Driving an Armed Passenger to a Drug Deal Constitutes “Transport[ing]” a Firearm “in Connection With” the Offense Under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a)(7)

Introduction

In United States v. Jose David Figueroa Pacheco (11th Cir. Sept. 1, 2026) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit addressed the scope of the Sentencing Guidelines’ “zero-point offender” reduction under U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1(a). The central issue was whether a defendant who drove another individual—who was carrying a firearm—to a drug transaction had “transport[ed]” a firearm “in connection with the offense” under § 4C1.1(a)(7), thus disqualifying him from the two-level reduction.

The parties were the United States (appellee) and Jose David Figueroa Pacheco (appellant), who appealed a 72-month sentence imposed by the Middle District of Florida after his conviction for distributing and possessing with intent to distribute a controlled substance.

Summary of the Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. It held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Mr. Figueroa Pacheco was ineligible for the § 4C1.1 zero-point offender reduction because he transported a firearm in connection with the offense when he drove a person carrying a firearm to a prearranged drug transaction. The court also rejected his reasonableness challenge, noting his sentence fell within the advisory Guidelines range (63 to 78 months).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • United States v. Morilla, 177 F.4th 1291 (11th Cir. 2026): cited for the standard of review—Guidelines interpretation and application reviewed de novo, factual findings for clear error. This framed the appellate lens: even if another view of the facts existed, reversal required a firm conviction of mistake.
  • United States v. Munoz, 112 F.4th 923 (11th Cir. 2024): quoted for the “clearly erroneous” definition. This mattered because the appeal turned largely on whether the district court could infer knowledge/awareness of the firearm from the record.
  • United States v. Owens, 96 F.4th 1316 (11th Cir. 2024): supported the sentencing court’s ability to rely on undisputed PSR statements and hearing evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences. The panel used this principle to uphold the inference that the firearm was not a surprise and was visible to the driver.
  • United States v. Carrasquillo, 4 F.4th 1265 (11th Cir. 2021): cited in the “Safety Valve” discussion for the proposition that mere possession by a co-defendant can be insufficient to defeat safety-valve relief. The opinion leveraged this case to highlight an important contrast: § 4C1.1(a)(7) can disqualify a defendant for transporting a firearm—language broader than the safety valve’s focus on possessing.
  • United States v. Carrillo-Ayala, 713 F.3d 82 (11th Cir. 2013): provided the court’s framework for “in connection with” in the firearm-and-drugs context, including the strong proximity presumption and examples of facilitation (protection/emboldening; barter). Although the case concerned safety-valve analysis, the panel treated its “in connection with” reasoning as informative for § 4C1.1(a)(7), which uses the same phrase.
  • United States v. Jackson, 997 F.3d 1138 (11th Cir. 2021): cited alongside Carrillo-Ayala for the proposition that firearms can facilitate drug offenses, including when they are integral to the transaction (e.g., barter scenarios).
  • United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2008): referenced to distinguish procedural from substantive reasonableness. The panel observed that, despite labeling, the appellant’s argument sounded chiefly in procedure.
  • Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007): cited for the principle that a within-Guidelines sentence permits a presumption of reasonableness on appeal. This supported the panel’s rejection of the general “unreasonable sentence” claim.

Notably, the panel also used dictionary definitions (including Black’s Law Dictionary) to support a plain-meaning understanding of “transport.”

Legal Reasoning

  1. Textual focus on § 4C1.1(a)(7)’s added verb: “transport.” The district court (and the panel in affirming it) treated “transport” as having its ordinary meaning: to carry or convey something from one place to another. Applying that plain meaning, a driver who conveys a person and the person’s firearm to a drug deal can be found to have “transport[ed]” the firearm.
  2. “In connection with” satisfied by the firearm’s role in the planned transaction. The district court found the trip culminated in a “preordained” drug transaction involving “drugs and gun,” tying the firearm’s movement to the offense conduct rather than an incidental presence.
  3. Knowledge/awareness addressed through reasonable inference, not direct proof. The appellant argued that “transport” should require knowing movement of the firearm and that merely driving a vehicle where another possesses a gun is insufficient. The panel assumed arguendo that knowledge is required, but held the district court did not clearly err in finding the gun was not hidden and was visible (“big” and something he could “see”), making the inference of knowledge permissible under United States v. Owens.
  4. Reasonableness challenge rejected as underdeveloped and undermined by within-range sentence. The sentence (72 months) fell within the advisory range (63–78 months). Citing Gall v. United States, the panel applied the presumption of reasonableness and found no error given the limited substantive argument.

The key doctrinal move is the court’s practical equation: driving an armed confederate to a drug deal can constitute transporting the firearm, even if the firearm is not physically handled by the driver, so long as the district court can reasonably infer awareness and the transport occurs “in connection with” the offense.

Impact

  • Broader disqualification risk under § 4C1.1 than under the safety valve. The opinion underscores that § 4C1.1(a)(7) is not merely a mirror of § 5C1.2(a)(2): it adds “transport,” expanding the ways firearm involvement can defeat the reduction. Defendants who act as drivers/logistical support in drug transactions face heightened exposure to losing the zero-point reduction if a firearm is present.
  • Fact-finding leverage: visibility + context can support knowledge. The affirmance signals that district courts may infer knowledge from circumstantial factors such as the firearm’s size, lack of concealment, and the planned nature of the transaction—making appellate reversal difficult under clear-error review.
  • Practical sentencing consequence. Because § 4C1.1 offers a two-level reduction, its denial can materially increase the advisory range. The case provides prosecutors and probation offices a roadmap to litigate “transport” as a disqualifier even without proving hands-on possession.
  • Limited precedential force but meaningful guidance. The decision is labeled “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” so it is not binding precedent in the same way as published opinions. Still, it provides persuasive reasoning and a concrete application of § 4C1.1(a)(7) that may influence district courts within the circuit.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Zero-point offender adjustment (U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1)
A Guidelines reduction (typically two levels) for certain defendants with no criminal history points who meet a set of conditions—one of which is no firearm involvement as defined in § 4C1.1(a)(7).
Safety valve (U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2)
A mechanism allowing qualifying drug defendants to avoid statutory mandatory minimums if they meet criteria, including a firearm-related condition. The opinion uses safety-valve case law to interpret “in connection with,” but emphasizes § 4C1.1 is textually broader because it includes “transport.”
“In connection with”
A relational requirement: the firearm must have some facilitating relationship to the offense (e.g., protection, emboldening, integral bargaining chip). Eleventh Circuit law recognizes a strong presumption of connection when a firearm is close to drugs/drug activity, though circumstances can rebut it.
Clear error review
A deferential appellate standard. Even if the appellate court might have weighed facts differently, it will not reverse unless it has a firm conviction the district court made a mistake.
Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness
Procedural reasonableness concerns the process (e.g., Guidelines calculation errors). Substantive reasonableness concerns whether the length of the sentence is justified under sentencing factors. The panel treated the appellant’s argument as largely procedural in substance.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the § 4C1.1 zero-point offender reduction where the defendant drove an armed associate to a planned drug transaction. The opinion’s practical rule is that, for § 4C1.1(a)(7), “transport” bears its ordinary meaning and may encompass driving a vehicle that conveys a visible firearm to an offense-related meeting, with knowledge inferred from context and visibility. Although unpublished, the decision highlights the breadth of § 4C1.1(a)(7) relative to the safety valve and signals that logistical participation (like driving) can carry significant sentencing consequences when firearms are part of the offense environment.