Consent Judgments as Contractual Authorization to Recover “Expenses” Beyond § 1920 in EPA/FLSA Fee Awards

I. Introduction

In Gloria Holladay v. Gestamp Alabama, LLC (11th Cir. June 10, 2026) (per curiam) (not for publication), Gloria Holladay, a Materials Analyst, sued her employer, Gestamp Alabama, LLC (“Gestamp”), asserting multiple employment claims: age discrimination under the ADEA, sex discrimination under Title VII, retaliation under the ADEA, Title VII, and the FLSA, and wage discrimination under the Equal Pay Act (“EPA”).

The district court granted summary judgment for Gestamp on all claims except the EPA claim, which the parties settled via a consent judgment awarding $102,699.50 plus “reasonable attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses.” Holladay then sought $829,559.70 in attorney’s fees, $19,481.55 in costs, and $9,891.52 in expenses. The district court sharply reduced fees and costs and denied all “expenses,” reasoning they were “not permitted by Section 1920 or controlling precedent.”

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the merits rulings and the fee/cost reductions, but vacated and remanded the denial of expenses—holding that the district court failed to account for the consent judgment’s contractual language authorizing “expenses” in addition to costs.

II. Summary of the Opinion

  • Title VII termination (mixed-motive): Affirmed. Holladay failed to produce evidence from which a reasonable jury could find sex was a motivating factor in her termination.
  • ADEA termination: Affirmed. Gestamp offered legitimate performance-based reasons; Holladay failed to show pretext and failed to meet the “but-for” causation standard.
  • Retaliation (Title VII/ADEA/FLSA): Affirmed. Holladay’s pay emails complained of unfairness and tenure-based inequity, but did not reference discrimination based on sex or age; thus, no protected activity.
  • EPA vs. Title VII wage claim: Affirmed. EPA is strict-liability in structure (no intent element for plaintiff), while Title VII requires discriminatory intent; evidence sufficient for EPA did not necessarily suffice for Title VII.
  • Attorney’s fees and costs: Affirmed. The district court permissibly reduced the award based on limited overall success and excessive billing.
  • Expenses: Vacated and remanded. The district court erred by analyzing “expenses” solely under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 and ignoring the consent judgment’s separate authorization.
  • Evidentiary hearing: Affirmed. No hearing required where disputes concern reasonableness and can be resolved on the written record.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1. Summary-judgment and appellate-review framework

  • King v. King, 69 F.4th 738 (11th Cir. 2023) and Cohen v. United Am. Bank of Cent. Fla., 83 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir. 1996): supplied the de novo summary-judgment standard and Rule 56 framing.
  • Atlanta J. & Const. v. City of Atlanta Dep't of Aviation, 442 F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2006): provided the abuse-of-discretion standard for fees/costs (with de novo review of legal questions).

2. Title VII discriminatory-termination (mixed-motive) doctrine

  • McCreight v. AuburnBank, 117 F.4th 1322 (11th Cir. 2024): distinguished single-motive and mixed-motive theories and emphasized that mixed-motive changes causation, not the quantum of proof.
  • Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2016): supplied the mixed-motive summary-judgment question—whether a reasonable jury could find, by a preponderance, the protected trait was a motivating factor.
  • Rojas v. Florida, 285 F.3d 1339 (11th Cir. 2002): supported the comparator principle—where “good reasons” exist, plaintiffs commonly must show similarly situated comparators were treated more favorably to sustain a discrimination inference.

3. ADEA “but-for” causation and the McDonnell Douglas structure

  • Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) and Mora v. Jackson Mem'l Found., Inc., 597 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2010): anchored the ADEA’s “but-for” requirement (“The employer either acted because of the plaintiff’s age or it did not.”).
  • McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and Liebman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 808 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2015): supplied the prima facie elements, burden-shifting, and the qualification inference from long tenure.
  • St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) and Patterson v. Ga. Pac., LLC, 38 F.4th 1336 (11th Cir. 2022): reinforced the pretext requirement: the stated reason must be false and discrimination the real reason; plaintiff must show the employer’s explanation is “unworthy of credence.”

