Extended Liability under Helms-Burton Act for Trafficking in Confiscated Cuban Property: Shareholder Claims and Broad Interpretation of “Use” and “Benefit”

Introduction

Odette Blanco de Fernandez and her siblings, U.S. citizens whose family assets in Cuba were seized after the 1959 revolution, sued Seaboard Marine Ltd. under Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (“Helms-Burton Act”). They alleged that Seaboard’s shipments of frozen chicken to the newly opened container terminal at Mariel Bay “trafficked” in property confiscated from two family companies—Azucarera Mariel, S.A. (sugar interests on the west side of the bay) and Maritima Mariel, S.A. (port facilities on the east side, Punta Coco Solo). The district court granted summary judgment to Seaboard. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, clarifying who may sue, what “trafficking” means, and the scope of the “lawful travel” exception.

Summary of the Judgment

Heirs and Estates Barred: The court held that family heirs and estate representatives who inherited claims after the statutory cutoff of March 12, 1996, may not bring actions under the Helms-Burton Act (22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4)(B)).
Shareholder Standing: The court recognized that shareholders hold a “claim” to confiscated property under 22 U.S.C. § 6023(12)(A) and may sue if they owned that claim before the cutoff date.
Maritima Concession: The 1955 Cuban‐government concession granted Maritima Mariel a non‐exclusive right to build and operate specific docks in Punta Coco Solo. It did not bar others from using or developing the bay. Summary judgment was proper on this claim.
Azucarera Land Claim: A reasonable jury could find that the modern container terminal on the old naval air station extends onto land confiscated from Azucarera Mariel. Under 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(A)(ii), “trafficking” includes “engaging in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from” confiscated property. Summary judgment for Seaboard was reversed on this theory.
“Lawful Travel” Exception: The exception shielding “transactions and uses of property incident to lawful travel to Cuba” (22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(B)(iii)) does not apply to commercial shipments of goods (gift parcels or agricultural commodities) because “travel” connotes movement of persons, not transport of merchandise.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Garcia-Bengochea v. Carnival Corp. (11th Cir. 2023): Individuals who inherit Helms-Burton claims after March 12, 1996, cannot sue. Adopted Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of “acquires.”
Glen v. American Airlines (5th Cir. 2021): Ordinary meaning of “acquire” includes inheritance.
Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield (1989): Federal statutes are not made “dependent on state law” without clear indication.
Havana Docks Corp. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises (11th Cir. 2024): Interpreting pre-revolutionary Cuban concessions under common‐law principles.

2. Legal Reasoning

Heirs vs. Shareholders: The court emphasized the statutory requirement that the plaintiff “acquire ownership of the claim before March 12, 1996.” By ordinary meaning, inheritance is an “acquisition.” Under Florida law, an estate “vests” in the personal representative only at death—after the bar date—so estate representatives lack standing. Only the original sibling shareholders, who acquired their claims before the cutoff, may sue.

Shareholder Standing as “Claim” Owners: Title III grants a right of action to “any United States national who owns the claim to [confiscated] property.” A “claim” includes “any present, future, or contingent right, security, or other interest therein” (22 U.S.C. § 6023(12)(A)). Shareholders whose corporate shares were confiscated hold a “claim” under the Act, even if they never held title to land or docks directly. This reading gives effect to every statutory word.

Scope of “Trafficking”: Use and Benefit: Trafficking covers three categories (22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(A)(i–iii)). The court focused on (ii) “engages in a commercial activity using or otherwise benefiting from confiscated property.” Dictionaries define “use” as “employ” or “avail oneself of” (Webster’s & Black’s). “Otherwise benefit” means deriving an “advantage or privilege” in a “different manner.” A party need not occupy the property directly. By employing the terminal built on, and operated in part over, confiscated land, Seaboard arguably “benefits” from that property because without it the terminal—and Seaboard’s shipments—could not exist.

Non-Exclusive Maritima Concession: The 1955 decree explicitly reserved third‐party rights (“without detriment to vested rights of third parties”). Nothing in the text or recitals granted Maritima exclusive use of all docks in Mariel Bay for seventy years. A court construes unambiguous contractual language, and this decree was clear on its face.

“Lawful Travel” Exception: The exception covers only “lawful travel to Cuba,” understood in context to mean movement of travelers, not export of goods. Federal Cuba‐sanctions regulations also distinguish between travel‐related transactions and export‐related transactions. This exception does not protect ordinary trade shipments, including gift parcels (GFT exception) or agricultural commodities (AGR exception).

3. Impact

Broader Liability: Third parties who conduct commerce over or via facilities built on confiscated Cuban property may face Helms-Burton liability even without direct land ownership or physical presence on the seized parcel.
Investor Rights: U.S. nationals with confiscated corporate holdings may sue for “trafficking” even if they never held the land titles themselves.
Clarified Exceptions: Logistics firms, carriers, and freight forwarders must distinguish between travel-related services and export-related services under Cuba-sanctions law. Transport of goods is not “lawful travel.”
Future Litigation: Courts will need to parse “use” and “benefit” in discrete factual scenarios, and litigants must develop evidence showing how a defendant’s commerce “uses” or “benefits from” specific confiscated assets.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Helms-Burton Act (1996): Federal law giving U.S. nationals a private cause of action against anyone who knowingly “traffics” in property confiscated by Cuba after 1959.
“Traffics” (22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)): Three categories: (A)(i) disposes of or acquires an interest; (A)(ii) engages in a commercial activity using or benefiting from confiscated property; (A)(iii) causes or profits from another’s trafficking.
“Claim to Property”: Under the Act, shareholders’ stock represents a “claim” to underlying corporate assets seized by the Cuban government.
Statutory Cutoff (March 12, 1996): New claimants after that date cannot sue. Inheritors “acquire” claims at death, so only those who held the claim before that date may bring actions.
“Lawful Travel” Exception (22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(B)(iii)): Protects transactions incident to authorized trips by persons into Cuba—not commercial exports of goods.

Conclusion

This decision refines Title III of the Helms-Burton Act by:

Confirming that corporate shareholders hold actionable “claims” to confiscated property;
Interpreting “trafficking” broadly to include any commercial activity that “uses or otherwise benefits” from seized assets, even without direct occupation;
Limiting the “lawful travel to Cuba” exception to the movement of travelers, not trade in goods;
Enforcing the March 12, 1996 cutoff to bar heirs who inherited claims after that date.

Logistics providers, shippers, and investors should reassess their exposure under Helms-Burton when Cuban facilities sit on or derive value from confiscated property. Courts will grapple with fact‐intensive inquiries into how defendants “use” or “benefit from” those assets in future cases.