Eleventh Amendment Sovereign Immunity Requires Dismissal Without Prejudice of ADA Title I (and Derivative Title V) Claims Against State University Boards; Ex parte Young Relief Unavailable Against State Agencies

Introduction

In Tamika Momanyi v. The Board of Trustees of The University of Alabama (11th Cir. Aug. 28, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), a pro se graduate student and former employee of the University of Alabama at Birmingham (“UAB”) sued the UAB governing entity, the Board of Trustees of The University of Alabama (the “Board”). She alleged disability discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) and asserted Fourteenth Amendment claims tied to denial of accommodations and alleged retaliation.

The case presented recurring issues in public-university litigation: (1) the scope and consequences of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity for ADA employment claims (Title I) and derivative retaliation claims (Title V); (2) the pleading requirements for ADA public-services/education claims (Title II) and Title V retaliation; (3) how constitutional claims must be routed through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and who qualifies as a proper defendant; and (4) when courts may deny further amendments as futile.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit largely affirmed the dismissal of Momanyi’s suit but made a jurisdictional correction:

  • ADA Title I (employment) claims (Counts I & III): barred by sovereign immunity because the Board is an arm of the State of Alabama and Congress did not abrogate immunity for Title I.
  • ADA Title V claim predicated on Title I (Count II): also barred/subject to dismissal because it depended on the immune Title I claims.
  • Key modification: because sovereign immunity is jurisdictional, Counts I–III must be dismissed “without prejudice,” not with prejudice. The court vacated and remanded for the limited purpose of entering a dismissal without prejudice as to those counts.
  • ADA Title II (education/public services) and related Title V claims (Counts IV–VI): affirmed dismissal for failure to state a claim—insufficient allegations of exclusion/denial of benefits “by reason of” disability and insufficient allegations of protected activity/adverse action for retaliation.
  • Fourteenth Amendment claims (Counts VII–IX): affirmed dismissal because the Amendment itself does not supply a private right of action; and even construing the pleading under § 1983, the Board is not a “person” defendant under that statute.
  • Preliminary injunction: properly denied for lack of likelihood of success on the merits.
  • Further amendment/supplementation: properly denied as futile and after repeated failures to cure deficiencies; proposed HIPAA/FERPA claims lacked a private right of action; and proposed state-law claims on behalf of her spouse were impermissible.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The panel’s reasoning is an application and synthesis of established sovereign-immunity, pleading, ADA, and § 1983 doctrine, anchored by the following authorities (listed in the order they materially shape the decision).

1) Sovereign immunity, Title I, and the “without prejudice” rule

  • Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001): The central Title I immunity anchor. The court relied on Garrett both to confirm the Board’s status as a state entity and to reiterate that Congress did not validly abrogate state sovereign immunity for ADA Title I claims.
  • Dupree v. Owens, 92 F.4th 999 (11th Cir. 2024): Provided the jurisdictional framing and the dispositive remedial correction. The opinion used Dupree for two propositions: (i) sovereign immunity is reviewed de novo and is jurisdictional; and (ii) dismissals on sovereign-immunity grounds must be entered without prejudice. It also supplied the rule that a Title V claim “predicated on” an immune ADA provision fails against the state entity.
  • Nichols v. Ala. State Bar, 815 F.3d 726 (11th Cir. 2016): Supported the general proposition that Eleventh Amendment immunity bars suits against the State or its agencies absent waiver/consent or abrogation, and reinforced that Alabama has not consented to civil-rights suits.

2) Ex parte Young and why injunctive relief failed against the Board

  • Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908): Momanyi invoked the doctrine to seek prospective injunctive relief despite sovereign immunity.
  • Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139 (1993): The limiting principle the panel applied—Ex parte Young authorizes suits against state officials (in their official capacity for prospective relief), not suits against the State or its agencies “regardless of the relief sought.” This foreclosed injunctive relief because Momanyi sued the Board itself rather than an appropriate state officer.

3) Title II abrogation, but pleading failure on discrimination and retaliation

  • United States v. Georgia, 546 U.S. 151 (2006): Confirmed that Title II can validly abrogate sovereign immunity, so the Board could not defeat Title II claims on immunity grounds. This shifted the analysis from jurisdiction to sufficiency of pleading.
  • Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Silberman v. Miami Dade Transit, 927 F.3d 1123 (11th Cir. 2019)): Supplied the three-part Title II discrimination test (qualified individual; excluded/denied benefits or otherwise discriminated against; causation “by reason of” disability).
  • Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985): Used for the “meaningful access” and “reasonable accommodations” concept—critical in education/public services claims, but here the panel found Momanyi did not plausibly allege denial of meaningful access.
  • Nehme v. Fla. Int'l Univ. Bd. of Trs., 121 F.4th 1379 (11th Cir. 2024) (quoting Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985)): Provided the higher-education overlay—courts give “great respect” and the “widest range of discretion” to faculty “genuinely academic decision[s]” about student performance. The panel relied on this deference to reject attempts to transform grading and classroom interactions into plausible ADA Title II adverse actions without stronger causation and access-denial allegations.
  • Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 2004): Supplied the Title V retaliation elements and the “fatal if any element is missing” framing; also underscored that the ADA is “not a code of civility.”
  • Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 1997): Provided the prima facie retaliation framework (protected activity; adverse action; causal link).
  • Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla., 344 F.3d 1161 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Doe v. Dekalb Cnty. Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 1998)): Clarified the “materially adverse” requirement in ADA public services/accommodations contexts—an action must be adverse under the circumstances as viewed by a reasonable person, not merely “unkind.”

