Corroborated Hearsay and “Good Cause” to Deny Confrontation in Supervised-Release Revocation Hearings

1. Introduction

In United States v. Thomas Clay Wade (3d Cir. Jan. 12, 2026) (not precedential), the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a district court’s finding that Thomas Wade violated conditions of supervised release by (1) using controlled substances and (2) committing simple assault under Pennsylvania law. The key appellate dispute centered on whether the district court properly admitted and relied on the alleged victim’s out-of-court statements (to an EMT and in hospital records) after the victim failed to appear at the revocation hearing.

The case sits at the intersection of two recurring revocation-hearing problems: (a) the limited confrontation rights available in supervised-release proceedings, and (b) the evidentiary reality that domestic-violence complainants may be unavailable or unwilling to testify, sometimes after recanting.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit rejected Wade’s arguments that his due process right to confront adverse witnesses was violated and that the evidence was insufficient. It held:

  • The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the victim’s hearsay statements because they bore indicia of reliability and the Government showed “good cause” for her nonappearance (including multiple attempts to contact her and service of a subpoena).
  • The evidence—principally the victim’s contemporaneous statements, corroborating circumstances, and medical documentation—supported by a preponderance that Wade committed Pennsylvania simple assault (18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2701(a)(1)).

3. Analysis

3.1. Precedents Cited

Framework: Revocation hearings are not full criminal trials

  • United States v. Rose, 152 F.4th 153 (3d Cir. 2025): The panel reiterated that “neither the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment nor the Federal Rules of Evidence apply in supervised release revocation hearings.” This frames the dispute as a due process and Rule 32.1 question rather than a Sixth Amendment question.
  • Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b): The court anchored the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses in “minimum requirements of due process,” while emphasizing that this right is qualified: confrontation may be denied upon a specific finding of “good cause.”

The Third Circuit’s governing balancing test

  • United States v. Lloyd, 566 F.3d 341 (3d Cir. 2009): This is the central doctrinal reference point. Lloyd requires courts to balance (1) the releasee’s interest in confrontation (informed heavily by the reliability of the hearsay) against (2) the Government’s good cause for not producing the witness. The Wade panel treated reliability as “a principal factor” on the confrontation side of the scale.

    The opinion also uses Lloyd as a contrast case: in Lloyd the hearsay was “unsworn,” “cursory,” involved “multiple levels of hearsay,” and was “uncorroborated,” making admission improper. Wade is presented as the opposite: corroborated hearsay from direct observers (EMT; bodycam; medical records).

Reliability factors for hearsay in the revocation setting

  • United States v. Brown, 254 F.3d 454 (3d Cir. 2001): Cited for the “excited state” rationale—excitement can reduce reflection and fabrication. Wade relied on the timing and distressed presentation of the victim’s statements to an EMT shortly after the alleged assault.
  • United States v. Martin, 382 F.3d 840 (8th Cir. 2004) and United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 688 (7th Cir. 2006): Both support treating as reliable a victim’s hearsay statements relayed by others when corroborated by injury or circumstances and made while “excited” or distressed. The Third Circuit used these cases to reinforce that corroboration plus contemporaneity can substitute for cross-examination in revocation proceedings.
  • United States v. Fennell, 65 F.3d 812 (10th Cir. 1995) and United States v. Comito, 177 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 1999): These illustrate when hearsay is unreliable—unsworn, “adversarial” sources, or relayed by an officer who did not observe demeanor; and unsworn verbal allegations that require corroboration. Wade distinguished itself by emphasizing that the EMT personally observed and assessed the declarant and the district court could view demeanor through body camera footage.

Good cause and witness nonappearance

  • United States v. Martin, 371 F.3d 446 (8th Cir. 2004) and United States v. Martin, 382 F.3d 840 (8th Cir. 2004): Cited for the proposition that a victim’s refusal to testify in related proceedings can support a finding of good cause for nonproduction at a revocation hearing.
  • United States v. Williams, 443 F.3d 35 (2d Cir. 2006): Used to support giving a defendant’s confrontation interest “little, if any, weight” where the declarant’s absence is attributable to intimidation by the defendant. The Wade panel did not find explicit intimidation, but treated Wade’s social-media message (“put a fake case on”) as relevant to diminished confrontation interest and to why the victim might not appear.

Preservation, standards of review, and proof burdens

  • United States v. Dowdell, 70 F.4th 134 (3d Cir. 2023) and United States v. Price, 458 F.3d 202 (3d Cir. 2006): Addressed preservation of objections. The panel held Wade did not waive the hearsay issue because the parties fully briefed it post-hearing and the district court ruled on it, satisfying the purpose of contemporaneous objection.
  • United States v. Poellnitz, 372 F.3d 562 (3d Cir. 2004), United States v. Maloney, 513 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2008), and United States v. Manuszak, 532 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1976): These supply review standards and the burden in revocation proceedings: proof by a preponderance under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) and that the court need only be “reasonably satisfied” of a violation.

