Commonwealth v. Young: DUI as a Lesser-Included Offense of Wanton Murder – A New Double-Jeopardy Safeguard in Kentucky

Introduction

On 20 June 2025, the Supreme Court of Kentucky decided David Young v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, a case that not only affirmed murder and assault convictions arising from a tragic alcohol-related traffic collision, but also clarified—and for the first time squarely declared—that a DUI conviction must be vacated when the jury instruction for wanton murder already requires the very same DUI elements. The decision sets a fresh precedent on the application of double jeopardy in impaired-driving homicide prosecutions.

• Appellant: David Young
• Appellee: Commonwealth of Kentucky
• Originating Court: Lewis Circuit Court, No. 20-CR-00012
• Dispositive Holding: Murder and assault convictions affirmed; DUI conviction vacated as double-jeopardy barred; case remanded for re-entry of judgment.

Summary of the Judgment

Justice Nickell, writing for a unanimous Court (Lambert, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting without opinion), addressed five assignments of error:

1. Denial of a directed verdict on wanton murder – affirmed.
2. Exclusion of a 911 operator witness – affirmed.
3. Exclusion of “per se” DUI statutory references – affirmed.
4. Denial of a directed verdict on first-degree assault – affirmed.
5. Alleged double-jeopardy violation between DUI and murder instructions – error found; DUI conviction vacated.

The Court concluded that the DUI instruction duplicated every element embedded in the wanton-murder instruction (save for the “extreme indifference” language), rendering DUI a lesser-included offense. Under Blockburger v. United States and Kentucky’s own Commonwealth v. Burge, the dual convictions offended both federal and state double-jeopardy clauses.

Detailed Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Commonwealth v. Benham, 816 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1991) – Articulated the directed-verdict standard. Guided the Court’s refusal to disturb the jury’s murder and assault verdicts.
• White v. Commonwealth, 360 S.W.2d 198 (Ky. 1962) – “Layman’s exception” to medical-testimony rule. Provided doctrinal basis to admit the coroner’s testimony without an autopsy.
• Bowling v. Commonwealth, 553 S.W.3d 231 (Ky. 2018) – Recognized intoxication as a factor evidencing wantonness. The Court distinguished Bowling when conducting its double-jeopardy analysis.
• Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932) & Commonwealth v. Burge, 947 S.W.2d 805 (Ky. 1996) – Classic “same-elements” test for double jeopardy. Directly controlled the vacation of the DUI conviction.
• Parson v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 775 (Ky. 2004) – Defined prolonged pain as “serious physical injury,” supporting the assault conviction.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Wanton Murder – Sufficiency of Evidence

• The coroner’s testimony plus graphic collision evidence triggered the White layman’s exception, making expert medical testimony unnecessary.
• Evidence of Young’s 0.156 BAC nearly three hours post-crash, eyewitness accounts of impairment, and severe rain conditions showed a conscious disregard of a grave risk, satisfying KRS 507.020(1)(b).

b. Excluded Evidence and Witnesses

• Proposed 911-call data about other weather incidents lacked nexus to the crash site; under KRE 401 the trial court’s exclusion was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate.
• References to per se DUI law (two-hour BAC rule) were irrelevant because Young was prosecuted under the “impairment” subsections, KRS 189A.010(1)(b)/(e); exclusion averted jury confusion.

c. Assault – Serious Physical Injury

Combined testimony of the treating physician and minor victim B.M. demonstrated prolonged impairment and chronic pain, bringing the injuries within KRS 500.080(19).

d. Double Jeopardy

• Murder Instruction 4 expressly required the jury to find Young “wantonly operat[ed] a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol” and caused death.
• DUI Instruction 12 required: (i) operation, (ii) under the influence, (iii) accident causing death/serious injury.
• Because every element of DUI was subsumed within murder, DUI added no additional fact; hence it was a lesser-included offense. Under Burge, separate punishment violated double-jeopardy guarantees.

3. Impact of the Decision

1. Blueprint for Trial Judges: Jury instructions in vehicular-homicide cases must be drafted to avert element-overlap. Prosecutors may need to elect between standalone DUI counts or embed intoxication solely as the mens rea modifier for wanton murder.

2. Strategic Shifts for Defense Counsel: Counsel can now argue that a DUI count must merge with wanton murder whenever the murder instruction incorporates all DUI elements; appellate relief is available even when unpreserved (Cardine approach).

3. State-wide Consistency: The holding closes the doctrinal gap left by Bowling, providing a clear statement: if intoxication is expressly listed in the murder instruction, DUI is duplicative.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Wantonness: Acting with awareness but reckless disregard of a substantial, unjustifiable risk; more blameworthy than negligence, less than intent.
• Per se vs. Impairment DUI: • Per se – Simply driving with BAC ≥ 0.08 within two hours is illegal, regardless of observable impairment.
  • Impairment – Commonwealth must prove actual influence of alcohol/drugs on driving ability; BAC evidence admissible even if drawn > 2 hours later.
• Layman’s Exception (Cause of Death): When death-inducing injuries are obvious, a coroner or eyewitness may state cause of death without a medical autopsy.
• Double Jeopardy (Same-Elements Test): Two convictions cannot stand if each crime does not require proof of a fact the other lacks. When overlap is total, the lesser merges into the greater.

Conclusion

Commonwealth v. Young cements an important procedural safeguard in Kentucky criminal jurisprudence: where a wanton-murder instruction explicitly incorporates DUI impairment, a separate DUI conviction is constitutionally barred. The case also re-affirms established evidentiary standards—the layman’s exception for cause of death, the flexibility in proving serious physical injury, and the discretion of trial courts to exclude marginally relevant or confusing evidence.

Going forward, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and trial judges must scrutinize the interplay of DUI and homicide instructions to avoid double-jeopardy pitfalls, ensuring that impaired-driving prosecutions remain both effective and constitutionally sound.