Evasive Flight Near an Abandoned Crash Creates Reasonable Suspicion; Control Strikes to Expose Hands Are Reasonable Amid Active Resistance

1. Introduction

In Michael Kaplon v. Morris Township Police Department (3d Cir. Mar. 11, 2026) (not precedential), Michael Kaplon appealed the District of New Jersey’s summary-judgment dismissal of his federal civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, parallel claims under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (NJCRA), and related New Jersey tort claims. The case arose from a predawn encounter following Kaplon’s crash of his mother’s vehicle into a utility pole while intoxicated, his departure from the crash scene on foot, and his subsequent physical struggle with officers who attempted to detain and arrest him.

The appeal presented two core constitutional issues: (1) whether Officer DeCaro had reasonable suspicion to seize Kaplon, and (2) whether Officer Yeboah and Sergeant Boeninghaus used excessive force in effectuating the seizure/arrest. A third, state-law axis concerned immunities and “willful misconduct” under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for all defendants. It held:

  • Investigatory stop/seizure: Officer DeCaro had reasonable suspicion to stop Kaplon based on the totality of circumstances—an abandoned, crashed, possibly stolen vehicle; predawn conditions; Kaplon’s apparent hiding; and his escalating evasive conduct culminating in flight.
  • Force: No reasonable jury could find that Officer Yeboah’s and Sergeant Boeninghaus’s force was excessive given Kaplon’s active resistance, attempts to strike officers, and the officers’ articulated concerns about gaining control of Kaplon’s hands (including the perceived risk of a concealed weapon).
  • Municipal/supervisory liability: The Monell-type claims failed because Kaplon did not establish an underlying constitutional violation and did not identify evidence of an actionable policy or custom.
  • State tort claims: They failed under statutory immunities applicable to injuries caused by resisting/evading arrest and police pursuit, and Kaplon did not show “willful misconduct” to defeat immunity.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Summary-judgment lens and video evidence

  • Burns v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 642 F.3d 163 (3d Cir. 2011): Supplied the standard principle that facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant at summary judgment.
  • Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007): Added the “body camera/video” overlay—when video “blatantly contradict[s]” a party’s version such that no reasonable jury could believe it, the court need not adopt that version. The panel also used Scott to explain why unrebutted officer testimony could be treated as undisputed where the plaintiff did not properly counter it with record citations.
  • Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e); Wiest v. Tyco Elecs. Corp., 812 F.3d 319 (3d Cir. 2016); Doeblers' Pa. Hybrids, Inc. v. Doebler, 442 F.3d 812 (3d Cir. 2006): These authorities framed summary judgment as “put up or shut up” time and emphasized that courts will not scour the record for a party’s evidence. The panel relied on this cluster to conclude Kaplon failed to create a genuine dispute to overcome defendants’ evidence.
  • Ellis v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 11 F.4th 221 (3d Cir. 2021); Andrews v. Scuilli, 853 F.3d 690 (3d Cir. 2017): Reiterated de novo review and the standard for reversal only when disputes of material fact exist or the nonmovant could prevail on undisputed facts.

B. Reasonable suspicion and the investigatory stop

  • Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)): The doctrinal centerpiece. Wardlow contributed two key propositions used here: (i) “nervous, evasive behavior” is pertinent to reasonable suspicion, and (ii) unprovoked flight is “the consummate act of evasion.”
  • United States v. Brown, 448 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981)): Supplied the requirement that suspicion be “particularized” and “objective” as to the person stopped.
  • United States v. Nelson, 284 F.3d 472 (3d Cir. 2002): Supported the “totality of the circumstances” approach and the legitimacy of investigative inferences based on personal observation.
  • United States v. Valentine, 232 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2000): Reinforced that time and context (late/early hours, crime conditions) plus evasive movement upon noticing police can contribute to reasonable suspicion.
  • United States v. Brown, 159 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 1998): Contributed the Third Circuit’s articulation that flight combined with other factors can justify a warrantless stop-and-frisk.
  • United States v. Bonner, 363 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2004): Used both to support that flight from uniformed officers can support reasonable suspicion and (separately) to buttress the notion that officers may use some force to effectuate a valid stop.

