Entitlement to Back Pay for ADA Medical-Inquiry Violations Under §12112(d)(4)(A)

Introduction

This commentary examines the Seventh Circuit’s 2025 decision in John Nawara v. Cook County Municipality, addressing for the first time whether an employer’s requirement of a fitness-for-duty medical examination and related disclosures constitutes “discrimination on the basis of disability” under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for purposes of awarding back pay. The case arose when Mr. Nawara, a Cook County correctional officer, engaged in workplace altercations, was placed on leave, and was ordered to sign medical‐information releases before returning to duty. He sued under 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A), won a jury verdict that the medical inquiry violated the ADA, but was awarded zero damages. On post-trial motions, the district court restored his seniority but denied back pay, construing Title VII’s remedial scheme to bar relief absent a showing that the employee was actually or perceived to be disabled. The Seventh Circuit reversed that portion of the judgment and clarified that any violation of § 12112(d)(4)(A) constitutes discrimination “on the basis of disability,” entitling a prevailing plaintiff to back pay.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered two competing appeals:

• Nawara’s appeal: challenging the district court’s denial of back pay and lost pension benefits.
• Cook County’s cross‐appeal: challenging the restoration of seniority absent an award of back pay.

The panel unanimously held that:

1. By incorporating 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5’s remedial provisions, Title I of the ADA makes back pay available to any plaintiff who prevails on an ADA discrimination claim.
2. A violation of § 12112(d)(4)(A)—the prohibition on mandatory medical examinations and disability‐related inquiries unless job-related and consistent with business necessity—qualifies as “discrimination on the basis of disability” under § 12112(a). Therefore, § 2000e-5(g)(2) does not bar back pay simply because the plaintiff did not prove an actual or perceived disability.
3. The district court erred in denying Mr. Nawara’s request for back pay and pension relief; that portion of the judgment is reversed and remanded for further proceedings to quantify appropriate equitable relief.
4. The district court correctly restored Mr. Nawara’s seniority, and Cook County’s mootness argument fails because reinstated seniority remains relevant in tie-breaking and other employment contexts.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

• Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976): authorized courts under Title VII to restore seniority as equitable relief, which guides similar ADA remedies.
• Kurtzhals v. County of Dunn, 969 F.3d 725 (7th Cir. 2020): held that § 12112(d)(4)(A) applies even to employees without an actual or perceived disability, underscoring its broad scope.
• Food Marketing Institute v. Argus Leader Media, 588 U.S. 427 (2019): and United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989): reinforced the principle that courts must enforce clear statutory text according to its terms.
• Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528 (2015): illustrated the utility of statutory headings and structure in interpreting legislative intent.

Legal Reasoning

The Seventh Circuit’s opinion turned on two statutory-interpretation questions:

1. Does Title I’s incorporation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 make back pay available in ADA cases?
   Yes. Section 12117(a)commands that ADA plaintiffs have “the powers, remedies, and procedures set forth” in Title VII’s remedial provisions. Subsection 2000e-5(g)(1) authorizes “any other equitable relief”including back pay, while 2000e-5(g)(2)(A), as modified by the ADA’s focus on “disability,” excludes back pay only when the adverse action was for reasons other than discrimination on account of disability.
2. Does a § 12112(d)(4)(A) violation qualify as “discrimination on the basis of disability” even if the plaintiff is not disabled?
   The court observed that § 12112(a) broadly bans discrimination on the basis of disability “in regard to … terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” Section 12112(d)(1) then provides that that same ban “shall include medical examinations and inquiries.” By applying the “nearest-referent” canon and avoiding surplusage, the court concluded that any compelled medical inquiry is itself a form of discrimination “on the basis of disability,” triggering Title VII’s back-pay remedy when incorporated by the ADA.

Impact

This decision carries significant implications for employment law and ADA enforcement:

• Broader Remedies: Plaintiffs who prove a § 12112(d)(4)(A) violation may now expect courts to award back pay and pension benefits even absent proof of an actual or perceived disability.
• Employer Practices: Public‐sector employers and private entities with fitness-for-duty protocols must carefully tailor medical inquiries to the “job-related and consistent with business necessity” standard or risk full equitable liability.
• Lower-Court Guidance: The decision offers a clear framework for applying statutory canons of construction—particularly the incorporation canon—when overlapping remedial schemes govern civil rights statutes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Fitness-for-Duty Examination: A medical or psychological evaluation that an employer may require to ensure an employee can safely perform essential job functions.
• § 12112(d)(4)(A): The ADA provision forbidding non-job-related or non-business‐necessary medical exams or disability inquiries of current employees.
• Back Pay: Monetary compensation for wages, salary, and benefits lost due to an employer’s unlawful employment action from the date of violation to the date of judgment.
• Incorporation Canon: A rule of statutory interpretation holding that when one statute incorporates another, it adopts its provisions as modified by relevant context.

Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in John Nawara v. Cook County Municipality establishes a new precedent that any violation of the ADA’s ban on unwarranted medical examinations and inquiries—§ 12112(d)(4)(A)—constitutes “discrimination on the basis of disability” for purposes of Title VII’s back-pay remedy. By reversing the district court’s denial of back pay and affirming the restoration of seniority, the court reinforced the ADA’s remedial objectives and clarified the interplay between Title I and Title VII. Going forward, employers must exercise heightened care in medical-inquiry practices, knowing that courts have full equitable power to award back pay for any § 12112(d)(4)(A) violation, regardless of an employee’s disability status.