Compassionate Release May Be Denied Solely on § 3553(a) Factors with a Brief, Record-Based Explanation
Introduction
In United States v. Leoncio Perez (11th Cir. Mar. 31, 2026) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a
motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
The parties were the United States of America (appellee) and Leoncio Perez (appellant), a federal prisoner
serving life sentences imposed in 1997 for cocaine-trafficking offenses enhanced under 21 U.S.C. § 851.
Perez sought a reduction based on (i) advanced age and declining health under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(2),
(ii) “other reasons” including rehabilitation and the timing of the government’s § 851 notice under
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(5), and (iii) an allegedly “unusually long sentence” in light of intervening legal changes
under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6).
The district court denied relief on two independent bases: (1) the § 3553(a) factors did not favor release and (2) Perez did not
show extraordinary and compelling reasons. On appeal, the central issue became whether the district court’s § 3553(a) analysis—
though brief—was legally sufficient.
Summary of the Opinion
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed on the § 3553(a) ground alone.
It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Perez’s criminal history and the seriousness of his crack cocaine
conduct (including the court’s view that, under current law, he would remain a career offender with a 360-months-to-life guideline range) outweighed
mitigating considerations.
Critically, the panel did not decide whether Perez proved extraordinary and compelling reasons—nor did it resolve the district
court’s view that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) exceeded the Sentencing Commission’s authority. Instead, the court relied on existing
Eleventh Circuit precedent permitting denial when any one statutory requirement fails.
Analysis
Precedents Cited
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United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343 (11th Cir. 2021)
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Role in the opinion: Giron supplies both the standard of review and a key structural rule: if the defendant fails to satisfy
one prerequisite for compassionate release, the court may deny without addressing the others.
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How it influenced the outcome: The panel invoked Giron to justify affirming on the district court’s § 3553(a) analysis without
reaching the disputed “extraordinary and compelling reasons” questions.
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United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234 (11th Cir. 2021)
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Role in the opinion: Tinker is the backbone for two propositions:
(1) compassionate release requires satisfaction of three requirements—extraordinary and compelling reasons, consistency with § 3553(a), and
no danger to the community; and (2) a district court need not exhaustively analyze every § 3553(a) factor.
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How it influenced the outcome: Tinker supported the panel’s conclusion that a brief § 3553(a) explanation can suffice where the order
acknowledges consideration of the factors and arguments, especially when related mitigation is addressed elsewhere in the order.
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United States v. Butler, 39 F.4th 1349 (11th Cir. 2022)
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Role in the opinion: Butler reinforces that the weight assigned to each § 3553(a) factor is committed to the district court’s
discretion, including the ability to assign great weight to one factor (e.g., seriousness of the offense) over others (e.g., rehabilitation).
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How it influenced the outcome: The panel used Butler to validate the district court’s prioritization of offense seriousness and criminal
history over age, health, and rehabilitation.
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United States v. Puentes, 803 F.3d 597 (11th Cir. 2015)
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Role in the opinion: Puentes provides the general principle that district courts lack inherent authority to modify sentences and may do
so only when a statute or rule authorizes it.
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How it influenced the outcome: It frames compassionate release as a limited, statute-bound remedy, reinforcing the idea that courts must
adhere to the statutory prerequisites rather than broadly “re-sentence.”
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Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)
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Role in the opinion: Apprendi appears in a historical footnote explaining why the jury did not find drug quantity in Perez’s 1997 trial:
at the time, quantity findings increasing punishment were not yet clearly required to be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
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How it influenced the outcome: It did not drive the compassionate release analysis, but it contextualizes the vintage of the conviction
and why sentencing depended on judge-found drug quantity—an underlying feature often invoked in “unusually long sentence” arguments.
Legal Reasoning
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Compassionate release is a multi-prong test; failure on any prong ends the inquiry.
