Digital Plain View: Opening Files Within an Authorized Search and Discovering Evidence of Another Crime

Case: United States v. Troy Anderson, No. 25-2680
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Filed: November 10, 2026
Opinion by: Circuit Judge Porter, joined by Circuit Judges Krause and Ambro

Precedential status: This opinion is expressly nonprecedential under Third Circuit I.O.P. 5.7. It applies existing Fourth Amendment principles rather than establishing a new binding rule.

1. Introduction

This case concerns the constitutional boundaries of a computer search undertaken to investigate stalking and the transmission of obscene materials. During that search, a forensic examiner discovered an image depicting child sexual abuse. The central question was whether alleged defects in the original state warrant required suppression of evidence subsequently obtained through a federal investigation.

Pennsylvania State Police began investigating Troy Eugene Anderson after his former intimate partner, identified as Jane Doe, reported that he had sent a partially nude photograph of her to her then-current partner without her consent. Although Doe later withdrew her initial complaint, subsequent conduct prompted further investigation. Anderson allegedly made repeated unwanted contacts, sent derogatory messages and photographs to Doe’s friends, threatened her employment, and created a false LinkedIn profile impersonating her.

In February 2021, Trooper Corey Murphy obtained a state warrant relating to stalking and transmitting obscene materials. Officers seized two cellphones and a laptop from Anderson’s residence. While examining the laptop’s trash folder, a forensic examiner encountered child pornography in the second file he opened. He stopped searching and reported the discovery. Federal investigators then obtained a separate warrant addressing child-pornography offenses.

After the District Court denied suppression, Anderson conditionally pleaded guilty to knowingly receiving visual depictions of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. His plea preserved specified suppression issues for appeal. The Third Circuit affirmed, addressing warrant particularity, allegedly material omissions, good-faith reliance, and the digital plain-view doctrine.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The court reached five principal conclusions:

  1. The warrant incorporated its supporting affidavit. References to Attachment A in the portions addressing the items sought and the supporting probable cause adequately incorporated the affidavit.
  2. The warrant was not an unconstitutional general warrant. The identified offenses and the varied electronic forms in which their evidence could appear constrained the search, even though investigators needed substantial latitude to inspect files.
  3. The alleged omissions did not defeat probable cause. Adding the omitted information would not have undermined the substantial basis for finding evidence on Anderson’s laptop.
  4. The good-faith exception independently supported admission. The forensic examiner could reasonably rely on the warrant. Consequently, the court did not decide Anderson’s separate overbreadth challenge.
  5. The discovery satisfied the plain-view doctrine. The examiner could inspect file contents for evidence of the authorized offenses, and the incriminating character of the discovered image was immediately apparent.

The disposition affirmed the denial of suppression. It did not separately adjudicate whether the warrant was overbroad or announce an unrestricted authority to search digital devices.

3. Analysis: Legal Reasoning and Precedents Cited

A. Appellate Review and Deference to the Issuing Judge

United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 336 (3d Cir. 2002), supplied the standard for reviewing the suppression ruling: factual findings receive clear-error review, while the application of law to those facts receives de novo review. This distinction mattered particularly when the court accepted the District Court’s decision to credit Trooper Murphy’s testimony concerning the withdrawal of complaints in domestic-stalking investigations.

United States v. Jones, 994 F.2d 1051, 1057 (3d Cir. 1993), supplied a related limitation on appellate review of warrants. The appellate court does not independently substitute its own probable-cause assessment for the issuing judge’s. It asks whether the affidavit provided a sufficient basis for the determination actually made.

These principles operate together: legal questions receive independent review, but the issuing judge’s reasonable probable-cause determination retains substantial deference. The question was not whether the appellate panel would have drafted or evaluated the application identically, but whether the warrant rested on an adequate constitutional foundation.

