Colorado River Stay Treated as an Appealable Final Order; Protective Discovery Orders Generally Not Appealable

1. Introduction

Raymond E. Butler, II sued more than thirty defendants, alleging a decades-long conspiracy to deprive him of trust benefits purportedly created by his grandfather. While a related Illinois state-court action was pending, Butler filed a federal action (initially in the Western District of Michigan), which was transferred to the Northern District of Illinois. The federal court stayed the case under the Colorado River abstention doctrine because the state case was parallel and potentially preclusive.

Butler then sought emergency relief in federal court: (1) lift the stay, (2) vacate a protective order restricting his communications due to harassment, and (3) enter a preliminary injunction freezing trust assets and appointing a neutral fiduciary. The district court denied the requested relief, continued the stay, and continued (with modification) the protective order. Butler appealed and also sought mandamus.

The Seventh Circuit’s order is notable for its jurisdictional sorting: it treated the continued Colorado River stay as an appealable final order, but treated the protective order as a non-appealable discovery order, while reaching the merits of the preliminary-injunction denial under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

2. Summary of the Opinion

• Preliminary injunction: Affirmed. Butler failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits—indeed, not even a “negligible chance.” The district court’s credibility determinations (discounting Butler’s testimony and spreadsheets and crediting defendants’ declarations) were plausible and entitled to deference.
• Colorado River stay: Affirmed. The state and federal actions were parallel; additional federal defendants did not change the central issues because their interests aligned with the state defendants, making the party sets “functionally the same.”
• Protective order appeal: Dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction as a discovery order compliable without irreparable harm; no pendent appellate jurisdiction applied.
• Judicial bias: Rejected. Adverse rulings and courtroom frustration did not meet the standard for disqualifying bias.
• Mandamus (and supplement request): Denied as frivolous.

3. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited

1) Abstention / parallel proceedings and appellate jurisdiction

• Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. et al. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-14 (1976).
  The foundational abstention doctrine permitting a federal court, in “exceptional circumstances,” to stay a federal action in deference to parallel state litigation to promote wise judicial administration. The district court relied on this doctrine to stay proceedings because the state case could resolve (and preclude) the core beneficiary/forgery issues.
• DuPuy Synthes Sales, Inc. v. OrthoLA, Inc., 953 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 2020).
  Critical to jurisdiction: the Seventh Circuit invoked DuPuy Synthes for the proposition that a stay entered under Colorado River is treated as a final order for appellate purposes. This allowed review of the refusal to lift the stay.
• GeLab Cosmetics LLC v. Zhuhai Aobo Cosmetics Co., 99 F.4th 424, 429 (7th Cir. 2024).
  Provided the modern Seventh Circuit test language: a stay is appropriate where actions are “parallel” and there is a substantial likelihood the state case will dispose of all claims in federal court. The panel used it to reject Butler’s argument that broader federal scope defeated parallelism.
• Antosh v. Village of Mount Pleasant, 99 F.4th 989, 994 (7th Cir. 2024).
  Addressed the “new parties” problem in parallelism analysis: the question is whether added parties “alter the central issues,” and whether parties are “functionally the same” when incentives and goals align. The panel applied this to find parallelism despite ~30 federal defendants.

2) Discovery orders, pendent jurisdiction, and appealability

• Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc., 32 F.3d 1175, 1177 (7th Cir. 1994).
  Anchored the conclusion that the protective order was an ordinary discovery order: it could be complied with without irreparable harm and would become moot as the case progressed, so it was not immediately appealable.
• Abelesz v. Erste Group Bank AG, 695 F.3d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 2012).
  Set the standard for pendent appellate jurisdiction. The court refused to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the protective order because it was not “inextricably intertwined” with the preliminary-injunction issues.