4. Retaliation and “protected activity” boundaries

  • Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp., 291 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2002) and Smith v. Haynes & Haynes P.C., 940 F.3d 635 (11th Cir. 2019): provided the standard prima facie retaliation elements across Title VII/ADEA/FLSA.
  • Jefferson v. Sewon Am., Inc., 891 F.3d 911 (11th Cir. 2018): framed protected activity as requiring a reasonable, good-faith belief that discrimination occurred.
  • Coutu v. Martin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 47 F.3d 1068 (11th Cir. 1995): supported the court’s conclusion that generalized workplace “unfairness” complaints—without a discrimination nexus—do not constitute protected activity.

5. EPA vs. Title VII wage discrimination standards

  • Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc., 975 F.2d 1518 (11th Cir. 1992) and Meeks v. Comput. Assocs. Int'l, 15 F.3d 1013 (11th Cir. 1994): drove the central distinction: the EPA is strict-liability in structure (plaintiff need not prove discriminatory intent), while Title VII requires intent and keeps the “risk of nonpersuasion” on the plaintiff; and the Eleventh Circuit will not import EPA standards into Title VII.

6. Attorney’s fees reductions and process

  • Caplan v. All Am. Auto Collision, Inc., 36 F.4th 1083 (11th Cir. 2022), Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974), and Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983): supplied the lodestar framework, the Johnson factors, and the mandate to exclude hours not reasonably expended.
  • Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 292 F.3d 712 (11th Cir. 2002) and Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292 (11th Cir. 1988): supported reductions for limited success and delineated when across-the-board reductions are appropriate.
  • Loranger v. Stierheim, 10 F.3d 776 (11th Cir. 1994): required the district court to explain reductions sufficiently for meaningful appellate review.
  • Sweeney v. Athens Reg'l Med. Ctr., 917 F.2d 1560 (11th Cir. 1990) and Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292: governed when an evidentiary hearing is required (rare; only when material factual disputes cannot be resolved on the paper record).

7. The “expenses” holding: costs statutes vs contractual authorization

  • Evans v. Books-A-Million, 762 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2014): recognized that certain litigation outlays (e.g., mediation, legal research, postage, travel) may be awarded as part of attorney’s fees if reasonably incurred, even if not taxable “costs” under § 1920.
  • Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp., 841 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1988) and Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987): reaffirmed that, absent explicit statutory or contractual authorization, federal courts are constrained by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1920 for taxing witness-related expenses as costs.
  • Turner v. Orr, 785 F.2d 1498 (11th Cir. 1986): supplied the key move—construing a consent judgment as a contract.
  • Norfolk S. Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 371 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2004): supported plain-meaning interpretation of clear consent-judgment language.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Title VII termination: why the mixed-motive theory failed

Applying Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist. and the motivating-factor standard in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), the court asked whether the record would allow a reasonable jury to find sex “motivated” the termination decision. The panel emphasized two evidentiary deficiencies: (i) Gestamp substantiated its performance-based justification with “extensive evidence,” and (ii) Holladay failed to identify a similarly situated male comparator (including her replacement) with comparable performance problems who was treated more favorably, as contemplated by Rojas v. Florida.

2. ADEA termination: “but-for” causation and pretext

Even though Holladay met the Liebman v. Metro. Life Ins. Co. prima facie case, the ADEA requires proof that age was the determinative cause under Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.. The court concluded she did not carry the final pretext burden under St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks because the record supported Gestamp’s explanation—supplier complaints and inventory shortages tied to her accounts—and she failed to show that explanation was false or that age animus was the real reason.

3. Retaliation: what counts as protected activity

The panel held Holladay’s emails about being underpaid compared to coworkers due to her tenure and loyalty did not constitute protected activity because they did not allege discrimination on a protected basis (sex or age). Relying on Coutu v. Martin Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, the court treated “unfairness alone” as insufficient.

4. EPA vs Title VII wage discrimination: strict liability vs intent

The panel reaffirmed that an EPA wage claim and a Title VII wage claim are not interchangeable. Citing Miranda v. B & B Cash Grocery Store, Inc. and Meeks v. Comput. Assocs. Int'l, it explained the allocation of risk differs: under the EPA, once equal work and a wage differential are shown, the employer must prove a “factor other than sex”; under Title VII, the plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent and bears the risk of nonpersuasion throughout. Thus, evidence that “gets you to trial” under the EPA may still be insufficient under Title VII.

