1. Introduction
This case concerns the boundary between an employee’s personal commute and conduct attributable to an employer under respondeat superior. The underlying collision caused catastrophic injuries, but the principal question before the Indiana Supreme Court was narrower: whether Tesla’s responsibility for its employee’s negligence could be established without a jury deciding disputed facts about his trip.
Kyle Kaszuba, a Tesla service assistant, drove a company service truck home after completing an assignment the previous evening. His manager authorized the arrangement because returning the truck to the service center during rush-hour traffic would have been inconvenient. While driving back to work the next morning, Kaszuba attempted to turn into a gas station and collided with Christopher Dugan’s motorcycle. Dugan suffered a traumatic brain injury and partial amputation of his left foot.
Dugan’s mother, Annamarie Dugan Norris, became the plaintiff as guardian of his estate after the trial court found him incompetent. She sought to hold Tesla liable for Kaszuba’s negligence because, she argued, he was acting within the scope of his employment. Kaszuba supported that position; Tesla disputed it.
The Supreme Court divided 3–2 over whether the evidence conclusively established Tesla’s vicarious liability. Justice Slaughter, joined by Justices Massa and Molter, held that it did not. Justice Goff, joined by Chief Justice Rush, would have upheld summary judgment against Tesla. All agreed with the disposition preserving the original allocation of fault while requiring a new damages trial.
2. Background and Procedural History
The truck, the commute, and the refueling practice
The day before the accident, Kaszuba used Tesla’s truck to deliver a company trailer for repair. Rather than return to the service center to retrieve his own vehicle, he obtained permission to take the truck home and return it the following day. Tesla employees ordinarily commuted in personal vehicles, although manager-approved use of company vehicles for commuting was permitted as a convenience.
The service team also followed an informal refueling practice. Evidence described an expectation that employees returning a vehicle with less than a quarter tank should fill it. But the manager characterized the practice as a courtesy or recommendation, not an official corporate policy or required job duty. Kaszuba’s testimony and discovery responses reflected his understanding that refueling was expected before returning the truck.
These differing accounts became central. The parties disagreed both about the purpose of the morning trip and about whether stopping for gas implemented an employment obligation.
The trial and first appeal
Norris and Kaszuba separately sought partial summary judgment establishing Tesla’s vicarious liability. Tesla opposed their motions and sought summary judgment in its own favor under Indiana’s going-and-coming rule.
The trial court ruled against Tesla, reasoning that Kaszuba was undertaking a special errand to refuel the truck before returning it. A bifurcated trial followed:
- Fault: The jury assigned 70% fault to Kaszuba and 30% to Dugan.
- Damages: The jury awarded $60,687,491 in total damages. The opinion reports a judgment of $42,481,243 after reduction for Dugan’s comparative fault.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the scope-of-employment ruling and the allocation of fault. It nevertheless ordered a new damages trial because of the trial judge’s private communication with deliberating jurors after announcing a damages mistrial and then withdrawing that announcement.
The Supreme Court granted transfer, thereby vacating the appellate decision under Indiana Appellate Rule 58(A). It independently addressed vicarious liability and summarily affirmed the appellate disposition of the remaining trial issues, with an express exception concerning the appellate court’s professional-conduct determination.
4. Analysis
A. Precedents Cited and Their Significance
Foundations of vicarious liability
- Sword v. NKC Hosps., Inc., 714 N.E.2d 142 (Ind. 1999)
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The majority used this decision to explain vicarious liability as a “legal fiction”: responsibility imposed because of a relationship with the wrongdoer, rather than the defendant’s own misconduct. This distinction defined the case. Norris did not claim that Tesla independently acted negligently; her theory depended on attributing Kaszuba’s conduct to Tesla.
- Stropes ex rel. Taylor v. Heritage House Childs. Ctr. of Shelbyville, Inc., 547 N.E.2d 244 (Ind. 1989)
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This decision supplied the basic respondeat-superior rule: employers may answer for employees’ wrongful acts committed within the scope of employment. It also established that an employee’s predominantly personal motivation does not necessarily defeat liability when the act appreciably furthers the employer’s business.
