Dismissals Based on Rooker-Feldman or Eleventh Amendment Immunity Must Be Without Prejudice; Other Claim-Defeating Doctrines May Warrant With-Prejudice Dismissal

Introduction

In Richard Silverberg v. DuPont De Nemours Inc., consolidated appeals from two Eastern District of Pennsylvania actions (No. 23-cv-01868, “Silverberg III,” and No. 24-cv-00924, “Silverberg IV”), appellant-attorney Richard J. Silverberg alleged a wide-ranging conspiracy by private corporations, City of Philadelphia actors, state-court judges, and Pennsylvania attorney disciplinary officials. He contended that the City’s tax-collection litigation and ensuing disciplinary proceedings were a “proxy war” designed to deter or punish him for speech—particularly a planned book about alleged wrongdoing arising from earlier litigation (the “Jackson actions”)—and to retaliate for prior federal suits.

The key issues on appeal were (1) whether the District Court correctly dismissed the actions under jurisdictional bars and immunity doctrines, (2) whether the pleadings plausibly stated federal (RICO and § 1983) and state-law claims under modern pleading standards, and (3) whether the District Court could dismiss the cases with prejudice when some grounds were jurisdictional or immunity-based.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit affirmed dismissal of both actions but modified the judgment to reflect an important remedial distinction: where dismissal rests on (a) lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine or (b) Eleventh Amendment immunity, the dismissal must be without prejudice. The court otherwise affirmed with-prejudice dismissals for claims that failed on the merits (including failure to state a claim) and for claims barred by Younger abstention (for which dismissal with prejudice was required).

The panel also affirmed the District Court’s denial/dismissal of Silverberg’s partial-summary-judgment motions as premature or moot.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) Pleading and procedural posture

  • Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny — Cited for the standard of taking allegations as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff at the dismissal stage.
  • Doe v. Abington Friends Sch. — Supported the District Court’s handling of premature summary judgment where discovery is incomplete.
  • Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly — The backbone of the panel’s conclusion that Silverberg’s conspiracy allegations against many defendants were conclusory and did not plausibly suggest an illegal agreement.
  • Frederico v. Home Depot — Applied to reject generalized fraud allegations that failed Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement.

2) Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional limits

  • Allen v. DeBello and Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP — Provided the four-part framework for Rooker-Feldman (state-court loser; injury caused by state judgment; judgment predates federal suit; plaintiff invites federal review/rejection of the state judgment).
  • Silverberg v. City of Philadelphia — The panel’s earlier non-precedential decision dismissing Silverberg’s first federal challenge to these tax judgments under Rooker-Feldman, showing the repetitive nature of the litigation.
  • Merritts v. Richards — Cited to illustrate that attempts to negate entitlement to collect on state judgments can amount to impermissible review of the judgments.

3) Immunities shielding state actors and disciplinary counsel

  • Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of New Jersey — Central to holding that disciplinary counsel offices are arms of the state supreme court for Eleventh Amendment purposes, and that employees receive Eleventh Amendment and quasi-judicial immunity in the disciplinary function.
  • Azubuko v. Royal — Supported absolute judicial immunity for judicial acts taken by state judges in the tax cases.

4) RICO predicate acts and limits

  • United States v. Manzo — Used to reject “extortion under color of official right” where the government seeks money “due” to it; tax-judgment collection is not a taking of something not due.
  • Fischer v. United States — Narrowed the scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c) to impairment of records/documents/objects used in an official proceeding, undermining Silverberg’s witness-tampering theory.
  • United States v. Pierce — Reinforced that deception alone is not mail/wire fraud absent a scheme to deprive someone of money or property.
  • Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp. — Foreclosed RICO conspiracy where substantive RICO fails.

5) § 1983 constitutional theories

  • Ambrose v. Twp. of Robinson — Required awareness of the protected activity by decisionmakers to establish that it was a motivating factor for retaliation.
  • Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis — Supported the conclusion that ordinary settlement bargaining (including requiring releases) is not, without more, evidence of retaliatory motive.
  • Kane v. Barger — Provided the “shocks the conscience” threshold for substantive due process.
  • Berne Corp. v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands — Framed the need to allege denial of required process for procedural due process.

