Collateral-Review Harmless-Error Rule for Davis-Based § 924(c) General Verdicts: Brecht “Actual Prejudice” Controls

Introduction

In United States v. Melvin Williams (3d Cir. May 14, 2026) (not precedential), the Government appealed an order from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting Melvin Williams’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and vacating his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction. The case arose from a robbery conspiracy targeting drug dealers, during which Williams—armed—ordered co-conspirators to shoot approaching FBI agents; both agents were shot, and a conspirator was killed.

The key post-conviction issue was a familiar one after United States v. Davis: the jury had been instructed that Williams’s § 924(c) conviction could rest on multiple predicate offenses, including conspiracy counts that are no longer considered “crimes of violence.” The central legal question on collateral review was whether that instructional error, paired with a general verdict, justified § 2255 relief—and what harmless-error standard governed that determination.

Summary of the Opinion

The Third Circuit reversed the District Court’s grant of § 2255 relief and remanded. While acknowledging that the jury instructions incorrectly treated conspiracy counts as “crimes of violence,” the Court held that the District Court applied the wrong harmless-error standard. On collateral review, the petitioner must show “actual prejudice” under Brecht v. Abrahamson, i.e., that the error had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on the outcome.

Applying Brecht, the Court concluded Williams failed to carry his burden because the jury’s convictions on the substantive assault/attempt counts (Counts Three through Six) necessarily required a finding that Williams ordered the shooting, which in turn supplied valid “crime of violence” predicates for § 924(c). Thus, the inclusion of invalid conspiracy predicates did not substantially influence the § 924(c) verdict.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

1) United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019)

United States v. Davis invalidated § 924(c)’s residual clause. That development prompted Williams’s collateral attack: if his § 924(c) conviction could have rested on predicates that qualify only under the residual clause (or otherwise no longer qualify as “crimes of violence”), the conviction might be vulnerable. Davis supplies the doctrinal trigger for re-examining older § 924(c) convictions tied to broad “crime of violence” instructions.

2) Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57 (2008) (per curiam)

The District Court relied on the general principle from Hedgpeth v. Pulido that a general verdict is challengeable where a jury is instructed on alternative theories and may have relied on an invalid one. The Third Circuit did not dispute that principle; it instead emphasized that the real question on collateral review is whether the error was harmful under the correct harmless-error framework.

3) Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967)

These cases supply the opinion’s core doctrinal correction. Chapman v. California sets the direct-appeal harmless-error standard (often framed as whether there is a “reasonable possibility” the error contributed to the verdict). But Brecht v. Abrahamson rejects Chapman’s direct-review approach for collateral proceedings, requiring instead “actual prejudice”—a “substantial and injurious effect or influence.”

The Third Circuit held the District Court mistakenly used Chapman-style language (“reasonable possibility”) while citing Brecht, and reiterated Brecht’s view that the Chapman approach is “at odds” with habeas/collateral review’s purposes, including finality.

4) United States v. Bentley, 49 F.4th 275 (3d Cir. 2022) and United States v. Davies, 394 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2005)

United States v. Bentley and United States v. Davies provide the Third Circuit’s § 2255 framework: the movant must show (1) a qualifying error under § 2255(a), and (2) that the error was not harmless. Bentley is particularly important because it makes explicit that Brecht governs § 2255 harmlessness in the Third Circuit.

5) Lacombe v. Warden James T. Vaughn Corr. Ctr., 95 F.4th 127 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Lacombe v. Emig, 145 S. Ct. 333 (2024), and Freeman v. Superintendent Fayette SCI, 62 F.4th 789 (3d Cir. 2023)

Lacombe is cited for the operative formulation of Brecht’s test (“substantial and injurious effect or influence”) and for the proposition that absent such a showing, courts do not remedy trial errors on collateral review. Freeman reinforces the same point: in habeas proceedings, the defendant bears the burden to prove substantial and injurious effect.

6) United States v. Wilson, 960 F.3d 136 (3d Cir. 2020)

United States v. Wilson is used as an analogy: even on direct appeal (with a more defense-favorable harmlessness framing), the Third Circuit found harmless an instruction that allowed § 924(c) to rest on either conspiracy or a substantive crime, because the record showed the jury did not base the § 924(c) conviction solely on conspiracy. Williams extends that logic to the collateral context: if the error is harmless even under the “reasonable possibility” approach, it is necessarily harmless under Brecht’s more demanding “actual prejudice” requirement.

