction between rejecting a procedure categorically and questioning its use in a particular proceeding.

Filja v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 256 (3d Cir. 2006). This case supplied the standard for evaluating the Board’s explanation. The Board need not “write an exegesis on every contention,” but its reasoning must permit a reviewing court to recognize that it “has heard and thought and not merely reacted.” Applying that functional standard, the panel found the Board’s discussion sufficient. Brevity did not, by itself, establish a failure to consider Reyes’s case.

The Appointments Clause

Duenas v. Garland, 78 F.4th 1069, 1074 (9th Cir. 2023). The panel relied on this decision’s statement that the appointment and removal process for immigration judges and Board members complies with Article II. It supported rejection of Reyes’s constitutional objection to the official who decided his administrative appeal.

Bernardo-De La Cruz v. Garland, 114 F.4th 883, 890–92 (7th Cir. 2024). Cited comparatively, this decision rejected a constitutional challenge involving the appointment of a temporary Board judge. It was particularly relevant to Reyes’s objection to the adjudicator’s temporary status. The Third Circuit’s treatment was brief and did not develop an independent, comprehensive Appointments Clause analysis.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The Statutory Definition Directly Reached Reyes’s Conviction

The aggravated-felony analysis followed a chain of statutory cross-references:

  1. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) provides for removal based on an aggravated-felony conviction.
  2. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) includes a “drug trafficking crime,” as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), within the aggravated-felony category.
  3. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) defines that term to include a felony punishable under the Controlled Substances Act.
  4. 21 U.S.C. § 846 expressly criminalizes conspiracy to commit the relevant federal controlled-substance offenses.

Reyes did not dispute that he had pleaded guilty to the identified federal drug conspiracy. Because the offense fell directly within the incorporated statutory definition, the court concluded that it was an aggravated felony.

This reasoning also answered his claim that the immigration judge had improperly added a firearms offense as a new ground for removal. A statute may contain both substantive prohibitions and definitions incorporated elsewhere. Here, the immigration judge used § 924(c) for its definition, not to attribute a firearms conviction to Reyes.

The opinion’s conclusion is therefore specific: Reyes’s federal Controlled Substances Act conspiracy qualified through the drug-trafficking provision. It should not be read as holding that every offense called a “conspiracy,” under any jurisdiction’s law, necessarily qualifies as an aggravated felony.

2. CAT Eligibility Required More Than a Plausible Fear of Retaliation

CAT protection addresses whether a person would more likely than not face torture upon removal, with the requisite involvement, consent, or acquiescence of public officials. A serious criminal conviction does not eliminate the need to evaluate an otherwise available CAT protection claim. Accordingly, the agency examined Reyes’s claimed risk separately from the aggravated-felony determination.

The immigration judge identified several gaps in the asserted path from past cooperation to future torture:

  • The people Reyes suspected of the Connecticut shootings had not been identified as the perpetrators.
  • The record did not adequately establish that those people could locate him in the Dominican Republic.
  • Their continuing desire to harm him remained uncertain.
  • The anticipated harm was not sufficiently shown to constitute torture.
  • The necessary connection to Dominican state authorities—through assistance or acquiescence—was not established.

Corroboration was a central weakness. Reyes supplied neither testimony nor affidavits from his mother or sister, although he said they could describe threats against him. He also failed to present the shooting-related police reports during the administrative proceedings.

The court did not announce that these particular documents are mandatory in every CAT case, nor did it expressly resolve the claim through an adverse credibility determination. Rather, it accepted the agency’s assessment that the evidence actually presented did not sufficiently support Reyes’s prediction of torture.

3. Country Evidence and Internal Relocation Were Assessed Individually

The immigration judge found that the record did not establish relevant governmental abuse or tolerance of private abuse supporting Reyes’s claim. The opinion noted evidence of discrete abuses against persons of Haitian descent, but Reyes was not a member of that group.

This discussion must be read as an assessment of the evidence in Reyes’s case, not as a universal finding that the Dominican Republic has no human-rights problems. Nor does CAT protection require membership in a protected ethnic or social group. The issue was whether the cited evidence demonstrated a sufficiently individualized risk to Reyes and the required official involvement or acquiescence.

The immigration judge also considered relocation within the country, including to Punta Cana or another tourist area. Reyes’s English fluency and employment history supported the finding that he could establish himself and obtain service-sector work elsewhere. The Third Circuit upheld that record-based assessment; it did not establish a categorical rule that tourist regions are safe for all returnees.

