Deportation Risk Is Not a Proper § 3553(a) Basis to Deny an Amendment 821 § 3582(c)(2) Reduction, but Denial Stands When Offense Seriousness Independently Controls

1. Introduction

This appeal arose from Kenny Rosado-Quijije’s request for a reduced prison term under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) after the Sentencing Commission made part of Amendment 821 retroactive. Rosado-Quijije had pleaded guilty in the Middle District of Florida to a maritime cocaine-trafficking conspiracy involving 708 kilograms of cocaine. He received a below-guidelines sentence of 102 months after a U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1 substantial-assistance departure.

Amendment 821 added U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1, providing a two-level offense-level decrease for certain defendants with zero criminal-history points. Rosado-Quijije was eligible, and his amended range (with a comparable assistance reduction) became 87–108 months. The district court nevertheless denied relief after weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. On appeal, Rosado-Quijije argued the court overemphasized the offense’s seriousness and undervalued his rehabilitation and personal circumstances.

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, emphasizing the breadth of district-court discretion at step two of the § 3582(c)(2) analysis. Importantly, the panel also stated that immigration status/deportation is not a relevant § 3553(a) consideration, but found any mention of likely deportation non-dispositive because the denial rested on offense seriousness and deterrence.

2. Summary of the Opinion

• Eligibility (Step One): The district court correctly found Rosado-Quijije eligible under Amendment 821’s new U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1 and determined an amended range of 87–108 months when accounting for a comparable substantial-assistance reduction.
• Discretionary Denial (Step Two): The district court denied a reduction after weighing § 3553(a), citing the scale of the trafficking venture (multiple vessels; nearly three-quarters of a ton of cocaine), Rosado-Quijije’s role as an “experienced captain,” and deterrence/respect-for-law concerns.
• Appellate Holding: No abuse of discretion occurred because the court considered the amended range and mitigation arguments but reasonably assigned greater weight to offense seriousness and deterrence.
• Immigration Note: The panel agreed deportation is not relevant to the § 3553(a) analysis (citing United States v. Velasquez Velasquez), but affirmed because the order’s core rationale was otherwise proper and centered on offense conduct.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The opinion’s reasoning is built from a line of Eleventh Circuit cases defining (i) the standard of review for § 3582(c)(2) decisions, (ii) the two-step framework, and (iii) the breadth of district-court discretion when balancing § 3553(a) at step two—along with Supreme Court guidance on the level of explanation required.

• United States v. Caraballo-Martinez, 866 F.3d 1233 (11th Cir. 2017)
  Used for the governing standard of review: denial of a § 3582(c)(2) reduction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. This frames the appellate posture: the panel does not reweigh the factors de novo, but asks whether the district court stayed within permissible bounds.
• United States v. Campbell, 491 F.3d 1306 (11th Cir. 2007)
  Supplies the practical content of abuse-of-discretion review: even if the appellate court might have decided differently, it will not reverse absent a “clear error of judgment.” This supports affirmance despite plausible mitigation evidence (rehabilitation, no disciplinary infractions).
• United States v. Williams, 557 F.3d 1254 (11th Cir. 2009) and United States v. Bravo, 203 F.3d 778 (11th Cir. 2000)
  Together provide the canonical two-step method: (1) recalculate the amended guideline range as if the amendment applied at sentencing; then (2) consider § 3553(a), public safety, and (optionally) post-sentencing conduct, with the ultimate decision remaining discretionary. The panel uses these cases to show the district court did what was required: it performed step one correctly and then exercised discretion at step two.
• United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
  Provides the Eleventh Circuit’s three-part description of abuse of discretion: failing to consider important relevant factors, giving weight to improper factors, or making a clear error of judgment. The opinion uses this framework to assess Rosado-Quijije’s claim that the district court overemphasized offense seriousness and underemphasized rehabilitation and personal history.
• United States v. Olson, 127 F.4th 1266 (11th Cir. 2025)
  Critical to the result: it reiterates that a district court need not assign equal weight to each § 3553(a) factor and may give “great weight” to one factor (here, seriousness of the offense). This directly answers Rosado-Quijije’s core argument (improper weighting).
• Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481 (2022)
  Cited for the proposition that a court is not required to be persuaded by every argument and may reject unconvincing contentions without a detailed explanation. Although Concepcion arose in a different sentence-modification context, the panel uses it to validate the district court’s relatively concise discussion of mitigation (rehabilitation; lack of danger).
• United States v. Velasquez Velasquez, 524 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2008)
  Anchors the panel’s statement that immigration status is not relevant to the § 3553(a) calculus, and that sentencing based on “unfounded assumptions” about immigration status or personal views of immigration policy is error. The panel applies this to the district court’s remark that Rosado-Quijije would “most likely be deported,” recognizing it as improper to the extent it influenced the decision—yet treating it as non-dispositive on this record.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning tracks the established § 3582(c)(2) architecture:

