Continuing Offenses in Methamphetamine Distribution: Venue at Delivery Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and § 3237(a)

Introduction

This commentary examines the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Stephen Purks (No. 23-4495, decided June 5, 2025). From his Florida prison cell, Purks orchestrated a multi-state methamphetamine distribution ring. Indicted on 17 counts (14 substantive distributions under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and one conspiracy count under 21 U.S.C. § 846), he challenged (1) the denial of his motion to suppress statements made to DEA agents and (2) the propriety of venue in the Western District of Virginia. The Fourth Circuit affirmed both rulings. This case establishes that 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) distribution counts are continuing offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) and that venue lies where the “delivery” of contraband occurs.

Summary of the Judgment

The Fourth Circuit addressed two main issues:

Motion to Suppress: Purks argued his statements to DEA Special Agent Hickey were involuntary, coerced by an earlier Florida Department of Corrections (FDOC) beating. The district court—crediting Agent Hickey’s testimony over Purks’s—found no Miranda violation (Purks never invoked counsel) and held the statements voluntary on the totality of circumstances. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed: compliance with Miranda was clear and the alleged beating, two days earlier by state officers unknown to the DEA agents, did not overbear Purks’s will.
Venue Challenge: Purks contended that the Western District of Virginia was improper for the 14 distribution counts. The court applied 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a), holding distribution under § 841(a) is a continuing offense—each “delivery” spans time and place—and venue is proper in any district where the offense began, continued, or completed. Because the packages (or intercepted attempts) reached or were seized in the Western District of Virginia, venue was proper.

Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s orders and Purks’s convictions.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436, 1966): The Court re‐affirmed the requirement to advise suspects of rights and obtained a waiver before custodial interrogation. Agent Hickey read Miranda rights; Purks never asked for counsel.
Illinois v. Perkins (496 U.S. 292, 1990): Voluntary statements made after proper warnings are admissible if not the product of coercion.
Oregon v. Elstad (470 U.S. 298, 1985): Introduced a multi-factor test for whether a coerced first confession taints subsequent statements, looking to time elapsed, change of environment, and identity of interrogators.
United States v. Jenkins (9th Cir. 1991): Two coerced confessions held involuntary when police misconduct closely preceded both interrogations without sufficient intervening curative measures.
United States v. Olaniyi (11th Cir. 2019, unpublished): Statements to U.S. agents were voluntary when foreign‐officer beating was not “causally linked” and interview by different officials occurred hours later.
United States v. Midstate Horticultural Co. (306 U.S. 161, 1939): A “continuing offense” is a series of unlawful acts driven by a single impulse; venue lies where conduct occurs.
United States v. Tingle (7th Cir. 1999) & United States v. Brunty (11th Cir. 1983): Drug distribution involving multiple transfers is a continuing offense for venue purposes under § 3237(a).
United States v. Lowry (4th Cir. 1982): “Importation” of marijuana is a continuing crime completed at the final destination; venue proper there.
United States v. Bagnell (11th Cir. 1982): Congress amended the obscenity‐distribution statute to expand venue to the place of delivery; courts treated “delivery” broadly.

Legal Reasoning

The Fourth Circuit divided its analysis into the two appeals:

1. Voluntariness of Statements

The Court found no Miranda violation: Special Agent Hickey properly advised Purks of his rights; the district court credited his testimony that Purks never invoked counsel.
Under the totality of circumstances, Purks’s will was not overborne:
- The FDOC beating occurred “a couple of days” before and was inflicted by state officers not involved in the DEA interview.
- The DEA interview was brief (about an hour), cordial, with no threats, promises, or coercive tactics, and took place in an office setting.
- Purks freely refused to answer certain questions, demonstrating preserved volition.
Guided by Elstad’s factors and Eleventh and Ninth Circuit holdings, the court held that any residual coercive effect did not taint the later statements.

2. Venue for Distribution Counts

Under the Constitution and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 18, venue must be proven for each count; proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
Section 3237(a) provides that “any offense . . . begun in one district and completed in another . . . may be prosecuted in any district where such offense was begun, continued, or completed.”
The Court held that 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)’s “distribute” (defined as “deliver” in § 802(11)) is a continuing offense:
- Each transfer/negotiation/supervision of a package spans time and multiple locations.
- “Delivery” includes attempted transfers; venue attaches where the package (or attempted package) arrived or was seized.
Applying Lowry’s rationale (importation as continuing offense) and analogies from obscenity law (mailing “delivery” venue), the court found venue proper in the Western District of Virginia for all 14 distribution counts.

Impact on Future Cases

This decision has three major implications:

Clarification of Venue Law in Drug Cases: It solidifies that § 841(a) distribution is a continuing offense under § 3237(a) and that venue lies at the place of delivery or interception. Prosecutors may choose to try distribution cases where the defendant never set foot, so long as deliveries or attempts occurred there.
Miranda & Voluntariness Nuance: Defendants alleging involuntariness due to prior coercion must demonstrate a causal link between the coercive event and their statements to later interrogators. Intervening days, different agencies, and cordial interview settings weigh strongly against suppression.
Strategic Considerations: Defense counsel must carefully attack venue as to each substantive count and probe the connection between alleged coercion and any post-event interrogation. Government attorneys have clear authority to rely on imported continuing-offense venue theories.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Continuing Offense: Think of a crime not as a single moment (e.g., handing someone a package) but as a flow of acts (arranging, sending, supervising) driven by the same plan. Venue can attach anywhere along that flow.
Venue vs. Jurisdiction: Venue is the proper geographic location for trial; jurisdiction is the court’s power over the case. A court may have jurisdiction but improper venue.
Miranda v. Arizona: Before questioning someone in custody, you must read them their rights. But even if you do that, a confession must also be voluntary—free from coercion—to be used at trial.
“Delivery” in § 841: Not just the moment drugs change hands, but the entire process of getting them to the buyer, even if it never reaches the buyer but is intercepted en route.

Conclusion

United States v. Purks breaks important new ground in two areas:

It affirms that distribution of a controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) is a continuing offense. Venue under 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) properly attaches at the location where delivery (or attempted delivery) occurs, even if the defendant is never physically present there.
It clarifies that statements made after a prior beating by unrelated officers may still be voluntary if the post-beating interrogation is conducted by different agents, after a meaningful time lapse, in a non‐coercive manner, and following proper Miranda warnings.

This ruling provides a robust framework for prosecutors seeking favorable venue and guidance for courts assessing voluntariness challenges where prior coercion is alleged but not directly linked to the interrogation.