Federal Diversity Courts Apply New York Anti-SLAPP’s Actual-Malice Standard; CPLR 302(a)(1) Does Not Reach Out-of-State Journalists Absent New York Newsgathering

Disposition: Affirmed.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Personal jurisdiction in New York defamation cases (CPLR 302(a)(1))

• Best Van Lines, Inc. v. Walker: The Second Circuit followed its own guidance that New York’s long-arm statute must be applied as New York courts construe it, and that the defamation carve-outs require a narrower reading of “transacts any business” for defamation claims than for other torts.
• SPCA of Upstate N.Y., Inc. v. Am. Working Collie Ass’n: The principal New York Court of Appeals authority. The panel used SPCA to emphasize that, in defamation cases, (i) accessibility of online speech in New York is not enough, and (ii) jurisdiction is especially unlikely where the speech was not written in or directed to New York and the defendant did not come to New York “to conduct research, gather information or otherwise generate material” for publication.
• Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank and Deutsche Bank Sec., Inc. v. Montana Bd. of Invs.: Cited for the general breadth of § 302(a)(1) outside defamation (single act can suffice; no strict causation requirement), which the court contrasted with the narrower defamation application described in SPCA.
• Montgomery v. Minarcin: Treated as an intermediate appellate decision indicating that jurisdiction may exist when the defamatory broadcast is “researched, written, produced and reported” in New York with extensive in-state interviews. The panel read Minarcin (as later described by SPCA) to reinforce a “New York-based newsgathering” focus rather than an “employer headquartered in New York” focus.
• Legros v. Irving: An example where jurisdiction was found because the allegedly defamatory book was researched in New York and its publishing contract was negotiated/executed there. It supported the panel’s emphasis on forum-based creation and production activities.
• Prince v. Intercept: Persuasive federal district court authority aligning with the panel’s approach: employment by a New York media company and sending drafts to New York colleagues does not, by itself, establish CPLR 302(a)(1) jurisdiction in defamation without New York-centered reporting activity.
• Seetransport Wiking Trader Schiffarhtsgesellschaft MBH & Co., Kommanditgesellschaft v. Navimpex Centrala Navala: Cited for the procedural posture: where jurisdiction is decided on written submissions, factual disputes are resolved in the plaintiff’s favor.
• Pahuta v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc.: Used for the federal courts’ obligation to follow New York intermediate appellate authority absent persuasive evidence the New York Court of Appeals would differ.

B. Anti-SLAPP in diversity and “public forum / public interest”

• Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc. and Corley v. United States: The framework for distinguishing substantive from procedural rules; § 76-a was characterized as substantive because it defines parties’ rights/obligations by altering the required fault standard.
• Adelson v. Harris: Cited to support that state anti-SLAPP protections conferring liability protections and fee shifting can be substantive and apply in diversity; it bolstered the conclusion that New York’s heightened-fault requirement applies in federal diversity litigation.
• 600 W. 115th St. Corp. v. Von Gutfeld: Provided the definition and policy context for SLAPP suits as merit-light claims meant to chill speech through litigation burdens.
• Gottwald v. Sebert: Used for the history: New York’s original 1992 anti-SLAPP statute was narrow; the 2020 amendments broadened coverage substantially.
• VIP Pet Grooming Studio, Inc. v. Sproule: Cited as a post-amendment New York appellate decision describing the legislature’s intent to “extend the protection” and “substantially expand” the statute’s reach.
• Reeves v. Associated Newspapers, Ltd.: Supported the conclusion that a news media website is “a quintessential public forum” and that allegations of criminal conduct (including domestic violence) qualify as issues of public interest.
• Aristocrat Plastic Surgery, P.C. v. Silva: Demonstrated New York courts’ expansive reading of “public interest,” even for consumer reviews, reinforcing that the statute’s threshold is intentionally broad.
• Huggins v. Moore and Krauss v. Globe Int’l, Inc: Invoked and distinguished: Huggins recognized matters of social concern in spousal abuse reporting; Krauss treated a private cheating scandal as “mere gossip.” The panel used them to reject the Temple’s attempt to characterize the challenged subject matter as non-public-interest.
• Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and DiBella v. Hopkins: Used to emphasize that states may impose greater protections for speech than the federal constitutional floor, and to note (without deciding) public-figure doctrine.

C. Actual malice: definition and evidentiary rules

• New York Times Co. v. Sullivan: The constitutional source of the “actual malice” formulation; the panel found New York’s statutory language mirrors Sullivan nearly verbatim.
• Kipper v. NYP Holdings Co. and Liberman v. Gelstein: New York actual malice authorities: “serious doubts”/“high degree of awareness of probable falsity,” and the critical distinction between uncertainty and probable falsity.
• Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. Connaughton: Reinforced that even “extreme departure” from journalistic standards does not alone establish actual malice; the inquiry is subjective awareness.
• Swiezy v. Investigative Post, Inc.: Emphasized limited evidentiary value of journalistic-standard compliance for actual malice.
• Celle v. Filipino Rep. Enters. Inc.: Used to show that ill will can be circumstantial evidence only when combined with other indications of recklessness/knowledge; ill will alone is insufficient.
• St. Amant v. Thompson: Established that reliance on anonymous sources does not prove actual malice absent “obvious reasons” to doubt the informant’s veracity.
• Church of Scientology Int’l v. Behar: The court drew on Behar to reject the argument that use of hostile sources shows actual malice where there is “considerable corroboration.”
• Dongguk Univ. v. Yale Univ.: Supported the proposition that publishers need not initiate further investigation absent obvious reasons to doubt accuracy.
• Carey v. Carey: Illustrated New York appellate courts’ practice of borrowing constitutional actual malice doctrine when applying New York’s anti-SLAPP actual-malice requirement.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The long-arm holding: defamation narrows “transacts business”

The panel’s jurisdiction analysis is built around New York’s legislative decision to treat defamation differently in CPLR 302, leaving § 302(a)(1) as the operative path and constraining it by a defamation-specific, New York Court of Appeals gloss. Applying SPCA of Upstate N.Y., Inc. v. Am. Working Collie Ass’n, the court focused on where the speech was created and whether the defendant purposely conducted in-state activities to generate the allegedly defamatory content.

