EFTA “Notice of Error” Must Be Pleaded with Statutory Specificity; “Best Case” Dismissal and Prefiling Injunction Affirmed

1. Introduction

In Reyna v. Block (5th Cir. May 18, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), Plaintiff–Appellant Joseph Anthony Reyna, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, sued Block, Incorporated, d/b/a Cash App and Sutton Bank alleging violations of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act (EFTA). Reyna claimed that unauthorized Google Play transactions totaling $67.66 appeared in a Cash App account and that defendants failed to respond timely to his “notice of account errors.” Although the funds were restored, he sought statutory penalties on the theory that reimbursement was untimely under the EFTA.

The district court dismissed the case on screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(ii), concluding that the complaint failed to allege statutorily sufficient notice under the EFTA, and it also entered a prefiling injunction based on Reyna’s extensive pattern of repetitive filings (noting he had filed 24 pro se lawsuits in Texas federal courts since June of the prior year, and this was the ninth such case).

On appeal, the Fifth Circuit addressed two core issues: (1) whether Reyna adequately pleaded EFTA-compliant notice triggering a financial institution’s duty to investigate and respond; and (2) whether dismissal without leave to amend and the entry of a prefiling injunction were within the district court’s discretion.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Fifth Circuit affirmed both the dismissal and the prefiling injunction. It held that Reyna failed to plead facts showing he gave defendants EFTA-compliant notice—his complaint referenced only a “Litigation Preservation Notice (June 6, 2025)” without alleging its contents or that it satisfied the statute’s specific informational requirements. Because he was informed of the defect and still did not add necessary facts—nor sought leave to amend— the court concluded he had pleaded his “best case,” making dismissal without inviting amendment permissible. Finally, given the undisputed findings about Reyna’s litigation history and prior warnings, the court held the prefiling injunction was supported by sufficiently specific findings and was not an abuse of discretion.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Yohey v. Collins, 985 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1993) and Brinkmann v. Dall. Cnty. Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1987)
    Role in the opinion: These cases supplied the forfeiture rule: issues not briefed on appeal are not preserved, even for pro se litigants. The panel used them to note that Reyna forfeited appellate review of the dismissal of his Americans with Disabilities Act and Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act claims by not briefing them. This narrowed the appeal to the EFTA dismissal and the prefiling injunction.
  • Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)
    Role in the opinion: Provided the de novo standard of review for dismissal. The panel applied that standard to assess whether the complaint pleaded sufficient facts to state an EFTA claim.
  • Qureshi v. United States, 600 F.3d 523 (5th Cir. 2010)
    Role in the opinion: Supplied the abuse of discretion standard for reviewing a prefiling injunction. The panel relied on this framework to evaluate whether the district court’s restrictions were justified and appropriately supported.
  • Brewster v. Dretke, 587 F.3d 764 (5th Cir. 2009)
    Role in the opinion: Central to two determinations: (1) the abuse-of-discretion standard for reviewing denial of leave to amend in this pro se context; and (2) the “best case” doctrine—leave to amend is not required if the plaintiff has already pleaded his best case. The Fifth Circuit used Brewster to affirm dismissal without inviting amendment because Reyna did not add key facts despite being put on notice of the deficiency.
  • Kashanchi v. Tex. Commerce Med. Bank, N.A., 703 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1983)
    Role in the opinion: Clarified that the EFTA applies only to “consumers,” meaning “natural persons.” The panel flagged an additional threshold pleading problem: it could not discern whether the relevant account belonged to Reyna as a natural person or instead to his LLC or foundation, which the complaint listed as related parties. While not the dispositive ground (the notice defect was), this reinforced the complaint’s insufficiency.
  • Hale v. King, 642 F.3d 492 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)
    Role in the opinion: These cases supplied modern pleading standards. The panel reiterated that while pro se pleadings are held to “less stringent standards,” they must still allege sufficient factual matter to state a claim that is plausible on its face. The court used this to reject Reyna’s conclusory reference to a June 6 notice without factual detail.
  • United States v. Riascos, 76 F.3d 93 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam)
    Role in the opinion: Explained that a district court may construe an issue first raised in objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation as a motion to amend. The panel cited it while emphasizing that Reyna did not meaningfully supply new facts even at the objections stage—supporting the conclusion that further amendment would not change the outcome.
  • Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, 513 F.3d 181 (5th Cir. 2008)
    Role in the opinion: Supported the proposition that prefiling injunctions may be sustained where the district court makes sufficiently specific findings about abusive litigation conduct and the burdens of frivolous suits. The panel used Baum to affirm the injunction based on Reyna’s undisputed filing history and prior warnings.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. The EFTA’s notice requirement is content-specific—and must be pleaded as such

The panel described the EFTA framework governing error resolution: within 60 days of seeing an error, a consumer must provide the financial institution “notice” that includes: (1) the consumer’s name and account number (or information enabling identification), (2) the consumer’s belief the statement contains an error, (3) the amount of the error, and (4) the reasons for believing an error occurred. Upon receipt of statutorily sufficient notice, the institution must investigate and respond within ten business days (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1693f(a)).

