Enforceable § 3593 Death-Notice Deadlines and Territorial Predicate Offenses Under § 924(c) in the Virgin Islands

I. Introduction

United States v. Richardson Dangleben, Jr. is a precedential Third Circuit decision resolving two “first impression” questions arising from a federal prosecution in the District Court of the Virgin Islands.

Background. After being charged in Virgin Islands Superior Court with first-degree murder and a related firearm offense, Richardson Dangleben, Jr. was released pretrial with firearm restrictions. Four months later, he allegedly engaged in a shootout with police on St. Thomas that killed Virgin Islands Detective Delberth Phipps, Jr. A federal grand jury indicted Dangleben, including a capital-eligible count under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1) (death resulting from use of a firearm in the course of a § 924(c) violation where the killing is murder), and two counts under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A).

Key issues. (1) Whether a district court may set and enforce a deadline for the Government to provide notice of intent to seek the death penalty under 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a), and strike a notice filed after that court-ordered deadline—particularly where the Government previously represented it would not seek death. (2) Whether Virgin Islands territorial offenses can qualify as predicate “crime[s] of violence” for § 924(c), given § 924(c)’s requirement that the predicate be one “for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States.”

Parties. The United States appealed orders that (a) struck its belated death-penalty seek notice and (b) dismissed § 924(c) counts (and territorial predicates) on the theory that only federal offenses may serve as § 924(c) predicates.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  1. Death-penalty notice management (affirmed). The Third Circuit held that § 3593(a) does not displace a district court’s inherent authority to manage its docket by setting and enforcing a deadline by which the Government must file a death-penalty seek notice. On the facts presented—where the Government joined a 60-day deadline, obtained one extension, then filed a notice that it “will not seek” death, only to reverse course over a year later—the District Court did not abuse its discretion in striking the later seek notice as violating the court-ordered deadline.
  2. Territorial predicates under § 924(c) (reversed and remanded). The Third Circuit held that Virgin Islands territorial felonies may qualify as § 924(c) predicate “crime[s] of violence” because (a) § 924(c)(3)(A)’s definition is not limited to federal offenses, and (b) under 18 U.S.C. § 23 and 48 U.S.C. § 1612(c), such territorial offenses may be prosecuted in the District Court of the Virgin Islands, which Congress defines as a “court of the United States” for Title 18. The court rejected the District Court’s “absurdity” and “policy” rationale for departing from the statute’s plain text.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Appellate jurisdiction to review striking a death notice and dismissal-related orders

  • United States v. Mitchell (652 F.3d 387 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc)) framed the baseline rule that Government criminal appeals exist only as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3731. The panel used that framework to decide whether striking a death notice fits within § 3731’s authorization.
  • United States v. Bass (266 F.3d 532 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d on other grounds, 536 U.S. 862 (2002)), United States v. Quinones (313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002)), United States v. Acosta-Martinez (252 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2001)), United States v. Cheely (36 F.3d 1439 (9th Cir. 1994)), and United States v. Woolard (981 F.2d 756 (5th Cir. 1993)) supplied persuasive authority that striking a death notice functions like “partial dismissal” of a charge and is appealable under § 3731. The Third Circuit “join[ed] the chorus,” adopting this widely shared view.
  • Uttecht v. Brown (551 U.S. 1 (2007)) and White v. Wheeler (577 U.S. 73 (2015) (per curiam)) were cited to illustrate concrete trial consequences of capital status (e.g., death-qualification of jurors), reinforcing that striking a death notice materially changes the prosecution and thus warrants immediate review.
  • Geo Grp., Inc. v. Menocal (146 S. Ct. 774 (2026)), Abney v. United States (431 U.S. 651 (1977)), Brown v. Ohio (432 U.S. 161 (1977)), and Burks v. United States (437 U.S. 1 (1978)) supported an alternative basis for immediate appellate review under the collateral-order doctrine: the order conclusively determined capital status, was separate from merits, and could be effectively unreviewable later due to double-jeopardy constraints on retrying a non-capital conviction as a capital case.

