Countrywide “Women” PSG Requires a Record-Based Unifying Targeting Characteristic; Generalized Gender Violence Is Not Enough

1. Introduction

In Marlin Lopez-Ramirez v. Attorney General United States of America (3d Cir. July 17, 2026), Marlin Lopez-Ramirez and her minor daughter (a derivative applicant) sought review of a Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision affirming an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) relief.

The petitioners, natives and citizens of Guatemala, entered the United States without valid documentation in 2015 and conceded removability. Lopez-Ramirez’s claim centered on severe domestic abuse by a former partner, Javilardo Hernandez, and documentary evidence regarding gender-based violence in Guatemala. She pursued asylum and withholding based on membership in a particular social group (“PSG”), framing that PSG as “Guatemalan Females,” and separately sought CAT protection based on the risk of future harm.

The key issues were:

• PSG cognizability: whether “Guatemalan Females” satisfies the requirements of particularity and social distinction under Third Circuit law.
• CAT likelihood: whether substantial evidence supports the finding that it is not more likely than not Lopez-Ramirez would be tortured if returned to Guatemala.
• Remand/harmless error: whether any alleged error related to a different PSG formulation required remand, given intervening developments.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit denied the petitions for review. It held:

• Asylum and withholding: The proposed PSG “Guatemalan women/females” was not cognizable because it lacked particularity (and also failed social distinction as found by the agency) absent record evidence of a “unifying characteristic” that causes all women in the country to be targeted for persecution based solely on gender.
• CAT: Substantial evidence supported the agency’s conclusion that future torture was not more likely than not, given the absence of contact for five years and the lack of harm to family after she left Guatemala.
• Acquiescence not reached: Because the BIA did not decide the CAT government-acquiescence prong, the court did not reach it.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Particular Social Group doctrine and “countrywide women” groups

• S.E.R.L. v. Att'y Gen., 894 F.3d 535 (3d Cir. 2018)
  This is the Third Circuit’s foundational articulation of the three PSG elements: (1) immutable characteristic, (2) particularity, and (3) social distinction. The court relied on S.E.R.L. for both the test and the definitional distinction between “particularity” (clear boundaries) and “social distinction” (societal perception of separateness).
• Chavez-Chilel v. Att'y Gen., 20 F.4th 138 (3d Cir. 2021)
  This case directly framed the analysis for PSGs defined as “all women in a particular country.” The opinion quoted Chavez-Chilel for the proposition that such groups are generally “overbroad,” but may be cognizable if there is record evidence of “a unifying characteristic that results in them being targeted for any form of persecution based solely on their gender.” The court treated this “unifying characteristic” requirement as part of the particularity inquiry in this context, and rejected the petitioners’ attempt to equate generalized gender violence with a qualifying unifying characteristic.
• Safaie v. I.N.S., 25 F.3d 636 (8th Cir. 1994)
  Cited (via Chavez-Chilel) for the idea that “all women” in a country is typically too broad to support a finding that all members have a well-founded fear based solely on gender—supporting the Third Circuit’s overbreadth/particularity concern.
• Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513 (8th Cir. 2007)
  Used as the contrasting example where “all Somali females” could be recognized given record evidence of widespread female genital mutilation. The Third Circuit used this contrast to show what the required “unifying characteristic” looks like: a near-universal, gender-linked persecutory practice affecting the group as such.
• Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018)
  Cited for the proposition that social groups defined by “vulnerability to private criminal activity” likely lack particularity. The court invoked Matter of A-B- to reject the petitioners’ framing of the unifying characteristic as “risk of violence,” reasoning that generalized vulnerability in a high-violence environment sweeps too broadly.

B. Standards of review and derivative claims

• Zhi Fei Liao v. Att'y Gen., 910 F.3d 714 (3d Cir. 2018) and Herrow v. Att'y Gen., 93 F.4th 107 (3d Cir. 2024)
  These cases supplied the opinion’s review framework: de novo review for legal determinations and mixed questions, and substantial evidence review for factual findings (conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude otherwise).
• Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627 (3d Cir. 2006)
  Cited to justify analyzing the child’s claim as derivative of the principal applicant’s asylum claim.

C. CAT framework and future-likelihood analysis

• Saban-Cach v. Att'y Gen., 58 F.4th 716 (3d Cir. 2023) and Myrie v. Att'y Gen., 855 F.3d 509 (3d Cir. 2017)
  These decisions provide the two-prong CAT structure: (1) likelihood of torture and (2) government involvement or acquiescence, and explain the first-prong sub-questions—what is likely to happen and whether it qualifies as torture. The court applied this framework to uphold the agency’s finding that future torture was not more likely than not.
• Denis v. Att'y Gen., 633 F.3d 201 (3d Cir. 2011)
  Cited for the evidentiary principle that “unsupported speculation” does not meet the “more likely than not” burden for CAT relief.
• Khan v. Att'y Gen., 979 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2020)
  Used to confine review to the grounds the BIA actually addressed; because the BIA did not reach acquiescence, the Third Circuit did not affirm on that alternative basis.