Both opinions relied on that principle. The majority considered the underlying purpose and benefit disputed; the dissent believed Tesla’s benefit was conclusively established. The case therefore prevented personal convenience from becoming an automatic defense, even though convenience remained relevant evidence.
- Barnett v. Clark, 889 N.E.2d 281 (Ind. 2008)
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This was the majority’s central substantive framework. An injurious act falls within employment when it is incidental to authorized conduct or appreciably furthers the employer’s business. Drawing on the Restatement (Third) of Agency, the decision also distinguishes assigned work or employer-controlled conduct from an independent course of conduct intended to serve no employer purpose.
Importantly, the majority retained appreciable business benefit as an alternative inquiry. Even if refueling arose during a personal commute rather than from a mandatory assignment, the jury must still consider whether it sufficiently furthered Tesla’s business.
- Bushong v. Williamson, 790 N.E.2d 467 (Ind. 2003)
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The majority relied on this case’s explanation that conduct is incidental when it is subordinate or pertinent to an act the employee is employed to perform. The dissent invoked its complementary procedural principle: scope of employment ordinarily presents a factual question, but conclusive evidence can permit resolution as a matter of law. The disagreement concerned whether this record met that threshold, not whether summary judgment is ever permissible.
Commuting and employer service
- Biel, Inc. v. Kirsch, 161 N.E.2d 617 (Ind. 1959) (per curiam)
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This foundational going-and-coming decision establishes that an employee ordinarily does not act within employment merely by traveling to work. Using the employer’s vehicle does not itself transform permission to possess the vehicle into an agency relationship for the trip.
The majority also relied on it to reject the proposition that employer payment for fuel conclusively establishes scope of employment. Vehicle ownership and operating expenses may be relevant, but they do not automatically convert an ordinary commute into company business.
- Warner Trucking, Inc. v. Carolina Cas. Ins. Co., 686 N.E.2d 102 (Ind. 1997)
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The majority later discusses the same decision under the title Warner Trucking, Inc. v. Carolina Casualty Insurance Co.. It provided both the governing inquiry—whether the employee was serving the employer—and the closest factual analogy.
There, an employee who had consumed alcohol drove a company semi-tractor and injured the plaintiff. Evidence showed that the employer had advanced money for fuel and that employees commonly fueled trucks before early-morning work. But the evidence also permitted an inference that the employee acted independently. Those competing explanations required factual resolution rather than summary judgment.
The present majority treated Kaszuba’s refueling stop similarly: it could implement Tesla’s practice or reflect an independent decision. The dissent emphasized another aspect of the precedent: an employee can serve the employer even while off duty, so being “off the clock” cannot alone decide the issue.
- Dodson v. Carlson, 14 N.E.3d 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)
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The majority used this decision to frame the factual inquiry around competing facts or inferences concerning why the employee was on the road. This focus directed attention away from the vehicle’s ownership alone and toward the actual purpose of the journey.
Factfinding and summary judgment
- Knighten v. E. Chicago Hous. Auth., 45 N.E.3d 788 (Ind. 2015), quoting Walgreen Co. v. Hinchy, 21 N.E.3d 99 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)
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These authorities support the ordinary allocation of scope-of-employment questions to the factfinder. Their importance is institutional: when competing reasonable accounts remain, judges must not replace the jury’s assessment with their preferred interpretation.
- Sees v. Bank One, Ind., N.A., 839 N.E.2d 154 (Ind. 2005)
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This decision supplied the rule requiring courts to credit the nonmovant’s evidence, draw favorable inferences, and resolve doubts against the moving party. Because the trial court granted Norris’s and Kaszuba’s motions, Tesla was the relevant nonmovant when reviewing those rulings. The existence of cross-motions did not authorize weighing the conflicting evidence.
- Hughley v. State, 15 N.E.3d 1000 (Ind. 2014)
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The majority emphasized the distinction between a “genuine” factual issue and a “persuasive” one. Tesla did not have to establish at summary judgment that its account was more convincing; it had to demonstrate a genuine material dispute. Calling the standard a “two-way street,” the Court stressed that its protection applies to defendants as well as plaintiffs.
