“Described In” Means Conduct: Sixth Circuit Upholds State Drug Priors as Career-Offender Predicates After the End of Chevron

I. Introduction

In United States v. Cody Dewayne King (6th Cir. July 28, 2026), the Sixth Circuit affirmed a 188-month within-Guidelines sentence imposed on Cody Dewayne King, a defendant who pleaded guilty to a federal fentanyl-trafficking offense. The appeal presented three themes: (1) a structural challenge to the career-offender guideline’s inclusion of state drug convictions; (2) a procedural challenge to the district court’s handling of a policy-based variance request (including a proposed—but ultimately failed—Guidelines amendment); and (3) a substantive reasonableness challenge to a within-Guidelines sentence.

The court’s most consequential holding is doctrinal: 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)’s reference to offenses “described in” enumerated federal drug statutes reaches state-law offenses that match the federally described conduct. Separately—and with forward-looking importance—the panel grounded its analysis in independent statutory interpretation rather than deference to the Sentencing Commission, expressly aligning sentencing-law methodology with the post-Loper Bright environment.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Career-offender authority: The Sentencing Commission did not exceed its authority by defining “controlled substance offense” in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) to include state convictions. The phrase “described in” in 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) naturally refers to conduct, not merely to the listed federal statutes as charging instruments.
  • No dispositive preservation dispute: Even assuming forfeiture and applying the framework referenced in United States v. Bauer, the court found no error—so there could be no plain error.
  • Procedural reasonableness: The district court did not commit significant procedural error under Gall v. United States; it adequately considered the § 3553(a) factors and did not “refuse to consider” King’s variance argument tied to a proposed amendment.
  • Substantive reasonableness: The within-Guidelines sentence carried the presumption of reasonableness under United States v. Vonner, and King’s reliance on Commission reports and proposed reforms did not overcome it.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Sixth Circuit foundations and intra-circuit guidance

  • United States v. Najar (unpublished): Previously read § 994(h) to “reasonably includ[e] state convictions for conduct criminalized under the federal statutes mentioned.” The King panel found Najar “instructive” on outcome, but declined to replicate its deference-based method.
  • United States v. Williams: Quoted for two propositions crucial to the holding: (i) Congress’s mandate empowers the Commission to treat as career offenders those the Commission views as “on a par” with enumerated offenses; and (ii) § 994(h) sets a minimum (“floor”) obligation rather than a ceiling.
  • United States v. Bricker: Used to reinforce that courts must “independently interpret the statute” rather than defer to the Commission’s statutory views.

2. The post-Chevron shift: deference rejected

  • Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo: Cited as the Supreme Court decision that “ended Chevron deference,” requiring courts to interpret statutes independently.
  • Seldon v. Garland: Applied the post-Loper Bright approach—courts may consider agency interpretations “for guidance” but “do not defer.”
  • Rutherford v. United States: Emphasized that Commission policy statements must be consistent with governing statutes and that courts have a “duty” to independently interpret and effectuate Congress’s will.

3. Supreme Court interpretive method

  • Torres v. Lynch: Provided the interpretive template that “describe” can vary by context and must be read in statutory context rather than “in a vacuum.”
  • United States v. LaBonte: Distinguished rather than followed. LaBonte invalidated a Commission reading of “maximum term authorized” in § 994(h) because it ignored Congress’s enhanced-penalty structure (e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 851). King treated LaBonte as a warning against agency misreadings, but found no comparable mismatch here.

4. Cross-circuit consensus on state predicates under § 994(h)

The opinion stressed that “every other circuit to consider the question” has agreed state-law controlled-substance offenses can qualify, citing:

  • United States v. Jones
  • United States v. Gonsalves
  • United States v. Hightower
  • United States v. Consuegra
  • United States v. Rivera
  • United States v. Beasley (Breyer, J.)

The panel used these decisions both as confirmation of its textual reading and as evidence that King’s proposed limitation to federal priors would be an outlier rule.