D. Remand and intervening-law/harmless-error reasoning

• NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969)
  Cited for the principle that remand is unnecessary where it would be “an idle and useless formality.” The opinion invoked this to address petitioners’ argument about remand for a previously mentioned PSG theory.
• Matter of S-S-F-M, 29 I. & N. Dec. 207 (BIA 2025)
  The court referenced this decision to conclude that even if there had been error regarding remand for consideration of a different PSG formulation, it would be harmless because the legal predicate for cognizability of the alternative PSG had been invalidated in the interim—making remand futile.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

A. Why “Guatemalan Females” failed as a PSG

The court treated the core defect as particularity (and noted the agency also found lack of social distinction). Under S.E.R.L., particularity requires “discrete and definable boundaries” rather than an “amorphous, overbroad” class.

Following Chavez-Chilel, the court emphasized that a countrywide women’s group can be cognizable only if there is record evidence that the group shares a “unifying characteristic” producing targeting “based solely on their gender.” The petitioners’ proof—general prevalence of femicide, gender-based violence, and historical violence during Guatemala’s civil war—did not establish a group-wide unifying characteristic of the type exemplified by Hassan v. Gonzales (FGM as an allegedly near-universal, gender-linked persecutory practice).

The court also rejected “susceptibility to violence in a country where violence is prevalent” as a unifying characteristic, invoking Matter of A-B- to explain that vulnerability to private crime is typically too diffuse and broad to define a particular social group with meaningful boundaries.

Having found no cognizable PSG, the court concluded asylum and withholding necessarily failed because both forms of relief required persecution (or feared persecution) “on account of” PSG membership.

B. CAT: why past abuse did not establish future torture likelihood

Applying Saban-Cach and Myrie, the court focused on the first CAT prong—what is likely to happen upon return. Even assuming (without deciding) that the past abuse could satisfy the legal definition of torture, the court held substantial evidence supported the agency’s finding that future torture was not more likely than not, emphasizing:

• After Lopez-Ramirez left Hernandez and lived with family, he did not physically harm her or her family.
• She had no contact with him for five years while in the United States.
• Threats and generalized country conditions, without a concrete showing of likely future harm, were insufficient under Denis v. Att'y Gen..

The court also declined to reach government acquiescence because the BIA had not addressed that issue, consistent with Khan v. Att'y Gen..

3.3 Impact

• PSG framing constraints in domestic-violence/gender-violence cases: The decision reinforces that a PSG defined as “women in X country” will generally fail in the Third Circuit unless the record supports a concrete, group-wide “unifying characteristic” that drives gender-based targeting (the opinion’s touchstone being Chavez-Chilel and its contrast with Hassan).
• Country conditions evidence is necessary but not sufficient: Evidence of widespread violence against women may support risk context, but this opinion treats it as insufficient to supply PSG particularity (for asylum/withholding) or to satisfy “more likely than not” future torture (for CAT) absent individualized, forward-looking indicia.
• CAT future-likelihood emphasis: The opinion underscores that severe past harm does not carry the day without evidence of continuing interest or realistic opportunity for the torturer to inflict harm—especially where there is a long period of no contact.
• Remand futility doctrine in immigration review: By invoking NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co. and referencing Matter of S-S-F-M, the court signaled a willingness to deny remand where intervening authority would foreclose relief anyway.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Particular Social Group (PSG): A protected ground for asylum/withholding. In the Third Circuit (per S.E.R.L.), a PSG must have an immutable characteristic, clear boundaries (particularity), and be recognized as distinct by society (social distinction).
• Particularity vs. Social distinction:
  • Particularity asks: Who is in the group, and who is out? Are the boundaries clear?
  • Social distinction asks: Would people in that society view the group as a distinct class?
• “Unifying characteristic” for a countrywide women’s PSG: Under Chavez-Chilel, “all women” in a country can be a PSG only where record evidence shows a shared condition that results in women being targeted for persecution based solely on gender (the opinion contrasts this with FGM evidence in Hassan).
• CAT “more likely than not”: A higher probability standard than asylum’s “well-founded fear.” The applicant must show a greater-than-50% likelihood of torture if removed.
• Substantial evidence review: The court does not re-weigh facts; it asks whether the record compels a contrary conclusion. If not, the agency’s factual findings stand.
• Harmless error / futility of remand: Even if an agency misstep occurred, a court may decline remand when intervening law means the outcome cannot change—making remand an “idle and useless formality” (per NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co.).

5. Conclusion

The Third Circuit’s decision rests on two practical rules drawn from its existing framework: (1) a PSG defined as “women in a particular country” generally fails particularity absent record evidence of a concrete, group-wide “unifying characteristic” that produces gender-based targeting; and (2) CAT protection requires a forward-looking, evidence-based showing that torture is more likely than not, not merely proof of past abuse plus generalized country conditions.

Although nonprecedential, the opinion is a clear illustration of how the Third Circuit applies S.E.R.L. and Chavez-Chilel to broad gender-based PSG formulations and how it evaluates future-torture probability under Saban-Cach/Myrie when significant time has passed without contact or renewed harm.