Deadly Force Clearly Established at the “Unarmed and Nonthreatening” Level; No Scavenger-Hunt Specificity in Qualified Immunity

I. Introduction

Manning v. City of Tulsa (10th Cir. Mar. 30, 2026) arises from the 2016 shooting death of Terence Crutcher, Sr., an unarmed Black man, by Officer Betty Jo Shelby of the Tulsa Police Department. Michael Manning, as administrator of Crutcher’s estate (the “Estate”), filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and also sued the City of Tulsa under Oklahoma wrongful-death law and under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) for municipal policies/practices allegedly causing the death.

The district court (i) dismissed the Estate’s Monell claims at the pleadings stage for failure to plausibly allege municipal liability, then (ii) granted summary judgment to Shelby on qualified immunity, and finally (iii) dismissed the state-law claim without prejudice after concluding no federal claims remained.

The Tenth Circuit reversed the qualified-immunity summary judgment for Shelby and affirmed dismissal of the Monell claims, remanding for further proceedings and for reconsideration of supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claim.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Qualified immunity reversed: The panel held the district court failed to view disputed facts in the Estate’s favor at summary judgment, and erred by defining the “clearly established” right at an impermissibly granular, case-specific level. On the Estate’s version of disputed facts, Crutcher was unarmed, his hands were up, and the SUV window was mostly rolled up such that no weapon was within reach—making Shelby’s deadly force objectively unreasonable and in violation of clearly established law.
  • Monell dismissal affirmed: The Estate’s allegations about training, hiring/screening, and investigations/discipline were deemed too general and insufficiently connected to a pattern of similar constitutional violations or to causation (“moving force”) as required under Twombly/Iqbal plausibility and Monell doctrine.
  • State-law claim: Because federal claims were reinstated on appeal, the district court must reconsider whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Oklahoma wrongful-death claim.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Qualified immunity framework and appellate posture

  • Tenorio v. Pitzer, 802 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009)): Reiterates the two-prong qualified-immunity framework and places the burden on plaintiffs in the Tenth Circuit to show both a constitutional violation and clearly established law. The panel also notes (in a footnote) the Estate’s preservation-only argument about a circuit split on burden allocation, but adheres to Tenorio.
  • Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009): Confirms courts may address qualified-immunity prongs in either order. Here the district court addressed only clearly established law; the Tenth Circuit addressed both prongs.
  • Shepherd v. Robbins, 55 F.4th 810 (10th Cir. 2022) and Torres v. Madrid, 60 F.4th 596 (10th Cir. 2023): Anchor the de novo standard of review and the summary-judgment requirement to view evidence and inferences in the nonmovant’s favor.
  • Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a): Sets the “no genuine dispute as to any material fact” summary-judgment standard.
  • Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007): The panel applies Scott’s “blatantly contradicted by the record” limitation, rejecting Shelby’s reliance on a blurry frame and underscoring that ambiguous video does not permit a court to resolve disputed material facts against the nonmoving party.

2. Fourth Amendment excessive-force standards

  • Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989): Provides the objective reasonableness test and the three key factors (severity of crime, immediate threat, resistance/flight). The panel applies all three and finds they favor the Estate under its version of facts.
  • Clerkley v. Holcomb, 121 F.4th 1359 (10th Cir. 2024): Used for both the general Graham framework and for synthesis on clearly established law—particularly the proposition that it is “clear” an officer may not use deadly force on an “unarmed, nonthreatening person,” even when responding to potentially dangerous situations.
  • Est. of Larsen ex rel. Sturdivan v. Murr, 511 F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 2008) and Baca v. Cosper, 128 F.4th 1319 (10th Cir.): Provide the “Larsen factors” used in deadly-force cases to illuminate the threat inquiry (commands/compliance, hostile motions with weapon, distance, and manifest intentions). The panel emphasizes the absence of any weapon and finds the factors weigh sharply against deadly force.
  • Est. of Taylor v. Salt Lake City, 16 F.4th 744 (10th Cir. 2021): Supports the principle that nonviolent misdemeanors weigh against significant force.
  • Est. of Harmon v. Salt Lake City, 134 F.4th 1119 (10th Cir. 2025): Used to illustrate that even close distance does not automatically establish imminent threat, particularly when the threat indicators are weak.
  • Krueger v. Phillips, 154 F.4th 1164 (10th Cir. 2025) (quoting Surat v. Klamser, 52 F.4th 1261 (10th Cir. 2022)): Reinforces that passive noncompliance is a low level of resistance and generally does not justify severe force.
  • Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006): Cited both in the constitutional-violation analysis (deadly force unconstitutional where suspect did not threaten officers) and in the clearly established discussion, emphasizing that shooting a person who is not threatening officers violates the Fourth Amendment.