2. Inherent authority, case management, and the “reasonable time” death-notice statute

  • Dietz v. Bouldin (579 U.S. 40 (2016)) provided the governing statement of inherent authority: district courts may manage proceedings, but that authority cannot contradict statutes/rules and must reasonably respond to fair administration needs. The Third Circuit used Dietz to assess whether setting a § 3593(a) deadline conflicts with the statute (it does not).
  • Drippe v. Tobelinski (604 F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 2010)) supplied the Third Circuit’s deference principle on case management, bolstering the conclusion that enforcing a jointly requested deadline fell within the trial court’s discretion.
  • United States v. Wright (913 F.3d 364 (3d Cir. 2019)) was cited for the standard that enforcing deadlines typically lies within the district court’s discretion and also for the broader principle that prosecutorial discretion is substantial but not a license to override the judiciary’s managerial role in proceedings.
  • United States v. Cole (799 F. Supp. 3d 438 (D.V.I. 2025)), United States v. Meehan (2026 WL 447431 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 17, 2026)), United States v. Suarez (801 F. Supp. 3d 872 (N.D. Cal. 2025)), and United States v. Rivas-Moreiera (2023 WL 11960650 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 7, 2023)) were used as practical confirmation that courts do set § 3593 deadlines even without a fixed trial date; they served as persuasive, on-the-ground examples that the District Court’s approach was not anomalous.
  • United States v. Spurlock (782 F. Supp. 3d 987 (D. Nev. 2025), appeal dismissed, 2025 WL 2319947 (9th Cir. June 11, 2025)) reinforced the distinction central to this opinion: courts may set compliance deadlines that serve “administrative concerns” without intruding on the Executive’s ultimate charging/penalty decision.

3. Separation of powers and prosecutorial discretion

  • United States v. Nixon (418 U.S. 683 (1974)) and Wayte v. United States (470 U.S. 598 (1985)) were invoked by the Government to argue exclusive executive authority over prosecution decisions. The Third Circuit accepted the premise of broad discretion but held it did not answer the separate question whether courts can manage deadlines that structure fair and efficient litigation.
  • United States v. Slone (969 F. Supp. 2d 830 (E.D. Ky. 2013)) helped mark the boundary: courts should not supervise DOJ’s internal capital-review protocol, but may set a seek-notice deadline because it directly affects the court’s case administration and the defendant’s capital-case rights.
  • United States v. Goodwin (457 U.S. 368 (1982)) was used to acknowledge that charging decisions can evolve and that early prosecutorial decisions do not necessarily “freeze” later conduct. The Third Circuit nevertheless distinguished the capital context and stressed the absence of new evidence and the Government’s own role in agreeing to the deadline and representing “will not seek” death.

4. Statutory interpretation: text, absurdity doctrine, purpose, and legislative history

  • Rotkiske v. Klemm (589 U.S. 8 (2019)) supplied the principle that clear statutory text ends the inquiry. This anchored the Third Circuit’s rejection of the District Court’s policy-based departure from § 924(c)’s “plain and unambiguous” language.
  • Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States ex. rel Hunt (587 U.S. 262 (2019)), Riccio v. Sentry Credit, Inc. (954 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 2020) (en banc)), and Yellen v. Confederated Tribes of Chehalis Rsrv. (594 U.S. 338 (2021)) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) framed the narrowness of the absurdity doctrine and warned against using it to rewrite statutes because a result seems “odd” or harsh.
  • Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts was cited as interpretive authority cautioning that “absurdity” is a slippery slope and not a license to fix perceived drafting “errors” or unexpected consequences by judicial revision.
  • S.H. ex rel. Durrell v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist. (729 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 2013)), Riva v. Mitchell (460 F.2d 1121 (3d Cir. 1972)), and Diamond v. Chakrabarty (447 U.S. 303 (1980)) collectively reinforced textual primacy: when statutory language unambiguously covers a situation, courts do not narrow it to only the “particular applications contemplated” at enactment.
  • Milner v. Dep't of Navy (562 U.S. 562 (2011)) and Est. of Arrington v. Michael (738 F.3d 599 (3d Cir. 2013)) reinforced that legislative history is not used to create ambiguity; it is, at most, a tool to resolve genuine ambiguity.
  • United States v. Culbert (435 U.S. 371 (1978)) supported the court’s critique of attempts (notably in D.C. district court cases) to “manufacture” ambiguity to justify reliance on legislative history.