The prior appeal and jury communications
- Tesla, Inc. v. Norris, 274 N.E.3d 956 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025)
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This was the intermediate appellate decision under review. It characterized refueling as a required task integral to returning Tesla’s property, rather than a personal commuting activity. The Supreme Court rejected that characterization as conclusive because it failed to accommodate Tesla’s contrary evidence.
The Supreme Court nevertheless summarily affirmed the appellate disposition preserving the fault allocation and requiring a new damages trial. It expressly excluded the appellate finding of a Rule 4.2 violation from its approval.
- Minor v. State, 252 N.E.3d 979 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025)
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Quoted in the account of the appellate ruling, this decision supplied the principle that improper private judicial communication with jurors creates a rebuttable presumption of error, rather than automatic grounds for reversal. The presumption was not rebutted here: the circumstances, including the quick verdict after the private discussion, left unresolved whether a resistant juror had been encouraged to abandon an opinion.
Additional authorities supporting the dissent
- Arrendale v. Am. Imaging & MRI, LLC, 183 N.E.3d 1064 (Ind. 2022)
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The dissent used this decision to explain relational liability and the employer–employee or principal–agent foundation of respondeat superior. It supplied background consistent with the majority’s framework rather than a competing rule.
- SONY DADC U.S. Inc. v. Thompson, 56 N.E.3d 1171 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans. denied
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This authority supported the dissent’s distinction between acts incidental to authorized work or appreciably benefiting the employer and independent acts serving no employment purpose. The dissent considered Kaszuba’s return trip and refueling stop to fall conclusively within the former category, despite any personal convenience.
- Hudgins v. Bemish, 64 N.E.3d 923 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), quoting Dillman v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 665 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)
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These decisions articulate an exception when the employee does more than simply travel to work—such as performing an errand or providing a company service or benefit beyond merely arriving. The dissent viewed returning and refueling the truck as precisely that additional service.
- Cox v. Evansville Police Dep't, 107 N.E.3d 453 (Ind. 2018)
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This was central to the dissent’s objection to emphasizing whether refueling was mandatory. Scope of employment encompasses delegated or authorized activities and acts naturally or predictably arising from them. Thus, the dissent argued, authorized refueling could qualify even if the policy was merely a recommendation. The majority did not overrule that principle; it found the purpose and employment connection unresolved on this record.
B. The Majority’s Legal Reasoning
1. Two related questions required separate examination
The Court distinguished the character of the overall commute from the character of the particular refueling stop. Either could potentially establish the necessary employment connection:
- The return trip might complete the prior day’s company assignment.
- Even if the trip was otherwise personal, refueling might constitute employment-related conduct during it.
This distinction prevents the label “commute” from resolving every activity occurring along the route. It also prevents a business-related stop from automatically establishing that the entire journey was company work.
2. The return trip supported competing accounts
Kaszuba understood himself to be returning the truck and completing the assignment. Tesla offered evidence that taking the truck home was an accommodation allowing him to avoid rush-hour delay. Their accounts also conflicted over whether he was working and being paid during the morning trip.
The majority did not make compensation status dispositive. Instead, the conflicting testimony contributed to uncertainty about whether this was ongoing company service or an ordinary commute in an employer-owned vehicle. A jury could accept either account.
3. The informal policy did not conclusively establish an employment task
Norris and Kaszuba argued that the gas stop implemented Tesla’s expectations and ensured the truck was ready for work. Tesla responded with evidence that maintaining the fuel level was a courtesy rather than an enforceable duty, with no discipline for noncompliance.
The policy’s reach was also uncertain. The majority observed that the record did not expressly establish its application during personal commuting time. Evidence that the practice arose to prevent service employees from encountering empty vehicles during customer work supported an inference that it concerned workday operations.
The Court did not decide that an informal recommendation can never support liability. It held that the recommendation’s meaning, application, and connection to this stop could not be conclusively resolved against Tesla.
4. Appreciable business benefit remained an independent route to liability
Despite its emphasis on whether refueling was required, the majority expressly preserved the broader business-benefit test. If the jury finds the stop arose from Kaszuba’s personal commute, it must still consider whether refueling appreciably furthered Tesla’s business.
Accordingly, the decision should not be read as limiting respondeat superior to compulsory assignments. Authorized conduct, employer control, and appreciable business advancement remain relevant. What failed was the contention that this particular record permitted only one conclusion.
