Deadly Force Is Reasonable Against an Advancing, Armed, Noncompliant Suspect Despite Low-Level Offense; Nonverbal Warning May Suffice

1. Introduction

In Wilver Catarino v. Banks County Sheriff (11th Cir. Aug. 6, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Banks County Sergeant Jeffrey Ledford and Sheriff Carlton Speed in a § 1983 Fourth Amendment excessive-force suit and related Georgia-law claims arising from the fatal shooting of Felix Catarino.

The encounter began as a dispute over a $330 taxicab fare and an arrest for theft of services. After being told he was under arrest and ordered to put his hands behind his back, Catarino refused, rummaged through a backpack, produced a ~20-inch metal pipe, and advanced toward Ledford while yelling. Ledford repeatedly commanded “Stop!” and warned he would shoot. After retreating for about eleven seconds, Ledford fired four shots, killing Catarino.

Key issues on appeal were: (1) whether the use of deadly force violated the Fourth Amendment under Graham/Garner; (2) whether qualified immunity applied; (3) whether Georgia official immunity barred tort claims; (4) whether the Georgia Constitution provided a private cause of action; and (5) whether the district court abused its discretion in denying a late motion to amend to add additional supervisory defendants.

2. Summary of the Opinion

  • Fourth Amendment / § 1983: No constitutional violation. Applying Graham v. Connor and the deadly-force framework derived from Tennessee v. Garner (as described through circuit precedent), the court held Ledford’s shooting was objectively reasonable because Catarino posed an immediate threat while armed and advancing and was actively resisting arrest.
  • Qualified immunity: Because plaintiffs failed to show a constitutional violation, the court did not reach the “clearly established” prong (though the district court had alternatively ruled the right was not clearly established in this context).
  • Georgia tort claims: Barred by Georgia official immunity; no evidence of “actual malice.”
  • Georgia constitutional claims: Not actionable because Georgia appellate authority recognizes no private cause of action for Georgia constitutional violations against an officer in this posture.
  • Motion to amend: Denial affirmed under Rule 16(b) “good cause” and, alternatively, futility principles; plaintiffs were not diligent and, in any event, supervisory claims would fail absent an underlying constitutional violation.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

A. Excessive force and deadly force standards

  • Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989): The court applied Graham’s objective-reasonableness factors—(1) severity of the crime, (2) immediate threat, (3) active resistance/flight. Although “theft of services” was a low-severity offense (favoring plaintiffs), the court emphasized the second and third factors: an immediate threat created by an armed advance and active resistance.
  • Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), as cited through Vaughan v. Cox, 343 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2023): The opinion treated Garner as supplying deadly-force considerations, including probable cause to believe the suspect posed a threat of serious physical harm, necessity, and warning. The court credited repeated verbal warnings and also held that pointing the gun constituted an adequate nonverbal warning even amid arguments about a language barrier.
  • Shaw v. City of Selma, 884 F.3d 1093 (11th Cir. 2018): Central comparator: when confronting an “armed and noncompliant suspect,” officers need not wait for a suspect to strike first before using deadly force. The court analogized Catarino’s advancing-with-a-weapon behavior to Shaw.
  • Singletary v. Vargas, 804 F.3d 1174 (11th Cir. 2015): Reinforced the principle that officers in dangerous situations need not wait until the suspect uses the deadly weapon before acting to stop the threat.
  • Davis v. Waller, 44 F.4th 1305 (11th Cir. 2022), citing Menuel v. City of Atlanta, 25 F.3d 990 (11th Cir. 1994) and Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143 (7th Cir. 1994): The court relied on this line to reject any argument that the Constitution requires officers to exhaust feasible non-deadly alternatives (e.g., a taser) before using deadly force once deadly force is otherwise justified.

B. Plaintiffs’ cited cases distinguished

  • Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2005): Distinguished because the suspect threatened only himself, was not advancing on officers, and officers gave no warning; here, Catarino threatened the officer, advanced, and was warned repeatedly.
  • McKinney v. DeKalb County, 997 F.2d 1440 (11th Cir. 1993): Distinguished as a dispute-heavy record unsuitable for summary judgment; here, bodycam footage objectively fixed the material facts.

