Credible Child Forensic Interviews and Mandatory “No Reasonable Likelihood” Findings for Sexual Abuse Under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(5)

1. Introduction

In re A.L. and B.L. is a memorandum decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia affirming the Circuit Court of Wayne County’s termination of Father D.L.’s parental rights after the court adjudicated him as having sexually abused B.L. in the family home where A.L. also resided.

The central issues on appeal were (1) whether the circuit court clearly erred in adjudicating Father as an abusing parent based largely on a young child’s forensic interview and related testimony, and (2) whether the circuit court improperly relied “solely” on Father’s criminal conviction and incarceration at disposition when it terminated his parental rights. The Department of Human Services (DHS) prosecuted the abuse-and-neglect petition; the children were represented by a guardian ad litem.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court affirmed. It held that the adjudication findings were supported by clear and convincing evidence, emphasizing that appellate review does not permit reweighing credibility determinations the circuit court made after hearing live testimony. The Court rejected Father’s attacks on the forensic interview (including the absence of “narrative event practice” and a formal truth/lie inquiry) and rejected the argument that a lack of physical findings negated sexual abuse.

At disposition, the Court held the circuit court did not rely solely on incarceration. Instead, the termination was supported by West Virginia Code § 49-4-604(d)(5), which recognizes “no reasonable likelihood” of correcting conditions when an abusing parent has sexually abused a child and the family stress/potential for further abuse is so great that resources cannot mitigate the risk. The Court concluded termination was permissible under § 49-4-604(c)(6) and necessary for the children’s welfare.

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

  • Syl. Pt. 1, In re Cecil T., 228 W. Va. 89, 717 S.E.2d 873 (2011)
    The Court anchored its standard of review in In re Cecil T.: findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, conclusions of law de novo. This framing mattered because Father’s appellate strategy was largely a factual attack (credibility/reliability of the interview), which is difficult to win under clear-error review.
  • Syl. Pt. 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 196 W.Va. 223, 470 S.E.2d 177 (1996)
    Quoted through In re Cecil T., Tiffany Marie S. supplied the operational definition of “clearly erroneous” and emphasized that an appellate court must affirm if the circuit court’s view of the evidence is “plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” This case underwrote the Court’s refusal to second-guess the circuit court’s acceptance of the child’s disclosures.
  • Syl. Pt. 1, In re Joseph A., 199 W. Va. 438, 485 S.E.2d 176 (1997) (quoting Syl. Pt. 1, In re S.C., 168 W. Va. 366, 284 S.E.2d 867 (1981))
    These cases were used to address Father’s evidentiary/proof complaints: DHS must prove conditions existing at the time of filing by clear and convincing evidence, but the statute does not require a specific “manner or mode” of proof. This helped the Court reject the notion that a particular forensic-interview technique was legally required for adjudication.
  • In re F.S., 233 W. Va. 538, 759 S.E.2d 769 (2014) (quoting Cramer v. W. Va. Dep't of Highways, 180 W. Va. 97, 375 S.E.2d 568 (1988))
    The Court relied on In re F.S. and Cramer to situate the “clear and convincing” standard as intermediate—more demanding than preponderance, less than beyond a reasonable doubt. This comparison was important because Father’s critique implicitly sought something closer to criminal-proof certainty (e.g., physical findings, strict interviewing formalities), which is not the civil standard in abuse-and-neglect adjudications.
  • In re D.S., 251 W. Va. 466, 914 S.E.2d 701 (2025)
    In re D.S. was central to the Court’s response to Father’s argument that the child’s statements were ambiguous/inconsistent: the appellate court does not reweigh evidence or make credibility determinations. This precedent effectively foreclosed Father’s request to relitigate the circuit court’s evaluation of competing expert and lay testimony.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

(a) Adjudication: credibility of the forensic interview and supporting testimony.
The Court treated the case as a classic credibility-and-weight dispute. The circuit court heard the forensic interviewer’s training and methods, the mother’s testimony about observed redness and disclosures, Father’s denial and allegation of coaching, and Father’s expert (Dr. Drew Barzman), who opined the interview could be “less reliable” without “narrative event practice,” while also conceding the interviewer asked no suggestive questions.

