Factual Disputes Bar Interlocutory Qualified-Immunity Review; State-Law Immunity Must Be Raised Below

1. Introduction

In Rayshawn Walden v. City of Detroit, Michigan, No. 25-1919 (6th Cir. May 20, 2026), the Sixth Circuit addressed the limits of its interlocutory appellate jurisdiction in qualified-immunity appeals. Detroit police officer Bailey Rumschlag shot plaintiff Rayshawn Walden during a foot pursuit after seeing a suspected firearm bulge under Walden’s shirt. Walden brought federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (including a Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim and a municipal-liability claim against the City of Detroit) and Michigan state-law tort claims (gross negligence and willful/wanton misconduct) against Rumschlag.

The district court denied defendants’ motion for (partial) summary judgment, concluding there was a genuine dispute of material fact— principally whether Walden turned toward Rumschlag with a gun at the moment shots were fired. Rumschlag appealed the denial of qualified immunity. The key appellate issues were:

  • Whether the Sixth Circuit could review the denial of qualified immunity on interlocutory appeal when the dispositive issue depended on disputed facts, including gaps/uncertainties in body-camera footage.
  • Whether the Sixth Circuit could consider Michigan state-law immunity when Rumschlag had not moved for summary judgment on those claims in the district court.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and remanded. It held that:

  • The qualified-immunity appeal turned on a crucial factual dispute (whether Walden turned and aimed a gun), so the court lacked interlocutory jurisdiction.
  • Neither narrow exception allowing review of fact-laden qualified-immunity appeals applied: Rumschlag did not genuinely concede Walden’s version of events, and the record (including video) did not blatantly contradict the district court’s factual view.
  • The court also lacked jurisdiction to address state-law immunity because there was no appealable denial: Rumschlag did not move for summary judgment on the state-law claims, so the district court did not deny immunity as to them; the argument was also treated as forfeited on appeal.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The panel’s decision is primarily jurisdictional, built from a line of Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court cases defining what is (and is not) reviewable on interlocutory appeal from a qualified-immunity denial.

Standard of review and record on interlocutory qualified-immunity appeal

  • Peck v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 237 F.3d 614 (6th Cir. 2001): Cited for de novo review of qualified immunity and for permitting reliance on the hearing transcript where the district court issues no written opinion. Here, because the district court did not write an opinion, the Sixth Circuit used the summary-judgment hearing transcript to identify the court’s reasoning and fact assumptions.
  • Campbell v. Cheatham Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 47 F.4th 468 (6th Cir. 2022): Reinforced both de novo review and the “light depicted” approach to unambiguous video evidence.
  • Bunkley v. City of Detroit, 902 F.3d 552 (6th Cir. 2018): Emphasized that, at the interlocutory stage, appellate courts should ideally rely on the district court’s statement of facts and inferences.
  • LaPlante v. City of Battle Creek, 30 F.4th 572 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Latits v. Phillips, 878 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 2017)): Established that if video has “relevant gaps or uncertainties,” those gaps are construed in the nonmovant’s favor at summary judgment. This principle mattered because the body camera did not show Walden at critical instants and did not clearly show him drawing, aiming, or turning with a gun.

Limits of interlocutory jurisdiction in qualified-immunity appeals

  • Heeter v. Bowers, 99 F.4th 900 (6th Cir. 2024): Provided the two-step qualified-immunity framework, but more importantly, articulated the jurisdictional limit: interlocutory review exists “only to the extent the appeal turns on an issue of law,” not record-supported factual disputes. The panel used Heeter to characterize this appeal as impermissibly fact-bound (“dueling affidavits”/credibility disputes).
  • Perez v. Simpson, 83 F.4th 1029 (6th Cir. 2023): Stood for the proposition that when “the facts are everything,” appellate jurisdiction is lacking. The panel invoked Perez to underscore that Rumschlag’s argument depended on his disputed version of the encounter.
  • Ramsey v. Rivard, 110 F.4th 860 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Adams v. Blount County, 946 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 2020)): Explained that if disputed facts are “crucial” to the qualified-immunity appeal, the court must dismiss—unless an exception applies: (1) genuine concession of the plaintiff’s version, or (2) the record “blatantly contradicts” the district court’s factual determination. This case supplied the decision’s controlling jurisdictional test and exceptions.
  • Gillman v. City of Troy, 126 F.4th 1152 (6th Cir. 2025): Clarified that a defendant’s concession must be “genuine,” and cannot be a jurisdictional tactic while still disputing the facts substantively. The panel relied on Gillman to reject Rumschlag’s purported acceptance of the summary-judgment posture because his brief continued to insist Walden turned and drew/aimed a gun.
  • Berryman v. Rieger, 150 F.3d 561 (6th Cir. 1998): Cited (through Heeter) for the idea that interlocutory appeals cannot hinge on credibility determinations. The panel used Berryman to label the posture here: a credibility contest the appellate court cannot resolve.