6) State tort standards and abstention

  • Gen. Refractories Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. — Set the bar for abuse of process (use of litigation procedure so unjustified that it loses legitimate function).
  • Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc. and Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 — Supported “privilege or justification” defeating tortious interference where a party pursues lawful judgment enforcement.
  • Universal Premium Acceptance Corp. v. York Bank & Tr. Co. — Supported conversion’s requirement of acting without legal justification.
  • Hoy v. Angelone — Supplied the “outrageousness” standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
  • Boyanowski v. Cap. Area Intermediate Unit — Used to reject civil conspiracy absent an underlying viable tort or actionable wrong.
  • Younger v. Harris and Borowski v. Kean Univ. — Applied to abstain from interfering with ongoing, important state proceedings that provide an adequate forum (here, attorney discipline).
  • Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton (and reference to abrogation on other grounds by Spring Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs) — Supported treating state proceedings as “ongoing” if pending when the federal complaint is filed.
  • Juidice v. Vail and Klayman v. Porter — Framed the narrowness and evidentiary demands of the “bad faith” exception to Younger.
  • Lui v. Comm'n, Adult Ent. — Required dismissal with prejudice when Younger abstention applies.

7) The key remedial correction: prejudice of dismissal

  • Associated Builders & Contractors W. Pa. v. Cmty. Coll. of Allegheny Cnty. and Merritts v. Richards — Cited for the rule that dismissals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction (including Rooker-Feldman) must be without prejudice; the panel extended the same corrective logic to Eleventh Amendment-based dismissals.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Summary judgment was properly denied/dismissed. Under Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., it was premature while discovery remained incomplete; later motions became moot after the complaint’s dismissal.
  2. Claims against disciplinary authorities and judges failed largely on immunity. The Office of Disciplinary Counsel was treated as an arm of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, triggering Eleventh Amendment immunity per Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of New Jersey. Individual ODC actors were also protected (official-capacity damages barred; and quasi-judicial immunity for disciplinary functions). Judicial defendants were protected by absolute judicial immunity for acts taken in their judicial capacity under Azubuko v. Royal.
  3. Many conspiracy allegations failed under Twombly/Iqbal plausibility. Against a large set of corporate and individual defendants, Silverberg alleged—“upon information and belief”—that his 2016 email about a forthcoming book triggered a broad retaliatory “proxy war.” But he pleaded no concrete factual bridge connecting those private actors to the City’s specific tax enforcement decisions, so the complaint did not plausibly suggest an agreement or concerted action, as required by Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal.
  4. RICO failed because no plausible predicate acts were pleaded. The panel methodically dismantled each alleged predicate:
    • Extortion (18 U.S.C. § 1951): judgment collection sought money “due” to the City; under United States v. Manzo, “under color of official right” requires taking something not due.
    • Witness tampering (18 U.S.C. § 1512): no pleaded facts showing interference with testimony/evidence or impairment of documents; Fischer v. United States underscored the statute’s records-focused scope.
    • Obstruction of justice (18 U.S.C. § 1503): limited to federal proceedings, not the state tax litigation.
    • Mail/wire fraud (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343): the alleged scheme (dissuading a book) was not a scheme to deprive Silverberg of money or property; United States v. Pierce was cited for the property requirement.
    Because substantive RICO failed, RICO conspiracy failed under Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp..
  5. § 1983 claims failed on knowledge, motive, and due process standards. For First Amendment deterrence/retaliation theories, the panel emphasized the missing knowledge element: Silverberg did not plausibly allege that relevant City decisionmakers even knew of the threatened book, as required by Ambrose v. Twp. of Robinson. As to alleged retaliation for prior lawsuits, the City’s settlement condition requiring releases was treated as ordinary negotiation, not retaliation, consistent with Lauren W. ex rel. Jean W. v. DeFlaminis. For due process, the alleged conduct did not meet the substantive “shocks the conscience” standard of Kane v. Barger, and the complaint did not plausibly allege denial of required procedures under Berne Corp. v. Gov't of the Virgin Islands.
  6. State-law tort claims failed due to privilege/justification and pleading defects. Abuse of process failed under Gen. Refractories Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.; fraud failed under Rule 9(b) and Frederico v. Home Depot; tortious interference and conversion failed because judgment enforcement is privileged/justified under Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical Servs., Inc. and Universal Premium Acceptance Corp. v. York Bank & Tr. Co.; IIED failed under Hoy v. Angelone; and civil conspiracy failed for lack of an underlying actionable wrong under Boyanowski v. Cap. Area Intermediate Unit.
  7. Younger abstention barred claims targeting ongoing attorney discipline, and required with-prejudice dismissal. The disciplinary proceedings were “ongoing” under Addiction Specialists, Inc. v. Twp. of Hampton. Silverberg’s attempt to invoke the “bad faith” exception failed because the claimed facts were not in the operative complaint and the record did not support the exception under Juidice v. Vail (and Klayman v. Porter). Under Lui v. Comm'n, Adult Ent., Younger-based dismissals are with prejudice.
  8. The dispositive corrective holding: some dismissals cannot be “with prejudice.” Even though the District Court sought to deter repetitive filings, the panel held the judgment had to be modified: claims dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under Rooker-Feldman, and claims dismissed on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds, must be dismissed without prejudice (citing Associated Builders & Contractors W. Pa. v. Cmty. Coll. of Allegheny Cnty. and Merritts v. Richards). All other dismissals (failure to state a claim, and Younger) were affirmed as with prejudice.

