Coconspirator Statements and Cumulative Harmlessness: Corroboration and Independent Evidence Sustain Conspiracy Convictions

1. Introduction

The First Circuit affirmed the convictions of Luis H. Quiñones-Santiago, Eduardo Rosario-Orangel, and Avelino Millán-Machuca for RICO conspiracy and conspiracy to possess controlled substances with intent to distribute. The decision resolves evidentiary issues left open in an earlier appeal, principally whether statements introduced through cooperating witnesses and intercepted telephone calls qualified as coconspirator statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E).

The prosecution concerned La Asociación Ñeta, or La Ñeta, an organization originally founded to advocate for prisoners’ rights in Puerto Rico. The indictment alleged that it had developed into a criminal enterprise whose members engaged in drug trafficking and violence. Fifty defendants were charged. The three appellants were each convicted of conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) and 21 U.S.C. § 846.

The opinion’s central contribution is a detailed application of established evidentiary principles rather than a new categorical rule. Operational communications may further a conspiracy when they address drug quality, financial obligations, leadership responsibilities, discipline, or organizational problems. Their admission nevertheless requires corroboration of the declarant’s participation in the conspiracy. Separately, even assumed evidentiary errors may fail to justify reversal—individually or cumulatively—when substantial independent evidence establishes the defendant’s knowing agreement to the criminal venture.

2. Background and Procedural History

The charges and trial evidence

The RICO count alleged an agreement to facilitate La Ñeta’s racketeering activities involving cocaine, heroin, and marijuana. The drug-conspiracy count alleged quantities exceeding one kilogram of heroin, five kilograms of cocaine, and one hundred kilograms of marijuana.

Several important prosecution witnesses were La Ñeta members. José González-Gerena, Alex Miguel Cruz-Santos, and Orlando Ruiz-Acevedo had pleaded guilty to the charged RICO conspiracy. Another witness, Miguel Álvarez-Medina, was not charged and denied participating in the organization’s illicit activities. Additional evidence consisted of intercepted telephone calls and their transcripts.

The earlier appeal and limited remand

In United States v. Ramos-Baez, 86 F.4th 28 (1st Cir. 2023), the court rejected other challenges arising from the joint prosecution but could not resolve these appellants’ coconspirator-statement objections because the district court had not made necessary admissibility findings. The First Circuit retained jurisdiction and remanded for findings under United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1977).

On remand, the defendants identified dozens of statements. Although the government failed to file a response because of a stated calendar oversight, the district court held a hearing and found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the declarants and defendants belonged to the same conspiracy, that the statements furthered it, and that extrinsic evidence corroborated participation. The appellate court then received supplemental briefing.

The district court made collective findings rather than a statement-by-statement explanation. Importantly, the appellants did not argue that those findings omitted any identified statement. They instead challenged the evidentiary support for particular findings. The First Circuit therefore evaluated the individual objections against the trial record.

3. Summary of the Decision

The court affirmed both convictions for each appellant. Its analysis followed three distinct paths:

1. Properly admitted coconspirator statements: Independent evidence supported the declarants’ participation, and context demonstrated that their communications advanced the conspiracy.
2. No hearsay problem: Some testimony challenged as secondhand actually described the witness’s personal participation or experience.
3. Harmless assumed error: For other statements, the court did not decide admissibility because comparable, properly admitted or unchallenged evidence made any error harmless.

The court also rejected Millán’s cumulative-error claim. Even assuming error in every statement whose admissibility it had bypassed, the combined effect did not undermine the verdicts given the strength of the remaining evidence.

These distinctions matter: the opinion does not hold that every challenged statement satisfied Rule 801(d)(2)(E). Several challenges failed without an admissibility ruling.

4. Governing Principles and Precedents Cited

A. Coconspirator statements require corroboration and a conspiratorial purpose

United States v. Petrozziello supplies the governing First Circuit framework. A statement offered against a party qualifies under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) when the required conspiracy relationship exists and the statement was made during and in furtherance of that conspiracy. The proponent must establish the necessary preliminary facts by a preponderance of the evidence. As United States v. Ramos-Baez emphasizes, the declarant’s participation must be corroborated by evidence beyond the challenged statement itself.

Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211 (1974), explains the agency rationale: conspirators are treated as partners whose statements can bind one another when made within the scope of their shared criminal undertaking. This rationale also limits admissibility. A conspirator’s statement does not become admissible merely because its speaker belongs to the group; it must further the conspiracy.

The earlier remand reflected United States v. Machor, 879 F.2d 945 (1st Cir. 1989). Missing findings could not initially be dismissed as harmless because the record did not make it apparent that the preponderance standard had been satisfied. The present opinion therefore completes the evidentiary inquiry rather than treating the original omission as inconsequential.

B. Operational updates can further a conspiracy

Several precedents explain why communications short of an express criminal instruction can satisfy the “in furtherance” requirement:

• United States v. Pérez-Vásquez, 6 F.4th 180 (1st Cir. 2021), and United States v. Flemmi, 402 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2005), recognize that keeping conspirators informed about current developments and group problems can advance their undertaking. United States v. Jefferson, 215 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2000), supplied the formulation quoted through United States v. Flemmi. These authorities supported admission of discussions about unpaid incentives, drug finances, and internal difficulties.
• United States v. Martinez-Medina, 279 F.3d 105 (1st Cir. 2002), treats information about the operation of a drug conspiracy as furthering it. This supported statements explaining how drug proceeds were to be handled and how responsibilities were allocated.
• United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161 (1st Cir. 1993), recognizes the operational significance of identifying a participant’s role and activities. That principle supported communications about leadership assignments.
• United States v. Colón-Díaz, 521 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2008), explains that praising drug quality can promote sales by generating confidence. It supported admission of a supplier’s statement vouching for drugs distributed to Rosario and others.
• United States v. Laureano-Pérez, 797 F.3d 45 (1st Cir. 2015), supports admission of communications encouraging loyalty and compliance with group rules. United States v. Ciresi, 697 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2012), similarly recognizes statements intended to forestall internal dissension.
• United States v. Avilés-Colón, 536 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2008), supports the relevance of updates about conspirators’ activities and also distinguishes firsthand testimony from hearsay. Both applications mattered here.

Together, these cases supported a contextual inquiry: what did the communication accomplish within the criminal organization? The court did not require every statement to accompany an immediate drug sale.

C. Corroboration need not come exclusively from live, firsthand testimony

United States v. Mitchell, 596 F.3d 18 (1st Cir. 2010), permits consideration of admissible recorded communications as extrinsic evidence of conspiracy membership. United States v. Ruiz, 999 F.3d 742 (1st Cir. 2021), confirms that out-of-court statements classified as nonhearsay under the federal rules can supply such corroboration.

These authorities were important to the finding that “Omi” participated in the conspiracy. His involvement in smuggling contraband phones was supported by a separate admissible coconspirator communication. Thus, “extrinsic evidence” means evidence beyond the particular statement being tested; it does not invariably mean evidence untouched by any out-of-court communication.

United States v. Rodríguez, 162 F.3d 135 (1st Cir. 1998), supplied another route to corroboration: violence against a suspected informant can demonstrate conspiracy participation. The court applied that reasoning to testimony that “Sandwich” threatened to kill a supposed snitch.

D. Appellate review, preservation, and alternative grounds

Under United States v. Ciresi, preserved Petrozziello findings receive clear-error review. The appellate court therefore examined whether the record supported the district court’s findings, rather than independently retrying the preliminary facts.

Segrain v. Duffy, 118 F.4th 45 (1st Cir. 2024), and United States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284 (1st Cir. 1997), allow affirmance on grounds apparent from the record. United States v. Piper, 298 F.3d 47 (1st Cir. 2002), specifically supports rejecting a coconspirator-statement challenge through harmless-error analysis. These precedents permitted the court to affirm without endorsing every aspect of the district court’s reasoning.

For an unpreserved challenge, United States v. Ortiz, 966 F.2d 707 (1st Cir. 1992), supplies plain-error review. Under United States v. Benjamin-Hernandez, 49 F.4th 580 (1st Cir. 2022), an appellant who fails even to argue that demanding standard may waive the argument for relief under it. This combination defeated one newly raised challenge by Quiñones.