C. Qualified immunity framework

  • Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009): Provided the two-prong structure (constitutional violation / clearly established) and discretion to address prongs in either order.
  • Holmes v. Kucynda, 321 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2003); Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188 (11th Cir. 2002); Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240 (11th Cir. 2010): Cited for burden shifting once discretionary authority is shown and for the rule that plaintiffs must satisfy both prongs to overcome qualified immunity.

D. State-law official immunity

  • Reed v. DeKalb County, 589 S.E.2d 584 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003): Framed Georgia official immunity for discretionary acts absent willfulness, malice, or corruption.
  • Merrow v. Hawkins, 467 S.E.2d 336 (Ga. 1996): Defined “actual malice” as a “deliberate intention to do wrong,” a standard not met by actions taken in perceived self-defense during law-enforcement duties.
  • Hoyt v. Cooks, 672 F.3d 972 (11th Cir. 2012): Cited for de novo review of summary judgment rulings on official immunity.

E. Georgia Constitution—no private cause of action

  • Collins v. Schantz, 893 S.E.2d at 287 (Ga. Ct. App.): Treated as controlling Georgia authority that “there is no viable private cause of action against [an officer] for … alleged constitutional violations” of the Georgia Constitution in this context.
  • Howard v. Miller, 222 Ga. App. 868 (1996): Reinforced the same proposition.
  • Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 881 F.3d 835 (11th Cir. 2018); Silverberg v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 710 F.2d 678 (11th Cir. 1983): Cited for the federal court’s obligation to follow state intermediate appellate decisions on state-law questions.

F. Amendment after scheduling deadline (Rule 16)

  • Newton v. Duke Energy Fla., LLC, 895 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2018): Provided the abuse-of-discretion standard for denying leave to amend.
  • Sosa v. Airprint Sys., Inc., 133 F.3d 1417 (11th Cir. 1998); S. Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v. 3M Co., 575 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2009): Applied Rule 16(b)’s “good cause” and “diligence” requirement where a party moves to amend after the scheduling-order deadline, including the principle that failure to pursue discovery (e.g., depositions) can demonstrate lack of diligence.
  • Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d 1230 (11th Cir. 2008): Supported denial of leave for futility where amendment would not survive a motion to dismiss.
  • Braddy v. Fla. Dep't of Lab. & Emp. Sec., 133 F.3d 797 (11th Cir. 1998); Myrick v. Fulton County, 69 F.4th 1277 (11th Cir. 2023): Emphasized the “extremely rigorous” standard for supervisory liability and the rejection of respondeat superior in § 1983.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

A. Objective reasonableness under Graham v. Connor

The court accepted that the initiating offense was minor. But it treated the encounter as rapidly transforming from a low-level property offense into a dangerous, close-range confrontation once Catarino (i) resisted arrest, (ii) ignored repeated commands, (iii) searched a bag after being warned not to, (iv) produced a heavy metal pipe, and (v) advanced on the officer while yelling.

The decisive Graham factors were the immediate threat and active resistance. The opinion implicitly treated the pipe and forward movement as creating a realistic prospect of serious injury in close quarters, making the use of deadly force reasonable even though the original offense was nonviolent.

B. Deadly force under Garner as applied via Vaughan v. Cox

With deadly force, the court looked for probable cause to believe a threat of serious harm existed and whether warnings were provided. On the record described (including bodycam footage), the court found Ledford reasonably perceived imminent danger and repeatedly warned Catarino to stop, including warnings that he would be shot. It further accepted a nonverbal warning theory: raising and pointing a gun can communicate impending deadly force even if verbal comprehension is disputed.

C. No constitutional requirement to try lesser force first

Plaintiffs’ theory that Ledford should have used a taser (or otherwise de-escalated differently) ran into the Eleventh Circuit’s recurring rule—summarized through Davis v. Waller and Menuel v. City of Atlanta—that the Fourth Amendment does not impose a duty to exhaust non-deadly alternatives before using deadly force once the deadly force is otherwise justified by an imminent threat.

D. Bodycam footage and the absence of material factual disputes

The panel distinguished cases turning on disputed facts (e.g., McKinney v. DeKalb County) because the bodycam footage “objectively” established the critical sequence: refusal to submit, bag-searching after warnings, weapon production, sustained advance, officer retreat, and shots fired.