3. “Clearly established” law and the proper level of specificity

  • Finch v. Rapp, 38 F.4th 1234 (10th Cir. 2022): Central to the panel’s articulation of clearly established law: it was clearly established that an officer “may not shoot an unarmed and unthreatening suspect.” Finch is also used to reject the need for identical facts where deadly force is “totally unnecessary.”
  • City of Tahlequah v. Bond, 595 U.S. 9 (2021): The panel acknowledges the Supreme Court’s admonition not to define clearly established law at too high a level of generality, but contrasts that with the district court’s opposite error—over-particularizing the right by essentially restating the case facts.
  • Casey v. City of Fed. Heights, 509 F.3d 1278 (10th Cir. 2007): Explains why exact factual matches are rare in excessive-force litigation due to Graham’s totality-of-the-circumstances nature.
  • Packard v. Budaj, 86 F.4th 859 (10th Cir. 2023) (quoting Reavis v. Frost, 967 F.3d 978 (10th Cir. 2020)): Rejects a “scavenger hunt” for factually identical cases; officers must draw commonsense parallels.
  • Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002): Supplies the panel’s conceptual anchor against “fundamentally similar” requirements; officials can have fair notice in novel factual settings.
  • King v. Hill, 615 F. App’x 470 (10th Cir. 2015): Used persuasively to show an acceptable tailoring of the right—avoiding both overly broad generalities and hyper-specific fact recitations.
  • Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985): Establishes the foundational rule: police may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead.
  • Zuchel v. Spinharney, 890 F.2d 273 (10th Cir. 1989), Zia Trust Co. ex rel. Causey v. Montoya, 597 F.3d 1150 (10th Cir. 2010), and Walker v. City of Orem, 451 F.3d 1139 (10th Cir. 2006): These cases provide the pre-2016 body of authority demonstrating that shooting a person who is not reasonably perceived as an imminent threat violates clearly established law.
  • Wise v. Caffey, 72 F.4th 1199 (10th Cir. 2023) and Frasier v. Evans, 992 F.3d 1003 (10th Cir. 2021): Support the panel’s methodological point that post-incident precedent can be used to guide the “level of generality” framing, even though it cannot itself clearly establish law for the past incident.
  • Elder v. Holloway, 510 U.S. 510 (1994) and Hardy v. Rabie, 147 F.4th 1156 (10th Cir. 2025): Reinforce that courts are not limited to the parties’ cited authority when analyzing clearly established law, while still allowing waiver/forfeiture principles where issues are inadequately briefed (see also Sawyers v. Norton, 962 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2020)).

4. Supplemental jurisdiction

  • Baca v. Sklar, 398 F.3d 1210 (10th Cir. 2005): Supports remanding for reconsideration of state-law claim disposition when federal claims are reinstated.

5. Monell doctrine and pleading standards

  • Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011) and Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986): Confirm municipalities are liable only for “their own illegal acts,” not vicariously for employee misconduct, and highlight the notice/pattern requirement in failure-to-train claims (“ordinarily necessary”).
  • Thao v. Grady Cnty. Crim. Just. Auth., 159 F.4th 1214 (10th Cir. 2025) (quoting Moss v. Kopp, 559 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2009)) and Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2019): Provide the elements for municipal liability and enumerate the five categories of policies/customs (including failure to train/supervise).
  • Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997)): Supplies the “moving force” causation requirement and the deliberate-indifference articulation.
  • Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intel. & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163 (1993): Invoked to reject heightened pleading in Monell civil-rights cases, while the panel clarifies that modern plausibility pleading applies.
  • Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009): Establish plausibility pleading; the panel holds the district court properly applied this standard and did not impose a heightened Monell pleading rule.
  • Pyle v. Woods, 874 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2017): Reinforces that merely alleging a policy is insufficient; factual allegations must support a plausible inference that the policy caused the injury.
  • City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), Barney v. Pulsipher, 143 F.3d 1299 (10th Cir. 1998), and Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011): Govern failure-to-train notice/pattern requirements and the “single-incident” narrow exception.
  • Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997) and Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2019): Set the stringent standard for failure-to-screen/hiring: liability only where adequate scrutiny would make it plainly obvious the hire would lead to constitutional deprivation.
  • Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep’t, 717 F.3d 760 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting Butler v. City of Norman, 992 F.2d 1053 (10th Cir. 1993)), Cordova v. Aragon, 569 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2009), and Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 932 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2019): Shape the “failure to discipline/investigate” theory—particularly the temporal-causation problem where post-incident non-discipline cannot cause the incident itself.
  • Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188 (10th Cir. 2012): Used to characterize overly broad allegations as failing to cross from conceivable to plausible.
  • Toevs v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903 (10th Cir. 2012): Supports the panel’s finding that an equal-protection Monell theory was waived by inadequate briefing.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. The court’s handling of disputed facts: video does not erase the jury function