3) Preliminary injunction standards, burdens, and review of factfinding

• Minocqua Brewing Co. LLC v. Hess, 160 F.4th 849, 855 (7th Cir. 2025).
  Reinforced that the movant bears the burden of showing entitlement to preliminary relief, including likelihood of success. This undercut Butler’s claim that he could not produce trust documents pre-discovery; he still had the burden at the injunction stage.
• Lukaszczyk v. Cook County., 47 F.4th 587, 598 (7th Cir. 2022).
  Supplied the “negligible chance” formulation. Even if the district court had erred on irreparable harm, Butler’s failure to show any meaningful likelihood of success made any such error harmless.
• Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985).
  Governed appellate deference to trial-court credibility determinations and factfinding: findings are not disturbed if “plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.” The panel used this to uphold the district court’s choice to credit sworn declarations over Butler’s testimony and spreadsheets.
• Santos Mendoza v. Bondi, 151 F.4th 900, 905 (7th Cir. 2025).
  Used to dismiss Butler’s attempt to recast factual disagreement as legal error—he could not “manufacture a legal dispute” from a credibility loss.

4) Judicial bias / recusal standards

• Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994).
  The controlling principle: critical or hostile judicial remarks during proceedings ordinarily do not establish bias. The panel used Liteky to reject Butler’s reliance on interruptions and an alleged outburst.
• United States v. Williams, 949 F.3d 1056, 1061 (7th Cir. 2020).
  Cited for examples of circumstances suggesting bias (e.g., personal involvement or financial interest). Butler did not allege anything approaching that level.
• United States v. Barr, 960 F.3d 906, 921 (7th Cir. 2020).
  Reinforced that judicial “dissatisfaction, annoyance, or even anger” does not require recusal absent more.

B. Legal Reasoning

1) Appellate jurisdiction: splitting the order into reviewable and nonreviewable parts

The panel treated the district court’s rulings as belonging to three different appellate “channels”:

• Preliminary injunction denial: reviewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), a standard interlocutory appeal route for orders granting or denying injunctions.
• Refusal to lift the Colorado River stay: reviewable because a Colorado River stay is treated as final for jurisdictional purposes (DuPuy Synthes Sales, Inc. v. OrthoLA, Inc.).
• Protective order: not reviewable because it was a discovery management order that could be obeyed without irreparable harm (Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc.), and it was not pulled in under pendent jurisdiction (Abelesz v. Erste Group Bank AG).

This architecture matters: the court did not “rubber stamp” the entire district court order as one unit, but instead applied different jurisdictional rules to different components—an increasingly common approach in complex federal litigation.

2) Merits of preliminary relief: likelihood of success as the decisive gate

The district court’s denial rested primarily on likelihood of success. Butler’s proof that he was a beneficiary of the GPN Family Trust and Doros Generation Trust amounted to:

• his personal recollection from age six about his grandfather creating trusts “for his benefit,” and
• spreadsheets he compiled from Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services regulatory data, offered to infer transfers of nursing homes to new trusts.

The defendants countered with sworn declarations from (i) the attorney who drafted/renamed the trusts, denying Butler’s grandfather created them and denying Butler was a beneficiary, and (ii) the general counsel for the management company, denying any ownership by similarly named “new” trusts.

The Seventh Circuit’s affirmance turned on two review principles:

• Credibility and factfinding deference (Anderson v. City of Bessemer City): the district judge’s choice to credit the declarations and reject Butler’s testimony/spreadsheets was “plausible,” so the appellate court would not reweigh evidence.
• Burden allocation at the injunction stage (Minocqua Brewing Co. LLC v. Hess): regardless of discovery limitations (especially given the stay), Butler chose to seek preliminary relief and therefore carried the burden to show likely success.

The panel also held that even if there were an error regarding irreparable harm, it would not matter because Butler failed on likelihood of success (Lukaszczyk v. Cook County.).

3) The Colorado River stay: “parallel” actions despite extra defendants and broader alleged scope

Butler argued the federal case was different—more defendants, broader conspiracy allegations, and different requested relief. The Seventh Circuit focused instead on the “central issues” and practical alignment:

• The state and federal cases shared the same plaintiff and core questions about the Jack Finn Irrevocable Trust—whether Butler was a beneficiary and whether he signed a release.
• The presence of additional federal defendants did not defeat parallelism because the key inquiry is whether added parties change the core issues and whether their objectives align, making parties “functionally the same” (Antosh v. Village of Mount Pleasant; GeLab Cosmetics LLC v. Zhuhai Aobo Cosmetics Co.).