4. Appellate Review Was Deferential and Record-Bound

The Board reviewed the immigration judge’s factual findings for clear error. The court of appeals, in turn, applied the substantial-evidence standard to the agency’s factual conclusions. Neither stage involved a fresh evidentiary hearing.

Under that standard, the question was not whether a different adjudicator might have credited Reyes’s fears more heavily. It was whether the evidence compelled a contrary result. The panel found that it did not.

The record limitation independently prevented consideration of the police reports Reyes later attached to a reply supporting his motion for a stay of removal. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(A), judicial review is confined to the administrative record underlying the removal order. Attaching documents to a court filing did not retroactively make them part of that record.

5. Procedural Fairness Did Not Require a Longer or Multi-Member Decision

The court treated panel composition and explanatory adequacy as distinct questions. A single-member decision was permissible because the issues were straightforward and controlled by existing law. The explanation was sufficient because it allowed the court to identify the Board’s reasoning and confirm that the necessary arguments had been considered.

This approach requires meaningful administrative consideration without equating due process with either a particular number of adjudicators or a particular opinion length. The decision does not excuse the Board from addressing material issues; it concludes that the Board did so here.

C. Potential Impact and Limits

First, the opinion illustrates the importance of selecting the correct statutory classification route. Arguments about conspiracy offenses must account for whether the conviction independently falls within the Controlled Substances Act definition incorporated into the immigration statute. A case involving another kind of conspiracy may not control that inquiry.

Second, it emphasizes evidentiary development before the immigration judge. Evidence of retaliation, witness statements, police records, and relevant country conditions should be presented at the administrative stage. Judicial review generally cannot repair an incomplete record through newly attached evidence.

Third, it separates fear of private violence from the complete CAT inquiry. Even a serious concern about criminal retaliation must be connected to a sufficiently probable risk of torture and the necessary governmental involvement or acquiescence. The court’s reasoning does not impose a categorical requirement to identify every potential attacker, but it shows the difficulty of prevailing when several essential links remain speculative.

Fourth, it confirms the importance of case-specific procedural objections. Neither the use of one Board member nor a concise explanation establishes a constitutional violation by itself. A successful objection would require a concrete deficiency beyond those features alone.

These are persuasive lessons, not new binding commands. The opinion’s expressly nonprecedential status, and its highly record-specific CAT analysis, limit how broadly future litigants should characterize it.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Aggravated felony
A statutory immigration category that carries serious consequences, including potential removal. The label depends on Congress’s definitions, not simply on how serious an offense sounds.
Statutory incorporation
One law borrows a definition from another. Here, immigration law borrowed the definition of “drug trafficking crime” from a criminal statute without accusing Reyes of every offense addressed in that statute.
De novo review
The reviewing court independently decides a legal question rather than deferring to the agency’s legal answer.
Substantial-evidence review
A deferential review of factual findings. The court cannot overturn the agency merely because another conclusion is possible; the record must compel a contrary conclusion.
CAT protection and governmental acquiescence
CAT concerns a sufficiently probable risk of torture, not every risk of violence. Private violence may qualify when the required official involvement or acquiescence exists; officials need not personally carry out the torture.
Administrative record
The evidence and materials before the immigration authorities. A court reviewing the removal order ordinarily cannot consider new evidence submitted for the first time in the judicial proceeding.
Facial and as-applied challenges
A facial challenge attacks a rule itself. An as-applied challenge argues that its operation in a particular case was unlawful.
Appointments Clause
The constitutional provision governing the appointment of federal officers. Reyes unsuccessfully argued that the temporary Board judge’s participation violated those requirements.
Nonjurisdictional claims-processing rule
A procedural requirement that governs how a claim proceeds but does not itself define the court’s adjudicative power. Such a rule is not optional, although an objection to noncompliance can sometimes be forfeited.

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit upheld Reyes’s removal order because his federal drug-trafficking conspiracy fell within the statutory aggravated-felony definition, the administrative record did not compel CAT protection, and his procedural and constitutional challenges failed.

The opinion’s broader significance is practical rather than precedential: statutory cross-references must be followed carefully, CAT claims require developed evidence connecting anticipated harm to the governing legal requirements, and appellate review generally cannot substitute a new factual record for the one presented to the agency.