A decisive feature of the opinion is its insistence that summary judgment is not a forum for choosing among competing factual narratives, especially where video evidence is ambiguous. The district court accepted Shelby’s view that Crutcher “did at least lower his arm,” and credited the theory that he was reaching into the SUV. The panel rejected that approach for two reasons:

  1. The key factual predicates were genuinely disputed (hand movements, window position, arm position), and the Estate’s version controlled at summary judgment.
  2. Scott v. Harris did not apply because the cited imagery was blurry, temporally mismatched (the screenshot was not from the expert-identified discharge frame), and far from “blatantly” contradicting the Estate’s account.

The opinion thus operationalizes a practical rule for deadly-force cases with video: unless the footage clearly forecloses the nonmovant’s version, courts must preserve the factfinder’s role.

2. Constitutional violation: Graham and Larsen converge on unreasonableness

On the Estate’s assumed facts—Crutcher unarmed, hands up, no weapon within reach—the panel finds all Graham factors weigh against deadly force:

  • Severity of the crime: suspected public intoxication/obstruction, “non[]violent misdemeanors,” which “weigh[s] against the use of significant force.”
  • Immediate threat: Larsen factors underscore the absence of any weapon-related cues, minimal distance significance absent a weapon, and no manifest intent to harm.
  • Resistance/flight: at most “passively noncompliant,” which does not justify a severe force response.

The panel’s reasoning is noteworthy for how it frames the “threat” inquiry: the “reaching for a weapon” narrative cannot be used to justify deadly force when the record (viewed properly) permits a finding that the suspect’s hands were up and the window mostly rolled up, making weapon access implausible.

3. Clearly established law: rejecting hyper-specific “right framing”

The opinion’s most important doctrinal move is its critique of the district court’s “clearly established” framing. The district court asked whether an officer could use deadly force under an elaborate list of descriptors that largely restated the incident’s particulars, even including a disputed factual assertion (“lowered his arm”). The panel holds that this methodology improperly demands “fundamental[] similar[ity]” and resembles a forbidden “scavenger hunt.”

Instead, the panel approves a right framed at the level of the “essential facts”: an officer may not use deadly force against an unarmed, nonthreatening person. This framing is not an abstract “no excessive force” maxim; it is a deadly-force-specific rule tied to threat assessment.

The panel then grounds the rule in pre-2016 authority: Tennessee v. Garner (baseline), and Tenth Circuit applications including Zuchel v. Spinharney, Zia Trust Co. ex rel. Causey v. Montoya, and Walker v. City of Orem. It further relies on the synthesis offered by later cases such as Finch v. Rapp and Clerkley v. Holcomb to show the proper level of generality for the inquiry, while acknowledging that post-incident precedent cannot itself “establish” the law retroactively.

4. Monell: plausibility, pattern/notice, and causation are the hard gates

Although the Estate argued the district court used a heightened pleading standard, the panel held the district court applied ordinary Twombly/Iqbal plausibility: factual content must allow a reasonable inference of municipal liability; labels and conclusions do not suffice.

The panel then affirms dismissal across the Estate’s three Monell theories:

  • Failure to train: Allegations of a “history of high rates of excessive[-]force complaints” were too thin without meaningful detail showing a pattern of similar constitutional violations. Without similarity and constitutional adjudication (or plausible facts establishing it), the City lacked the requisite notice under Connick v. Thompson. The panel also rejects “single-incident” liability because the complaint attacked “nuance” in training (de-escalation/implicit bias), not the Canton footnote’s archetype of a complete absence of training on deadly-force limits.
  • Failure to screen/hire: Even if a background check would have uncovered prior incidents and protective orders, the standard from Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown requires that the constitutional deprivation be the “plainly obvious consequence” of hiring. The panel deems three prior incidents (without injury or conviction) insufficient to make deadly-force constitutional violations a plainly obvious consequence.
  • Failure to investigate/discipline (“code of silence”): Post-incident non-discipline cannot have caused the shooting due to linear time (Cordova v. Aragon; Waller v. City & Cnty. of Denver). As to prior investigative failures, the complaint did not plausibly allege that the referenced shootings/complaints involved excessive force, leaving causation speculative and overly broad under Khalik v. United Air Lines.

