Conditional Caregiving Does Not Establish “Full and Permanent” Parental Responsibility Under 15C V.S.A. § 501(a)(1)(C)

Introduction

In Mary Zigman v. Sarah Goodwin (Vt. Sup. Ct. May 8, 2026), petitioner Mary Zigman appealed a Rutland Family Division order denying her petition to be adjudicated a de facto parent of C.G., the minor child of respondent Sarah Goodwin, under Vermont’s De Facto Parentage Act, 15C V.S.A. §§ 501–502.

The case arose from an unusual relationship dynamic: Zigman (an executive director) and another petitioner (Chris Scotellaro) provided respondent social services through the Rutland County Parent Child Center; the parties’ relationship evolved into extensive caregiving for the child during respondent’s crises (substance use, domestic violence, and instability). When respondent later cut off contact, petitioners sought de facto parentage.

The appeal presented intertwined procedural and substantive issues: (i) preservation and due-process challenges to the scope and conduct of a reopened evidentiary hearing; (ii) evidentiary preservation regarding hearsay rulings; and (iii) whether the trial court erred in concluding Zigman failed to prove two statutory factors—§ 501(a)(1)(C) (“full and permanent responsibilities”) and § 501(a)(1)(G) (best interests).

Summary of the Opinion

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed. It held that Zigman’s principal procedural objections were unpreserved because she (through counsel) had requested the limited reopening of evidence to factors (C) and (G), and had earlier moved to consolidate the proceedings. Her evidentiary challenges were likewise unpreserved because counsel failed to object and withdrew an exhibit when the court asked for a non-hearsay basis.

On the merits, the Court deferred to the trial court’s findings and concluded there was no error in determining that Zigman’s role was “limited and conditional” and therefore did not satisfy § 501(a)(1)(C). The Court also rejected claims that the trial court misapplied the best-interests inquiry under § 501(a)(1)(G), emphasizing that factor (G) entails a broader assessment of the relationship, consistent with prior precedent.

The Court additionally admonished that the brief contained citations that did not correspond to the quoted authorities, warned that Rule 11 certifications apply to self-represented litigants, and cautioned that future misconduct could lead to sanctions.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

  • Pcolar v. Casella Waste Syst. Inc., 2012 VT 58, ¶ 19, 192 Vt. 343
    Role in the opinion: The Court relied on Pcolar to enforce minimum appellate briefing standards under V.R.A.P. 28(a)(4), including for self-represented appellants. Here, arguments supported only by inaccurate/nonexistent citations were treated as inadequately briefed and not addressed.
  • Stone v. Irasburg, 2014 VT 43, ¶ 27, 196 Vt. 356
    Role in the opinion: Provided the general due-process standard—an opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” The Court cited it as the governing principle but did not reach the merits of Zigman’s due-process claims due to lack of preservation.
  • O'Rourke v. Lunde, 2014 VT 88, ¶ 21, 197 Vt. 360
    Role in the opinion: Central to the disposition. O’Rourke supplied the preservation rule: an appellant must present an argument to the trial court “with specificity and clarity.” The Court used this to deem unpreserved (i) objections to limiting reopened evidence to factors (C) and (G), (ii) objections to proceeding with the expanded consolidation at the rehearing, and (iii) challenges to hearsay rulings where counsel failed to object or withdrew the exhibit.
  • Zorn v. Smith, 2011 VT 10, ¶ 22, 189 Vt. 219
    Role in the opinion: Supported the warning that self-represented litigants are bound by procedural rules, including V.R.C.P. 11 obligations and the availability of sanctions. The Court used Zorn to reinforce that inaccurate citations and misquotations can trigger consequences.
  • In re Green Mountain Power Corp., 2012 VT 89, ¶ 22, 192 Vt. 429
    Role in the opinion: Cited (in a footnote) for the proposition that it is the appellant’s burden to show preservation, consistent with V.R.A.P. 28(a)(4)(A). This reinforced the Court’s refusal to consider complaints about proceeding in respondent’s absence.
  • Lanfear v. Ruggerio, 2020 VT 84, ¶¶ 16, 20–23, 27, 36, 213 Vt. 322
    Role in the opinion: Served two functions. First, it supplied standards of review and deference to trial-court credibility determinations. Second, it materially informed the interpretation of factor (C): the Court analogized to Lanfear where a petitioner’s role “more akin to that of a nanny than of a parent” failed to meet “full and permanent responsibilities.”
  • Peralta v. Brannan, 2020 VT 100, ¶¶ 21, 42, 213 Vt. 493
    Role in the opinion: Reinforced appellate deference (“clearly erroneous” factual findings; conclusions upheld if supported) and, importantly, guided the factor (G) analysis: factor (G) is “not limited” to whether continuing a “parental” relationship is in a child’s best interest; it requires a broader consideration of the relationship between the petitioner and child.
  • In re M.E., 2019 VT 90, ¶ 20, 211 Vt. 320
    Role in the opinion: Used to reject the argument that the trial court erred by not making findings about every piece of evidence. The trial court must make findings on “all material issues,” not every item of testimony—supporting affirmance where the court did address key issues (including its weighing of the expert testimony).

Legal Reasoning

1. Preservation as a gatekeeping doctrine

The opinion is driven by preservation. Zigman’s due-process and procedural complaints (scope of rehearing; time allocation; consolidation impacts) were not reviewed because the record did not show she objected—indeed, the Court emphasized that she had requested the limited reopening and earlier sought consolidation. Likewise, challenges to hearsay rulings failed because counsel did not object and withdrew an exhibit rather than articulate a non-hearsay purpose or exception.

