DeAngelis v. State: A Trial Judge’s Neutral Explanation of Partial Verdicts Is Not an Allen Charge Absent Deadlock or Coercive Pressure
I. Introduction
In DeAngelis v. State (Del. Jan. 28, 2026), the Delaware Supreme Court addressed when a trial judge’s
mid-deliberations response to a jury question crosses the line into a coercive Allen-type supplemental charge.
Douglas DeAngelis, the defendant, was tried in Superior Court on charges arising from an alleged sexual assault:
second-degree rape, fourth-degree rape, and second-degree assault.
During deliberations, the jury sent a note asking whether, if it reached verdicts on some counts but could not agree on others,
the entire decision would be “nullified,” or whether a partial hung jury was accepted. The judge explained that a partial verdict
could be taken and that a mistrial could be declared on any unresolved counts, then asked the jury to continue deliberating.
The jury later returned a partial verdict: guilty of fourth-degree rape and second-degree assault, and no verdict on second-degree rape.
DeAngelis moved for a new trial, arguing the judge’s response functioned as a coercive Allen charge that pushed the jury
toward conviction. The Superior Court denied relief, and DeAngelis appealed.
II. Summary of the Opinion
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the trial court’s response to the jury’s hypothetical question
about partial verdicts and a potential partial hung jury was not an Allen charge. Because the Court concluded
there was no Allen charge, it did not apply Delaware’s coercion analysis for Allen instructions (the Streitfeld factors).
III. Analysis
A. Precedents Cited
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Streitfeld v. State, 369 A.2d 674 (Del. 1977)
Role in DeAngelis: Streitfeld supplies the well-known Delaware four-factor test for determining whether an
Allen charge was coercive (“the time of day when the instruction was given, the words used, the length of the deliberations
both before and after the instruction, and the complexity of the case.”). DeAngelis tried to trigger Streitfeld review by labeling
the judge’s response a “modified Allen charge.” The Supreme Court refused to reach Streitfeld because it found the response was
not an Allen charge in the first place.
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Smith v. State, 341 A.3d 511, 2025 WL 1473872 (Del. May 22, 2025), as corrected (May 23, 2025) (TABLE)
Role in DeAngelis: Smith is used for two propositions: (1) a definition of an Allen charge as a supplemental instruction
encouraging a verdict “without abandoning any firmly held beliefs,” and (2) the analytical sequencing rule—if the communication
is not an Allen charge, the Court does not analyze coercion under the Streitfeld factors. DeAngelis follows this structure:
it ends the inquiry once it determines the response was not an Allen charge.
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Adkins v. State, 454 A.2d 732 (Del. 1982)
Role in DeAngelis: Adkins is the principal Delaware comparator. It distinguishes true Allen/Brown-style “coerced reconsideration”
from a judge’s non-coercive instruction to continue deliberations. Quoting Adkins, the Court emphasized features that avoid
an Allen charge: no request (express or implied) that minority jurors reconsider in deference to the majority; no suggestion that a verdict
“must or should” be returned; and language demonstrating willingness to accept a hung jury, thereby respecting jurors’ personal convictions.
DeAngelis treats the jury’s note as hypothetical rather than an announced deadlock and finds the judge’s response similarly
non-coercive—indeed, explicitly acknowledging the possibility of a mistrial on unresolved counts.
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Waters v. State, 242 A.3d 778 (Del. 2020)
Role in DeAngelis: Waters supplies the standard of review for the denial of a motion for a new trial:
abuse of discretion. That deferential standard frames the appellate posture: the Supreme Court is not re-trying the case,
but examining whether the trial court acted within permissible bounds.
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Collins v. State, 56 A.3d 1012 (Del. 2012)
Role in DeAngelis: Collins supports using the abuse of discretion standard specifically when reviewing a trial court’s
use of an Allen charge (or alleged Allen charge). In DeAngelis, Collins undergirds the Court’s restrained approach to evaluating the trial judge’s
real-time deliberation management.
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United States v. Lena, 497 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1980), aff’d, 649 F.2d 861 (3d Cir. 1981) (TABLE)
Role in DeAngelis: Although not binding on Delaware courts, Lena provides a persuasive checklist of what coercion indicators
look like when a court urges continued deliberations. DeAngelis adopts Lena’s negative formulation: even if a judge expresses a preference for unanimity,
it is not coercive absent references to retrial expense, pressure on a minority to yield, coercive deadlines, threats of marathon deliberations, or pressure
to surrender conscientiously held views.
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Allen and Brown (as referenced in Adkins)
Role in DeAngelis: Through Adkins, DeAngelis situates the doctrine’s core concern: post-deadlock instructions that promote
“coerced reconsideration” by urging jurors to be convinced by others. DeAngelis treats these as the archetypes of impermissible coercion,
contrasted with the trial judge’s informational, non-directive response here.
B. Legal Reasoning
The Court’s reasoning proceeds in two steps: first, classify the trial judge’s response; second, only if it is an Allen charge,
evaluate coercion under Streitfeld.