B. Incorporation, Particularity, and the Difference Between Generality and Overbreadth

The Fourth Amendment requires warrants to describe particularly the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized. Applying United States v. Yusuf, 461 F.3d 374, 393 n.19 (3d Cir. 2006), the court distinguished two different defects:

  • A general warrant leaves officers with unbridled discretion to search for criminal evidence.
  • An overbroad warrant may describe its objects specifically but authorize seizure of items unsupported by probable cause.

The distinction is consequential. A warrant can provide clear instructions yet reach too much, or it can fail to provide meaningful instructions at all. Rejecting one objection therefore does not necessarily resolve the other.

United States v. Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars & Fifty-Seven Cents (92,422.25), 307 F.3d 137, 149 (3d Cir. 2002), supplied the formulation condemning exploratory rummaging through a person’s papers. The opinion used that principle to ask whether investigators’ discretion was genuinely confined, not merely whether the warrant listed numerous electronic devices.

The court first rejected Anderson’s attack on incorporation. The warrant’s first page referred to electronic devices listed in Attachment A, and its second page expressly incorporated that attachment by reference in the probable-cause section. Anderson emphasized the absence of a similar reference in the section identifying the premises and people to be searched. But that section already identified Anderson and his address. The court found no need to repeat incorporation there.

Reading the warrant with its incorporated affidavit, the panel concluded that the identified offenses supplied meaningful boundaries. The investigation concerned repeated electronic communications, photographs, social-media activity, and an impersonation profile. Relevant evidence could therefore exist across different media and file types.

United States v. Stabile, 633 F.3d 219, 237 (3d Cir. 2011), supported the practical recognition that advance restrictions on file types may be unsuitable in some digital searches. Here, limiting the examiner to a narrow category of files could have excluded material directly relevant to the investigation.

The resulting authority was broad but, in the court’s view, not unbridled. That is a fact-specific conclusion about this investigation, not a holding that identifying an offense invariably cures an otherwise general digital warrant.

C. The Franks Challenge: Whether Omitted Information Would Defeat Probable Cause

Under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171–72 (1978), and United States v. Yusuf, Anderson needed to establish both a culpable omission and materiality. As framed in the opinion, he had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Trooper Murphy recklessly omitted information and that including it would have negated probable cause.

United States v. Desu, 23 F.4th 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2022), informed the review of the corrected probable-cause showing. For Anderson’s omissions claim, the operative inquiry was whether an affidavit supplemented with the identified information would still support the issuing judge’s determination.

The court considered four asserted omissions:

Omitted information Anderson’s argument Court’s response
Doe initially misrepresented the timing of her relationship with Anderson. The inconsistency undermined her credibility. Investigators independently corroborated the relevant communications through her partner and friends.
Doe withdrew her initial complaint and signed a waiver of prosecution. The withdrawal weakened the basis for relying on her allegations. The District Court credited testimony that such withdrawals are not unusual in domestic-stalking cases; Anderson showed no clear error in that finding.
Doe did not identify a laptop as the means of harassment. The warrant lacked a sufficient connection to the laptop. The issuing judge could reasonably infer that the laptop was used for electronic communications or storage of relevant material.
Anderson lived near Doe. His observations of her home could have resulted from ordinary daily activity. Proximity did not eliminate probable cause and could arguably increase the threatening significance of the conduct.

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 241 (1983), was central to this analysis. Its totality-of-the-circumstances approach permits the issuing judge to assess the cumulative significance of the evidence, including independent corroboration. The question is whether there is a fair probability of finding evidence—not whether every statement is independently flawless or every potentially innocent explanation has been excluded.

The corroboration point was especially important. Doe’s inconsistency concerned the personal relationship’s chronology, whereas investigators verified information about the communications under investigation. The court therefore declined to treat that inconsistency as fatal to the substantive allegations.

United States v. Hodge, 246 F.3d 301, 305–06 (3d Cir. 2001), supported the inference connecting the laptop to the suspected offenses. A judge may infer where evidence is likely to be kept from the nature of the evidence and the offense. Direct testimony identifying the particular device used was therefore unnecessary on these facts.