5. Territorial jurisdiction and § 924(c) predicates

  • United States v. Gillette (738 F.3d 63 (3d Cir. 2013)) supplied the key jurisdictional proposition that the District Court of the Virgin Islands has jurisdiction over local crimes related to federal crimes under 48 U.S.C. § 1612(c), and that it is an Article IV court whose Title 18 status is defined by Congress.
  • United States v. Hodge (948 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2020)) was cited for de novo review of statutory interpretation. United States v. Hodge (870 F.3d 184 (3d Cir. 2017)) was cited for the constitutional status of the Virgin Islands (no independent sovereignty; authority derives from Congress), which undercut the District Court’s “absurdity” theory about differential treatment versus states.
  • United States v. Hodge (2016 WL 8730657 (D.V.I. Apr. 15, 2016)) was cited as a district-level example recognizing territorial predicates under § 924(c), illustrating that the Government’s textual reading had already been accepted in Virgin Islands practice.
  • United States v. Brown (58 F. Supp. 3d 115 (D.D.C. 2014)) and United States v. Mejia (657 F. Supp. 3d 123 (D.D.C. 2023)) were acknowledged as contrary authority in a similar “local offenses in federal court” setting (D.C.). The Third Circuit found them unpersuasive for treating the phrase “may be prosecuted in a court of the United States” as ambiguous and for effectively inserting the word “federal” into § 924(c).

6. Capital punishment in jurisdictions that do not themselves authorize death

  • United States v. Gabrion (719 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2013) (en banc)) supported the court’s rebuttal to the District Court’s “oxymoronic” concern: the federal government may seek the federal death penalty even where the relevant state has abolished it, underscoring that local abolition does not constrain federal penalties.

7. Canons and constitutional doctrines raised and rejected

  • United States v. Davis (588 U.S. 445 (2019)), United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop. (532 U.S. 483 (2001)), and United States v. Perez-Colon (62 F.4th 805 (3d Cir. 2023)) framed the limits of constitutional avoidance and the rule of lenity: they apply only where the statute is ambiguous. Because the Third Circuit found § 924(c) unambiguous in this setting, it declined to apply either doctrine.
  • Johnson v. United States (576 U.S. 591 (2015)) was cited for the vagueness standard; the court held there was no vagueness because the statutory scheme clearly states the District Court of the Virgin Islands is a “court of the United States” for Title 18, and clearly ties § 924(c) to crimes prosecutable there.

8. Interpreting § 924(j) through § 924(c)

  • Barrett v. United States (146 S. Ct. 482 (2026)) was cited for the relationship between § 924(j) and § 924(c): § 924(j) increases the punishment ceiling for § 924-authorized conduct. That linkage mattered because once territorial crimes can be § 924(c) predicates, they can also support § 924(j)’s heightened penalties—including death—if other requirements are met.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Enforcing a § 3593(a) seek-notice deadline: inherent authority complements the “reasonable time” standard

The statutory anchor is simple: if the Government “will seek the sentence of death,” it must file a notice “a reasonable time before the trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a). The Government argued that because the statute speaks only in terms of “reasonable time before trial,” a court may not impose an earlier, firm deadline (or enforce one once the trial date shifts).

The Third Circuit rejected that framing by treating “reasonable time” as a standard that necessarily requires judicial administration. In other words, § 3593(a) does not create a prosecutor-controlled, moving target; it calls for reasonableness, and reasonableness often must be operationalized through scheduling orders. Relying on Dietz v. Bouldin and Drippe v. Tobelinski, the court held that deadline-setting is a paradigmatic use of inherent authority so long as it does not contradict the statute. It did not: § 3593(a) sets a floor (“reasonable time before trial”), not a safe harbor allowing the Government to disregard court-ordered case-management deadlines, especially where the Government agreed to the timeline and the court granted an extension.