State-law recklessness analogy

  • Commonwealth. v. Moore, 395 A.2d 1328 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978): Cited as an analogy that circumstantial evidence can support recklessness. The panel used it to bolster the inference that striking a pregnant woman in the stomach is, at minimum, reckless conduct for Pennsylvania simple assault.

3.2. Legal Reasoning

  1. Identify the governing right: Wade had no Sixth Amendment confrontation right in this setting; instead, he had a due-process-based right under Morrissey v. Brewer and Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b), qualified by “good cause.”
  2. Apply the Lloyd balancing test:
    • Confrontation interest (driven by reliability): Although the victim had impairment indicators and inconsistencies on other topics, the district court had several reliability anchors: (a) contemporaneous statements to an EMT and at the hospital; (b) visible pain and treatment consistent with reported trauma; (c) first-hand testimony from an EMT who observed demeanor; and (d) bodycam footage allowing the court to assess the interaction directly.
    • Government’s good cause: The Government attempted contact through multiple channels, served a subpoena, and the victim left the state and did not appear; she also briefly recanted to the Government and hung up. The court also treated Wade’s social-media message as relevant context supporting why the victim might be unwilling to appear.
    The panel concluded the district court acted within its discretion in finding the balance favored admission.
  3. Sufficiency of evidence (preponderance): For Pennsylvania simple assault (18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2701(a)(1)), the court found adequate evidence that Wade caused bodily injury and acted intentionally/knowingly/recklessly. The victim’s contemporaneous statements and medical records supported bodily injury; the recantation did not defeat the finding, particularly given the district court’s observation that recantation is “not uncommon in domestic violence situations.” Striking the stomach of a pregnant woman was treated as at least reckless.

3.3. Impact

Although designated “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the opinion is practically important as a roadmap for litigating hearsay in revocation hearings:

  • Corroboration is the hinge: The decision underscores that independent corroboration (bodycam, medical records, first-responder testimony) can move hearsay from the “Lloyd-problematic” category (unsworn, cursory, layered, uncorroborated) into admissible territory.
  • Direct demeanor observation matters: The court emphasized that reliability increases when the testifying witness personally observed the declarant (EMT) and when the judge can independently evaluate demeanor (bodycam), distinguishing situations like United States v. Fennell.
  • Domestic-violence dynamics are explicitly recognized: The panel accepted the district court’s view that recantation can be common in domestic violence contexts—supporting judicial willingness to credit initial statements when corroborated.
  • “Good cause” can be built by process evidence: Documented efforts to locate/contact a witness (calls, texts, emails, subpoena) and proof of refusal or flight can satisfy good cause without the Government proving impossibility in an absolute sense.
  • Defendant conduct can affect the balance: Even without a formal finding of intimidation, communications suggesting pressure or retaliation (here, social media questioning a “fake case”) may reduce the weight of confrontation interests and bolster good cause arguments.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Supervised release revocation hearing: A post-prison proceeding where the court determines whether a person violated supervision conditions. It is not a new criminal trial.
  • Hearsay: An out-of-court statement offered for its truth (e.g., the victim told an EMT, “he struck me,” offered to prove she was struck). In revocation hearings, hearsay can be admitted if the court finds “good cause” to deny confrontation.
  • “Good cause” (Rule 32.1(b)): A fact-specific justification for not producing a live witness—commonly, the witness cannot be located, refuses to appear, or there are safety/intimidation concerns—combined with sufficient reliability of the hearsay.
  • Balancing test (from Lloyd): The judge weighs the defendant’s need to cross-examine (stronger if the hearsay is unreliable) against the Government’s reason for not calling the witness (stronger if the Government made genuine efforts or the witness is unavailable/refusing).
  • Preponderance of the evidence: More likely than not—lower than “beyond a reasonable doubt.” This is the burden for revocation findings under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).
  • Simple assault (18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2701(a)(1)): Causing bodily injury intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Thomas Clay Wade reinforces a pragmatic evidentiary principle in supervised-release revocations: when the Government demonstrates meaningful efforts to produce a witness and presents hearsay with concrete reliability markers—especially first-responder testimony, contemporaneous statements, and objective corroboration like medical records and bodycam footage—courts may find “good cause” to admit the statements despite the releasee’s qualified confrontation right. The opinion also highlights how recantation and witness unavailability in domestic-violence scenarios are assessed through corroboration rather than treated as dispositive.