FAAAA Safety Exception Preserves Negligent-Hiring Tort Claims Against Transportation Brokers “With Respect to Motor Vehicles”

1. Introduction

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC arises from a highway collision in Illinois in which petitioner Shawn Montgomery suffered catastrophic injuries, including the amputation of his leg, after his tractor-trailer (stopped roadside) was struck by a truck driven by respondent Yosniel Varela-Mojena. The load was being transported for respondent Caribe Transport II, LLC (a motor carrier), and the shipment had been arranged by respondent C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc. (a transportation broker).

Montgomery sued multiple defendants in federal court and, as relevant here, alleged that C.H. Robinson was liable under state tort law because it negligently hired (i.e., negligently selected) Caribe Transport and/or Varela-Mojena to perform trucking services. Montgomery emphasized Caribe Transport’s allegedly “conditional” federal safety rating and purported deficiencies (driver qualification, hours of service, inspection/maintenance, crash rate, and more), arguing the broker knew or should have known that selecting Caribe Transport was reasonably likely to lead to injury-causing crashes.

The key legal issue was federal preemption: whether the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA), 49 U. S. C. §14501, preempts state negligent-hiring claims against brokers—or whether such claims fall within the statute’s safety exception. The Court granted certiorari to resolve a circuit split on whether the FAAAA’s safety exception permits negligent-hiring claims against brokers.

2. Summary of the Opinion

Justice Barrett wrote for a unanimous Court. The Court assumed (without deciding) that Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim would otherwise be preempted by §14501(c)(1), and resolved the case under the safety exception in §14501(c)(2)(A).

The Court held that common-law duties are part of state safety regulatory authority and that negligent-hiring duties “concern” motor vehicles where the hiring decision bears on the safety of trucks used to transport goods. Because the claim is “with respect to motor vehicles,” it is saved from preemption by the safety exception.

Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Justice Alito, concurred. He agreed with the result but stressed the case was “closer” given textual/contextual arguments and statutory anomalies, ultimately concluding Congress did not, through oblique language in an economic-deregulation statute, preserve tort suits against carriers while categorically preempting tort suits against brokers that negligently select unsafe carriers.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

• United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337: cited in the syllabus to remind readers that the syllabus “constitutes no part of the opinion.” It does not drive the merits but frames how to read the Court’s materials.
• Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc., 536 U. S. 424: provided the Court’s interpretive backdrop for the safety exception’s purpose—preserving “traditional state police power over safety” despite economic preemption. The majority invoked Columbus to reinforce that Congress drew a line between economic regulation and safety regulation, and that §14501(c)(2)(A) must be read to protect meaningful state safety authority.

  The safety exception was designed “to ensure that its preemption of States’ economic authority … did ‘not restrict’” traditional state safety power.

  The Court also referenced Columbus in connection with how statutory phrases operate in context, including a quotation in Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey (below).
• Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U. S. 251: materially influenced the Court’s semantic approach. Because the FAAAA does not define “with respect to,” the Court relied on ordinary meaning and noted it had construed the same phrase in the FAAAA to mean “concern[s].” The majority imported that established construction into §14501(c)(2)(A), concluding a claim is “with respect to motor vehicles” when it “concerns” the vehicles used in transportation.
• Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp., 565 U. S. 625: used to support the proposition that state common-law duties and standards of care can constitute “a potent method of governing conduct,” and thus fit within “regulatory authority” for preemption/savings-clause analysis. This was important because respondents did not contest that common-law tort standards can count as state safety regulation; the dispute centered on the “with respect to motor vehicles” limitation.
• Ye v. Global-Tranz Enterprises, Inc., 74 F. 4th 453: functioned as the operative Seventh Circuit precedent applied by the district court and affirmed below. The Supreme Court’s reversal necessarily displaces Ye’s approach insofar as it treated broker negligent-hiring claims as outside the safety exception (and thus preempted). Justice Kavanaugh also cited Ye as articulating strong pro-preemption points and as observing the limited federal safety regulation of brokers.
• Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Landstar Ranger, 65 F. 4th 1261: identified as part of the circuit split (aligned with the Seventh Circuit’s approach). The majority did not parse its reasoning in detail, but its inclusion underscores that lower courts had read the safety exception more narrowly.
• Cox v. Total Quality Logistics, Inc., 142 F. 4th 847: identified as the opposing side of the circuit split (allowing such claims under the safety exception). The Supreme Court’s holding brings national uniformity, effectively adopting the broader “safety exception” view associated with decisions like Cox.
• Miller v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 976 F. 3d 1016: also on the non-preemption side of the split. Like Cox, it illustrates that several courts had already recognized negligent-selection claims as safety-related and not preempted.
• United States v. Miller, 604 U. S. 518; Dubin v. United States, 599 U. S. 110; Lamar, Archer & Cofrin, LLP v. Appling, 584 U. S. 709; and California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr., N. A., Inc., 519 U. S. 316: cited in the concurrence to explain that phrases like “with respect to,” “related to,” and “relating to” are “elastic” and context-dependent. These authorities support the concurrence’s methodological point: breadth cannot be assumed from the words alone; it is fixed by statutory surroundings and purpose.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) The statutory framework and the “safety exception”

The FAAAA contains an express preemption clause that prohibits States from enforcing provisions “related to a price, route, or service” of a motor carrier or broker “with respect to the transportation of property.” 49 U. S. C. §14501(c)(1). But Congress also preserved state authority over certain subjects, including safety: the preemption clause “shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” §14501(c)(2)(A).

