Dangerousness as the Controlling Test for As-Applied Bruen Challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) on Plain-Error Review

1. Introduction

Parties and posture. The United States (Plaintiff-Appellee) prosecuted Mykael Booker (Defendant-Appellant) for, among other offenses, being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Booker pleaded guilty and received a 180-month sentence. On appeal, he challenged only the constitutionality of his § 922(g)(1) conviction as applied to him.

Factual backdrop. The opinion situates the firearm issue within a broader narcotics context: Booker’s involvement in cocaine trafficking, intercepted calls suggesting gun possession and threats, and a search that recovered cocaine base, drug paraphernalia, an empty pistol box, and ammunition. The court ultimately did not need to rely heavily on the underlying offense conduct because Booker’s prior record itself established “dangerousness” under controlling circuit precedent.

Key issues. Two questions drove the appeal:

• Standard of review: Whether Booker’s new constitutional challenge—raised for the first time on appeal after New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)—should receive de novo review or plain-error review.
• Second Amendment merits: Whether, under post-Bruen Sixth Circuit doctrine, Booker could show § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him because he is not “actually dangerous.”

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed. It held that Booker forfeited his constitutional claim by not raising it in the district court, so review was for plain error. On the merits, the court applied its framework from United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024), under which § 922(g)(1) is constitutional on its face and as applied to dangerous individuals, and the defendant bears the burden to show he is “not actually dangerous.” Booker’s multiple drug-trafficking convictions and a Michigan second-degree home invasion conviction—along with being on probation when he offended and a broader pattern of disregard for court orders—were sufficient to establish dangerousness. Because Booker offered no evidence to rebut dangerousness, he could not demonstrate a Second Amendment violation, much less “plain” error.

The court also rejected Booker’s derivative challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (ACCA’s 15-year minimum), reasoning that because his § 922(g)(1) conviction stood, there was no basis to question § 924(e)(1) on the theory he advanced.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The opinion is best understood as an application (not an expansion) of existing Sixth Circuit post-Bruen doctrine, with two main precedent “tracks”: (a) forfeiture and plain-error review; and (b) the “dangerousness” standard for as-applied Second Amendment challenges to § 922(g)(1).

A. Forfeiture and standard of review

• United States v. Rose, 522 F.3d 710 (6th Cir. 2008): Cited for the general rule that constitutionality determinations are reviewed de novo—framing what would have applied had Booker preserved the issue.
• United States v. Johnson, 95 F.4th 404 (6th Cir. 2024): Supplies the Sixth Circuit’s contemporary articulation of the plain-error framework and confirms plain-error review for unpreserved claims.
• Greer v. United States, 593 U.S. 503 (2021): Provides the Supreme Court’s controlling forfeiture rule—when a defendant had an “opportunity to object” and did not, plain-error review applies on appeal.
• United States v. Stubbs, 279 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2002): Used to rebut Booker’s “no opportunity” argument by emphasizing that a defendant may move to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing if constitutionally infirm. The panel treats this as a practical avenue Booker could have used after Bruen and before sentencing.

How these cases shape the result: The court’s procedural holding is pivotal: by forcing Booker into plain-error review, the panel raises the bar from “was there a constitutional violation?” to “was any error clear/obvious and outcome-affecting?” That procedural lens makes it especially difficult for a defendant to win a newly minted as-applied Second Amendment claim on appeal without having developed a record below.

B. Second Amendment methodology and § 922(g)(1)

• Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008): Cited for the foundational proposition that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation, while also recognizing the right is “not unlimited.”
• New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022): Provides the governing methodological test: firearm regulations must be consistent with the Nation’s “historical tradition of firearm regulation.” The panel treats Bruen as the doctrinal starting point but resolves the case through Sixth Circuit implementing precedent.
• United States v. Williams, 113 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024): The controlling Sixth Circuit framework. The opinion quotes Williams for multiple propositions:
  • § 922(g)(1) is constitutional on its face and as applied to “dangerous people.”
  • To win an as-applied challenge, the defendant bears the burden to show “he himself is not actually dangerous.”
  • Dangerousness is fact-specific; courts may consider the “entire criminal record.”
  • Drug trafficking and burglary are “highly probative” of dangerousness.
  • Violence is not required; crimes posing risk to safety suffice.
• United States v. Stone, 608 F.3d 939 (6th Cir. 2010): Reinforces that drug trafficking “poses a danger to the community,” supporting the panel’s classification of Booker as dangerous.
• Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990): Quoted (via Williams) for the rationale that burglary is dangerous because it risks violent confrontation.
• United States v. Craft, No. 24-1624, 2025 WL 2888040 (6th Cir. Oct. 10, 2025) and United States v. Gibbs, 626 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 2010): Used to equate Michigan second-degree home invasion with “burglary of a dwelling,” enabling the panel to place Booker’s home invasion conviction within Williams’s “burglary” dangerousness category.