5. Sentencing procedure and reasonableness framework

  • United States v. Gardner: Standard of review for procedural (abuse of discretion where preserved) and substantive reasonableness.
  • United States v. Johnson and Gall v. United States: Defined “significant procedural error,” including failure to consider § 3553(a) factors or to explain the sentence.
  • United States v. Sweeney: District courts need not give a “formulaic point-by-point refutation” if they meaningfully consider arguments.
  • United States v. Penaloza: Suggested proposed Guidelines amendments may be better raised via 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) after sentencing, though the panel noted the district court addressed the argument anyway.
  • United States v. Rayyan, United States v. Sexton, and United States v. Ely: Substantive reasonableness principles; appellate courts do not reweigh § 3553(a) balancing.
  • United States v. Hymes and United States v. Barcus: Rejected efforts to use national statistics or new empirical data to compel changes to Guidelines outcomes on appeal.
  • United States v. Cooper and United States v. Blackman: Commission reports can be considered, but they are not binding law and do not require downward variances.
  • United States v. Hawkins: Reiterated that adequate § 3553(a) consideration is a procedural requirement (used to reject King’s attempt to repackage procedure as substance).

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The core statutory question: what does “described in” mean in § 994(h)?

King argued that 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)—which instructs the Commission to assure near-maximum sentences for defendants with two prior convictions of offenses “described in” enumerated federal drug statutes—authorizes only federal drug priors as career-offender predicates. The Sixth Circuit rejected that framing through a text-and-context analysis:

  • Text: The court reasoned that an “offense” is a crime (not a statute), and to “describe” is to give an account of something—pointing naturally toward the conduct described by the federal provisions, not the sovereign that prosecuted it.
  • Context: The court relied heavily on Congress’s usage elsewhere. In 18 U.S.C. § 3559(e)(3), Congress used “described in” federal sex-offense statutes yet expressly carved out certain state offenses; that carve-out would be nonsensical if “described in” did not already sweep in state conduct. The court contrasted Congress’s narrower formulations when it does mean strictly federal crimes, such as “an offense under the Controlled Substances Act” in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(i), and “indictable under” in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).

Having reached that conclusion, the panel held that U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.1(a) and 4B1.2(b), which treat state controlled-substance felonies as predicates, fit within Congress’s command.

2. Method matters: independent interpretation after Loper Bright

A notable feature of King is methodological. While acknowledging United States v. Najar reached the same destination, the panel disclaimed Najar’s deference to the Commission as incompatible with Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, as applied in Seldon v. Garland and reinforced for sentencing in Rutherford v. United States. The court framed its role as one of independent statutory interpretation, using Commission views only (if at all) as non-binding “guidance.”

3. Alternative holding: even if § 994(h) were limited, § 994(a) supplies authority

In a significant belt-and-suspenders move, the court added that even accepting King’s premise (that § 994(h) speaks only to federal priors), the result would not change. Relying on United States v. Williams and United States v. Damerville (as quoted in Williams), the court characterized § 994(h) as a minimum mandate that does not restrict the Commission’s broader guideline-promulgation authority under 28 U.S.C. § 994(a). Thus, state priors may be included as an additional category within the Commission’s general power.

4. Preservation/plain error: why it did not affect the outcome

The parties disputed whether King preserved his statutory challenge at sentencing. The court found the dispute immaterial because, under the “first prong” referenced in United States v. Bauer, there was no error at all in applying the guideline—so plain-error review could not help King. The court also declined to interpret a plea-agreement provision against King because the government did not rely on it in the district court or on appeal.