The court emphasized practical and fairness-based considerations that, in the capital context, become constitutional-adjacent even if not framed as constitutional holdings: capital status triggers distinct defense entitlements (e.g., learned counsel under 18 U.S.C. § 3005, and capital investigative/expert resources under 18 U.S.C. § 3599) and reshapes strategy (mitigation investigation; bifurcated proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b); voir dire and death qualification). Allowing the Government to “revoke” a no-seek stance long after a deadline—and after the defense forwent capital preparations in reliance—would undermine efficient adjudication and create incentives for costly “shadow capital” preparation in every capital-eligible case regardless of the Government’s representations.

Importantly, the court treated the District Court’s action as managing litigation posture, not supervising DOJ’s internal process or second-guessing the merits of seeking death. The District Court asked for a timeframe; the Government agreed that 60 days was “eminently reasonable”; the court granted one extension; then the Government filed a definitive “will not seek” notice. On this record—and with no new evidence prompting reversal—the Third Circuit held the District Court did not abuse its discretion by enforcing its own deadline and striking the late seek notice.

The opinion also carefully limited its reach. In footnote 4, the court expressly declined to decide whether the belated notice satisfied § 3593(a)’s “reasonable time before trial” requirement, whether a reversal from no-seek to seek is an “amendment” requiring “good cause” under § 3593(a), or whether due process independently bars the Government’s reversal. That restraint underscores that the holding is procedural and managerial: courts may set and enforce seek-notice deadlines.

2. Territorial “crime[s] of violence” predicates under § 924(c): text and territorial jurisdiction control

Section 924(c) applies to firearm use/possession during/in furtherance of “any crime of violence … for which the person may be prosecuted in a court of the United States.” The District Court reasoned that although the text seemingly allowed territorial predicates, applying it would be “absurd” because it would expose Virgin Islands defendants to a harsher federal regime not available elsewhere, including potentially the federal death penalty for conduct also chargeable as territorial murder where local law does not authorize death.

The Third Circuit’s reasoning proceeds in two textual steps:

  1. The “crime of violence” definition is offense-agnostic. Under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), a crime of violence is “an offense that is a felony” with a force element. Nothing in that definition limits it to U.S. Code offenses.
  2. The Virgin Islands territorial felonies at issue are prosecutable in a “court of the United States.” Congress defined “court of the United States” for Title 18 to include the District Court of the Virgin Islands (18 U.S.C. § 23), and Congress granted that court concurrent jurisdiction over certain local Virgin Islands offenses related to federal offenses (48 U.S.C. § 1612(c)). Thus, when a territorial felony is part of the same act/transaction as a federal offense, it “may be prosecuted” in that court, satisfying § 924(c)(1)(A)’s jurisdictional phrase.

Having found the text unambiguous, the court held the District Court erred by invoking the absurdity doctrine and purposivist considerations to override the ordinary meaning. The Third Circuit reiterated (via Rotkiske v. Klemm, Cochise Consultancy, Inc. v. United States ex. rel Hunt, and Riccio v. Sentry Credit, Inc.) that “odd” results are not “absurd” and that the absurdity doctrine cannot be used to impose judicial preferences. Differential treatment between territories and states is not only conceivable but expected because Congress’s power over territories is plenary (United States v. Hodge (870 F.3d 184)).

The panel also dispatched the “no local death penalty” argument with supremacy and federalism principles: federal punishment does not depend on whether the local jurisdiction authorizes the same punishment (United States v. Gabrion). If federal law authorizes death for a federal offense (here, § 924(j) predicated on § 924(c)), the absence of a territorial death penalty does not make application “nonsensical.”

Finally, the court acknowledged contrary D.C. district court decisions (United States v. Brown; United States v. Mejia) but found their ambiguity-based approach unconvincing and inconsistent with the statutory text. The Third Circuit emphasized that reading § 924(c) as limited to “federal” crimes effectively inserts words Congress did not use.