The Court treated the safety exception as a genuine carve-out preserving traditional state police power in tort as well as regulation, consistent with Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Service, Inc..

2) Common-law tort duties qualify as “safety regulatory authority”

The Court emphasized that state common-law standards of care are part of a State’s “authority to regulate safety,” citing Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp.. This matters because broker liability here arises from state negligence doctrine (including the duty described in Restatement (Second) of Torts §411), not from a state statute or agency rule.

3) The dispositive question: what does “with respect to motor vehicles” mean?

With no statutory definition of “with respect to,” the Court applied ordinary meaning—“referring to,” “concerning,” or “regarding”—and invoked Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey for the interpretive move that “with respect to” can mean “concern[s].”

It then paired that phrase with the statutory definition of “motor vehicle” in §13102(16). The result was a functional test:

On the pleaded facts, requiring a broker to use ordinary care in selecting a motor carrier “concerns” motor vehicles because the broker’s selection determines which trucks (and drivers operating those trucks) will be on the highway carrying the shipment. The negligent-hiring claim therefore falls inside the safety exception and is not preempted.

4) Rejecting the main counterarguments

• “Swallowing” concern: Respondents argued the safety exception, read broadly, would swallow preemption. The Court rejected that: only a subset of claims related to price/route/service are also “regulations concerning motor vehicle safety.” Many economic regulations remain preempted because they bear no safety relationship.
• Surplusage: Respondents contended Montgomery’s reading makes other carveouts redundant (route controls/weight limits/hazardous cargo). The Court found any overlap stems from the word “safety,” and the provisions can be harmonized because route/weight rules can serve non-safety ends (e.g., roadway preservation).
• Intrastate preemption anomaly (§14501(b)(1)): Respondents argued it would be anomalous to read a safety exception in subsection (c) to reach brokers when subsection (b) (intrastate broker preemption) has no safety exception. The majority acknowledged the mystery but refused to rewrite §14501(c)(2)(A): it would be “even odder” to say negligent hiring of an unsafe carrier whose truck causes injury is not an exercise of state safety authority “with respect to motor vehicles.”

C. Impact

• Uniform national rule for broker negligent-selection suits (interstate transportation): The decision resolves the circuit split and establishes that negligent-hiring/negligent-selection claims against brokers can proceed notwithstanding §14501(c)(1), so long as they fit within the safety exception as claims “with respect to motor vehicles.”
• Expanded practical exposure for brokers, but not strict liability: The Court’s rule is about preemption, not merits. Plaintiffs still must prove duty, breach, causation, and damages under state law. Justice Kavanaugh highlighted that proximate-cause limits and reasonableness defenses should restrain liability, though he acknowledged litigation/insurance costs could be substantial even when brokers prevail.
• Doctrinal significance for savings clauses and “elastic” connectors: The Court operationalized “with respect to” as “concerns” in the safety-exception setting. That move may influence how litigants frame other FAAAA safety-exception disputes—especially efforts to characterize a claim as sufficiently vehicle- and safety-centered to be “with respect to motor vehicles.”
• Regulatory-policy pressure point: The concurrence underscored a perceived gap in federal broker safety regulation. The decision effectively leaves much of the policing of broker selection practices to state tort law unless Congress enacts more direct federal safety standards or a clearer preemption rule.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• FAAAA “preemption”: A federal statute can override (“preempt”) state laws. Here, §14501(c)(1) broadly preempts certain state rules tied to trucking/broker “prices, routes, or services.”
• “Safety exception” / “savings clause”: Even when a federal statute preempts many state laws, it may “save” some. Section 14501(c)(2)(A) saves the State’s “safety regulatory authority” when it is “with respect to motor vehicles.”
• Common-law tort as “regulation”: Negligence rules (judge-made duties like “reasonable care”) can function like regulation by setting conduct standards and imposing damages for violations. The Court treated that as part of a State’s safety authority.
• Negligent hiring / negligent selection (Restatement (Second) of Torts §411): A party can be liable for hiring an independent contractor when reasonable care in selection is required because the work poses a risk of physical harm. In trucking, the selection of a carrier can influence whether unsafe trucks/drivers are placed on the road.
• “With respect to” as “concerns”: The Court read “with respect to motor vehicles” to mean a claim that “concerns” motor vehicles. Thus, broker-selection negligence “concerns” the trucks used to move goods.
• Surplusage: A canon of interpretation that statutes should not be read to make words redundant. The Court held that any redundancy here was not a reason to narrow “with respect to motor vehicles,” and that the provisions can still be read coherently together.

5. Conclusion

Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC establishes that state negligent-hiring (negligent-selection) claims against transportation brokers fall within the FAAAA’s safety exception when the claim “concerns” the motor vehicles used in transportation. By anchoring “with respect to motor vehicles” in ordinary meaning and prior FAAAA usage, the Court preserved a substantial domain for state tort law as a vehicle-safety mechanism, while leaving economic regulation of prices, routes, and services broadly preempted. The decision resolves a circuit split, recalibrates broker preemption defenses nationwide, and sets the interpretive baseline for future disputes at the boundary between economic deregulation and traditional state safety policing.