4) Fourteenth Amendment enforcement and proper defendants

  • Charles v. Johnson, 18 F.4th 686 (11th Cir. 2021): Provided the core procedural point that Fourteenth Amendment rights are enforced via 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
  • Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, 261 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2001): Restated that § 1983 requires deprivation by a “person” acting under color of state law.
  • Harden v. Adams, 760 F.2d 1158 (11th Cir. 1985): Used to reinforce that Alabama university boards are instrumentalities of the state, supporting the conclusion that the Board is not the right § 1983 defendant as pleaded.

5) Pleading standards, injunction standards, and amendment/supplementation

  • EEOC v. STME, LLC, 938 F.3d 1305 (11th Cir. 2019); Hill v. White, 321 F.3d 1334 (11th Cir. 2003); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007): Anchored the Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility framework applied to the Title II and retaliation pleadings.
  • Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165 (11th Cir. 2014): Supported liberal construction of pro se pleadings, which the panel acknowledged but still found insufficient.
  • Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., 840 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2016) (quoting Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc)): Provided the four-factor preliminary injunction test; lack of likelihood of success was dispositive.
  • Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island, 544 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2008): Standard of review for denial of leave to amend/supplement.
  • Blackburn v. Shire US Inc., 18 F.4th 1310 (11th Cir. 2021): Enumerated factors for leave to amend (including repeated failure to cure and futility).
  • Tampa Bay Water v. HDR Eng'g, Inc., 731 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2013), overruled on other grounds by, CSX Transp., Inc. v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 846 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2017): Supported denial for undue delay when new claims were known earlier and would prolong proceedings.
  • Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002): Supported the conclusion that FERPA does not create a private right of action; the panel similarly noted no private right under HIPAA-related provisions it cited.
  • Devine v. Indian River Cnty. Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576 (11th Cir.1997) overruled in part on other grounds, Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516 (2007): Supported denying proposed state-law claims asserted on behalf of Momanyi’s spouse (a pro se litigant generally cannot represent another person’s interests in court).
  • Shahar v. Bowers, 120 F.3d 211 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc); Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870 (11th Cir. 2008): Used to reject an argument raised late (recusal theory first appearing in reply posture), treated as abandoned.

Legal Reasoning

1) ADA Title I: state-agency immunity plus the remedial correction

The panel’s Title I analysis is straightforward: the Board is a state agency created to operate UAB (citing Ala. Code § 16-47-1), and Alabama’s constitution preserves broad immunity (Ala. Const. Art. I, § 14). Under Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, Congress did not abrogate that immunity for ADA Title I. The district court therefore lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the Title I counts against the Board.

The opinion’s most concrete doctrinal takeaway is the remedial consequence of that jurisdictional bar: citing Dupree v. Owens, the court held that dismissal on sovereign-immunity grounds is not “on the merits” and must be entered without prejudice. The Eleventh Circuit thus vacated the “with prejudice” aspect and remanded solely to correct the judgment as to Counts I–III.

2) Injunctive relief: why Ex parte Young did not help

Momanyi argued that even if damages were barred, the court could award prospective injunctive relief. The panel rejected this because she sued the Board itself. Under Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., Ex parte Young does not apply to “States and their agencies,” only to noncompliant state officials. The opinion thus functions as a pleading/party-selection warning: plaintiffs seeking prospective relief must typically name the appropriate state officer, not the state agency.

3) Title V retaliation tied to Title I: derivative failure

The panel construed Count II as a Title V retaliation claim predicated on the Title I employment theory. Under Dupree v. Owens, a Title V claim is “predicated on” harm after assertion of rights under another ADA title; when the predicate title claim is barred by sovereign immunity as to a state entity, the derivative retaliation claim cannot proceed against that entity either. The court also noted Momanyi separately pleaded a Title V theory tied to Title II, reinforcing its interpretation that Count II was the Title I-derivative retaliation count.

4) Title II discrimination: failure to plead “meaningful access” and disability causation

Unlike Title I, Title II immunity is abrogated (United States v. Georgia). But the panel found Momanyi did not plausibly plead that she was excluded from, or denied benefits of, a program or service “by reason of” disability. Her allegations about harsh critiques, low grades, classroom comments, and financial-aid “terms and conditions” did not amount to denial of “meaningful access” under Alexander v. Choate—particularly where she remained enrolled and ultimately received her aid. Additionally, she did not identify what classroom accommodations she requested or how their denial concretely impeded access to the program.