E. Harmlessness and cumulative error

United States v. Valdivia, 680 F.3d 33 (1st Cir. 2012), was central throughout the opinion: admission of purported hearsay can be harmless when it duplicates other evidence. United States v. Veloz, 948 F.3d 418 (1st Cir. 2020), similarly supports harmlessness when another witness has already testified to the same effect. United States v. Henderson, 911 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2018), reinforced the significance of an appellant’s failure to explain why particular statements caused prejudice.

But individual harmlessness does not automatically establish collective harmlessness. United States v. Sepulveda recognizes that multiple errors may have a more debilitating combined effect than any one error alone. The court accordingly performed a separate aggregate analysis for Millán.

United States v. Castellini, 392 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2004), supports rejecting cumulative error in the face of overwhelming independent evidence. Applying United States v. Manon, 608 F.3d 126 (1st Cir. 2010), the court found no reasonable probability that excluding the statements at issue would have changed the trial’s outcome.

United States v. Pérez-Montañez, 202 F.3d 434 (1st Cir. 2000), supplied the related proposition that there is no cumulative effect to assess when no qualifying collection of errors exists. That principle defeated Quiñones’s renewed cumulative-error contention, for whom the court assumed error concerning only one challenged category.

5. Application to Each Appellant

A. Quiñones: operational disputes, organizational history, and an unpreserved objection

Jowy’s complaints about unpaid incentives

Ruiz recounted Jowy’s statements about difficulties with Quiñones over drug “incentives”—payments owed to La Ñeta for permission to sell drugs privately. Quiñones argued that these statements concerned only his personal dealings.

The court rejected that distinction. González independently testified that he had worked drugs with Jowy for La Ñeta, corroborating Jowy’s participation. And a failure to pay the organization’s required share implicated its financial interests, even if the underlying sales benefited an individual member. Reporting that problem could further the enterprise’s racketeering conspiracy.

The Elders’ explanations of La Ñeta’s history and structure

Quiñones disputed both the Elders’ participation in the charged conspiracy and the timing and purpose of their statements to new inmates. The government relied on their La Ñeta membership and the organizational value of their instruction.

The court did not resolve those admissibility questions. Instead, it held that any error was harmless because numerous witnesses independently described La Ñeta’s hierarchy, meetings, rules, and disciplinary practices.

Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938 (2009), mattered because Quiñones argued that the disputed statements uniquely established the RICO enterprise’s structure. United States v. Rodríguez-Torres, 939 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 2019), demonstrated why the remaining evidence was sufficient: meetings, rules, a loose hierarchy, and business-like organizational practices can exceed the structural showing required by Boyle v. United States.

The court therefore did not adopt the government’s suggestion that La Ñeta membership alone established membership in the charged conspiracy, nor did it decide that the disputed historical statements fell within the charged period.

The alleged drug transaction with Millán

Quiñones argued that Cruz’s account must have rested on an unidentified third party because Cruz was housed elsewhere. But Quiñones had not identified this objection in his opening appellate brief or in his remand submission. Even assuming the issue remained available, review would be for plain error. His failure to argue that standard foreclosed relief.

B. Rosario: drug-quality assurances and duplicative identification evidence

Boringo’s statement

Ruiz testified that Boringo supplied him drugs for La Ñeta and sometimes vouched for their quality by saying that he had also supplied Rosario and others. Independent testimony that Ruiz sold drugs for Boringo, who paid La Ñeta in connection with those sales, corroborated Boringo’s participation.

The statement also served a commercial purpose: assuring another participant of the drugs’ quality. Under the reasoning of United States v. Colón-Díaz, the district court permissibly treated it as furthering the conspiracy.

References to conversations with Dianis Negrón

Ruiz said that he knew of Rosario before meeting him, partly through conversations with Negrón. The court assumed, without deciding, that the testimony involved hearsay. Any error was harmless because Ruiz also identified other sources of familiarity, including Boringo and “Tito Grande,” whose materially similar statements were not challenged.

Quintana’s identification of Rosario as a supplier

Álvarez recounted Quintana’s statement that Rosario supplied him with drugs. Again, the court relied on harmlessness rather than deciding admissibility. An unchallenged statement by “Chuito Carolina” conveyed the same information. González also testified that Rosario acknowledged possessing La Ñeta “fund” drugs, and Boringo’s properly admitted statement independently connected Rosario to trafficking.