This reasoning did not make the laptop connection automatic. It depended on conduct involving electronic messages, social media, photographs, and digital impersonation. Those activities supported an inference of both device use and electronic storage.

Because the omitted facts would not have negated probable cause, the challenge failed on materiality. The opinion should not be read as requiring a definitive resolution of recklessness once that essential element was absent.

D. Good-Faith Reliance as an Independent Ground for Admission

The court next held that suppression would be unwarranted even if the warrant were defective. Its analysis focused on whether the forensic examiner reasonably relied on judicial authorization.

United States v. Rosario, 180 F.4th 512, 524–25 (3d Cir. 2026), supplied the relevant circumstances in which good faith would be unavailable:

  1. The issuing judge relied on a recklessly false affidavit.
  2. The affidavit was so lacking in probable cause that official belief in probable cause was entirely unreasonable.
  3. The warrant was so facially deficient in identifying the search location or objects that reasonable reliance was impossible.

These were the exceptions relevant to Anderson’s arguments, not a purported exhaustive statement of every possible limit on good faith. The court found none applicable. The asserted omissions were not material, the affidavit contained concrete investigative detail, and the warrant identified electronic devices and explained their potential connection to the suspected crimes.

Messerschmidt v. Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 547 (2012), reinforced the demanding threshold for showing that reliance was entirely unreasonable. Here, police had corroborated communications rather than relying on an unsupported anonymous accusation. The application was neither factually empty nor dependent on stale information.

The court also rejected Anderson’s proposed categorical rule against good faith whenever the warrant’s affiant participates in execution. Anderson relied on Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004). But United States v. Pavulak, 700 F.3d 651, 665 (3d Cir. 2012), had already rejected that reading, treating Groh v. Ramirez as reinforcing the principle that a paltry affidavit cannot support reasonable reliance.

Because this affidavit was substantively developed, the affiant’s participation did not itself defeat good faith. The inquiry remained objective reasonableness, not a categorical disqualification based on an officer’s dual role.

This alternative holding explains the court’s treatment of overbreadth. Relying again on United States v. Ninety-Two Thousand Four Hundred Twenty-Two Dollars & Fifty-Seven Cents (92,422.25), the panel observed that evidence obtained under an overbroad warrant need not be suppressed when good faith applies. It therefore expressly left Anderson’s overbreadth argument unresolved.

That distinction separates constitutional validity from remedy: reasonable reliance can defeat suppression without establishing that every aspect of a warrant was constitutionally sound.

E. Digital Plain View and the Authority to Open Files

Drawing on United States v. Stabile, the court identified three requirements for plain view: the investigator must lawfully occupy the position from which the evidence is observed; the evidence’s incriminating character must be immediately apparent; and the investigator must have lawful access to the item.

Each requirement was satisfied. The state warrant authorized examination of computer files for evidence of stalking and transmitting obscene materials. Opening files was necessary to determine whether their contents were relevant. Once the examiner opened the image, its incriminating nature was immediately apparent. The court also relied on the warrant’s facial authorization and the examiner’s good-faith reliance when addressing access.

United States v. Williams, 592 F.3d 511, 522 (4th Cir. 2010), supported the conclusion that an examiner can immediately recognize child pornography encountered during a cursory review of computer files. As a Fourth Circuit decision, it supplied persuasive support rather than controlling Third Circuit authority.

Anderson’s principal response was that United States v. Stabile confined investigators to reviewing filenames and file types. The panel rejected that interpretation. United States v. Stabile involved a financial-crime investigation in which file characteristics could help identify relevant material. It upheld the plain-view observation of suspicious filenames but did not decide whether the files’ contents independently qualified under that doctrine.