7) United States v. Peppers, 899 F.3d 211 (3d Cir. 2018) and United States v. Williams, 172 F.3d 42 (3d Cir. 1998) (Table)

United States v. Peppers is cited for the de novo standard of review on purely legal issues. The 1998 table disposition confirms the original conviction’s affirmance but does not materially shape the collateral harmless-error analysis.

Legal Reasoning

  1. Error identified: The parties agreed that the conspiracy offenses in Counts One and Two are not “crimes of violence,” so instructing the jury that they were valid § 924(c) predicates was erroneous after Davis-era doctrine.
  2. Correct harmless-error standard: Because this was a § 2255 collateral attack, the court held Brecht controls. The District Court erred by applying a direct-review “reasonable possibility” framing.
  3. No “actual prejudice” on this record: Even though the § 924(c) verdict was general, the jury’s findings on the substantive counts mattered. The trial court instructed that to convict on Counts Two through Six the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Williams “gave the command to shoot” and that this command resulted in the shooting. That necessary finding supported conviction for substantive violent offenses (Counts Three through Six) and therefore supplied valid predicates for § 924(c).
  4. Inference from mandatory findings: The Third Circuit treated the jury’s required findings on the substantive counts as functionally eliminating the possibility that the § 924(c) verdict rested only on invalid conspiracy predicates in a way that mattered under Brecht. In other words, whatever the general verdict’s ambiguity in theory, the structure of the instructions and convictions made the error non-prejudicial in practice.

Impact

  • Re-centers § 2255 litigation on Brecht: The opinion underscores that Davis-based § 924(c) challenges brought via § 2255 are governed by Brecht “actual prejudice,” not direct-appeal harmlessness formulations. Petitioners must prove substantial and injurious effect, not merely point to a plausible reliance on an invalid predicate.
  • General verdicts are not automatically fatal: Even where instructions list both valid and invalid predicates and the verdict does not specify the predicate, courts may deny relief if the jury’s other necessary findings (or convictions) effectively establish reliance on valid crimes of violence.
  • Practical consequence for Davis retroactivity cases: Defendants seeking vacatur of § 924(c) convictions will face an uphill battle where the record shows the jury necessarily found facts supporting a valid elements-clause predicate (e.g., commanded or aided violent assaults/attempts), notwithstanding the presence of now-invalid conspiracy predicates.
  • Nonprecedential but instructive: Although designated “NOT PRECEDENTIAL,” the reasoning aligns with the Third Circuit’s published harmless-error jurisprudence (e.g., Bentley, Wilson) and is likely to be persuasive in similar § 2255 disputes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

18 U.S.C. § 924(c) “crime of violence” (elements clause)
§ 924(c) adds punishment for using/carrying a firearm during a “crime of violence.” After Davis, courts focus on whether the predicate offense has as an element the use/attempted use/threatened use of physical force (the “elements clause”).
Residual clause vs. elements clause
The “residual clause” was a broader definition of “crime of violence” that Davis invalidated as unconstitutionally vague. Many conspiracy offenses do not qualify under the narrower elements clause.
General verdict / alternative-theory error
A “general verdict” does not specify which factual or legal theory the jury relied on. If jurors were told they could convict using either a valid or invalid theory, the verdict can be challenged—but relief depends on harmless-error analysis.
Harmless error on direct appeal (Chapman) vs. collateral review (Brecht)
On direct appeal, courts use stricter scrutiny of constitutional errors (often asking if the error could reasonably have affected the verdict). On collateral review under § 2255, Brecht requires the petitioner to show “actual prejudice”—a substantial and injurious effect on the outcome.
“Actual prejudice”
Not a showing that an error was possible or conceivable; it must have meaningfully influenced the result.

Conclusion

United States v. Melvin Williams reinforces two practical rules for Davis-era § 924(c) collateral attacks: (1) Brecht’s “actual prejudice” test governs harmlessness in § 2255 proceedings (not Chapman’s direct-review framing), and (2) an instruction listing invalid conspiracy predicates does not warrant vacatur where the jury’s other required findings and convictions necessarily establish valid “crime of violence” predicates. The decision thus narrows the circumstances in which general-verdict ambiguity will translate into § 2255 relief after Davis.