C. Millán: leadership evidence had to be connected to criminal agreement

The government characterized Millán as La Ñeta’s “maximum leader.” Millán did not dispute holding leadership positions; he argued that the disputed statements improperly converted legitimate prisoner advocacy into proof of criminal agreement.

The court’s answer rested on evidence linking his authority to drug operations and related organizational control—not merely on his title.

The intercepted calls

The court separately examined several groups of recorded communications:

• Omi’s account of discipline for an unpaid incentive: Corroborated participation and the statement’s role in informing members and encouraging loyalty supported admission.
• Discussions involving La Cana and Mickey Motors: Independent evidence supported their participation. Their statements addressed rule violations and organizational problems following an inmate’s murder. Any error involving an unidentified speaker was harmless because the statements duplicated admissible portions of the call.
• Bambani’s account of a leadership directive and Jowy’s statement that Millán had “closed the doors” to certain drug sales: The court assumed possible error but found it harmless.
• Jowy’s discussion of incentive disputes and collection of money: Properly admitted as operational updates among corroborated participants.
• Rolando Millán-Machuca’s insistence that Millán receive “proof of everything”: Independent evidence linked Rolando to the conspiracy. In context, the statement sought evidence of violations of drug-trafficking rules and failures to remit money.
• Statements about Millán’s reactions to reports and a caller having “something” to give him: Any error was harmless because other evidence established both his supervisory role and his connection to trafficking.

The recurring distinction was between evidence that merely identified a leader and evidence showing how that leader exercised authority over criminal operations. The record contained substantial evidence of the latter.

6. Substantive Conspiracy Law and the Cumulative-Error Analysis

Personal drug dealing was not an indispensable element

United States v. Millán-Machuca, 991 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2021), supplied the background definition of a racketeering pattern: related qualifying acts occurring within the statutory period and posing a threat of continuing criminal activity.

More directly, United States v. Ramos-Baez and United States v. Leoner-Aguirre, 939 F.3d 310 (1st Cir. 2019), explained the relevant RICO-conspiracy agreement: knowing about and agreeing to facilitate the enterprise’s affairs through at least two racketeering acts. The government did not have to prove that Millán personally conducted each act or personally sold drugs to establish the conspiracy offenses.

This distinction was decisive when evaluating prejudice. Evidence of Millán’s agreement to facilitate trafficking could sustain the convictions even without every disputed allegation of his direct sales. It did not, however, eliminate the need to prove criminal agreement rather than legitimate organizational affiliation.

The court assessed assumed errors together

For Millán’s cumulative-error claim, the court assumed that every statement whose admissibility it had bypassed was erroneously admitted. It then considered their combined effect against the remaining evidence, including:

• González’s firsthand account of daily drug sales, organizational rules, leadership structure, and disciplinary processes;
• His personal work processing drugs with Jowy, together with Jowy’s properly admitted identification of Millán as their source;
• González’s own conversations with Millán about drugs and the consequences of a murder ordered by another La Ñeta leader;
• Millán’s response recognizing that leader’s authority and offering to address resulting internal objections;
• Recorded statements by Millán about drug debts, sanctions, financial reporting, and leadership expectations.

The murder-related evidence mattered as evidence of Millán’s knowing involvement in the enterprise’s internal authority and criminal affairs; the appeal did not concern a separate murder conviction against him.

United States v. Acevedo-Hernández, 898 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2018), supports inferring knowing participation from conduct advancing a conspiracy. United States v. Rodríguez-Reyes, 714 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), recognizes the significance of coordinated efforts to protect a group’s status. United States v. Negrón-Sostre, 790 F.3d 295 (1st Cir. 2015), identifies continuing interaction as strong circumstantial evidence of association with a venture. These authorities supported the conclusion that Millán’s conduct reflected criminal agreement, not merely advocacy leadership.

The court considered the independent case overwhelming even without Ruiz’s testimony. Including Ruiz’s and Cruz’s firsthand accounts of trafficking with Millán strengthened it further.