5. Fees and costs reductions: limited success and excessive billing

Applying the lodestar principles from Caplan v. All Am. Auto Collision, Inc. and Hensley v. Eckerhart, the court accepted the district court’s assessment that Holladay achieved success on only one claim (EPA) out of six and that the fee petition was voluminous with excessive or unnecessary entries—justifying reductions consistent with Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery and Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc..

6. The central holding: “expenses” cannot be denied solely because they are not taxable “costs” under § 1920 when a consent judgment authorizes them

The appellate court found legal error in the district court’s categorical denial of expenses on the ground that they were “not permitted by Section 1920.” Building from Evans v. Books-A-Million, the panel reiterated that “expenses” can be conceptually distinct from “costs” and may be recoverable as part of a reasonable fee if reasonably incurred. The panel then addressed Gestamp’s argument that EPA cases ordinarily do not permit such expense recovery beyond statutory costs, invoking Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp. and Crawford Fitting Co. v. J. T. Gibbons, Inc..

The decisive distinction was contractual: the court treated the consent judgment—approved by the district court and expressly providing “reasonable attorneys' fees together with expenses and costs”—as a contract under Turner v. Orr, construed by its plain language under Norfolk S. Corp. v. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.. That consent judgment constituted the “contractual authorization” referenced in Glenn v. Gen. Motors Corp.. Therefore, the district court was required to evaluate whether the submitted expenses were “reasonably incurred in the course of case preparation, settlement, or litigation” under Evans v. Books-A-Million, rather than rejecting them simply because they did not fit within § 1920.

C. Impact

  • Consent-judgment drafting becomes outcome-determinative for expense recovery: Parties who include “expenses” (in addition to “costs”) create a contractual basis for a fee applicant to seek non-§ 1920 outlays, subject to a reasonableness review.
  • District courts must separate “costs” from “expenses” when the resolution instrument does: Where a settlement/consent judgment uses all three terms—fees, costs, and expenses—the court cannot collapse “expenses” into § 1920 costs.
  • Practical leverage in FLSA/EPA settlements: Although the EPA (via 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)) speaks in terms of “reasonable attorney’s fee” and “costs,” this decision confirms that parties may expand recoverable categories by agreement and that courts must enforce the agreement’s plain language.
  • Continued strict separation between EPA and Title VII standards: The decision reinforces the Eleventh Circuit’s insistence (per Miranda and Meeks) that Title VII wage claims require proof of discriminatory intent even when the same pay facts support an EPA claim.
  • Limited precedential force but persuasive value: As “NOT FOR PUBLICATION,” the opinion is not binding precedent in the same manner as published decisions, but it is a detailed application of existing Eleventh Circuit law likely to be persuasive in similar fee/expense disputes.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Mixed-motive (Title VII) vs but-for causation (ADEA): Under Title VII mixed-motive, sex can be one motivating reason among others; under the ADEA, age must be the deciding reason—if the employer would have made the same decision regardless of age, the ADEA claim fails.
  • McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting: A method for organizing circumstantial evidence: (1) plaintiff makes a basic showing suggesting discrimination; (2) employer offers a legitimate reason; (3) plaintiff must prove the reason is a cover (pretext).
  • “Protected activity” in retaliation claims: Complaining about being treated “unfairly” is not enough; the complaint must reasonably convey opposition to conduct made unlawful by statutes like Title VII/ADEA (e.g., discrimination because of sex or age).
  • EPA strict-liability structure vs Title VII intent requirement: EPA focuses on equal work and unequal pay and then makes the employer justify the differential; Title VII requires the employee to prove the employer acted with discriminatory intent.
  • Costs vs expenses: “Costs” are a narrow set of litigation items taxable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. “Expenses” can include other litigation outlays (like travel, postage, mediation, legal research) that may be recoverable if a statute (as interpreted) or a contract (like a consent judgment) authorizes them and they are reasonable.
  • Consent judgment as contract: A consent judgment is both a court order and an agreement; courts interpret its clear terms like a contract and should enforce what the parties plainly bargained for.

V. Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit largely affirmed the district court’s merits rulings and fee reductions, but issued an important clarification for fee litigation following negotiated resolutions: when a consent judgment expressly provides for “expenses” in addition to “costs,” a district court may not deny expenses solely because they are not taxable under 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Instead, the court must treat the consent judgment as a contract authorizing expense recovery and then determine whether the claimed expenses were reasonably incurred under Evans v. Books-A-Million.