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No announced deadlock; the jury asked a hypothetical procedural question.
The Court stresses that the jury did not say it was deadlocked; it asked what would happen if it could not reach consensus on
all counts but had reached some verdicts. Like Adkins, this mattered because the most troubling Allen dynamics are typically triggered
when a judge responds to an explicit deadlock with language that pressures compromise or capitulation.
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The judge explicitly validated a partial hung jury and mistrial on unresolved counts.
The response included: “we would take a mistrial on the counts that you were unable to agree upon” and “if we have to, [a partial hung jury] can be [accepted].”
The Supreme Court treated this as demonstrating willingness to accept non-unanimity, which under Adkins signals respect for jurors’ convictions
rather than coercive insistence on a verdict.
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“Position A” language was not enough to convert the response into an Allen charge.
DeAngelis argued that “if you’re able to reach a unanimous verdict, obviously that’s position A for everybody” conveyed a judicial preference
for unanimity. The Court rejected the idea that such a preference—without more—constitutes an Allen charge. Importantly, the Court did not treat
ordinary institutional preference for completion as equivalent to coercive pressure to compromise.
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Persuasive support from United States v. Lena: no coercive hallmarks.
The Court found Lena instructive because it addressed a similar mid-deliberation question about whether the jury could return a verdict on only one count.
Applying Lena’s framework, the Court noted the absence of classic coercion markers: no references to the expense of retrial, no “minority” admonitions,
no deadline, no threats of extended deliberations, and no pressure to surrender conscientiously held views.
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Because it was not an Allen charge, the Court did not apply Streitfeld.
Following Smith and Adkins, the Court ended the analysis at classification: if the communication is not an Allen charge, there is no need to apply
the Streitfeld coercion factors.
C. Impact
DeAngelis clarifies (and effectively strengthens) a threshold rule in Delaware: not every judicial nudge to continue deliberating,
and not every statement reflecting a preference for a unanimous verdict, constitutes an Allen charge. The decision is likely to affect Delaware practice in at least four ways:
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More room for procedural guidance during deliberations.
Trial judges can answer jurors’ process questions about partial verdicts and mistrials without automatically triggering Allen-charge scrutiny,
so long as the response remains informational and avoids coercive hallmarks.
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Greater emphasis on the “classification” gatekeeping step.
Appellate challenges may increasingly turn on whether the trial court’s language is properly characterized as an Allen charge at all,
rather than on Streitfeld’s coercion factors.
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Partial verdict practice receives implicit endorsement.
By approving the explanation that a verdict can be taken on agreed counts and a mistrial declared on the rest, the Court normalizes (and protects)
the use of partial verdicts as a legitimate end state of deliberations—particularly in multi-count indictments.
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Borrowing from federal persuasive authority when Delaware precedent is factually adjacent but not identical.
The Court’s reliance on Lena suggests that Delaware may continue to look to federal decisions for practical markers of coercion in jury-management contexts.
IV. Complex Concepts Simplified
- Allen charge
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A supplemental instruction given to encourage a deadlocked jury to keep deliberating and attempt to reach a verdict, while not abandoning sincerely held beliefs.
Because it can pressure minority jurors to conform, courts scrutinize it for coercion.
- “Dynamite” charge
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A colloquial term (used in Delaware opinions like Adkins) for a strong Allen charge that may “blast” a verdict out of a deadlocked jury,
sometimes by urging minority jurors to reconsider in light of the majority—raising coercion concerns.
- Hung jury / deadlock
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When jurors cannot unanimously agree on a verdict on a charge after adequate deliberation.
- Partial verdict / partial hung jury
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In a multi-count case, a jury may unanimously decide some counts but be unable to agree on others. Courts can accept the unanimous verdicts
and declare a mistrial only on the unresolved counts.
- Mistrial
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A termination of the trial without a final resolution on a charge (here, because of inability to reach a unanimous verdict), typically permitting retrial of that charge.
- Abuse of discretion
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A deferential appellate standard: the reviewing court will not reverse merely because it would have decided differently, but only if the trial court’s decision
fell outside the range of reasonable choices.
- Streitfeld’s four-factor test
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Delaware’s framework for deciding whether an Allen charge was coercive, considering timing, wording, deliberation length before/after, and case complexity.
DeAngelis emphasizes that this test applies only if the instruction is first deemed an Allen charge.
V. Conclusion
DeAngelis v. State reinforces a practical, threshold boundary in Delaware jury-coercion doctrine: a trial court’s neutral explanation of how partial verdicts
and a partial hung jury would be handled—paired with a request to continue deliberating—does not become an Allen charge merely because the court expresses
that a unanimous verdict is preferable. Absent announced deadlock and absent coercive features (pressure on minority jurors, deadlines, retrial-expense appeals, threats of
prolonged deliberations), the Supreme Court will treat such communications as permissible deliberation management and will not reach Streitfeld’s coercion analysis.