Interlocutory “final decision” doctrine and state-law immunity arguments not raised below

  • Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985): The Supreme Court case establishing that a denial of qualified immunity can be an immediately appealable “final decision” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 when it turns on law. The panel used Mitchell to explain why jurisdiction can exist in qualified-immunity denials—while also explaining why it did not exist for the unraised state-law immunity defense.
  • Little v. City of Morristown, Nos. 23-5302, 23-5303, 2024 WL 1530468 (6th Cir. Apr. 9, 2024): Applied Mitchell to hold that absent a district-court denial of immunity, the court of appeals lacks interlocutory jurisdiction. The panel followed Little to reject review of state-law immunity where the district court never denied it because it was never presented.
  • Bannister v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 49 F.4th 1000 (6th Cir. 2022): Used for the forfeiture principle—arguments not raised below are forfeited on appeal. The panel used Bannister to characterize the belated assertion of state-law immunity as forfeited (at least for this appeal).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeded in a tight jurisdiction-first sequence:

  1. Identify the dispositive factual dispute. The district court denied summary judgment because a jury could find Walden did not turn and point a gun when shot. That fact is central to whether shooting a fleeing suspect was “objectively reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment. The panel noted evidence supporting Walden’s version, including Walden’s own account and testimony from officer Patterson (who did not observe Walden aim at officers), and it emphasized that the body camera did not clearly show Walden drawing/aiming, especially at key moments.
  2. Apply the summary-judgment/video framework. Under LaPlante v. City of Battle Creek and Latits v. Phillips, video gaps are resolved for the nonmovant. Because the footage did not unambiguously depict Walden turning or aiming, the panel could not treat the video as resolving the dispute.
  3. Apply interlocutory jurisdiction limits. Under Heeter v. Bowers, the court has jurisdiction only over legal issues, not quarrels with record-supported facts adopted for summary judgment. Under Ramsey v. Rivard and Adams v. Blount County, when “crucial” factual issues drive the outcome, the appeal must be dismissed unless an exception applies.
  4. Reject the two exceptions.
    • No genuine concession: Under Gillman v. City of Troy, a concession must be genuine. Although Rumschlag acknowledged the favorable-to-plaintiff lens, he repeatedly insisted Walden drew and turned with a gun—directly contesting Walden’s version.
    • No blatant contradiction: The “blatantly contradicts” standard (articulated through Ramsey v. Rivard / Adams v. Blount County) was not met because the video did not clearly show the critical conduct. Thus, a reasonable jury could still credit Walden’s account.
  5. Dispose of state-law immunity for want of a reviewable order and forfeiture. The defendants’ motion did not address the Michigan state-law claims, so the district court did not deny immunity on those claims. Under Little v. City of Morristown and Mitchell v. Forsyth, the appellate court cannot review an issue absent an appealable denial. And under Bannister v. Knox Cnty. Bd. of Educ., failing to raise the defense below forfeits it on appeal (at least at this stage).

3.3 Impact

Although unpublished and “not recommended for publication,” the opinion consolidates and illustrates important operational rules for Sixth Circuit practitioners:

  • Qualified-immunity interlocutory appeals cannot be used to reliitigate factual disputes. Where the material issue is what occurred (e.g., whether a suspect turned/aimed a gun), the Sixth Circuit will dismiss for lack of jurisdiction unless the defendant truly accepts the plaintiff’s version or the video unmistakably resolves the issue.
  • Video evidence helps only when it is unambiguous on the contested point. If video does not capture the key action or is equivocal, the court will not treat it as “blatant contradiction” and will instead credit the nonmovant on gaps. This increases the likelihood that fact-intensive police shooting cases proceed to trial when video does not clearly show the decisive moment.
  • Immunity defenses must be properly preserved and presented. The decision is a cautionary precedent on motion practice: if a defendant wants appellate review of state-law immunity, they must move on it in the district court. Otherwise, there may be neither an appealable denial nor a preserved argument.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Qualified immunity: A doctrine shielding government officials from damages liability unless they violated a constitutional right that was “clearly established” at the time. In many cases, the fight is partly factual (what happened) and partly legal (whether those facts amount to a constitutional violation and whether the law was clearly established).
  • Interlocutory appeal: An appeal taken before the case ends. Normally, only final judgments are appealable, but qualified-immunity denials can be appealed early only when the appeal presents a legal question rather than a dispute about what happened.
  • Summary judgment / “genuine dispute of material fact”: A case can be decided without trial only if no real dispute exists about facts that matter to the outcome. If reasonable jurors could disagree about a key fact, the case generally must proceed.
  • “Blatantly contradicts” (video rule): If a recording clearly disproves one side’s story such that no reasonable jury could believe it, the court can rely on the recording. But if the recording is unclear or has gaps, courts must not fill in those gaps against the nonmovant at summary judgment.
  • Forfeiture: Losing the ability to press an argument (at least at the current stage) by failing to raise it in the trial court when required—here, failing to move for summary judgment on state-law immunity.

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion reinforces a practical jurisdictional boundary: interlocutory qualified-immunity review is unavailable when the appeal hinges on disputed, outcome-determinative facts, especially where body-camera footage does not unambiguously resolve the critical moment. It also underscores a procedural lesson with immediate consequences: immunity defenses—particularly state-law immunities—must be timely raised and pursued in the district court to create an appealable denial and avoid forfeiture.