Discretionary Best‐Interests Standard in TPR Dispositions: No Burden of Proof Imposed

Introduction

State of Wisconsin v. H.C. is a 2025 decision by the Wisconsin Supreme Court addressing whether, in the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights (TPR) proceeding, the State or any party bears a burden of proof to show that termination is in the child’s best interests. The case arose after H.C.’s son, John, with severe medical and developmental needs, was removed from her care under a CHIPS order and the State petitioned to terminate her parental rights. H.C. conceded unfitness at the grounds phase but contended that due process and public policy require the State to prove the child’s best interests by clear and convincing evidence—or at least by a preponderance—before the court may terminate her rights. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the Court of Appeals’ contrary holding and clarified the role of the dispositional hearing in TPR cases.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court unanimously affirmed the termination order. It held that:

Under Wis. Stat. § 48.426(2), the circuit court’s prevailing consideration at disposition is the “best interests of the child.”
The statutory text contains no provision imposing any burden of proof—neither a preponderance nor clear and convincing standard—on the State or other parties during the dispositional phase.
Neither the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor statutory public policy requires imposing a burden of proof at disposition.
The dispositional phase is a discretionary determination by the court, distinct from the fact‐finding grounds phase (where a clear and convincing burden applies under Wis. Stat. § 48.31(1) and Santosky v. Kramer).

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Santosky v. Kramer (455 U.S. 745, 1982): Held that, in the grounds phase, due process requires the State to prove parental unfitness by clear and convincing evidence, applying the Mathews v. Eldridge factors.
Mathews v. Eldridge (424 U.S. 319, 1976): Established three factors for assessing procedural due process—private interest, risk of error, and governmental interest.
Wisconsin Statutes Chapter 48: Governs CHIPS and TPR proceedings, bifurcating them into a grounds phase (§ 48.422–.424) and a dispositional phase (§ 48.426–.427).

H.C. and the Court of Appeals applied Mathews to argue for a burden at disposition—preponderance according to the Court of Appeals, clear and convincing according to H.C. The Supreme Court held these applications misplaced because Mathews and Santosky govern fact‐finding, not discretionary determinations.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning unfolded in three main steps:

Statutory Interpretation
The dispositional statute (Wis. Stat. § 48.426) does not reference any burden of proof. It directs the court to “consider” statutory factors and make a discretionary “best interests” determination. Where the legislature chose not to impose a burden, courts should not add one.
Due Process Analysis
Due process demands meaningful opportunity to be heard but does not universalize burdens of proof for every decision. Santosky’s clear and convincing rule is limited to the grounds (fact‐finding) phase. Dispositional hearings are not fact‐finding but discretionary exercises of judgment grounded in statutory factors.
Analogy to Criminal Sentencing
Like sentencing decisions—taken after guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt—dispositional orders follow a finding of unfitness. Neither proceeding imposes an additional burden of proof on any party; both are guided by statutory criteria and judicial discretion.

Impact

This decision clarifies Wisconsin law and resolves disagreement among lower courts:

It affirms that circuit courts need only exercise discretion guided by § 48.426’s “best interests” factors at disposition, without allocating a burden of proof.
It prevents future litigants from challenging dispositions solely on the basis that the State—or another party—failed to meet a certain evidentiary threshold.
By distinguishing fact‐finding from discretionary judgment, it preserves procedural safeguards at the grounds phase while emphasizing the social policy that children’s welfare governs dispositional outcomes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Bifurcated TPR Proceeding: First, a “grounds phase” to determine parental unfitness (clear and convincing evidence). Next, a “dispositional phase” to decide if termination serves the child’s best interests (discretionary, no burden).
Preponderance vs. Clear and Convincing: Preponderance means “more likely than not.” Clear and convincing means “highly probable.” Neither applies at disposition by statute or due process.
Due Process Mathews Test: Balances private interests, risk of error, and governmental interests to set procedural protections. Here it confirms no heightened burden is required at disposition.
Statutory Discretion: Courts are instructed to weigh factors like the child’s age, health, relationship with the parent, and stability of placement—then freely decide what serves the child’s best interests.

Conclusion

State v. H.C. establishes a clear precedent: in the dispositional phase of a Wisconsin TPR proceeding, termination of parental rights hinges on a court’s discretionary evaluation of the child’s best interests under Wis. Stat. § 48.426, with no party bearing an evidentiary burden. This ruling safeguards procedural due process at the fact‐finding stage while ensuring that, once unfitness is established, children’s welfare remains paramount in dispositional decisions.