Co-Conspirator Relevant Conduct Can Support the Drug-Premises Sentencing Enhancement

A. Legal Reasoning

Different questions receive different standards of review

The court reviewed the interpretation of the Guidelines de novo, meaning it independently decided whether the premises enhancement legally permits reliance on co-conspirator conduct. It reviewed factual findings—including attributable drug quantities and maintenance of premises—for clear error. That deferential factual standard asks whether the appellate court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred.

This distinction matters: the court independently resolved the legal availability of co-conspirator attribution, but it did not freely reweigh the sentencing evidence.

Relevant conduct requires more than conspiracy membership

Under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a)(1)(B), another participant’s conduct is attributable to a defendant only when it was:

1. Within the scope of the jointly undertaken criminal activity;
2. In furtherance of that activity; and
3. Reasonably foreseeable in connection with that activity.

These are separate requirements. Mere knowledge of a broader enterprise does not establish that the defendant jointly undertook everything the enterprise did. Likewise, pleading guilty to conspiracy does not automatically make the entire conspiracy’s conduct relevant for sentencing.

The majority found the necessary connection in the undisputed account of McLaurin’s participation in a multi-location distribution operation. The sentencing court also expressly characterized the operation as jointly undertaken criminal activity and found that sales from other locations advanced its purpose. Thus, the opinion does not authorize attribution based on foreseeability alone.

The distinction between disputing facts and disputing their sentencing effect

McLaurin had reserved his position on relevant conduct at the plea hearing. But that reservation did not prevent the sentencing court from relying on later PSI allegations that he left undisputed.

His objection to the base offense level challenged the consequences of the report, not its underlying account of his participation across the BTE operation. His express acknowledgment at sentencing reinforced the court’s reliance on those facts. The decision therefore illustrates why a general objection to a Guidelines calculation may be insufficient when specific factual allegations independently support it.

The ruling should not be overstated: it does not make every contested legal conclusion in a PSI binding merely because the report contains it. Here, the court relied on undisputed offense-conduct allegations and McLaurin’s responses when those allegations were specifically raised.

Physical absence and arrest did not establish withdrawal

McLaurin argued that he had no connection to the other drug locations and did not return to the 50th Avenue residence after his arrest. The court distinguished physical participation from the continuing consequences of a jointly undertaken conspiracy.

Withdrawal requires affirmative action inconsistent with the conspiracy, communicated in a manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators, or disclosure of the illegal activity to law enforcement. Mere unavailability does not satisfy that standard. Because McLaurin pointed to no qualifying withdrawal, his arrest did not itself cut off attribution of subsequent conduct.

This reasoning does not eliminate the scope, furtherance, and foreseeability requirements for later conduct. It rejects arrest alone as a sufficient reason to avoid them.

The premises enhancement operates within the relevant-conduct framework

Section 2D1.1(b)(12) directs a two-level increase “[i]f the defendant maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” The majority read that language together with § 1B1.3, rather than treating the enhancement as an isolated provision.

The Guidelines ordinarily incorporate relevant conduct unless a particular provision specifies otherwise. The majority found no such limitation in § 2D1.1(b)(12). In particular, the phrase “the defendant” did not, by itself, require personal performance of every act supporting the enhancement.

The accompanying commentary identifies possessory interest and control over access or activities as considerations in determining maintenance. It also explains that manufacturing or distribution must be a primary or principal use, though not the property’s sole use. The majority did not interpret those considerations as an express restriction excluding otherwise attributable co-conspirator conduct.

Application to the BTE residences

McLaurin did not dispute that the conspiracy involved premises maintained for drug manufacturing or distribution. The remaining question was attribution. The majority relied on his own sales from a BTE residence, participation in a video that the court understood as promoting the drug network, and the conspiracy’s distribution purpose.

Those circumstances supported the finding that his co-conspirators’ maintenance of the residences was reasonably foreseeable. The videos functioned as contextual evidence within an established drug operation; the opinion does not announce that musical content alone establishes criminal responsibility.

Crucially, the majority left unresolved whether the district court correctly found that McLaurin himself controlled access to or activities at the 50th Avenue property. Its alternative, co-conspirator-conduct rationale was sufficient to affirm.

B. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Appellate review and sentencing procedure

United States v. George, 872 F.3d 1197 (11th Cir. 2017)

This decision supplied the distinction between independent review of Guidelines interpretation and clear-error review of factual findings. It also supported treating maintenance of drug premises as a factual issue assessed under the totality of the circumstances. Its role was methodological; it did not resolve the disputed availability of co-conspirator attribution here.

United States v. Almedina, 686 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 2012)

Quoted through another precedent, this case supplied the familiar clear-error formulation: reversal requires a definite and firm conviction that a mistake occurred. It explains the deference afforded the district court’s factual determinations.

United States v. Gonzalez, 550 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2008)

The court cited this decision for the general requirement that a sentence be procedurally and substantively reasonable. It established the broader sentencing framework, although McLaurin’s resolved challenges concerned Guidelines calculation and procedural reasonableness.

United States v. Isaac, 987 F.3d 980 (11th Cir. 2021)

This case explained why the alleged calculation errors mattered: procedural reasonableness requires a correctly calculated Guidelines range, including properly applied enhancements. McLaurin’s below-range sentence did not make those calculation questions irrelevant.

Scope of relevant conduct and withdrawal

United States v. Presendieu, 880 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2018)

This precedent cautions that mere awareness of a larger scheme does not establish that another participant’s activity falls within the defendant’s jointly undertaken undertaking. It supplies an important limitation on the majority’s holding: knowledge and foreseeability cannot substitute for the required scope determination.

United States v. Hunter, 323 F.3d 1314 (11th Cir. 2003)

This decision establishes that a conspiracy plea does not automatically make a defendant responsible for the entire conspiracy at sentencing. It required the majority to identify supporting facts beyond McLaurin’s guilty plea—principally the undisputed PSI account and the sentencing court’s findings.

United States v. Rodriguez, 34 F.4th 961 (11th Cir. 2022)

This was a central precedent with several functions. It identified drug quantity as a factual determination, supported attribution where a defendant worked extensively in partnership with an elaborate drug conspiracy, and explained that stopping work does not necessarily terminate responsibility for later conduct. It also supplied the withdrawal rule and rejected mere unavailability during a search as sufficient withdrawal.

United States v. Butler, 41 F.3d 1435 (11th Cir. 1995)

Quoted through United States v. Rodriguez, this case supplied the affirmative-withdrawal standard. Its importance was to distinguish an actual departure from the criminal agreement from arrest, inactivity, or physical absence.

United States v. Graham, 123 F.4th 1197 (11th Cir. 2024)

This decision attributed drugs sold by co-conspirators while a defendant was incarcerated. It provided a particularly direct analogy against McLaurin’s claim that his arrest alone prevented attribution of subsequent seizures.

Reliance on undisputed sentencing facts

United States v. Bennett, 472 F.3d 825 (11th Cir. 2006)

This case permits sentencing findings based on undisputed PSI statements. It authorized reliance on the report’s description of McLaurin’s participation without requiring the court to disregard those accepted facts merely because he contested the resulting offense level.

United States v. Wade, 458 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2006)

This decision treats failure to object to PSI factual allegations as an admission for sentencing purposes. Together with United States v. Bennett, it made McLaurin’s failure to dispute the relevant offense-conduct allegations central to affirmance.

The default attribution rule and its exceptions

United States v. Chavez, 584 F.3d 1354 (11th Cir. 2009)

This case supplied the general proposition that Guidelines calculations consider relevant conduct, sometimes including acts of others acting in concert with the defendant. It supported reading § 2D1.1(b)(12) within the Guidelines’ overall attribution system.

United States v. Cook, 181 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 1999)

This decision concerned the reckless-flight enhancement under § 3C1.2. Its commentary limits responsibility for another person’s conduct to specified forms of involvement, including aiding, abetting, counseling, commanding, inducing, procuring, or willfully causing it. That language displaced ordinary relevant-conduct attribution.

The important distinction is not that another person’s conduct can never support that enhancement. Rather, reasonable foreseeability alone is insufficient under its specific limitation. The majority distinguished the premises enhancement because it found no comparable restriction.