Reyna’s theory of liability depended on a particular date: he alleged a June 6, 2025 communication that supposedly triggered the EFTA clock, making defendants’ later restoration untimely. But his complaint did not allege the contents of the June 6 “Litigation Preservation Notice,” did not attach it, and did not plead facts showing it included the information the statute requires (account identification, error amounts, and reasons). By contrast, the August 11 letter and response were attached—underscoring that Reyna could attach documents when he chose to.

Applying Hale v. King and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the court treated the bare assertion that a notice was sent as insufficiently factual and thus implausible as a statutory “notice of error.” The result: Reyna failed to plead that valid notice occurred on June 6, 2025 “or on any other date within 60 days” of the April–May discovery of the alleged errors.

B. “Best case” doctrine justified dismissal without inviting amendment

The Fifth Circuit acknowledged the general rule that pro se litigants should usually be afforded an opportunity to amend before dismissal, but emphasized Brewster v. Dretke: leave to amend is not required when the plaintiff has already pleaded his “best case.”

The court’s “best case” conclusion was driven by process facts: the magistrate judge explicitly flagged the notice deficiency; Reyna nonetheless failed to add details about what his June 6 communication said; he did not seek leave to amend; he did not supply the missing facts in objections to the report and recommendation; and he still did not identify on appeal any additional material facts he would plead. In short, there was no concrete indication that amendment would cure the statutory notice defect.

C. Prefiling injunction affirmed as a discretionary response to repetitive frivolous filings

Reviewing for abuse of discretion under Qureshi v. United States, the panel held the prefiling injunction was supported by sufficiently specific findings. The district court relied on Reyna’s extensive filing history, multiple prior frivolity determinations on § 1915 screening, and prior warnings about sanctions. Importantly, the Fifth Circuit noted Reyna did not dispute those factual findings on appeal.

Citing Baum v. Blue Moon Ventures, LLC, the panel emphasized the institutional burden of frivolous suits and found the record adequate to sustain the injunction. The Fifth Circuit also issued its own warning that future abusive filings could result in sanctions, including monetary sanctions, dismissal, and filing restrictions within the circuit.

3.3. Impact

  • Pleading discipline for EFTA claims: The decision underscores that an EFTA plaintiff cannot rely on labels (“Litigation Preservation Notice”) or dates alone; the complaint must plausibly allege the communication’s statutory contents, especially where timeliness and trigger dates are the entire basis for liability.
  • Threshold “consumer” status matters: By highlighting Kashanchi v. Tex. Commerce Med. Bank, N.A., the panel signaled that plaintiffs should plead facts showing the account holder is a natural person (and not an LLC/foundation) when bringing EFTA claims.
  • Limits of pro se leniency: Invoking Hale/Iqbal and Brewster, the court reinforced that pro se litigants get procedural consideration, not exemption from plausibility pleading or statutory elements.
  • Prefiling injunctions remain a live tool in § 1915 contexts: The affirmance, coupled with the appellate warning, illustrates that repeated screened dismissals, ignored warnings, and burdensome filing patterns can justify forward-looking filing restrictions.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • In forma pauperis (IFP): Permission to file a lawsuit without paying fees due to inability to afford them. IFP status triggers court screening under § 1915.
  • § 1915(e) “screening”: A mandatory early review in IFP cases requiring dismissal if the complaint is frivolous, fails to state a claim, or seeks relief from an immune defendant.
  • EFTA “notice of error”: Not any complaint or warning letter; it must convey specific information (who, which account, what amount, and why it’s an error) to trigger the institution’s duty to investigate within the statutory timeframe.
  • Plausibility pleading (Iqbal): Courts disregard bare conclusions and require enough factual detail to make entitlement to relief plausible, not merely possible.
  • “Best case” (Brewster): If a plaintiff has been alerted to deficiencies and still does not (or cannot) add the needed facts, a court may dismiss without giving further chances to amend.
  • Prefiling injunction: A court order requiring a litigant to obtain permission before filing new lawsuits, used to curb repetitive or frivolous litigation that burdens the courts and opposing parties.

5. Conclusion

Reyna v. Block affirms a straightforward but consequential rule for EFTA litigation at the pleading stage: a plaintiff must allege facts showing that the statutory “notice of error” was actually provided—by content, not by label—and within the required window. The opinion also highlights two broader procedural lessons: (1) pro se status does not excuse failure to plead essential statutory elements under plausibility standards; and (2) when a litigant repeatedly files meritless suits despite warnings, district courts may impose—and the Fifth Circuit will uphold—prefiling injunctions supported by specific findings and a documented pattern of abuse.