C. Excessive force framework

  • Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989): The governing Fourth Amendment “objective reasonableness” test. The panel applied Graham’s factors—severity of the crime, threat posed, and active resistance/flight—and its admonition to evaluate force from the perspective of a reasonable officer in tense, rapidly evolving conditions.
  • Lamont v. New Jersey, 637 F.3d 177 (3d Cir. 2011): Provided the § 1983 excessive-force elements: a seizure occurred and it was unreasonable under the circumstances.
  • Rush v. City of Philadelphia, 78 F.4th 610 (3d Cir. 2023): Added Third Circuit-specific considerations (injury level, potential dangerousness, duration, arrest context, possibility suspect is armed, and number of persons).
  • Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628 (3d Cir. 1995): Used for the state tort framing that officers have a privilege to commit battery in a lawful arrest, negated by excessive force.

D. NJCRA equivalence to § 1983

  • Falcone v. Dickstein, 92 F.4th 193 (3d Cir. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Murray-Nolan v. Rubin, 144 S. Ct. 2560 (2024): Confirmed that NJCRA claims are interpreted analogously to § 1983, allowing the court to resolve both sets of claims through the same constitutional analysis.

E. Municipal liability and the “no underlying violation” rule

  • Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978): The source of municipal liability doctrine for policies/customs causing constitutional violations.
  • City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796 (1986) (per curiam); Brown v. Pa., Dep't of Health Emergency Med. Servs. Training Inst., 318 F.3d 473 (3d Cir. 2003): Cited for the principle that without an underlying constitutional violation by an employee, Monell-type claims fail.
  • Williams v. Borough of West Chester, 891 F.2d 458 (3d Cir. 1989): Reinforced the supervisory/municipal derivative-liability limitation in the posture the district court applied.

F. New Jersey Tort Claims Act and willful misconduct

  • Leang v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 969 A.2d 1097 (N.J. 2009) (quoting Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., Thiokol Chem. Corp., 181 A.2d 487 (N.J. 1962)): Supplied the standard for “willful misconduct” as “a deliberate act or omission with knowledge of a high degree of probability of harm and reckless indifference to consequences.”

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. The seizure: totality of circumstances + evasion + flight

The court treated the encounter as a Terry stop requiring “reasonable, articulable suspicion.” Applying Illinois v. Wardlow and Third Circuit reasonable-suspicion precedent, it emphasized the compounding effect of:

  • Context: a crashed, abandoned vehicle near the registered owner’s home, in an area with recent car thefts, in predawn hours;
  • Evasive conduct: Kaplon’s apparent concealment behind a sign and his brisk departure when the uniformed officer approached and called out;
  • Flight: Kaplon’s running from the officer, treated as significant indicia of wrongdoing under Wardlow;
  • Particularized suspicion: these facts tied suspicion to Kaplon specifically (not merely to the area), satisfying United States v. Brown (448 F.3d 239) / United States v. Cortez.

On that record, the court found reasonable suspicion that Kaplon was involved in either a possible motor vehicle theft or leaving the scene of an accident under N.J. Stat. Ann § 39:4-129. It also rejected Kaplon’s attempt to reframe the officer’s actions as unlawfully forceful, invoking United States v. Bonner and the general proposition (also stated in Graham v. Connor) that some physical coercion can be inherent in effectuating a lawful stop/arrest.

B. The force: active resistance and weapon-control concerns

Using the Graham v. Connor objective-reasonableness framework—supplemented by Rush v. City of Philadelphia— the panel held no reasonable jury could find the force excessive because:

  • Resistance and assaultive conduct: Yeboah observed Kaplon fleeing and swinging at DeCaro; Kaplon then punched and attempted to kick Yeboah.
  • Control of hands / weapon risk: Boeninghaus arrived to a still-volatile scene, perceived Kaplon’s hands hidden beneath his body, and suspected he might be holding a weapon.
  • Escalation and warnings: Boeninghaus repeatedly commanded Kaplon to show his hands and stop resisting; only after noncompliance did he deliver three closed-fist punches to the back, described as a “lower level of force” intended to gain control of Kaplon’s hands.
  • Temporal narrowness: The force was tied to the short window needed to end resistance and secure handcuffs, consistent with the “split-second judgments” rationale in Graham.