C. Impact

1. Capital-case administration: courts may lock in death-penalty posture through enforceable scheduling

This decision substantially strengthens district courts’ ability to manage capital-eligible cases by imposing a firm “seek decision” deadline and enforcing it. Practically:

  • Reliance interests matter procedurally. The Third Circuit’s reasoning gives weight to defense reliance on the Government’s “will not seek” representation, even without adopting an explicit due-process holding. That will likely encourage courts to demand clarity and finality early, and to treat late reversals skeptically absent compelling justification.
  • DOJ policy shifts will not automatically reopen capital posture. Here, the Government’s reversal followed a change in federal executive policy (Executive Order 14,164 and a new Attorney General memorandum directing review of “no-seek” decisions). The Third Circuit’s holding indicates that internal executive directives do not displace court-ordered deadlines in ongoing litigation.
  • Future litigation will focus on what the Third Circuit left open. Because the court did not decide “reasonable time before trial,” “good cause” for amendment, or due process, parties will likely litigate those questions in cases without a violated court-imposed deadline, or where the Government offers new evidence or materially changed circumstances.

2. Virgin Islands prosecutions: broader availability of § 924(c) and § 924(j) charging

By holding that Virgin Islands territorial crimes can be § 924(c) predicates when prosecutable in the District Court of the Virgin Islands under § 1612(c), the Third Circuit:

  • Reinstates a powerful federal enhancement regime for firearm use tied to local violent felonies litigated alongside federal charges in federal court.
  • Expands the universe of cases potentially eligible for § 924(j) punishments, because § 924(j) depends on a § 924(c) violation. That includes the possibility—at least as a matter of statutory eligibility—of federal capital exposure tied to killings connected to § 924(c), even where local law does not authorize death.
  • Signals skepticism toward “absurdity” challenges grounded in territorial/state comparisons, emphasizing Congress’s distinctive territorial governance powers.

3. Potential influence beyond the Virgin Islands

The court’s engagement with United States v. Brown and United States v. Mejia suggests the decision may be cited in other “local offenses in federal court” contexts, especially where Congress has expressly conferred local-offense jurisdiction on a federal tribunal. While the Virgin Islands has distinctive statutory architecture (notably § 23 and § 1612(c)), the reasoning is broadly textual: if an offense “may be prosecuted in a court of the United States,” it can qualify—without reading “federal” into § 924(c).

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • § 3593(a) death notice. In a capital-eligible federal case, the Government must file a notice stating it “will seek” death and listing aggravating factors. The statute requires the notice be filed a “reasonable time before the trial.”
  • Inherent authority (docket management). Courts have built-in power to run cases efficiently and fairly (set deadlines, manage schedules), so long as they do not contradict statutes or rules. The Third Circuit held that setting a § 3593(a) deadline implements, rather than contradicts, the “reasonable time” requirement.
  • Learned counsel. A defendant facing possible death is entitled to two attorneys, with at least one experienced in capital law (18 U.S.C. § 3005). Whether the case is “capital” thus materially changes defense staffing and preparation.
  • § 924(c) predicate “crime of violence.” A separate federal firearm offense that applies when a defendant uses/possesses a firearm during a qualifying violent felony. The “crime of violence” definition here is the “elements clause” (requires a force element), not a list of named offenses.
  • Concurrent jurisdiction under 48 U.S.C. § 1612(c). Congress allows the District Court of the Virgin Islands to hear certain local Virgin Islands crimes when they are tied to a federal offense (same act/transaction). That is what makes territorial crimes “prosecutable” in a Title 18 “court of the United States.”
  • Absurdity doctrine. A narrow exception allowing departure from clear text only when the result is truly irrational for any legislature. The Third Circuit held the District Court applied this doctrine too loosely.
  • Collateral order doctrine. A narrow path to immediate appeal of certain orders that are final in effect on an important issue separate from the merits and would be effectively unreviewable after final judgment.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Richardson Dangleben, Jr. establishes two consequential rules in the Third Circuit:

  1. District courts may set and enforce a deadline for the Government to file a death-penalty seek notice under 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a), and may strike a notice filed after that deadline—particularly where the Government previously represented it “will not seek” death and the case progressed in reliance on that representation.
  2. Virgin Islands territorial offenses may serve as predicate “crime[s] of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) when, by statute, they “may be prosecuted” in the District Court of the Virgin Islands, a “court of the United States” for Title 18 purposes.

In broader context, the opinion is a forceful reaffirmation of (a) judicial control over litigation architecture in capital-eligible cases and (b) textualism in construing federal criminal statutes that interact with territorial jurisdiction—rejecting policy-driven departures from unambiguous statutory language.