C. Probation status, disregard for law, and record sufficiency

• United States v. Goins, 118 F.4th 794 (6th Cir. 2024): Supports treating probation status as probative of dangerousness in an as-applied § 922(g)(1) challenge.
• United States v. Berry, No. 24-3769, 2025 WL 1082376 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 2025) (per curiam): Cited for the proposition that a combination of a dangerous crime and a “long history of disregarding the law” defeats an attempt to rebut dangerousness, and that § 922(g)(1) has been upheld as applied to individuals on probation for dangerous crimes.
• United States v. Hostettler, 170 F.4th 539 (6th Cir. 2026): Mentioned to acknowledge that remand for a dangerousness inquiry can sometimes be appropriate, but also to distinguish circumstances where the record is sufficiently individualized or where objections to the record exist.
• United States v. Morton, 123 F.4th 492 (6th Cir. 2024): Used (via later-cited authority) to justify denying remand where the defendant’s record already “demonstrates dangerousness.”
• United States v. Williams, No. 24-1409, 2025 WL 1136326 (6th Cir. Apr. 17, 2025): Cited for the proposition that once certain record facts suffice to establish dangerousness, the court “need not consider or analyze” additional factors.
• United States v. White, No. 24-2064, 2025 WL 2060869 (6th Cir. July 23, 2025) and United States v. Garrison, No. 24-5455, 2024 WL 5040626 (6th Cir. Dec. 9, 2024): Cited to emphasize the defendant’s evidentiary burden—where the defendant “hasn't provided any evidence to show he isn't dangerous”—and to reject the view that only violent conduct counts.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeds in three steps: (1) impose plain-error review; (2) apply the Sixth Circuit’s Williams dangerousness framework; (3) conclude Booker cannot show a Second Amendment violation and therefore cannot show plain error.

Step 1: Plain-error review controls because Booker had an opportunity to object

Booker attempted to avoid plain-error review by arguing that Bruen postdated his guilty plea. The panel’s response is practical and procedural: Booker still had time before sentencing to challenge the conviction’s constitutionality, including by moving to withdraw the plea. By invoking Greer v. United States and United States v. Stubbs, the court treats “opportunity to object” as extending through sentencing in circumstances where intervening law emerges.

Step 2: The merits turn on “dangerousness,” and Booker bears the burden

The panel treats United States v. Williams as dispositive: § 922(g)(1) remains valid at least as applied to dangerous individuals, and the defendant must prove he is “not actually dangerous.” The opinion emphasizes what evidence can be considered (the “entire criminal record”), and that certain convictions—drug trafficking and burglary—are “highly probative” of dangerousness.

Applying that framework, the court identifies multiple independent indicators of dangerousness:

• Repeated drug trafficking convictions (Michigan convictions in 2007, 2008, 2018; and federal drug trafficking convictions in the present case). The panel characterizes drug trafficking as inherently posing a “significant threat of danger,” supported by Williams and United States v. Stone.
• Second-degree home invasion (2011), treated as “burglary of a dwelling” via United States v. Craft and United States v. Gibbs, and deemed dangerous under Taylor v. United States’s confrontation rationale (as adopted in Williams).
• Probation status at the time of the offense, which the panel views as further evidence of dangerousness, supported by United States v. Goins and the court’s discussion of United States v. Hostettler.
• Broader disregard for the law (numerous additional convictions, court-order violations, failures to appear). The panel uses United States v. Berry to treat this pattern as reinforcing the conclusion that Booker cannot rebut dangerousness.

