Competitor Lawyers Cannot Sue for Illegal Solicitation Absent Direct Property Injury; Civil RICO Requires Direct, Non-Attenuated Causation

Case: CAMBRE & ASSOCIATES, LLC et al. v. LAZENBY et al., Court of Appeals of Georgia, A25A0935 (Nov. 3, 2025).
Posture: Interlocutory appeal from denial of motion to dismiss under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6).
Panel: Gobeil, J. (majority); Barnes, P. J., concurs; Watkins, J., concurs in judgment as to Div. 1 and dissents as to Div. 2.

1. Introduction

This opinion arises from a competitive dispute within the Georgia personal-injury bar. R. Shane Lazenby, a personal injury attorney, filed a putative class action on behalf of himself and other Georgia plaintiffs’ lawyers against Cambre & Associates, LLC and individual firm personnel (including an alleged “runner”). The complaint alleged the defendants were “literally ambulance chasing”—obtaining accident-victim information before it became public and then using in-person or live telephone solicitation to secure representation—thereby gaining an unfair competitive advantage over lawyers who comply with solicitation restrictions.

The suit asserted two theories: (1) an infringement of Lazenby’s “right to do business and compete honestly,” framed on appeal as interference with a property right to practice law under OCGA § 51-9-1; and (2) a civil Georgia RICO claim, premised on alleged repeated violations of OCGA § 16-9-93 (c) (computer invasion of privacy) as predicate acts, with Lazenby’s injury described as lost profits and business opportunities.

The central issues were whether a competitor-lawyer has a cognizable civil claim based on another lawyer’s alleged violations of criminal solicitation statutes and professional conduct rules, and whether the pleaded causal chain satisfies civil RICO’s proximate-cause requirement at the motion-to-dismiss stage.

2. Summary of the Opinion

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of the defendants’ OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6) motion to dismiss, holding:

  • Count 1 (property/right-to-compete theory): Lazenby’s claim fails because, even construing the complaint favorably, his alleged injury amounts to an inchoate expectation of obtaining clients, not an unlawful interference with an existing property interest cognizable under OCGA § 51-9-1 in these circumstances.
  • Count 2 (Georgia RICO): The alleged predicate acts (unlawful access to accident victims’ data) directly harm the accident victims, and Lazenby’s alleged losses (lost fees/business opportunities) are too attenuated and speculative to establish RICO proximate cause.

Judge Watkins agreed dismissal was required as to Count 1, but dissented as to Count 2, arguing proximate cause should not be resolved against the plaintiff at this early stage given the pleaded allegations, the demanding motion-to-dismiss standard, and the RICO Act’s directive of liberal construction.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

A. Pleading and motion-to-dismiss standards

  • Babalola v. HSBC Bank, USA, N.A. and Carter v. Cornwell: The court reiterates de novo review and the requirement to accept well-pled allegations as true, construing pleadings in the plaintiff’s favor. These cases frame the analytical lens but do not save claims lacking a recognized legal basis.
  • Hendon Props., LLC v. Cinema Dev., LLC and Lord v. Lowe: The opinion emphasizes the two-part test for sustaining dismissal and the important qualification that dismissal is proper where the complaint shows the plaintiff can prove no set of facts supporting an essential element. The court uses these authorities to justify ending the case at the pleading stage despite liberal construction.
  • Kearney v. Oppenheimer & Co.: Cited for the proposition that courts accept facts, not legal conclusions. This is central to Division 1: even if solicitation misconduct is assumed, the conclusion that it “unlawfully interfered” with Lazenby’s property is not compelled.
  • Dissent—Norman v. Xytex Corp.: The dissent relies on Norman to stress the “demanding” dismissal standard and “fair notice” pleading, positioning proximate cause as typically fact-laden and premature for dismissal.

B. No private enforcement of professional rules or criminal laws

  • Davis v. Findley: A cornerstone for Division 1. It supplies the rule that professional conduct codes provide disciplinary sanctions but do not establish civil liability or civil remedies for attorney misconduct. This undercuts any attempt to transform Bar Rule 7.3(d) into a private damages claim by a competitor.
  • Anthony v. Am. Gen. Fin. Svcs.: Cited for the general principle that violation of a criminal statute does not create a civil cause of action unless the statute provides one. This matters because the complaint rests on alleged violations of statutes such as OCGA § 33-24-53 and OCGA § 15-19-55, neither of which expressly authorizes private competitor suits.