E. Georgia official immunity and “actual malice”

For the battery/assault/wrongful death-type tort claims, the key move was doctrinal: if the conduct is discretionary and there is no evidence of “actual malice” (a deliberate intent to do wrong under Merrow v. Hawkins), official immunity bars personal liability. The court treated the shooting as a discretionary law-enforcement act performed in response to a perceived threat, not an intentional wrongdoing.

F. Georgia constitutional claims not privately actionable

The opinion treated Collins v. Schantz (and Howard v. Miller) as foreclosing a private damages action directly under the Georgia Constitution in this setting, particularly given plaintiffs’ acknowledgment that Georgia lacks a direct analogue to § 1983.

G. Late amendment under Rule 16(b): diligence and futility

The court affirmed denial because plaintiffs moved seven months after the amendment deadline and could not show diligence: their own Rule 26 disclosures included an expert report identifying key supervisors and relevant correspondence months before the deadline, yet plaintiffs did not timely pursue discovery such as depositions. Independently, the amendment was futile because supervisory liability is “extremely rigorous” (Braddy; Myrick) and, critically, the court found no underlying constitutional violation to support derivative supervisory claims.

3.3. Impact

  • Threat-focused analysis can dominate low-severity origins: Even when the underlying offense is minor, the Eleventh Circuit’s application of Graham/Garner underscores that escalation (weapon retrieval + advance + noncompliance) can justify deadly force when an officer reasonably perceives imminent serious harm.
  • “No need to wait” principle reinforced: Relying on Shaw v. City of Selma and Singletary v. Vargas, the court reaffirmed that officers need not wait to be struck before acting in self-defense against an armed, advancing suspect.
  • Warnings may be partly nonverbal: The acceptance of pointing a firearm as an “adequate nonverbal warning” may matter in future cases involving language barriers—though its persuasive force will depend on context, distance, and clarity of the suspect’s perception.
  • Bodycam narrows triable disputes: The decision illustrates how video evidence can convert what might otherwise be jury questions into summary judgment rulings by fixing the timeline and key threat indicators.
  • Georgia-law barriers remain high: Official immunity and the lack of a private cause of action for Georgia constitutional violations can significantly constrain state-law recovery even where a death occurs.
  • Case-management rigor: The Rule 16(b) discussion signals continued strict enforcement of amendment deadlines, especially where plaintiffs possessed early indicators of the facts supporting new claims but delayed discovery steps.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Qualified immunity: A defense that protects officials from damages unless the plaintiff shows (1) a constitutional violation and (2) the violated right was clearly established at the time. Courts may decide either prong first (Pearson v. Callahan).
  • “Objective reasonableness” (Fourth Amendment): The question is not whether force was tragic or avoidable in hindsight, but whether a reasonable officer on the scene could think the force was appropriate given the rapidly evolving situation (Graham v. Connor).
  • Deadly force considerations: Deadly force is generally constitutional where the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a serious physical threat, and warnings—verbal or, in some contexts, nonverbal—can matter (Tennessee v. Garner; Vaughan v. Cox).
  • Official immunity (Georgia): Georgia officers are generally immune from personal liability for discretionary acts unless the plaintiff proves “actual malice,” meaning a deliberate intent to do wrong (Reed v. DeKalb County; Merrow v. Hawkins).
  • Rule 16(b) “good cause” to amend late: After a scheduling deadline, a party must show diligence—i.e., they could not have reasonably met the deadline despite timely efforts (Sosa v. Airprint Sys., Inc.; S. Grouts & Mortars, Inc. v. 3M Co.).
  • Supervisory liability under § 1983: Supervisors are not liable just because they supervise; plaintiffs must show a stringent causal connection, and without an underlying constitutional violation, derivative supervisory claims fail (Braddy; Myrick).

5. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit’s disposition in Wilver Catarino v. Banks County Sheriff is a threat-centered application of Graham and Garner: when a suspect actively resists, retrieves a weapon, and advances on an officer, deadly force may be deemed objectively reasonable even if the encounter began with a low-level offense. The opinion reinforces that officers need not wait to be struck and are not constitutionally required to try lesser force first once deadly force is justified, while also highlighting how video evidence can eliminate material factual disputes at summary judgment. On the state-law side, Georgia official immunity and the absence of a private cause of action for Georgia constitutional violations remain formidable barriers. Finally, the decision underscores strict enforcement of scheduling orders where plaintiffs had early notice of facts supporting additional claims but did not act diligently.