Because the court found the force reasonable, it disposed of both § 1983 and NJCRA claims together, citing Falcone v. Dickstein.

C. Monell and related supervisory/municipal claims

The panel applied the familiar rule from City of Los Angeles v. Heller (and Brown v. Pa., Dep't of Health Emergency Med. Servs. Training Inst.) that municipal liability cannot stand without an underlying constitutional violation. Additionally, consistent with the district court’s analysis, Kaplon failed to produce evidence of an unlawful policy, custom, or training/supervision deficiency that caused a violation, as required by Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York.

D. New Jersey tort claims and statutory immunities

The court affirmed dismissal of state tort claims on multiple independent grounds:

  • Pursuit/resisting-evading immunity: N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:5-2(b)-(c) immunizes public employees for injuries caused by a person resisting/evading arrest and injuries resulting from law enforcement pursuit.
  • No “willful misconduct” shown: While N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:3-14 removes immunity for willful misconduct, Kaplon did not satisfy the Leang v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ. standard (via Berg v. Reaction Motors Div., Thiokol Chem. Corp.).
  • Entity nonliability where employee not liable: N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:2-2(b) foreclosed public-entity liability where the employee is not liable.
  • IIED derivative failure: The intentional infliction of emotional distress theory was predicated on excessive force and failed once excessive force failed.

3.3 Impact

Although designated “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the opinion is a detailed application of settled doctrine that is likely to be cited persuasively in factually similar cases, particularly at the summary-judgment stage:

  • Reasonable suspicion: It reinforces how context (abandoned crashed car + theft concerns + time of day) combined with evasion and flight can create a “particularized and objective basis” for a stop.
  • Force to secure hands: It supports the view that limited strikes used to obtain compliance and expose hidden hands may be reasonable when a suspect is actively resisting and officers reasonably perceive a weapon risk.
  • Proof discipline at summary judgment: By leaning on Scott v. Harris, Wiest v. Tyco Elecs. Corp., and Rule 56, it underscores that plaintiffs must meet record-evidence burdens—especially when video evidence and unrebutted testimony exist.
  • Monell gatekeeping: It continues the practical barrier: absent a triable underlying constitutional violation, Monell claims are typically extinguished.
  • State-law immunities: It highlights the breadth of New Jersey’s pursuit/resisting-evading immunities under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 59:5-2 and the demanding proof required to invoke the “willful misconduct” exception.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Reasonable suspicion (Terry stop): A lower threshold than probable cause. Officers need specific, articulable facts—viewed together—suggesting crime may be occurring. It can be based on inferences from observed behavior and context.
  • “Totality of the circumstances”: Courts do not isolate each fact (time of day, flight, location) and ask if it proves guilt; they ask whether all facts together justify the stop.
  • Objective reasonableness (Graham): Excessive force is judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, not with hindsight, and accounts for fast-moving uncertainty.
  • Monell liability: A city/police department is not automatically liable for officers’ actions. The plaintiff must show an official policy or custom caused a constitutional violation—and typically must show an underlying violation occurred.
  • Qualified immunity: A defense shielding officers unless they violated clearly established law. The district court relied on it in the alternative, but the Third Circuit’s affirmance on “no constitutional violation” mooted the need to expand the qualified-immunity analysis.
  • NJ Tort Claims Act immunity & willful misconduct: New Jersey broadly immunizes public employees/entities in specified situations (including pursuit/resistance injuries). The “willful misconduct” exception requires more than negligence or poor judgment—something closer to deliberate wrongdoing with recklessness toward a high probability of harm.

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision affirms a straightforward but consequential combination of rules: (1) evasive behavior and flight, when coupled with a suspicious context (here, a predawn abandoned crash with theft concerns), supplies reasonable suspicion to seize; (2) force calibrated to stop active resistance and secure control of a suspect’s hands—especially where weapon concealment is reasonably feared—can be constitutionally reasonable under Graham v. Connor; (3) without an underlying constitutional violation, Monell-style municipal liability typically collapses; and (4) New Jersey’s statutory immunities, paired with a stringent “willful misconduct” standard, make state tort recovery difficult in resisting/evading/pursuit scenarios.