The present investigation differed because photographs and other expressive content were themselves potential evidence of the authorized offenses. A filename alone might not reveal whether an image depicted Doe or whether a communication was harassing. The examiner therefore could inspect content without necessarily exceeding the authorized investigation.

The governing approach remains common-sense and fact-intensive. The holding does not authorize investigators to open unrelated files simply because they possess a computer warrant. The justification here was the relationship between the files being examined and the particular crimes under investigation.

The examiner’s decision to stop and obtain federal investigative involvement also marks the factual sequence: an initially authorized examination produced the unexpected discovery, and a separate federal warrant supported the ensuing child-pornography investigation. The opinion did not announce a universal stopping rule for every digital plain-view discovery.

4. Potential Impact and Limits

Fact-Specific Guidance for Digital Searches

The opinion illustrates why digital search restrictions must account for the suspected conduct. An investigation involving messages, photographs, and social-media activity may justify content review across several formats. The same justification may not exist where the authorized evidence can reasonably be identified through narrower methods.

Corroboration Can Preserve Probable Cause Despite Credibility Concerns

A witness’s inconsistency does not necessarily invalidate an affidavit when investigators independently verify the allegations central to the suspected crime. Equally, this decision does not establish that relationship-related inconsistencies or withdrawn complaints are always immaterial. Their significance depends on the whole evidentiary picture.

Device-Specific Evidence Is Not Always Necessary

The court accepted a reasonable inference linking the laptop to digitally committed misconduct. Future litigants may find that reasoning persuasive where an affidavit explains why the particular kind of evidence sought is likely to reside on the device. It is not a substitute for demonstrating a meaningful connection between the search target and the offense.

Suppression and Warrant Validity Remain Separate Questions

Good faith can determine admissibility without resolving an alleged constitutional defect. Here, that approach left the precise overbreadth boundary unsettled. The opinion therefore provides stronger guidance on reasonable reliance than on whether every authorized category of seizure was supported by probable cause.

No Binding Expansion of Search Authority

Because the opinion is nonprecedential, its principal value is explanatory and persuasive. It does not bind future panels or establish a categorical exception to digital-search particularity requirements.

5. Complex Concepts Simplified

Probable cause
A practical, evidence-based reason to believe that a search will uncover evidence of a crime. It requires a fair probability, not certainty.
Particularity
The requirement that a warrant meaningfully identify where officers may search and what they may seek, rather than leave those choices entirely to them.
Generality versus overbreadth
A general warrant gives insufficient direction. An overbroad warrant reaches beyond what the supporting evidence justifies, even if its directions are clear.
Incorporation by reference
A warrant’s express use of an attached document to supply additional descriptions or supporting information. Here, Attachment A helped define the warrant’s scope.
A Franks challenge
An attack on a warrant based on materially false or misleading supporting information. For the omissions alleged here, Anderson had to show both recklessness and that adding the omitted facts would defeat probable cause.
Nexus
The connection between the suspected offense, the evidence sought, and the place or device to be searched.
Good-faith exception
A rule allowing admission of evidence when officers reasonably relied on a warrant, even if the warrant is later found defective. It does not itself make a defective warrant valid.
Plain view in a digital search
The principle allowing recognition of evidence of another crime while lawfully examining digital material. It does not independently authorize opening a file that investigators otherwise have no authority to inspect.
Conditional guilty plea
A guilty plea preserving specified legal issues for appeal. Anderson’s agreement preserved the suppression issues identified in its terms.

6. Conclusion

United States v. Troy Anderson affirms that digital plain view can encompass file contents when examining those contents is justified by the authorized investigation. The court rejected the general-warrant and material-omission challenges, found reasonable reliance on the warrant, and upheld the discovery of child pornography.

Its significance lies in its careful distinctions: broad authority is not necessarily unbridled authority; an omission is not necessarily material; and admission under good faith does not resolve every question about warrant validity. As a nonprecedential decision, it offers fact-specific guidance rather than a new binding rule.