2. Statutory structure: failure of any required factor defeats the petition

Under 15C V.S.A. § 501(a)(1), a petitioner must prove all seven factors by clear and convincing evidence. The family division originally found factors (A), (B), (D), (E), and (F) satisfied but not (C) and (G). After reopening evidence on (C) and (G), the court again found (C) not proven and therefore explained that denial followed on that basis alone—then additionally analyzed (G).

3. Factor (C): “full and permanent responsibilities” versus conditional, permission-based caregiving

The Supreme Court accepted the trial court’s characterization of Zigman’s responsibilities as “limited and conditional,” based on facts such as: time-limited/conditional authorizations, ongoing deference to the legal parent’s directives, and an overall caregiving posture oriented toward stabilizing and assisting the parent rather than assuming a permanent parental role. The Court rejected Zigman’s claim that the trial court improperly required “unconditional parental responsibility,” construing the challenged language as factual findings supporting the statutory conclusion under § 501(a)(1)(C), not an extra-statutory requirement.

4. Factor (G): best interests requires a broader relational inquiry

The trial court reconsidered (G) in light of new evidence (boundary-setting efforts, a preliminary call to DCF, and generalized expert testimony about trauma from relationship disruption). It still found the burden unmet, partly because the expert had not evaluated C.G. and could not opine on actual effects for this child. On appeal, the Supreme Court emphasized (via Peralta v. Brannan) that factor (G) is broader than simply preserving a “parental” bond; it requires evaluating the petitioner-child relationship in context. The Court also rejected reliance on 33 V.S.A. § 5101 as inapposite to the De Facto Parentage Act.

5. Appellate deference and the refusal to reweigh evidence

Applying Lanfear and Peralta, the Court treated credibility and weight-of-evidence arguments as matters committed to the trial judge. It found no showing that findings lacked credible support or that legal conclusions were unsupported by findings.

6. Integrity of briefing and Rule 11 accountability

The Court took the unusual step of noting that several citations “do not appear to correspond to any existing case,” and warned that by filing a brief Zigman certified the legal contentions were warranted by law or a nonfrivolous argument under V.R.C.P. 11(b)(2) and V.R.A.P. 25(d)(2). This underscores that self-representation does not immunize a party from sanctions risk where a submission misstates authority.

Impact

  • De facto parentage petitions will rise or fall on factor (C) in “helper” caregiving scenarios. Even where a petitioner proves co-residence, caretaking, and a bonded relationship, the case illustrates that caregiving framed as conditional, permission-based support for the legal parent may not satisfy the “full and permanent responsibilities” requirement.
  • Best-interests evidence must be child-specific when feasible. General testimony that relationship disruption can be traumatic may carry limited weight without an evaluation of the particular child and circumstances.
  • Preservation is decisive in family appeals. Complaints about hearing scope, consolidation logistics, allocation of time, evidentiary rulings, and proceeding in an opposing party’s absence must be raised clearly in the trial court to secure appellate review.
  • Briefing accuracy is policed even for self-represented litigants. The opinion signals heightened sensitivity to fabricated/mismatched citations and frames the issue in Rule 11 terms, creating deterrence for future filings.

Important caveat: The order notes that decisions of a three-justice panel “are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.” Nonetheless, the reasoning reflects and applies established precedential doctrines (preservation, deference, and statutory interpretation) and thus offers practical guidance.

Complex Concepts Simplified

  • De facto parent: A person who is not a legal parent but seeks legal recognition as a parent based on having functioned as one under the statutory factors in 15C V.S.A. § 501(a)(1).
  • Clear and convincing evidence: A heightened burden of proof—more than “more likely than not,” less than “beyond a reasonable doubt”—requiring strong, persuasive proof.
  • Factor (C) (“full and permanent responsibilities”): Focuses on whether the petitioner truly stepped into a parent’s role as a lasting responsibility, not merely providing substantial childcare that remains dependent on the legal parent’s continuing permission and control.
  • Factor (G) (best interests): A forward-looking assessment of whether continuing the specific petitioner-child relationship benefits the child, considering the relationship in its full context (not simply whether the petitioner acted “parent-like”).
  • Preservation: The rule that an appellate court generally will not review an issue unless it was clearly raised in the trial court so the judge had a fair opportunity to address it.
  • Hearsay (V.R.E. 801–802): An out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of what it asserts; it is generally inadmissible unless an exception or non-hearsay purpose applies.
  • Rule 11 certification: By filing papers, parties certify their legal contentions are grounded in existing law (or a nonfrivolous argument to change it) and that factual contentions have evidentiary support; violations can result in sanctions.

Conclusion

Mary Zigman v. Sarah Goodwin affirms denial of de facto parentage where, despite extensive caregiving and a strong bond, the petitioner failed to prove she undertook the “full and permanent responsibilities” of a parent and failed to meet the best-interests factor. Procedurally, it underscores that appellate review in family matters is tightly constrained by preservation requirements and proper briefing, and it warns that inaccurate citations can raise Rule 11 concerns even for self-represented litigants. In the broader landscape of de facto parentage litigation, the decision highlights the evidentiary and doctrinal line between substantial support caregiving and the assumption of a truly parental, enduring role.