5. Reversal did not establish Tesla’s defense
The Court’s reasoning was procedural as well as substantive. A court deciding summary judgment cannot choose which witness to believe or which reasonable inference is stronger. Tesla’s evidence was sufficient to prevent judgment against it, but the competing evidence likewise left its ultimate responsibility unresolved.
C. The Dissent: Authorization and Business Benefit Were Already Established
Justice Goff considered the majority’s factual disputes either immaterial or unsupported. His disagreement focused on three points.
First, the truck remained connected to an authorized assignment. Kaszuba had used it for Tesla’s trailer delivery and obtained managerial permission to return it the next morning. The dissent also emphasized Tesla’s restrictions on personal use, driver-qualification requirements, and required pre-operation safety inspection. These controls supported an ongoing employment relationship during the trip.
Second, personal convenience did not negate company benefit. Letting Kaszuba drive home could save Tesla the paid time required for a rush-hour return to the service center. For the dissent, the arrangement benefited both parties, and mixed motives did not remove it from employment.
Third, authorized refueling need not be compulsory. The manager’s participation in establishing the practice, the expectation that low-fuel vehicles be replenished, and the truck’s dedicated gas card supported authorization. Refueling also saved later employees—and therefore Tesla—time and resources.
The central divide was thus not whether personal motives can coexist with employment. Both opinions accepted that they can. Rather, they disagreed over whether the evidence conclusively established sufficient authorization and business benefit, or instead permitted competing reasonable conclusions.
D. Trial Error, Professional Conduct, and the Limited Remand
The Court separated three matters that could otherwise be conflated: responsibility for causing the collision, Tesla’s derivative responsibility, and the monetary value of the injuries.
The jury’s fault allocation survived because the challenged liability-phase matters did not justify reversal. Those challenges included evidentiary rulings and alleged misconduct by Norris’s attorney. Although the Court of Appeals had found a Rule 4.2 violation without an effect on Kaszuba’s testimony, the Supreme Court expressly took no position on whether a professional-conduct violation occurred.
The damages award could not stand because of the trial judge’s private communication with deliberating jurors. The relevant error was not treated as automatically reversible in every case; the unrebutted presumption of error justified a new damages trial here.
Indiana Appellate Rule 66(D) generally limits a new trial to parties and issues affected by error unless doing so would be impracticable or unfair. Applying that rule, the Court rejected Tesla’s demand to retry everything. The original order contemplating the same jury for both trial phases did not require a wholesale retrial after appeal.
E. Likely Impact
- Fact-sensitive commuting disputes: Courts must examine the actual employment connection rather than treating company ownership, commuting status, or a refueling stop as independently decisive.
- Informal practices matter: A workplace custom can support scope of employment, but its content, authority, application, and intended benefit may require jury findings.
- No automatic protection from policy labels: Calling an expectation a “courtesy” or “recommendation” does not itself defeat liability. Conversely, calling it a “policy” does not conclusively establish liability.
- Evidence of purpose becomes especially important: Managerial instructions, compensation records, vehicle-use restrictions, and communications about returning company property may affect whether a case can be resolved without trial.
- Summary judgment remains available: The decision does not require a jury in every commuting case. It requires one where material facts or reasonable inferences genuinely conflict.
- Partial retrials remain viable: An error affecting employer attribution or damages need not reopen an otherwise valid allocation of accident fault.
The opinion’s principal contribution is therefore a fact-specific clarification of existing law, not a categorical new exception to the going-and-coming rule. Its strongest precedential message concerns judicial restraint when determining an employee’s purpose on a disputed summary-judgment record.
6. Conclusion
Kaszuba v. Norris preserves Indiana’s general exclusion of ordinary commuting from employment while reaffirming that authorized tasks and appreciable business benefit may bring conduct within it. Neither a company vehicle nor an informal refueling practice supplies an automatic answer.
The controlling lesson is procedural: when the evidence reasonably supports competing explanations of an employee’s purpose, the jury must decide. On remand, Tesla’s vicarious liability and damages will be tried anew, while the original 70%–30% allocation of fault remains intact.