C. Impact

1. Qualified-immunity litigation in deadly-force cases: right-framing discipline

The decision strengthens a recurring Tenth Circuit theme: district courts must avoid defining “clearly established law” as a bespoke factual checklist. By expressly faulting a near fact-for-fact restatement, the panel signals that over-particularization can be as erroneous as undue generality. Practically, plaintiffs will cite this opinion to argue that “unarmed and nonthreatening” is the appropriate level of specificity where the disputed facts (properly credited) negate weapon possession or imminent danger.

2. Video evidence: ambiguity preserves disputes

The opinion’s treatment of blurry or temporally mismatched frames provides a litigant-ready template: unless the video “blatantly contradict[s]” the plaintiff, factual disputes about hand placement, compliance, and weapon access remain for the jury. This will matter in cases where parties overclaim what aerial, dashcam, or bodycam footage “shows.”

3. Monell pleading: complaints-based statistics and generalized “culture” allegations are vulnerable

On the municipal-liability side, the opinion confirms a stringent, practical application of plausibility: allegations of “high rates of complaints” or generalized claims of a permissive culture are unlikely to survive without concrete prior incidents, similarity to the violation alleged, and facts supporting an inference of constitutional violations (not merely accusations). The decision therefore incentivizes plaintiffs to plead (and, when possible, particularize) prior episodes, investigative outcomes, and how those episodes put policymakers on notice.

4. Case management and supplemental jurisdiction

Because the panel reinstated the federal excessive-force claim, it instructs the district court to reconsider supplemental jurisdiction over the state wrongful-death claim. This can affect strategic sequencing: dismissal of state claims for lack of supplemental jurisdiction may be temporary if the federal claim returns on appeal.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Qualified immunity: A defense shielding officers from damages unless (1) they violated the Constitution and (2) the violated right was “clearly established” at the time. It is not enough that conduct seems wrongful in hindsight; prior law must have put a reasonable officer on notice.
  • “Clearly established” (right framing): Courts must define the right with enough specificity to give fair notice, but not so narrowly that the right becomes “the right to be free from the exact thing that happened to me.” This case holds the district court went too narrow by reciting the incident’s details.
  • Summary judgment: A pretrial ruling that can be granted only if no material facts are genuinely disputed. If the plaintiff has evidence that could lead a reasonable jury to accept its version, the case should proceed to trial.
  • Scott v. Harris rule: Video can override a party’s account only when it “blatantly contradict[s]” that account. Ambiguous footage does not.
  • Monell liability: A city is not automatically liable for an officer’s unconstitutional act. The plaintiff must connect the injury to the city’s own policy/custom (including deliberate-indifference failures to train/supervise/hire) and show that policy was the “moving force” causing the violation.
  • Deliberate indifference (training/hiring): More than negligence. Typically requires notice—often a pattern of similar constitutional violations—plus a conscious choice not to act. For hiring, the risk must be so obvious that the constitutional violation is a plainly obvious consequence of the hiring decision.

V. Conclusion

Manning v. City of Tulsa delivers two principal takeaways. First, it reinforces that courts must honor summary-judgment standards in deadly-force cases: disputed facts—especially those not conclusively resolved by video—must be credited in the plaintiff’s favor. Second, it clarifies that “clearly established” law cannot be defined as a hyper-specific replication of the incident; where the credited facts show an unarmed, nonthreatening person, longstanding precedent from Tennessee v. Garner through Zuchel v. Spinharney, Zia Trust Co. ex rel. Causey v. Montoya, and Walker v. City of Orem can clearly establish the unlawfulness of deadly force.

At the same time, the opinion underscores the rigor of modern Monell pleading: generalized allegations of a force-friendly culture, high complaint volumes, or poor discipline practices—without concrete, similar prior incidents and a plausible causal chain—will not satisfy the deliberate-indifference and “moving force” requirements. The result is a case that meaningfully tightens method (right framing and fact-crediting) while maintaining demanding substance for municipal-liability claims.