2. Factual and Procedural Background
The 2019 SGA meeting and trespass prosecution
Murie sought to attend an SGA meeting on November 1, 2019, to raise longstanding concerns about the college. Staff advisor Paul Kolak had told him that attendance was restricted to students taking courses for academic credit. At that time, Murie was enrolled only in a noncredit seminar.
Murie nevertheless went to the meeting room. Security footage showed him pulling the locked door handle, knocking on an adjacent window, and remaining near the doorway. Kolak, who was inside, described pounding on the window, rattling of the handle, student safety concerns, and a ten-minute recess.
Security employee Jim White asked Murie to leave. Murie called the police to complain about security personnel. Responding officers repeatedly warned him that refusing to leave would result in arrest. He refused, and they arrested him.
White told police that Murie had been banging on doors and windows and preventing entry or exit. After police requested information about potential witnesses, Kolak prepared an email describing the incident. The email also stated that guest speakers had been able to enter and leave freely. White forwarded it to police. Todd Neibauer, the college’s vice president responsible for student services and technologies, received a copy and later reviewed the security footage.
A prosecutor filed a trespass complaint on November 12, 2019, and dropped the charge on December 4, 2020.
The 2021 disciplinary proceedings
After reenrolling for academic credit in spring 2021, Murie became eligible for SGA participation and was elected secretary. He continued pressing his concerns at meetings, in emails, and through the SGA’s Discord communications.
Following escalating tensions, another student submitted a “red flag” complaint alleging harassment, insults, and disruption. College employees Leanne Baumeler and Marcus Bennett investigated, interviewing participants and reviewing communications.
The resulting report recorded allegations that Murie mocked members, sent aggressive emails, disregarded boundaries, and prevented meetings from proceeding as planned. It also recorded a statement attributed to Murie that he intended to continue disrupting meetings because he considered the SGA ineffective. Murie’s complaint, however, denied that he threatened or intimidated members.
Neibauer adopted the report’s findings and barred Murie from extracurricular activities for one year, removed him from the SGA, and prohibited contact with SGA members. A three-member review panel upheld the ruling.
The litigation
Murie filed suit on November 11, 2022. The district court dismissed his First Amendment claims, his Michigan malicious prosecution claims, and his federal malicious prosecution claim against the board under Rule 12(b)(6). It later granted summary judgment to White, Kolak, and Neibauer on the remaining federal malicious prosecution claims.
4. Analysis: Legal Reasoning and Precedents Cited
A. Different procedural stages required different treatment of the record
The court reviewed both dismissal and summary judgment de novo, meaning it independently assessed the district court’s rulings. But the materials it could consider, and the conclusions it could draw, differed between those stages.
Bassett v. Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426 (6th Cir. 2008). This decision supplied the framework for reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal: accept factual allegations as true, construe them favorably to the plaintiff, and determine whether they state a plausible claim. It also supported considering documents referenced in the complaint and central to the claims. The court cited it again for independent review of summary judgment, with reasonable inferences drawn for the nonmoving party.
Spencer v. Grand River Navigation Co., 644 F. App'x 559 (6th Cir. 2016). This precedent supported consideration of Kolak’s email, the criminal complaint, and the red flag report. Murie referenced those documents, they were central to his claims, and he submitted them with his response to the dismissal motion without objection.
Jones v. City of Cincinnati, 521 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2008). This case imposed an important limit on using the investigative report. The court could recognize that witnesses made particular statements and that investigators reached particular findings without accepting the underlying accusations as true. Consequently, affirmance did not amount to a factual determination at the pleading stage that Murie committed every reported act.
Croce v. New York Times Co., 930 F.3d 787 (6th Cir. 2019). When an incorporated document expressly contradicts a complaint’s description of that document, the document controls. Murie characterized the report as labeling his advocacy itself harassment. The court instead read it as recording complaints about how he treated members. This principle concerned the report’s actual contents, not automatic acceptance of those contents as fact.
Product Solutions Int'l, Inc. v. Aldez Containers, LLC, 46 F.4th 454 (6th Cir. 2022). This authority permitted affirmance on any ground supported by the record. It allowed the appellate court to assess the disciplinary retaliation claim through the report and the student-speech authorities, rather than confining its reasoning to the district court’s formulation.
For the individual defendants’ malicious prosecution claims, the court considered the developed evidentiary record, including security footage. Summary judgment was appropriate if no genuine dispute of material fact required a trial and the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. That inquiry was distinct from asking whether the complaint alone was sufficient.
B. First Amendment retaliation required a plausible causal connection
Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). This was the governing retaliation precedent. It required protected activity, an adverse action, and a connection showing that the adverse action was motivated at least partly by the protected activity. Murie’s claims repeatedly failed at that third requirement.
The arrest theory was untimely
Scott v. Ambani, 577 F.3d 642 (6th Cir. 2009). The court relied on this case for the three-year limitations period and the rule that the period begins when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury. Murie knew of his arrest on November 1, 2019. His November 11, 2022 complaint came too late for a retaliation claim rooted in that arrest.
The court distinguished the later prosecution. Charges were filed on November 12, 2019, within three years of the filing date. It assumed, without deciding, that a prosecution-based retaliation theory was timely and resolved it on the merits. The opinion therefore does not definitively establish accrual for every prosecution-based retaliation claim.
The prosecution theory lacked facts supporting retaliatory motive
Even assuming Murie’s attempted participation in the meeting was protected, the complaint did not plausibly connect the allegedly false information to an effort to punish that participation. Murie called police, refused their directions to leave, and was arrested. Police then sought information, prompting the college’s response.