Applying United States v. Tinker and United States v. Giron, the court treated the § 3582(c)(1)(A)
requirements as independent gates. Because the district court found the § 3553(a) factors did not support release, that alone
was enough to deny relief.
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A “brief” § 3553(a) explanation can be adequate when the record shows consideration.
The panel rejected Perez’s claim that the district court’s analysis was impermissibly “rote.” Under Tinker, it is enough that
the district court acknowledges consideration of the § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ arguments; it need not discuss every factor or each piece
of mitigating evidence. The panel emphasized that even though the district court did not discuss health and rehabilitation within the § 3553(a)
section itself, it addressed those points elsewhere in its order—supporting an inference that they were considered.
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Deference to the district court’s weighing of factors is substantial.
The panel relied on United States v. Butler to underscore that the district court may place greater weight on the seriousness of
the offense and criminal history. Here, the district court pointed to a “significant criminal history,” a “large amount of crack cocaine,” and the
view that even under current law Perez would face a severe guideline range as a career offender.
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The panel avoided the contested question about U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6).
The district court had held that the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority in promulgating the “change in law/unusually long sentence”
provision in § 1B1.13(b)(6). The Eleventh Circuit did not endorse or reject that reasoning; it simply found it unnecessary to
resolve because the § 3553(a) analysis independently supported denial.
Impact
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Operational rule for litigants: In the Eleventh Circuit, even strong “extraordinary and compelling” arguments may fail if the
§ 3553(a) factors are assessed as unfavorable; courts may deny on § 3553(a) alone without reaching eligibility disputes.
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Explanation sufficiency: The decision reinforces that district courts can write relatively concise orders so long as they
acknowledge the governing factors and demonstrate—sometimes by cross-referencing discussion elsewhere in the order—that the core mitigation was
considered.
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Unresolved policy-statement controversy: Because the panel bypassed the validity of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6),
uncertainty may persist in future cases where the “change in law/gross disparity” pathway is the primary basis for relief and § 3553(a) is more
evenly balanced.
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Practical drafting consequence: Movants should treat § 3553(a) as the decisive battlefield—developing release plans, recidivism
evidence, comparative sentencing data, disciplinary history context, and offense-specific mitigation—because appellate review is highly deferential.
Complex Concepts Simplified
- 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (Compassionate release)
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A statute allowing a court to reduce an existing prison term in narrow circumstances, typically requiring (i) extraordinary and compelling reasons,
(ii) consistency with sentencing purposes in § 3553(a), and (iii) no danger to the public.
- § 3553(a) factors
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The sentencing objectives and considerations (seriousness, deterrence, protection of the public, the defendant’s history/characteristics, guideline
range, and more) used both at original sentencing and when evaluating sentence reductions.
- U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13
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The Sentencing Commission’s policy statement describing what counts as “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” Here, it includes age-based criteria
(§ 1B1.13(b)(2)), “other reasons” comparable in gravity (§ 1B1.13(b)(5)), and an “unusually long sentence/change
in law” provision (§ 1B1.13(b)(6)).
- 21 U.S.C. § 851 enhancement
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A procedure allowing prosecutors to seek increased statutory penalties based on prior qualifying drug convictions by filing a notice. In Perez’s case,
the enhancement contributed to mandatory life exposure at sentencing.
- Apprendi v. New Jersey
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A Supreme Court rule requiring that any fact (other than a prior conviction) that increases the statutory maximum penalty must be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. Perez’s trial predated Apprendi, so drug quantity was not submitted to the jury.
Conclusion
United States v. Leoncio Perez reaffirms a pragmatic and often dispositive principle in Eleventh Circuit compassionate release
litigation: a district court may deny relief based solely on the § 3553(a) factors, and a concise explanation can be sufficient when
the record reflects consideration of the parties’ arguments. The decision also illustrates how appellate courts may avoid contested questions about the
scope of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) when § 3553(a) independently supports denial—leaving the most consequential debates for cases where
the sentencing factors do not clearly cut against release.