Step 3: No remand is necessary because the record already “demonstrates dangerousness”

Booker argued the appellate court should vacate and remand for the district court to conduct the dangerousness inquiry. The panel acknowledges (via United States v. Hostettler) that remand can be appropriate, but denies it here because Booker’s record was “individualized,” uncontested, and sufficient to resolve dangerousness as a matter of application. Relying on United States v. Williams, No. 24-1409, 2025 WL 1136326, and United States v. Morton, the court treats the record as conclusive.

Interaction with plain-error review

Even if one framed the constitutional landscape as evolving post-Bruen, the panel’s approach effectively forecloses relief under plain-error review once Williams supplies a clear circuit rule and the defendant’s record falls within Williams’s dangerousness categories. Because Booker cannot show a Second Amendment violation under controlling precedent, he necessarily cannot show a “plain” error.

3.3 Impact

Although unpublished, the decision illustrates several operational consequences of the Sixth Circuit’s post-Bruen approach:

• As-applied challenges are record-driven and defendant-burdened. The opinion underscores that the defendant must come forward with evidence showing he is “not actually dangerous.” A bare argument that the defendant has not committed “violent” acts is insufficient, particularly where the record includes drug trafficking or burglary-type offenses.
• Procedural preservation matters more after intervening Supreme Court decisions. By treating a motion to withdraw a guilty plea (pre-sentencing) as an available mechanism, the panel signals that defendants cannot sit on new constitutional arguments and then expect de novo review.
• Remand is not automatic. Where an undisputed criminal history plainly fits the “dangerousness” categories, the Sixth Circuit may resolve the as-applied question on appeal without sending the case back.
• ACCA challenges tied solely to § 922(g)(1) invalidity will fail if § 922(g)(1) stands. Booker’s § 924(e)(1) argument rose and fell with his § 922(g)(1) theory; the panel’s treatment suggests that litigants must develop independent constitutional arguments if they wish to attack ACCA beyond the predicate validity of § 922(g)(1).

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “As-applied” vs. “facial” challenge: A facial challenge argues a law is unconstitutional in all (or nearly all) applications. An as-applied challenge argues the law may be generally valid but unconstitutional when applied to the particular defendant’s circumstances. Here, Booker brought only an as-applied challenge.
• Bruen’s “historical tradition” test: After Bruen, courts evaluate whether a modern firearm regulation is consistent with historical firearm regulation traditions. In Sixth Circuit felon-in-possession litigation, that inquiry is mediated through United States v. Williams, which permits disarming those the legislature may deem dangerous.
• “Dangerousness” (Sixth Circuit usage): Not limited to prior violence. The court treats certain crimes—especially drug trafficking and burglary-type offenses—as inherently risk-producing and therefore probative of dangerousness.
• Plain-error review: When a defendant fails to raise an argument in the trial court, the appellate court will reverse only if there is (1) an error, (2) that is plain (clear/obvious), (3) affecting substantial rights (usually outcome), and (4) seriously affecting the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. This is a demanding standard; it is not enough that the defendant has a plausible claim.
• Withdrawing a guilty plea: A defendant may, in certain circumstances, seek to withdraw a plea before sentencing—here used by the court to show Booker had a meaningful opportunity to raise his post-Bruen constitutional objection in the district court.
• ACCA (§ 924(e)(1)): A federal sentencing enhancement imposing a 15-year minimum for certain defendants convicted under § 922(g) who have three qualifying prior convictions. Booker’s attack on ACCA was derivative of his Second Amendment attack on § 922(g)(1).

5. Conclusion

United States v. Mykael Lee Booker exemplifies the Sixth Circuit’s post-Bruen implementation of § 922(g)(1): the constitutional validity of a felon-in-possession conviction, as applied, turns on whether the defendant can carry the burden to show he is “not actually dangerous” under United States v. Williams. Booker’s repeated drug-trafficking convictions, home-invasion conviction treated as dwelling burglary, probation status, and extensive history of noncompliance with legal processes foreclosed any meaningful rebuttal. Procedurally, the opinion also reinforces that intervening Supreme Court decisions do not excuse failure to preserve an argument when the defendant had a pre-sentencing opportunity to raise it—placing such claims under plain-error review and making appellate relief unlikely without a developed record.