The court treated that sequence, together with the email’s acknowledgment that speakers could enter and leave, as insufficient to support retaliatory motivation. This was not a holding that responses to police inquiries are categorically immune from retaliation claims. It was a conclusion that this complaint supplied no adequate factual bridge between protected advocacy and the challenged reporting.
The disciplinary theory did not connect sanctions to election or protected advocacy
Murie identified his election as SGA secretary and his advocacy during SGA business as protected activities. The court assumed, rather than decided, that election to the office was constitutionally protected. But the investigation followed a complaint about subsequent behavior, and the report did not identify the election itself as a reason for discipline.
Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571 (6th Cir. 2005). This case supported rejecting a conclusory allegation of retaliation. Murie’s assertion that the report demonstrated retaliatory motive could not substitute for facts connecting the investigation to his election.
His advocacy theory required closer attention to the distinction between the substance of criticism and the manner in which SGA activities were allegedly disrupted. The report described complaints about personal treatment, aggressive communications, and interruptions—not simply disagreement with Murie’s policy positions.
C. The student-speech precedents distinguished protected criticism from substantial disruption
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). The court invoked the rule that student speech materially and substantially disrupting school activities, or reasonably forecast to do so, is not constitutionally protected in the relevant setting. This supplied a legal explanation for distinguishing sanctions directed at disruptive conduct from sanctions directed at protected viewpoints.
Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 2007). This decision extended the disruption analysis to extracurricular activities, specifically a school athletic team. It supported applying a disruption framework outside ordinary classroom instruction.
Diei v. Boyd, 116 F.4th 637 (6th Cir. 2024). This precedent connected the analysis to college students and the pleading stage. It showed that a court may evaluate allegations concerning disruption when determining whether a college student has alleged protected speech.
Here, Murie’s allegations described repeated disputes, growing tensions, a canceled meeting, and a safety survey. The report recorded complaints that unrelated grievances prevented meetings from proceeding, as well as Murie’s reported intention to continue disrupting them. The court again treated these as information supplied to investigators, not as conclusively proven misconduct.
The decisive deficiency was that Murie did not plausibly explain why the stated concerns about harassment and disruption were actually punishment for protected advocacy. The opinion should not be read to establish that criticism, personal offense, or an administrator’s use of the word “disruption” automatically defeats a First Amendment claim. Its reasoning depended on the particular allegations and incorporated report.
D. Federal malicious prosecution required more than inaccurate or exaggerated descriptions
Codrington v. Dolak, 142 F.4th 884 (6th Cir. 2025). This precedent supplied the decisive participation requirement: a defendant must have “made, influenced, or participated in the decision to prosecute.” The court resolved the federal claims on this requirement without deciding every other element of malicious prosecution.
Jones v. Naert, 121 F.4th 558 (6th Cir. 2024). The court relied on this decision to explain how supplying information can satisfy that requirement: a defendant may influence prosecution by knowingly or recklessly giving officials materially false information. Thus, a person need not be the prosecutor to incur liability.
Johnson v. Moseley, 790 F.3d 649 (6th Cir. 2015). This authority excluded negligence and innocent mistake from the required mental state. Demonstrating that a witness’s account was imperfect would not, without more, establish the culpable involvement alleged here.
Newman v. Twp. of Hamburg, 773 F.3d 769 (6th Cir. 2014). This case was central to the assessment of the security footage. Modest discrepancies or imprecise descriptions do not, standing alone, demonstrate knowing or reckless disregard for truth.
The court applied those principles separately to each employee:
- White: The footage showed knocking, pulling the handle, and standing immediately outside the door for extended periods. Describing this as “banging,” or as obstructing the doorway, did not on this record permit a reasonable finding of knowing or reckless falsity. His request for a six-month exclusion was a request rather than a factual representation capable of being false.
- Kolak: Differences between “pounding” and knocking, or “rattling” and pulling the handle, did not establish the necessary mental state. The footage did not contradict his account of a recess inside the room. His acknowledgment that speakers could enter and leave also undermined an inference of deliberate deception.
- Neibauer: Reviewing the footage did not give him reason to conclude that Kolak’s account was false. His failure to correct it therefore did not establish culpable participation.
Meeks v. City of Detroit, 727 F. App'x 171 (6th Cir. 2018). This decision supported the analysis of Neibauer’s omission. A failure to investigate assertions does not create malicious prosecution liability when there is no reason to doubt their truth. The court did not announce blanket immunity for failing to correct known falsehoods; it found insufficient evidence that Neibauer had encountered such falsehoods.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). The board’s claim failed at the pleading stage. Alleging “upon information and belief” that the board approved and ratified false statements did not provide factual support for its participation in the prosecution. The problem was the conclusory substance of the allegation, not merely its introductory phrasing.
E. Michigan malicious prosecution required a separately pleaded improper purpose
Matthews v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 572 N.W.2d 603 (Mich. 1998). This Michigan Supreme Court decision required malice or a purpose other than bringing the accused to justice. Murie’s allegations of decades of conflict did not connect that history to an improper purpose behind the prosecution.
The complaint itself described his refusal to leave after police warnings as the basis for the charge. Without additional facts linking defendants’ conduct to malice, the state claim was implausible.
This reasoning remained distinct from the federal summary judgment analysis: the state claim failed on the allegations, not because the court imported later evidentiary conclusions into the dismissal inquiry.