The panel also emphasized judicial deference to academic judgments, quoting Nehme v. Fla. Int'l Univ. Bd. of Trs. and Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing. That deference did not immunize disability discrimination, but it raised the bar for plausibly pleading that grading or academic critique was discriminatory “by reason of” disability rather than ordinary academic evaluation.

5) Title II-predicated retaliation: failure to plead protected activity and materially adverse action

Applying Higdon v. Jackson and Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., the court held Momanyi failed to plead (i) protected activity and (ii) a materially adverse action in the Title II context. She did not specify that her academic complaints invoked ADA-protected rights (as opposed to “personal grievance”), nor did she specify what classroom accommodations she sought. As to adversity, the panel treated the alleged classroom incidents as falling within ordinary academic discretion (Nehme) and reiterated that the ADA is not a “code of civility” (Higdon), requiring a tangible negative effect beyond unpleasant interactions.

6) Fourteenth Amendment: correct vehicle and correct defendant

The panel reframed the issue as procedural: even assuming constitutional wrongdoing, Momanyi did not sue using the correct enforcement mechanism or name a proper defendant. Under Charles v. Johnson, Fourteenth Amendment rights are enforced via § 1983. Under Griffin v. City of Opa-Locka, § 1983 requires a deprivation by a “person” acting under color of law. A state university board, treated as a state agency/instrumentality (see Harden v. Adams), is not a proper § 1983 “person” defendant as pleaded, so the claims were dismissed.

7) Preliminary injunction and amendment

The injunction denial followed automatically from the merits/jurisdiction determinations: under Wreal, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc. and Siegel v. LePore, failure to show likelihood of success is fatal.

The denial of further amendment/supplementation rested on repeated failure to cure and futility, invoking Blackburn v. Shire US Inc. and delay principles from Tampa Bay Water v. HDR Eng'g, Inc.. The panel additionally underscored that FERPA and HIPAA do not supply private causes of action (citing Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe and statutory authority), and that a pro se litigant cannot litigate claims on behalf of a spouse (citing Devine v. Indian River Cnty. Sch. Bd., as modified in part by Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist. on other issues).

Impact

  • Jurisdictional housekeeping with practical consequences: The decision reinforces that when sovereign immunity applies, dismissal must be without prejudice (Dupree v. Owens). Practically, this preserves the formal distinction between lack of jurisdiction and failure on the merits—important for claim preclusion analysis and for any attempt to refile against proper defendants (where legally available).
  • Party-selection clarity for prospective relief: The opinion highlights a common pleading defect: suing a state agency while invoking Ex parte Young. Prospective relief requires naming the appropriate state official; suing the agency itself triggers immunity “regardless of the relief sought” (Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.).
  • Higher-education ADA claims must be concrete: In academic settings, alleging unfair grading or humiliation is not enough without specific allegations tying denial of access or adverse educational action to disability and, where relevant, to requested accommodations—especially given deference to academic evaluation (Nehme v. Fla. Int'l Univ. Bd. of Trs.).
  • Retaliation claims require ADA-signaling and material adversity: Complaints must plausibly communicate disability-rights opposition/requests (protected activity), and the alleged response must be materially adverse under the circumstances (Shotz v. City of Plantation, Fla.).
  • Limits on “new statutory” add-ons: The decision reiterates that litigants cannot salvage a case late with statutes lacking private rights of action (FERPA/HIPAA) or by attempting to represent others’ claims pro se.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Sovereign immunity (Eleventh Amendment): States and their agencies generally cannot be sued in federal court by private individuals unless the state consents or Congress validly removes immunity for that specific type of claim.
  • Abrogation vs. waiver: “Abrogation” is Congress removing immunity by statute (only if constitutionally permitted). “Waiver” is the state agreeing to be sued. Here, Title I had no valid abrogation (Garrett) and Alabama did not waive immunity.
  • Why “without prejudice” matters: A dismissal “with prejudice” is a merits judgment; “without prejudice” reflects that the court lacked power to decide the claim at all. Sovereign immunity is jurisdictional, so courts must use “without prejudice.”
  • Ex parte Young: A narrow pathway to sue state officials (not agencies) for prospective orders to stop ongoing violations of federal law.
  • Title II “meaningful access”: In public programs (including public university programs), the ADA focuses on whether a qualified person with a disability had real, practical access to the program’s benefits, sometimes requiring reasonable accommodations.
  • Section 1983 as the “vehicle” for constitutional claims: You typically cannot sue directly under the Fourteenth Amendment; § 1983 is the statute that authorizes suits for constitutional violations, and it requires a proper “person” defendant.
  • No private right of action: Some statutes impose duties but do not let individuals sue for damages directly. The court concluded FERPA and HIPAA do not provide the private lawsuit path Momanyi sought.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision is most significant for its jurisdictional clarification: when ADA Title I (and a derivative Title V) claims are barred by sovereign immunity against a state university board, dismissal must be entered without prejudice. The opinion also reinforces two practical litigation lessons: (1) Ex parte Young requires suing the correct state official, not the agency; and (2) Title II education-based ADA and retaliation claims must plead concrete denial of meaningful access, disability-based causation, protected activity, and material adversity—especially in the face of strong judicial deference to academic judgments.