Disjunctive Drafting and Bail Eligibility:
People ex rel. Ellis v. Imperati Establishes that Making a Terroristic Threat is a Bail-Eligible Offense Under CPL 510.10(4)(a)

1. Introduction

People ex rel. Ellis v. Imperati, 2025 NY Slip Op 03646, presented the New York Court of Appeals with a deceptively simple question that exposed a deep tension within New York’s post-2019 bail statute: when two sub-paragraphs of Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) 510.10(4) speak to the same crime in different ways, which controls? The respondent, Michael Cavagnolo, had been charged with violating Penal Law § 490.20—making a terroristic threat—after phoning the Hyde Park Police Department to threaten officers, their families, and Police Department property. County Court set monetary bail under CPL 510.10(4)(a) (violent felonies). On habeas corpus, the Appellate Division (Second Department) held that paragraph (g) (terrorism offenses), which expressly excludes § 490.20, was the more specific provision and therefore barred bail. The People appealed. In a 4-3 decision authored by Judge Halligan, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that:

“Making a terroristic threat is a bail-eligible offense by virtue of CPL 510.10(4)(a); paragraph (g)’s exclusion does not override paragraph (a).”

The ruling clarifies the structure of New York’s bail statute, cements a “disjunctive” method of reading CPL 510.10(4), and will reverberate across future bail determinations involving overlapping statutory paragraphs.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Holding: The crime of making a terroristic threat (Penal Law § 490.20) is bail-eligible because it is incorporated by reference into CPL 510.10(4)(a) through Penal Law § 70.02 (violent felonies). Paragraph (g)’s explicit exclusion of § 490.20 affects only bail authority derived under paragraph (g); it does not limit paragraph (a).
• Reasoning: CPL 510.10(4) is drafted as a disjunctive list. Each of its twenty-one paragraphs is separated by semicolons, capped by the conjunction “or,” and operates independently. Therefore, exclusions or inclusions in one paragraph do not silently modify another absent express statutory language.
• Disposition: Judgment of the Appellate Division reversed; habeas corpus proceeding converted to a declaratory-judgment action; lower court authorized to impose bail under paragraph (a).
• Dissent (Wilson, C.J., joined by Troutman, J.; Rivera, J., separate): Accused the majority of ignoring the canon that the specific prevails over the general and of rendering paragraph (g)’s exclusion superfluous. Offered a vivid “zoo sign” hypothetical to argue that two contradictory signs must be reconciled, not ignored.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. Matter of Town of Southampton v. DEC, 39 NY3d 201 (2023); Matter of Mestecky, 30 NY3d 239 (2017); Kuzmich, 34 NY3d 84 (2019)
     • Cited for the basic proposition that legislative intent is gleaned primarily from statutory text, read in context.
2. Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) & Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70 (1984)
     • U.S. Supreme Court authorities explaining that terms connected by a disjunctive (“or”) should be read separately.
3. Pulsifer v. United States, 601 U.S. 124 (2024)
     • Emphasized that list items often serve distinct “concrete functions,” bolstering the majority’s view that each paragraph stands alone.
4. Stefanik v. Hochul, 43 NY3d 49 (2024)
     • Quoted for the maxim that when the Legislature expressly lists exceptions it is presumed to have excluded others.
5. Matter of Perlbinder Holdings v. Srinivasan, 27 NY3d 1 (2016)
     • Relied on heavily by the dissent; majority distinguished it as involving a truly broad grant of power versus a narrow carve-out, whereas both paragraphs (a) and (g) here are “specific.”
6. Companion bail-reform cases: People ex rel. Rankin v. Brann, 41 NY3d 436 (2024) (explaining bail reform structure); People ex rel. McManus v. Horn, 18 NY3d 660 (2012) (mootness exception).

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Textual Focus. The majority began with CPL 510.10(4)’s punctuation—semicolon-separated clauses ending with “or.” This depiction of a disjunctive list signals that each paragraph is independent unless the statute tells us otherwise.
2. Function of Each Paragraph. Paragraph (a) covers violent felony offenses (via Penal Law § 70.02) and contains two explicit exceptions: certain second-degree robberies and burglaries. Paragraph (g) covers terrorism-related felonies and in that context excludes § 490.20. Working in different topical spheres, neither paragraph modifies the other.
3. Redundancy Acceptable. The Court acknowledged overlap across paragraphs (class A felonies, felony sex offenses, etc.). That overlap, rather than requiring cross-editing, confirmed that the Legislature was comfortable with partial duplication and did not intend implicit cross-editing of exclusions.
4. “Specific-vs-General” Canon Rejected. Unlike the dissent, the majority regarded both paragraphs as equally precise regarding § 490.20—one by incorporation, the other by name—so the canon did not trigger.
5. Legislative Silence. When the Legislature amended the bail statute in 2020, 2022, and 2023, it tweaked other portions of paragraphs (a) and (g) but left § 490.20’s status untouched. If lawmakers had intended the exclusion to travel, they could have amended paragraph (a) concurrently.
6. Preservation of Legislative Determination. The Court insisted its reading best preserves both paragraphs: paragraph (g) still denies bail when a court relies on terrorism-predicate status; paragraph (a) still permits bail when the same crime qualifies as a violent felony. Thus, neither paragraph is nullified.

3.3 Likely Impact

• Bail Practice Going Forward. Trial courts may treat § 490.20 charges as bail-eligible without parsing paragraph (g). Where a defendant is charged solely under § 490.20, judges have discretion to set monetary bail under paragraph (a).
• Statutory Interpretation Framework. The decision cements a “disjunctive-list” methodology for CPL 510.10(4). Practitioners can expect courts to read each paragraph in isolation unless the Legislature explicitly states a cross-reference.
• Legislative Drafting Signal. Future amendments to bail law (or other disjunctive statutory schemes) must expressly state any cross-paragraph limitations; implied conflicts will be resolved in favor of parallel operation.
• Dissent’s Roadmap for Change. The strong dissents provide advocacy tools for reformers seeking either to re-impose the exclusion or to simplify the statute. Legislators may respond by clarifying paragraph (a) or re-drafting paragraph (g).
• Beyond Bail. The opinion’s structural approach may influence interpretation of other New York statutes that feature semicolon-plus-“or” lists (e.g., sentencing enhancements, licensing exemptions).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

5. Conclusion

People ex rel. Ellis v. Imperati is more than a fight over one defendant’s bail status; it is a blueprint for reading New York’s intricate bail statute. By holding that the violent-felony paragraph operates independently from the terrorism paragraph, the Court of Appeals endorsed a textual, punctuation-sensitive method of statutory construction that privileges disjunctive structure over implied hierarchy. Practically, prosecutors now have firmer ground to seek bail in terroristic-threat cases; defense counsel must redirect their arguments to bail factors rather than statutory ineligibility. Legislatively, if Albany wishes to reverse this outcome or avoid similar disputes, explicit cross-paragraph directions will be indispensable. Ultimately, the decision underscores a recurring truth in statutory interpretation: when the Legislature speaks in separate clauses, courts will hesitate to let one clause silence another unless the text unmistakably commands it.