C. The “right to practice law” as property—scope and limits

  • Eckles v. Atlanta Tech. Group: The defendants use Eckles to argue practicing law is a “privilege or franchise,” not a natural/constitutional right, thus not a property interest to be “infringed.” The court does not deny the franchise framing, but ultimately resolves the case on the absence of a direct, cognizable interference alleged here.
  • Studdard v. Evans and Weiner v. Fulton County: Lazenby relies on these for the concept that a lawyer’s ability to practice and earn fees can constitute a property right (including due-process contexts) and that attorneys have property in fees/emoluments. The court distinguishes them as involving interference with specific contractual relationships, fees, or established attorney-client relationships—elements missing from Lazenby’s pleading.
  • Lumpkin v. Mellow Mushroom: Used to reject the notion of an amorphous tort for “right to do honest business,” reiterating courts cannot create causes of action unknown to the common law—this is for the legislature.

D. Georgia RICO: predicate acts, pattern, and proximate cause

  • Najarian Capital v. Clark: Supplies the civil RICO requirement that the violation must proximately cause injury. The court uses Najarian to emphasize that injury must “flow directly” from at least one predicate act—not merely be an eventual consequence.
  • Tribeca Homes v. Marathon Inv. Corp.: Reinforces that the plaintiff must show “direct harm” from commission of an enumerated predicate crime.
  • Wylie v. Denton (physical precedent only): Cited for RICO conspiracy elements and, substantively, for the idea that injuries indirect to predicate acts directed at third parties fail proximate cause. The majority treats Wylie as persuasive on attenuation.
  • Nicholson v. Windham: Supports dismissal where predicate acts were not directed at the plaintiff and injury (employment termination) was not a direct result of racketeering. The majority analogizes Lazenby’s “lost business” to an injury derivative of acts aimed at accident victims.
  • Wommack v. G. S. Constr., Inc. (panel decision cited in majority and discussed in dissent): Invoked for the motion-to-dismiss framing—whether evidence could possibly show the injuries “flowed directly” from criminal acts directed at plaintiffs. It bolsters the majority’s focus on directionality and directness at the pleading stage.
  • Dissent—Overlook Gardens Properties, LLC v. Orix, USA, LP: Used to restate the “flowed directly” proximate-cause test while emphasizing that proximate cause is often for the jury.
  • Dissent—Clarke v. Freeman: Cited for the general proposition that proximate cause is ordinarily a jury question, supporting reluctance to dispose of the RICO claim at pleading.
  • Dissent—Coen v. Aptean, Inc.: Used to argue that language in prior opinions not necessary to their holdings should be treated as dicta. This is central to the dissent’s critique of the majority’s reliance on “targeted toward him / intended victim” phrasing.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

Division 1: Competitor claims based on solicitation misconduct fail absent a cognizable property interference

The complaint alleged defendants violated Bar Rule 7.3(d) and certain criminal statutes restricting solicitation and access to accident information, and that this misconduct diverted cases and fees away from ethical competitors. The court accepts that ethical rules and criminal statutes may have been violated for purposes of pleading, but treats the dispositive question as whether Lazenby pleaded a civil cause of action belonging to him.

Two doctrinal gates drive the analysis:

  • No private enforcement rule: Under Davis v. Findley and Anthony v. Am. Gen. Fin. Svcs., professional rules and criminal laws generally do not generate private civil remedies unless expressly provided. This prevents a competitor from using a civil suit as an enforcement mechanism for disciplinary and criminal regimes.
  • Property-interference framing under OCGA § 51-9-1 fails on these facts: Even if the right to practice law can be a property interest in certain contexts (Studdard, Weiner), the court draws a line between (a) interference with existing relationships/fees and (b) an expectation of future clients. Here, Lazenby did not allege any attorney-client relationship, contract, or services performed for the solicited accident victims. His alleged “loss” is thus the speculative claim that, absent defendants’ solicitation, those clients would have hired him or the class.

The court characterizes this as an “inchoate expectation” and holds it insufficient “as a matter of law” to state a claim. In effect, Division 1 limits competitor standing in civil court to complain about alleged solicitation wrongdoing unless the competitor can tie the misconduct to a recognized private-law interest (e.g., an existing contract, client relationship, or other direct property interest) rather than a generalized market opportunity.

Division 2 (majority): Civil RICO proximate cause requires directness; competitor’s lost-fee theory is too attenuated

Lazenby pleaded Georgia RICO predicated on “computer invasion of privacy” (OCGA § 16-9-93 (c)), asserting defendants repeatedly accessed accident victims’ private data “without authority,” and that this led to loss of profits and business opportunities. The majority “pretermit[s]” whether a “pattern” was adequately pled and resolves the claim on proximate cause.

Applying Najarian Capital v. Clark and Tribeca Homes v. Marathon Inv. Corp., the majority demands that the injury “flow directly” from at least one predicate act and reflect “direct harm” from an enumerated crime. The court reasons:

  • The direct victims of unauthorized data access are the accident victims whose data was accessed.
  • Lazenby’s injury is derivative: it depends on a chain of contingencies (access data → solicit victims → victims hire Cambre → Lazenby loses a hypothetical chance to be hired).
  • That chain is “too attenuated and speculative” to satisfy RICO proximate cause at the pleading stage, analogizing to Wylie and Nicholson (injuries indirect to predicate acts aimed at others).

