Consent Discipline Guidelines for Judicial Officers with Multiple Ethics Violations: In Re David Curlin
Introduction
In In Re: David Curlin, 2025-SC-0082-KB (Ky. 2025), the Supreme Court of Kentucky considered a motion by sitting family‐court judge David Curlin for consensual discipline. Judge Curlin negotiated a one-year suspension of his law license—with ninety days to serve and the remainder probated—together with a monitoring agreement related to his ADHD treatment. The case arose after multiple Kentucky Bar Association complaints against him, all predating or overlapping his tenure on the bench. The key issues were (1) the seriousness and multiplicity of his professional‐conduct violations, (2) the proper sanction in light of his ADHD impairment and pandemic‐related medication shortages, and (3) the court’s authority to impose a negotiated discipline on a sitting judge.
Summary of the Judgment
The Supreme Court of Kentucky independently reviewed the record and approved the negotiated sanction. It found Judge Curlin guilty of:
- Four violations of SCR 3.130(8.1)(b) (failure to respond in disciplinary matters);
- Three violations of SCR 3.130(1.4)(a)(3) (failure to keep clients informed);
- Three violations of SCR 3.130(1.4)(a)(4) (failure to comply with requests for information);
- One violation of SCR 3.130(1.3) (lack of diligence); and
- One violation of SCR 3.130(1.16)(d) (failure to protect clients’ interests on termination).
The court ordered a one-year suspension—retroactive to September 23, 2023—with ninety days to serve, the balance probated on conditions that Judge Curlin accept no further charges and enter a Kentucky Lawyer Assistance Program monitoring agreement.
Analysis
1. Precedents Cited
The court’s decision drew on both disciplinary and procedural precedents:
- Grigsby v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 181 S.W.3d 40 (Ky. 2005) – Confirmed the Supreme Court’s exclusive, de novo review of disciplinary matters and advisory status of Bar Board recommendations.
- Hansen v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 155 S.W.3d 721 (Ky. 2005) – Public reprimand for solitary case violations; distinguished due to Curlin’s multiple cases and a judicial office.
- Miniard, 289 S.W.3d 191 (Ky. 2009) – 61-day suspension for single-rule violation; distinguished by Curlin’s multiple violations across four matters.
- Stith, 627 S.W.3d 929 (Ky. 2021) – Single charges per rule; contrasted with multiple infractions here.
- Calmes, 686 S.W.3d 189 (Ky. 2024) and Cook, 281 S.W.3d 290 (Ky. 2009) – Multi-case, multi-rule suspensions (30 days probated; two years with partial serve) providing closer analogies.
- Miranda, 680 S.W.3d 844 (Ky. 2023) – Two underlying cases with identical rule breaches, resulting in a 181-day suspension, probated for two years; most directly comparable to Curlin’s multiplicity of violations.
2. Legal Reasoning
The court emphasized three pillars of its reasoning:
- Independent De Novo Review: Under Grigsby, the Supreme Court must independently weigh the record, rather than defer to the Bar Association’s recommendations.
- Aggregate Seriousness of Misconduct: Judge Curlin’s nine conceded violations across four cases—ranging from missed deadlines that triggered statute‐of‐limitations bars to failure to turn over client files and to respond to disciplinary inquiries—warranted a more severe sanction than single-case infractions.
- Mitigation vs. Accountability: Although ADHD is recognized as an “impairment” under SCR 3.900(1) and supply shortages of medication during COVID-19 provided context, the court held that (a) Judge Curlin’s successful judicial campaign demonstrated he could function effectively, and (b) ignorance of or trepidation about disciplinary procedures does not excuse noncompliance. See Kentucky Bar Ass’n v. Towles, 786 S.W.2d 874 (Ky. 1990).
In balancing these factors, the court found the proposed one-year suspension—retroactive and partially probated—consistent with its prior sanctions in Calmes, Cook and Miranda.
3. Impact
This decision establishes a clear framework for:
- Judicial Officers’ Consensual Discipline: Affirming that judges may invoke SCR 3.450’s consent‐discipline procedure but still face de novo review.
- Sanction Calibration: Demonstrating proportional sanctions for multiple, overlapping violations across different matters, especially when conventional single-case authorities are inapplicable.
- Mitigating Circumstances: Clarifying that medical impairments and pandemic disruptions, while relevant, do not override the obligation to respond timely to clients, courts and disciplinary authorities.
Complex Concepts Simplified
- Consensual Discipline (SCR 3.450)
- A procedure allowing an attorney to agree in advance with the Bar Association on a disciplinary sanction, subject to court approval and independent judicial review.
- Probated Suspension
- A period during which an attorney is not actively disbarred but must comply with conditions (e.g., no new charges, treatment monitoring) or face activation of the remainder of the suspension.
- SCR 3.130(8.1)(b)
- The rule prohibiting an attorney from failing to disclose facts or to respond to lawful disciplinary demands.
- De Novo Review
- The court’s practice of examining disciplinary records anew, without deferring to prior findings or recommendations.
Conclusion
In Re: David Curlin marks a landmark in Kentucky jurisprudence for how the Supreme Court handles consent discipline for sitting judges. It reinforces that:
- Judges remain fully subject to professional‐conduct rules when they practiced privately.
- Multiple rule violations across distinct matters justify more substantial suspensions than singular infractions.
- Health impairments and unprecedented disruptions, while mitigating, cannot excuse fundamental duties such as client communication and disciplinary cooperation.
By aligning Curlin’s sanction with analogous multi-case decisions (Calmes, Cook, Miranda), the court provides a guidepost for future disciplinary proceedings involving complex factual and medical-mitigation scenarios.
Comments