The Supreme Court emphasized that the circuit court made specific findings: (1) the interviewer conveyed the importance of accurate answers (supporting an expectation of truthfulness even without a formal truth/lie test), (2) the interview followed relevant protocols, (3) the questions were not suggestive, (4) the child’s answers did not indicate coaching, and (5) the child’s disclosures were credible and age-consistent. Because these findings were “plausible” on the whole record, they were insulated from reversal under clear-error review.

(b) No physical findings did not defeat sexual-abuse adjudication.
The Court relied on the statutory definition in W. Va. Code § 49-1-201 to reject the argument that a normal physical exam precludes a finding of sexual abuse; a person may be adjudicated for sexually abusing a child “notwithstanding” the absence of apparent physical, mental, or emotional injury. The Court thus treated the child’s disclosures and other testimony as legally sufficient evidence even without corroborating physical injury.

(c) Disposition: incarceration was not the sole basis; § 49-4-604(d)(5) independently supported termination.
Father invoked Syl. Pt. 3 of In re Cecil T. (addressing circumstances where incarceration is the only factor raised at disposition). The Court held that principle did not control because the dispositional order was not “solely” based on incarceration or the conviction. Instead, the record established sexual abuse and, critically, triggered W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(5): when a parent has sexually abused a child and the family stress/potential for further abuse is so great that resources cannot mitigate it, there is “no reasonable likelihood” of correction. With that statutory finding plus a best-interests determination, termination was authorized by § 49-4-604(c)(6).

3.3. Impact

  • Forensic interview challenges: The decision reinforces that, in West Virginia abuse-and-neglect proceedings, adjudication does not hinge on proving adherence to a single “nationally required” method (such as “narrative event practice”), so long as the interview is non-suggestive and the circuit court finds the disclosures credible based on the full record.
  • Physical corroboration not required: By invoking § 49-1-201, the Court reiterates that the absence of physical injury is not dispositive in sexual abuse adjudications—an important point for cases involving delayed reporting, digital penetration allegations, or abuse that leaves no observable injury.
  • Appellate posture: The ruling underscores that appellate review is constrained: disagreements over witness credibility, alleged inconsistencies, and the weight of expert critiques generally will not succeed absent a truly implausible or unsupported factual account.
  • Disposition in sexual abuse cases: The application of § 49-4-604(d)(5) signals that sexual-abuse findings can supply an independent, statutory “no reasonable likelihood” basis for termination—separate from (and stronger than) arguments about incarceration alone.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Adjudication vs. disposition: Adjudication decides whether abuse/neglect occurred. Disposition decides what outcome is necessary (services, custody changes, or termination).
  • Clear and convincing evidence: A mid-level burden of proof. It requires a firm belief that the claim is true—more than “more likely than not,” but less than “beyond a reasonable doubt.”
  • Clearly erroneous review: The appellate court does not redo the trial. It reverses factual findings only when left with a strong conviction the lower court made a mistake; if the lower court’s view is plausible, it is affirmed.
  • De novo review: Legal questions (what the law means) are reviewed fresh, without deference.
  • Forensic interview / “narrative event practice”: A forensic interview is a structured conversation designed to obtain reliable information from a child. “Narrative event practice” is a technique some interview models use to help a child practice giving a narrative account. This decision treats its use as a methodological choice, not a legal prerequisite.
  • “No reasonable likelihood” under § 49-4-604(d)(5): A statutory determination that the parent cannot correct conditions in the near future when sexual abuse and extreme family stress/risk make remedial resources ineffective.

5. Conclusion

In re A.L. and B.L. solidifies two practical rules in West Virginia abuse-and-neglect litigation: (1) circuit courts have broad discretion to credit child forensic interviews and related testimony without proof of a single “required” interview protocol or physical corroboration, and appellate courts will not reweigh that credibility; and (2) in sexual-abuse cases, termination may be affirmed under W. Va. Code § 49-4-604(d)(5) and § 49-4-604(c)(6) based on the nature of the abuse and risk to the child—not merely on a parent’s incarceration.