1. Step One (Eligibility and amended range): Amendment 821 created U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1, a two-level reduction for qualifying “zero-point offenders.” Through Amendment 825, the relevant portion of § 4C1.1(a) was made retroactive under § 1B1.10(d). The district court recalculated the guideline range and recognized an amended range that, after a comparable § 5K1.1 reduction, reached 87–108 months. No dispute remained on eligibility.
2. Step Two (Discretionary weighing of § 3553(a)): The district court denied relief after emphasizing: (a) the scale and sophistication of the trafficking venture (three vessels; 708 kilograms), (b) Rosado-Quijije’s role as captain and prior similar conduct (a prior 600-kilogram trip), and (c) core sentencing purposes: seriousness, respect for law, and deterrence. The Eleventh Circuit held this was a permissible weighting decision under United States v. Olson.
3. Handling of mitigation evidence: The district court acknowledged positive prison conduct and the “no danger” contention but found them insufficient to justify a lower sentence. The panel relied on Concepcion v. United States to reinforce that a district court may reject mitigation arguments without extensive elaboration, so long as it considered them.
4. Improper factor (deportation) treated as non-dispositive: The panel agreed deportation is irrelevant to § 3553(a) (via United States v. Velasquez Velasquez), and thus the district court “erred to the extent it relied” on likely deportation. But the panel affirmed because the order “otherwise reflects” the denial was grounded in the nature of the offense, not immigration considerations. In effect, the panel treated the remark as harmless in context.

3.3 Impact

The opinion’s likely effects are practical rather than doctrinal (given its non-publication), but it signals how the Eleventh Circuit will review Amendment 821 denials:

• High deference at step two: Defendants eligible under § 4C1.1 should expect that appellate relief will be rare unless they can show the district court ignored key factors, relied materially on improper considerations, or made a clear error of judgment under United States v. Irey.
• Seriousness of the offense can dominate: Courts may assign “great weight” to the offense’s magnitude, leadership/skill role (e.g., captaincy), and recidivist-like conduct even where criminal history is zero—consistent with the panel’s use of United States v. Olson.
• Rehabilitation helps but does not compel: Clean disciplinary history and programming are relevant but not outcome-determinative. The decision reinforces that consideration is required; persuasion is not.
• Immigration considerations remain a litigation flashpoint: The panel’s reliance on United States v. Velasquez Velasquez warns district courts away from deportation-based reasoning. For litigants, it provides a focused objection point: if deportation appears to drive the denial, that could be reversible error.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (sentence reduction for retroactive guideline changes): A limited mechanism allowing a court to reduce a prison term when the Sentencing Commission later lowers the guideline range and makes that change retroactive.
• Amendment 821 / U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1 (“zero-point offenders”): A guideline change that can reduce the offense level by two for certain defendants with no criminal-history points who meet specified criteria. Eligibility does not guarantee a lower sentence; it merely opens the door to a discretionary reduction.
• Amendment 825 / § 1B1.10(d) (retroactivity): The guidelines list which amendments apply retroactively. Amendment 825 placed the relevant part of Amendment 821 on the retroactive list.
• The “two-step” process (United States v. Williams; United States v. Bravo): Step one recalculates the new guideline range; step two decides, in discretion, whether to reduce based on § 3553(a), public safety, and possibly post-sentencing conduct.
• 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors: The statutory considerations that guide sentencing decisions, including seriousness of the offense, deterrence, protection of the public, and the defendant’s history and characteristics.
• Abuse of discretion (United States v. Caraballo-Martinez; United States v. Irey): A deferential appellate standard. The question is not whether the appellate court would have reduced the sentence, but whether the district court made a clear judgment error, relied on improper factors, or ignored important relevant factors.
• Substantial assistance (U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1): A government motion permitting a lower sentence when a defendant provides meaningful help to authorities.

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Kenny Rosado-Quijije affirms that Amendment 821 eligibility is only the beginning of the § 3582(c)(2) inquiry: district courts retain broad discretion to deny reductions after weighing § 3553(a), and they may give decisive weight to offense seriousness and deterrence. At the same time, the panel underscores that immigration status—such as the likelihood of deportation—is not a proper § 3553(a) consideration, though an isolated reference will not require reversal if the denial is independently supported by permissible factors.