5. Procedural reasonableness: proposed amendments and § 3553(a)

King argued the district court “refused to consider” the rationale of a proposed amendment that would have limited career-offender predicates to federal priors. The panel rejected that characterization. It noted (i) it was “not clear” the district court had to address proposed amendments (citing United States v. Penaloza), but (ii) the court did address the argument and (iii) it thoroughly analyzed the § 3553(a) factors. Invoking Gall v. United States, United States v. Johnson, and United States v. Sweeney, the Sixth Circuit found the sentencing explanation adequate—highlighting the district court’s discussion of offense gravity (high-volume fentanyl trafficking), history and characteristics (upbringing, brain development, time gap), deterrence, punishment, respect for law, and public protection.

6. Substantive reasonableness: presumption and failed policy attack

Because the sentence fell within the correctly calculated Guidelines range, United States v. Vonner supplied a presumption of reasonableness. King attempted to rebut it by invoking Commission recidivism research and the Judicial Conference’s Criminal Law Committee position, arguing the career-offender guideline should not apply to “offenders like him.” The panel rejected that approach, citing United States v. Hymes, United States v. Barcus, United States v. Cooper, and United States v. Blackman: policy critiques and research may be considered, but they do not compel a variance, and appellate courts will not convert them into a mandate. The court also held King’s argument about inadequate § 3553(a) explanation sounded in procedure, not substance (citing United States v. Hawkins), and that disagreement with the district court’s balancing is not reviewable reweighing (citing United States v. Sexton and United States v. Ely).

C. Impact

  • State drug priors remain viable predicates in the Sixth Circuit: The decision strengthens the circuit’s position that U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b) validly includes state controlled-substance offenses, limiting defendants’ ability to mount authority-based challenges premised on § 994(h)’s enumerated federal statutes.
  • Post-Loper Bright sentencing methodology crystallizes: King is a clear signal that Sixth Circuit panels will justify Guidelines validity through independent statutory interpretation rather than deference to the Commission—especially where older cases rested on deferential reasoning.
  • “Proposed amendment” arguments face headwinds on appeal: Although district courts may consider evolving policy debates, King suggests appellate review will be reluctant to require reliance on non-enacted amendments, particularly where the court already gave a full § 3553(a) explanation.
  • Floor-not-ceiling framing is a backstop: The court’s § 994(a) alternative holding makes challenges harder even if litigants narrow § 994(h), because the Commission’s general authority can independently support inclusion of additional predicate categories.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Career-offender guideline (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1): A Guideline that increases the advisory sentencing range if the defendant has two qualifying prior felony convictions (typically “crime of violence” or “controlled substance offense”).
  • Predicate offense: A prior conviction that “counts” toward a status enhancement (here, career-offender status).
  • “Controlled substance offense” (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b)): Defined by the Guidelines to include certain drug-trafficking crimes under both federal and state law; that state-law inclusion was the central statutory-authority dispute.
  • Variance vs. departure: A “variance” is a sentence outside the Guidelines range based on the statutory factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (including policy disagreement). (The opinion addresses a variance request.)
  • Procedural vs. substantive reasonableness: Procedural asks whether the court followed the right process (correct calculation, consideration of § 3553(a), adequate explanation). Substantive asks whether the length is reasonable given the § 3553(a) factors.
  • Plain-error review: A stricter appellate standard that applies when an issue was not properly preserved; it requires (among other things) an actual error.
  • Chevron deference (now ended): A former doctrine directing courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. After Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, courts interpret statutes independently; agency views may be consulted but are not controlling.

V. Conclusion

United States v. Cody Dewayne King delivers two key takeaways. First, the Sixth Circuit held that § 994(h)’s reference to offenses “described in” federal drug statutes covers state offenses matching the federally described conduct—and, in any event, § 994(a) supplies independent authority for the Commission to include state drug priors as career-offender predicates. Second, the opinion operationalizes the post-Loper Bright landscape in sentencing law: the validity and scope of Guidelines provisions are to be assessed through independent judicial interpretation, not deference to the Commission. The remaining holdings—rejecting procedural and substantive challenges—reinforce conventional reasonableness review where the district court thoroughly addresses § 3553(a) and imposes a within-Guidelines sentence.