Even accepting (for purposes of the posture) that Duin was a Newsweek employee and that edits were made by a New York-based editor, the court treated those facts as incidental to Newsweek’s headquarters location rather than purposeful journalistic activity by Duin in New York. The opinion thus operationalizes a practical rule: for out-of-state journalists, in-state employer ties and editorial communications are not enough; plaintiffs must show forum-centered reporting work (research, interviews, travel, production) substantially related to the alleged defamation.

B. The anti-SLAPP holding: § 76-a is substantive and applies broadly

The court held N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 76-a applies in federal diversity because it changes the elements/standard of liability—i.e., it raises the plaintiff’s burden on fault to “knowledge of falsity” or “reckless disregard” proven by clear and convincing evidence. Under Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc. and the substantive/procedural distinction described in Corley v. United States, that is substantive law governing rights and obligations. The panel also cited Adelson v. Harris to reinforce that anti-SLAPP protections can be substantive.

On applicability, the panel read the 2020 amendments as deliberately expansive: Newsweek’s website is a public forum, and allegations that a large organization habitually covered up sexual abuse are plainly not “purely private.” The court declined the Temple’s invitation to import a “public figure” requirement, noting the statute’s text does not contain one and that New York is permitted to create a higher protection level than the First Amendment floor.

C. The actual malice holding: negligence, hostility, and imperfect process are not enough

The opinion then applied a familiar actual malice framework (drawing from both constitutional and New York cases, and treating the statutory standard as mirroring New York Times Co. v. Sullivan). The Temple’s evidence—internal editorial guidelines, alleged bias, use of a pseudonymous and purportedly hostile source, and lack of independent fact-checking or failure to specifically ask Greaves about the quote—was categorized as, at most, negligence or imperfect process.

The panel emphasized the subjective nature of actual malice: the question is not whether Newsweek could have done more, but whether it published while entertaining serious doubts or with high awareness of probable falsity (Kipper v. NYP Holdings Co.), and whether there were “obvious reasons” to doubt the source (St. Amant v. Thompson). In the court’s view, corroboration from other sources defeated any inference that Newsweek must have harbored serious doubts, and “not knowing whether something is true” is not the same as being highly aware it is probably false (Liberman v. Gelstein).

3.3. Impact

• Forum-shopping limits in media defamation: The jurisdiction holding strengthens New York’s defamation-specific restraint in CPLR 302(a)(1). Plaintiffs cannot reliably sue an out-of-state reporter in New York merely because the publisher is New York-based, the article is accessible in New York, or an editor in New York touched the story. Expect heightened focus on where reporting work occurred.
• Anti-SLAPP’s reach in federal court: The decision reinforces that New York’s heightened fault standard under § 76-a(2) applies in federal diversity cases, pushing more public-interest defamation claims toward early resolution (dismissal/summary judgment) absent clear-and-convincing evidence of actual malice.
• Broad “public interest” threshold: By applying § 76-a to allegations about a large organization’s handling of sexual-abuse complaints, and by relying on cases like Aristocrat Plastic Surgery, P.C. v. Silva, the opinion signals that “public interest” will often be satisfied for reporting on institutional conduct, misconduct allegations, and consumer/informational speech.
• Evidence demanded for actual malice: The analysis underscores that plaintiffs must identify concrete record evidence of subjective doubt or awareness of probable falsity—process critiques, bias claims, and source hostility will rarely suffice without additional proof.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Personal jurisdiction (CPLR 302(a)(1)): A New York court can sometimes hear a case against a non-New Yorker if the defendant purposefully did business in New York and the lawsuit is substantially related to that business. In defamation, New York applies this more narrowly; online accessibility in New York and a New York-based publisher are usually not enough without New York-based newsgathering tied to the publication.
• Anti-SLAPP: “Strategic lawsuits against public participation” are suits used to chill speech by imposing litigation cost and risk. New York’s statute (as amended in 2020) protects speech in public forums on issues of public interest by raising the plaintiff’s burden.
• “Public forum” and “public interest” (New York anti-SLAPP): A public forum includes places like news websites. “Public interest” is defined broadly—essentially anything not purely private.
• Actual malice (fault standard): Not ill will. It means publishing while knowing a statement is false, or while seriously doubting it / being highly aware it is probably false.
• Clear and convincing evidence: A higher burden than “more likely than not.” The proof must be strong and persuasive.
• Substantive vs. procedural (diversity cases): Federal courts hearing state-law claims apply state rules that define liability (substantive), while using federal rules for litigation mechanics (procedural). The court treated § 76-a’s fault standard as substantive because it changes what must be proved to win.

5. Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s decision delivers two core lessons for modern defamation litigation involving national media and online publication. First, New York’s defamation jurisdiction doctrine remains deliberately constrained: an out-of-state journalist is not haled into New York under CPLR 302(a)(1) without meaningful in-state reporting activity tied to the allegedly defamatory work. Second, New York’s expanded anti-SLAPP statute meaningfully raises the bar for plaintiffs—even in federal diversity cases—by requiring clear and convincing evidence of actual malice for public-forum speech on issues of public interest. Together, these holdings fortify New York’s policy choice to provide defamation defendants greater protection than the constitutional minimum, particularly in public-interest reporting disputes.