Division 2 (dissent): At pleading, intended economic displacement may be direct enough under a liberal RICO construction

Judge Watkins agrees the motion-to-dismiss standard is stringent (Norman v. Xytex Corp.) and that proximate cause is often for juries (Clarke v. Freeman). He disputes the majority’s application of an “intended victim/targeted toward him” gloss, questioning whether that language is binding law or dicta (relying on Coen v. Aptean, Inc. to cabin unnecessary language in prior decisions).

The dissent’s central factual-legal reframing is that the complaint alleges defendants accessed private data for the purpose of “scooping” competitors—securing the attorney-client relationship before Lazenby could. On that view, even if the predicate act involves accident victims’ data, the alleged economic injury to competitors may be “direct and intended” enough to survive a motion to dismiss, particularly given the legislature’s instruction to construe Georgia RICO liberally (OCGA § 16-14-2 (b)).

3.3 Impact

A. Competitive-lawyer suits over solicitation: a constrained civil pathway

The majority opinion signals strong reluctance to permit competitor plaintiffs to repurpose disciplinary rules and criminal solicitation statutes into civil damages claims. Absent a traditional private-law hook (existing contract/relationship, direct fee entitlement, or other recognized property interference), “lost opportunity” allegations will likely be treated as speculative and non-cognizable.

B. Civil RICO in business-competition settings: reinforced “directness” screen at Rule 12(b)(6)

Division 2 strengthens a defense roadmap: where predicate acts are directed at third parties (here, accident victims), and the plaintiff’s harm is economic displacement framed as lost market opportunity, defendants can argue the causal chain is too attenuated for RICO proximate cause. Plaintiffs, conversely, will likely emphasize the dissent’s theory—pleading facts showing the racketeering scheme was designed to economically displace them, not merely incidentally harm them.

C. Institutional allocation: discipline and criminal enforcement remain primary tools

The court’s closing footnote underscores institutional competence: deterrence of improper solicitation is important, but the remedy under these pleaded facts lies with the General Assembly (creating private rights) and the State Bar of Georgia (discipline), not judicial creation of new competitor torts.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6) motion to dismiss: A request to end the case at the pleading stage because, even assuming the facts alleged are true, the law does not provide a remedy.
  • Private right of action: A statute may define criminal conduct, but that does not automatically let private parties sue for damages unless the legislature expressly authorizes it (or a recognized common-law theory applies).
  • OCGA § 51-9-1 (property enjoyment tort): Creates a tort for unlawful interference with enjoyment of “private property.” The dispute here was whether a competitor’s hoped-for future clients are “property” that can be “interfered with” absent an existing relationship.
  • Predicate act / pattern (Georgia RICO): RICO liability requires specified criminal acts (“predicate acts”) and at least two interrelated acts forming a “pattern.”
  • RICO proximate cause (“flowed directly”): The injury must be the direct result of a predicate act—not merely something that might eventually happen because of it. Courts reject long causal chains involving multiple independent decisions (e.g., victims choosing counsel).
  • Physical precedent only: In Georgia appellate practice, some opinions are not binding precedent (though they may be persuasive). The majority and dissent spar over how much weight to place on language originating in such cases.
  • Dicta: Statements not necessary to decide the case. The dissent argues that “targeted toward him/intended victim” wording is dicta if the earlier case could be decided on the “flowed directly” test alone.

5. Conclusion

Cambre & Associates, LLC et al. v. Lazenby et al. establishes (and in Division 2, sharpens) a limiting principle for civil litigation built on alleged “ambulance chasing” by competitors: ethical rules and criminal solicitation prohibitions do not, without more, translate into competitor damages actions, and a lawyer’s lost, speculative opportunity to be retained is not a cognizable property interference under OCGA § 51-9-1 on the pleaded facts. For civil Georgia RICO, the majority insists on a tight causal nexus—economic displacement that depends on predicate acts aimed at third parties and on intervening client-choice decisions is too attenuated to satisfy proximate cause at the pleading stage.

The dissent highlights an emerging fault line: whether a competitor who alleges the racketeering scheme was designed to “scoop” business can plead a sufficiently “direct” injury under a liberal RICO construction. Until resolved, the opinion’s practical message is that regulatory and criminal channels remain the primary enforcement mechanisms for improper solicitation, while civil competitor suits face significant doctrinal barriers unless they can plead (and later prove) direct, non-speculative injury grounded in recognized private-law interests.