2. Background and Procedural History
The encounter and arrest
Shortly after midnight on July 4, 2023, Zebley encountered Arrey asleep in a car on a residential street in Brookhaven, Pennsylvania. Their interaction began on July 3. It was raining, and Arrey explained that he was an Uber driver who had pulled over because business was slow and he felt “a little dizzy.”
Zebley reported that the car obstructed traffic and that Arrey showed signs suggesting impairment. Those assertions became central factual disputes. The District Court concluded that a reasonable jury could instead find that:
- Arrey parked reasonably close to the curb;
- his eyes were not red or glassy;
- there was no marijuana “shake” or other relevant vegetable matter on his clothing or in his car; and
- his performance on six field sobriety tests showed no intoxication.
No responding officer smelled alcohol or marijuana on Arrey or in his vehicle. An inventory search found no drugs or paraphernalia. Nevertheless, Zebley arrested him and took him to a hospital for a blood draw.
Testing and prosecution
Arrey’s blood tested negative for alcohol and drugs on July 14 and, approximately two weeks later, negative for synthetic marijuana. Despite those results, Zebley submitted an affidavit supporting a DUI complaint on September 4, 2023. A magisterial district judge signed the affidavit and complaint on September 11.
The affidavit alleged obstructive parking, reddened and glassy eyes, vegetable matter, and an inability to recall identifying information. Arrey maintained that his refusal to provide information during processing was deliberate, not evidence of impaired memory. Although the affidavit acknowledged the negative toxicology findings, Zebley asserted that an untested synthetic cannabinoid variation could explain the alleged impairment.
At a January 2024 hearing, Assistant District Attorney Jack Meehan initially told Arrey that the negative blood results meant the charge would be dropped. According to the plaintiff-favorable account, Meehan later indicated that Zebley wanted to continue pursuing the case. The timing of Zebley’s disclosure of the test results and his role in prolonging the prosecution remained disputed. The District Attorney’s Office withdrew the charge two weeks later.
The civil litigation
Arrey initially asserted several claims. After partial dismissal, only false arrest and malicious abuse of process proceeded. The District Court denied Zebley’s subsequent summary-judgment motion because genuine disputes of material fact prevented qualified immunity.
Zebley appealed immediately under the collateral-order doctrine. The appeal concerned his entitlement to immunity before trial, not a final determination of liability.
4. Analysis
A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence
1. The underlying proceedings
Arrey v. Zebley, 2025 WL 409661, supplied the procedural history concerning partial dismissal. Arrey v. Zebley, 2025 WL 3143450, supplied the factual account and summary-judgment conclusions under review. These District Court decisions were the procedural foundation of the appeal, rather than independent sources establishing the constitutional rules.
2. Interlocutory jurisdiction and summary judgment
- Jacobs v. Cumberland County, 8 F.4th 187 (3d Cir. 2021), and Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 772 F.3d 979 (3d Cir. 2014)
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These decisions define the appellate court’s limited role when reviewing a denial of qualified immunity before final judgment. The court may decide whether the facts identified by the District Court establish a violation of clearly established law. It ordinarily cannot reconsider whether the plaintiff has enough evidence to prove those facts. This distinction prevented Zebley from using the appeal to relitigate Arrey’s appearance, parking, sobriety-test performance, or the alleged presence of marijuana residue.
- Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007)
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Scott v. Harris supplies the exception for a factual account “blatantly contradicted” by the record. The Third Circuit reviewed the record, including video, and found no such contradiction. Video evidence therefore did not displace the ordinary requirement to accept the plaintiff-favorable account.
- Jutrowski v. Township of Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2018)
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This case supplies de novo review of the summary-judgment ruling. Independent review of legal questions did not expand the court’s authority to resolve disputed historical facts.
- SodexoMAGIC, LLC v. Drexel Univ., 24 F.4th 183 (3d Cir. 2022), and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)
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These authorities explain that a factual dispute is genuine when a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Arrey did not need to establish his allegations conclusively to defeat summary judgment; he needed evidence supporting a reasonable favorable verdict.
- Walker v. Horn, 286 F.3d 705 (3d Cir. 2002)
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This decision reinforces the prohibition against deciding whose factual account is correct in this kind of interlocutory appeal. It answered Zebley’s arguments contesting his responsibility for prolonging the prosecution and the alleged statements surrounding the January hearing.
3. Qualified immunity and clearly established law
- Evans v. Newark City, 152 F.4th 537 (3d Cir. 2025), and Clark v. Coupe, 55 F.4th 167 (3d Cir. 2022)
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These cases supply the two-part qualified-immunity framework: whether the plaintiff sufficiently established a constitutional violation and whether the right was clearly established when the conduct occurred. Both requirements were satisfied on the facts assumed for this appeal.
- Urda v. Sokso, 146 F.4th 311 (3d Cir. 2025); Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001); and Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011)
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These authorities explain that the unlawfulness must be clear to a reasonable officer confronting the actual situation. Ordinarily, controlling precedent or a robust consensus of persuasive decisions must provide that notice. The court used this framework to assess the factual relevance of the cases invoked against Zebley.
- Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987), and District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018)
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These decisions reject defining constitutional rights at an excessively abstract level. Their influence is particularly visible because the Third Circuit agreed with Zebley that the District Court’s formulations were insufficiently specific. In probable-cause cases, the relevant circumstances must be considered together rather than reduced to a general right against unlawful arrest or abusive prosecution.
- Mack v. Yost, 63 F.4th 211 (3d Cir. 2023)
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This decision supplies the language of “closely analogous” precedent and “fair warning.” The Third Circuit used it to explain why an earlier DUI decision could establish the unlawfulness of Zebley’s alleged conduct without matching every fact exactly.
The authorities issued after the 2023 events explain the governing analytical framework. The substantive notice supporting the result came principally from earlier decisions, especially Harvard v. Cesnalis and Jennings v. Shuman.
4. False arrest and DUI probable cause
- Harvard v. Cesnalis, 973 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2020)
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This was the decisive factual analogy. There, the court found no probable cause for a DUI arrest despite evidence that the driver had consumed two beers four hours earlier, moderately smelled of alcohol, spoke rapidly, appeared sweaty, and registered a blood-alcohol level just below the legal limit. Those circumstances contained more affirmative indications of alcohol use than the account the court had to accept here.
The comparison supplied both the governing probable-cause principles and sufficiently particularized notice. If the circumstances in that case did not establish probable cause, an officer had fair warning that the materially weaker indications attributed to Arrey were insufficient.
- James v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 700 F.3d 675 (3d Cir. 2012), and Osratti v. N.J. State Police, 71 F.3d 480 (3d Cir. 1995)
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Cited through Harvard v. Cesnalis, these decisions establish the elements of false arrest and the objective definition of probable cause. An arrest violates the relevant rule when the facts known to the officer would not warrant a reasonable person’s belief that the suspect committed an offense.
- Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485 (3d Cir. 1995)
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The District Court relied on this decision when framing a right against seizure based on an unreasonable belief that vegetable matter was marijuana. The Third Circuit did not reject its relevance. Instead, it found that focusing on vegetable matter alone inadequately captured the totality of circumstances underlying Arrey’s claim. The ultimate affirmance rested on the broader, fact-specific comparison with Harvard v. Cesnalis.
5. Continued prosecution, procedural due process, and improper purpose
- Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir. 1977)
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This decision anchors the malicious-abuse-of-process analysis. It characterizes malicious abuse of process as a denial of procedural due process, recognizes the liberty interests implicated by continued prosecution, including where a person is released on bail, and addresses prosecution without probable cause for an improper purpose.
The court nevertheless declined to treat that general language as sufficient by itself to defeat immunity. It paired the decision with the fact-specific DUI analysis to explain why continuing this particular prosecution was clearly unlawful on the assumed facts.
- Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2000)
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This decision supports the procedural-due-process framework requiring a deprivation of a protected interest without adequate process. Its role was to situate the claim within constitutional doctrine rather than treat every alleged misuse of legal proceedings as automatically actionable under § 1983.
- Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1989)
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This case supplies the additional requirement that process be used “for a purpose other than that intended by the law.” It explains why the alleged insistence on continuing the prosecution mattered beyond the objective question whether probable cause existed.
- Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)
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The court cited this decision as constitutional support for the proposition that a seizure without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment. It reinforced the common probable-cause foundation underlying the alternative constitutional characterizations of Arrey’s claim.
- Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490 (3d Cir. 1993)
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This decision permits lack of probable cause to support an inference of malicious intent. Here, that inference was reinforced by the negative test results and the allegation that Zebley insisted on further prosecution. The court did not hold that lack of probable cause conclusively establishes improper purpose.
- Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2014), and Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)
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These decisions establish that probable cause is objective and does not turn on an officer’s subjective intentions. They allowed the court to distinguish two inquiries: whether prosecution lacked an objective justification, and whether the alleged abuse of process also involved an improper purpose. The second inquiry did not alter the first.
- Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004)
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This decision emphasizes that arrest probable cause depends on the facts known to the officer at the time of arrest. Statements allegedly made months later could not supply retrospective justification for the initial seizure, although later events remained relevant to the separate continued-prosecution allegations.
6. The unresolved Fourth–Fourteenth Amendment question
The court cited Thompson v. Clark, 596 U.S. 36 (2022); Black v. Montgomery County, 835 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 2016); and Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217 (3d Cir. 1998), as authorities suggesting that the relevant prosecution-related claim might arise under the Fourth Amendment.
It also identified Swartz v. Insogna, 704 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2013); Smart v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 34 F.3d 432 (7th Cir. 1994); and Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 2001), as additional authorities bearing on that characterization. Their role was to flag the doctrinal issue, not to resolve it.
Halsey v. Pfeiffer further supported the observation that postarrest, pretrial claims may implicate either amendment. Finally, One 1958 Plymouth Sudan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965), supplied the proposition that the applicable probable-cause standard is the same under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. That common standard allowed the court to leave the constitutional classification undecided.