By emphasizing functional alignment, the panel reaffirmed a pragmatic approach to parallelism: litigants cannot necessarily avoid a Colorado River stay simply by naming more defendants in federal court if those defendants’ interests track the state defendants and the core dispute remains the same.

4) Judicial bias claim: separating courtroom tone from disqualifying partiality

Butler’s bias claim relied on adverse rulings and alleged courtroom behavior. The panel applied Liteky v. United States to hold that irritation or sharp questioning—even hostility—usually does not establish bias. Absent allegations like personal involvement or financial incentive (United States v. Williams), the claim failed; United States v. Barr further reinforced that anger or annoyance is not enough.

C. Impact

1) Appellate practice: a clear warning about what can (and cannot) be appealed immediately

The most durable takeaway is procedural: litigants may appeal the continuation of a Colorado River stay (treated as final), but they ordinarily cannot immediately appeal a protective order governing communications or discovery unless it inflicts irreparable harm or fits a narrow exception. The court also signaled it will not use pendent appellate jurisdiction to “smuggle” discovery disputes into an otherwise proper interlocutory appeal.

2) Injunction strategy in stayed cases: the movant still must prove entitlement without discovery

The decision underscores a tactical reality: when a case is stayed (especially under Colorado River), discovery may be frozen, but that does not relax the preliminary-injunction burden. Parties seeking asset freezes or fiduciary appointments must present independently intelligible, credible evidence of entitlement and traceability—particularly where the requested relief is extraordinary.

3) Parallelism doctrine: “functional sameness” limits end-runs around abstention

By relying on Antosh v. Village of Mount Pleasant, the panel reinforces that adding parties and claims does not necessarily negate parallelism if the heart of the dispute is the same and the added defendants’ incentives align with the state-court defendants. Future litigants should expect courts to look past pleadings’ breadth and evaluate the practical litigation center of gravity.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Colorado River stay (abstention): A federal court sometimes pauses (stays) its case to avoid duplicating a parallel state-court case, especially when the state case is likely to resolve the same core issues and might preclude the federal claims.
• “Parallel” actions / “functionally the same” parties: Two cases can be “parallel” even if they are not identical. Courts ask whether they revolve around the same central issues and whether the parties’ interests are aligned such that the state case will effectively decide the dispute.
• Preliminary injunction (asset freeze, fiduciary appointment): Temporary emergency relief before final judgment. The moving party must show (among other factors) a likelihood of success on the merits; without that, courts generally will not impose drastic interim remedies.
• Discovery/protective order: A trial court’s order controlling how parties exchange information and communicate during litigation. Many such orders are not immediately appealable because errors can be corrected later.
• Pendent appellate jurisdiction: A narrow doctrine allowing an appellate court to review an otherwise non-appealable ruling only when it is tightly bound up with an appealable ruling. The Seventh Circuit found the protective order was not intertwined with the injunction merits.
• Mandamus: An extraordinary appellate remedy used to correct a clear abuse of power where normal appeal is inadequate. The court denied it as frivolous here.
• Credibility determinations: Trial judges decide which witnesses and evidence are believable. Appellate courts almost never reweigh those decisions unless they are implausible or unsupported.

5. Conclusion

The Seventh Circuit’s disposition delivers a procedural-and-proof double message. Procedurally, it confirms that a Colorado River stay is appealable as a final order (DuPuy Synthes Sales, Inc. v. OrthoLA, Inc.), while ordinary protective discovery orders are generally not immediately appealable (Allendale Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bull Data Sys., Inc.) and will not be reviewed via pendent jurisdiction (Abelesz v. Erste Group Bank AG). Substantively, it reaffirms that extraordinary injunctive remedies—such as freezing assets and appointing a fiduciary—require credible, comprehensible proof establishing likely success, and appellate courts will defer heavily to district-court credibility judgments (Anderson v. City of Bessemer City).

Even as a nonprecedential order, the reasoning provides a practical roadmap for future litigants in trust-related disputes and parallel state/federal litigation: align your forum strategy with abstention realities, and do not expect emergency relief to substitute for evidence—especially when discovery is stayed.