Impact

Although designated “NONPRECEDENTIAL” under 3d Cir. IOP 5.7, the opinion is a useful doctrinal checklist for complex, multi-defendant “conspiracy” pleadings challenging state-court outcomes:

  • Remedial discipline for federal courts: even when a plaintiff is a serial filer, courts must correctly label jurisdictional and Eleventh Amendment dismissals as without prejudice, preserving the conceptual boundary that such dispositions do not adjudicate merits.
  • Rooker-Feldman framing remains outcome-determinative: claims that functionally require a federal court to conclude a state money judgment was not collectible (or invalid) are especially vulnerable.
  • Attorney-discipline challenges face layered barriers: Eleventh Amendment/quasi-judicial immunity and Younger abstention together create formidable obstacles to collateral federal litigation.
  • RICO as a “super-claim” is constrained: routine governmental judgment-collection conduct does not easily map onto Hobbs Act extortion, federal obstruction statutes, or property-based fraud predicates.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rooker-Feldman doctrine
A jurisdiction rule: federal district courts cannot act like appellate courts reviewing state-court judgments. If the injury you complain about is essentially “the state judgment harmed me,” and you want the federal court to undo it, the federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
Eleventh Amendment immunity
A state (and certain state “arms,” like disciplinary agencies tied to a state supreme court) generally cannot be sued in federal court without consent. When this immunity applies, the federal court cannot proceed on the claim in that forum.
Judicial immunity
Judges are absolutely immune from civil liability for acts they perform in their judicial role (even if the plaintiff alleges the acts were wrong), to protect judicial independence.
Younger abstention
Even if a federal court has jurisdiction, it may (and often must) abstain from interfering with certain ongoing state proceedings that implicate important state interests—such as attorney discipline—so long as the state forum can hear federal issues.
“With prejudice” vs. “without prejudice”
“With prejudice” means the claim is finally resolved and cannot be refiled. “Without prejudice” means the claim was dismissed without a merits decision (often because the court lacked power to hear it), leaving open the possibility of refiling in a proper forum or posture.
Twombly/Iqbal plausibility
A complaint must allege concrete facts that make wrongdoing plausible—not merely possible. Labels like “conspiracy” or “upon information and belief” must be supported by factual content showing who did what, how, and why it plausibly fits a legal claim.

Conclusion

The Third Circuit affirmed broad dismissal of Silverberg’s sprawling conspiracy suits because the pleadings lacked plausible factual support, RICO predicates were not met, constitutional and tort theories failed as a matter of law, immunities protected key state actors, and Younger barred federal interference with ongoing attorney discipline. The panel’s principal corrective holding was remedial: dismissals grounded in Rooker-Feldman or Eleventh Amendment immunity must be entered without prejudice, even where other claims in the same case properly warrant with-prejudice dismissal.