7. The limits of a disclosure-only claim
- United States v. Higgs, 713 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1983), and Brady v Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
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These cases identify the fair-trial right to receive exculpatory evidence in time for its effective use at trial. They provided the starting point for distinguishing a disclosure violation from prosecution without probable cause.
- Morgan v. Gertz, 166 F.3d 1307 (10th Cir. 1999), and Abbey v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 182 F.4th 496 (6th Cir. 2026)
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These decisions support the conclusion that a fair-trial-based § 1983 claim does not arise where all criminal charges are dismissed before trial. Accordingly, if probable cause otherwise supported the prosecution, delayed disclosure alone would not establish the constitutional claim advanced here. The surviving theory instead concerned the continuation of a prosecution that allegedly lacked probable cause.
B. Legal Reasoning
1. The assumed facts controlled the immunity analysis
The central methodological point is that qualified immunity did not authorize the appellate court to credit Zebley’s disputed observations. Assertions that Arrey obstructed the road, had glassy eyes, possessed marijuana residue, or performed poorly on sobriety tests could not establish immunity when a reasonable jury could reject them.
This does not mean that every factual dispute defeats qualified immunity. The disputed facts must matter to the constitutional analysis. Here, they concerned the very observations that could have supplied probable cause. Removing those disputed indicators materially changed the legal assessment.
2. The false-arrest inquiry was tied to the moment of arrest
Pennsylvania’s relevant DUI provision, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3802(d)(2), requires drug influence that impairs the ability to drive safely, operate, or exercise actual physical control over a vehicle. The court asked whether the circumstances known at the scene established a fair probability of such an offense.
On the accepted account, sleeping in a parked car late at night, reporting dizziness, and taking a break during slow business did not establish that probability when considered alongside the absence of drug odors, visible drugs, abnormal eyes, or failed sobriety tests.
The later negative blood results were important to continued prosecution, but they were not information available to justify or invalidate the arrest retrospectively. Similarly, Arrey expressly disavowed an affidavit-based theory of false arrest. The court therefore evaluated the initial arrest on its own factual and temporal footing.
3. Clearly established law required factual specificity, not an identical case
The Third Circuit accepted Zebley’s criticism that the District Court had defined the relevant rights too generally. Nevertheless, it found the necessary specificity in Harvard v. Cesnalis. That precedent involved more affirmative evidence suggesting intoxication yet still found probable cause lacking.
The reasoning illustrates a distinction: courts must avoid abstract formulations, but qualified immunity does not require an earlier case with precisely identical facts. A sufficiently close comparison can make the constitutional boundary clear.
4. Continued prosecution required continued justification
The court separately assessed the prosecution after testing. Given the assumed absence of meaningful observational evidence, a viable prosecution depended on toxicology supporting the synthetic-marijuana theory. The results did not provide that support.
Zebley’s suggestion that an untested cannabinoid variation might explain the alleged behavior did not compel a finding of probable cause on this record. Combined with the alleged effort to keep the case alive, the negative results supported a jury finding of both unjustified prosecution and improper purpose.
The holding is fact-specific: it does not require positive toxicology in every DUI prosecution, nor does it declare that every negative test automatically extinguishes probable cause. Observations and other reliable evidence may establish impairment in other cases. Here, the assumed facts left no adequate independent basis.
5. Objective justification and improper purpose remained distinct
The constitutional probable-cause inquiry asked whether the known facts reasonably supported the charge. The malicious-abuse-of-process inquiry additionally considered whether legal proceedings were used for an improper purpose.
A benign motive would not create probable cause where none existed. Conversely, hostility would not itself eliminate otherwise valid probable cause. The alleged insistence on prosecution mattered because it could establish improper use of process when considered with the objective lack of support.
6. The court preserved important doctrinal limits
The opinion did not revive the separately dismissed malicious-prosecution claim or treat every prosecution-related tort as interchangeable. Its analysis addressed the surviving claim as framed and litigated by the parties.
It also did not establish that delayed disclosure always creates constitutional liability. Because the charges were withdrawn before trial, a disclosure-only fair-trial theory was insufficient. Nor did the court definitively choose between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Those reservations materially limit the opinion’s reach.
C. Potential Impact
- Qualified-immunity appeals: The opinion illustrates why an officer must present a legal argument based on the District Court’s assumed facts rather than seek appellate resolution of disputed evidence.
- DUI investigations: It emphasizes the combined significance of sobriety-test performance, physical observations, odors, statements, and vehicle circumstances. Suspicion must be evaluated against the whole record.
- Postarrest reassessment: Negative laboratory findings can become critical when the prosecution’s remaining justification depends on a drug theory unsupported by other reliable evidence.
- Constitutional pleading: Plaintiffs must connect misuse-of-process allegations to a constitutional deprivation. An asserted litigation wrong does not automatically support § 1983 liability.
- Clearly established rights: A lower court’s overly general formulation need not require reversal if existing, factually analogous precedent supplies adequate notice.
- Unresolved doctrine: Future cases may still require a definitive analysis of the proper constitutional source and the liberty restrictions necessary for a prosecution-related claim.
Because the opinion is nonprecedential, these implications are principally illustrative and persuasive. The binding legal force remains with the controlling authorities it applies.