Why earlier disclosure claims did not enlarge the cumulative-error claim

The earlier appeal had addressed challenges under the Jencks Act, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). Those issues were not newly decided here.

The important clarification concerned Giglio v. United States: material prejudice is an element of the disclosure violation itself. The earlier findings of no prejudice therefore meant that no violation had been established—not that an established violation had simply been excused as harmless.

The court had left open reconsideration if the remand revealed evidentiary problems affecting that assessment. But Millán did not show that the potential hearsay errors changed the prior materiality analysis. Accordingly, those unsuccessful disclosure claims did not become additional errors in the cumulative-error calculation.

7. Significance and Likely Impact

A. Financial and disciplinary communications can be central conspiracy evidence

The opinion reinforces that communications about debts, reporting requirements, appointments, sanctions, and internal conflict may sustain a criminal enterprise. Their importance lies in their operational function, not whether they expressly describe a completed offense.

B. Organizational membership and criminal participation remain distinct

The decision does not authorize treating every La Ñeta member—or every member of an organization with lawful and unlawful activities—as a conspirator. Its affirmative admissibility rulings repeatedly relied on additional evidence of criminal participation. Where participation or timing remained uncertain, the court often used harmlessness rather than adopting a broader membership-based rule.

C. Statement-specific appellate arguments matter

The opinion rewards precise identification of the declarant, the challenged statement, the missing foundational element, and the resulting prejudice. A generalized assertion that a witness must have relied on hearsay may fail when the record shows personal participation. Newly raised objections also risk plain-error review and appellate waiver.

D. Harmlessness cannot replace a genuine cumulative assessment

Although overlapping evidence supported many individual harmlessness rulings, the court still examined the combined effect of assumed errors. Future courts can use that approach without deciding every difficult admissibility issue, provided they genuinely evaluate the aggregate prejudice against the remaining record.

E. The treatment of collective findings is limited

The opinion does not establish that generalized findings always satisfy Petrozziello. The appellants accepted that the district court had made findings covering their identified statements and contested their support. The adequacy of collective findings over a properly framed procedural objection therefore remains outside this holding.

F. The decision concerns evidentiary rules, not a new confrontation holding

The court resolved the remaining challenges through hearsay doctrine, preservation, and prejudice analysis. It did not announce a separate Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rule.

8. Complex Concepts Simplified

Hearsay

An out-of-court statement offered to prove what it asserts. Testimony describing the witness’s own actions is not hearsay merely because it concerns other people.

Coconspirator statement

A statement made by a participant during and to advance a shared conspiracy. Although often called an exception, Rule 801(d)(2)(E) technically classifies qualifying statements as nonhearsay.

Extrinsic corroboration

Evidence beyond the particular statement being offered that supports the speaker’s participation. Other independently admissible recorded statements may qualify.

Preponderance of the evidence

The preliminary admissibility standard: more likely than not. It is lower than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard governing criminal guilt.

Clear error

Deferential appellate review of factual findings. A plausible supported finding is not displaced simply because another interpretation is possible.

Harmless error

An error that does not justify reversal because it did not sufficiently affect the outcome. Here, independent and duplicative evidence frequently defeated claims of prejudice.

Cumulative error

The possibility that several errors, although individually insufficient for reversal, together undermine the fairness or reliability of the verdict.

Disclosure materiality

The requirement that withheld information have sufficient significance to establish a constitutional disclosure violation. An unsuccessful materiality showing is not itself an established but harmless violation.

The opinion also cited United States v. Rosa-Borges, 101 F.4th 66 (1st Cir. 2024), and Caz v. Garland, 84 F.4th 22 (1st Cir. 2023), solely to explain its use of Spanish surnames. Those citations did not influence the substantive evidentiary holdings.

9. Conclusion

The First Circuit affirmed because the challenged evidence was either properly admitted, based on personal knowledge, procedurally unavailable for meaningful review, or harmless against the independent record. Millán’s assumed evidentiary errors also failed collectively to undermine the verdicts.

The decision’s broader lesson is disciplined separation: organizational affiliation from criminal agreement, firsthand testimony from hearsay, admissibility from harmlessness, and individual prejudice from cumulative prejudice. Its force lies in that careful, record-specific analysis—not in any blanket authorization to admit statements by organizational members.