United States v. McClain, 252 F.3d 1279 (11th Cir. 2001)

This was the majority’s principal analogy. It permitted the enhancement for using a minor under § 3B1.4 to rest on reasonably foreseeable co-conspirator conduct. That provision, like the premises enhancement, begins with language focusing on “the defendant.”

The precedent therefore undercut the argument that those words alone demand exclusively personal conduct. It also answered the concern about strict liability: the relevant-conduct requirements constrain attribution. Judge Rosenbaum disputed the analogy because the premises commentary specifically emphasizes the defendant’s relationship to the property and because stash houses are much more integral to drug conspiracies than minors are to bank fraud.

Guidelines commentary and interpretive deference

United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc)

This decision limits deference to Guidelines commentary when the guideline itself is unambiguous. The majority addressed it to clarify that its distinction of United States v. Cook was not an exercise in deferring to commentary to interpret § 2D1.1(b)(12).

Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558 (2019)

Cited through United States v. Dupree, this decision supplies the principle that interpretive deference does not arise without genuine uncertainty in the governing text. Its role was limited: the majority did not undertake a general reconsideration of the validity or authority of the premises commentary.

The dissent’s premises-enhancement comparisons

United States v. Thomas, 32 F.4th 1073 (11th Cir. 2022)

Judge Rosenbaum noted that the defendant lived in the stash house during part of the conspiracy. The case illustrated application of the enhancement through a concrete personal relationship with the premises.

United States v. Soto-Villar, 40 F.4th 27 (1st Cir. 2022)

The defendant rented the stash house. The dissent used this example to reinforce the significance of a personal possessory connection.

United States v. Garcia, 774 F.3d 472 (8th Cir. 2014)

The defendant performed upkeep, including mowing the lawn and taking out the trash. This illustrated that personal maintenance can be demonstrated through practical responsibilities, not merely ownership or a lease.

These three cases supported the dissent’s observation that prior applications examined the particular defendant’s relationship to the premises. As presented in the opinion, however, they did not establish that other circuits had squarely rejected co-conspirator attribution. The decision therefore does not establish a circuit split on that question.

C. Judge Rosenbaum’s Partial Dissent

Judge Rosenbaum agreed that McLaurin was responsible for the conspiracy’s drug quantities. Her disagreement concerned only the premises enhancement and the sufficiency of the findings supporting its application.

Her first argument was interpretive. Application Note 17 directs courts to consider whether the defendant owned or rented the premises and how far the defendant controlled access or activities. In her view, that focus requires meaningful “touchpoints” between the particular defendant and the property. It distinguishes this enhancement from the use-of-a-minor enhancement considered in United States v. McClain.

Her second argument concerned the Guidelines’ structure. She reasoned that drug conspiracies commonly use stash houses. If foreseeable maintenance by any co-conspirator suffices, the premises enhancement could become nearly routine in conspiracy cases, effectively increasing the base offense level rather than identifying a special offense characteristic. This was the dissent’s concern about the decision’s likely operation, not a factual finding adopted by the majority.

Finally, Judge Rosenbaum considered the district court’s findings insufficient to establish McLaurin’s own maintenance of the premises. She would have vacated the sentence and remanded for further findings, including whether he regularly performed upkeep, stored property there, or controlled access.

The disagreement was therefore not simply about whether McLaurin had keys. It concerned whether qualifying personal involvement was legally necessary at all. The majority answered no where another participant’s maintenance is properly attributable as relevant conduct.

D. Impact and Limits

A broader evidentiary route to the premises enhancement

Within the Eleventh Circuit, the government need not always establish that the defendant personally leased, maintained, or controlled the drug property. It may instead establish qualifying maintenance by a co-participant and connect that conduct to the defendant through § 1B1.3.

This can matter substantially for lower-level participants. Even a defendant who describes himself as a commission-based seller answering to others may receive the enhancement if the required attribution findings are supported.

The enhancement remains conditional, not automatic

The majority did not hold that every drug conspiracy warrants the increase. The record must still establish qualifying maintenance of premises, including the requisite drug-related purpose. For another participant’s conduct to count, scope, furtherance, and reasonable foreseeability must all be satisfied.

Consequently, neither general awareness of a stash house nor membership in a conspiracy alone resolves the inquiry. The dissent’s concern about widespread application is significant, but it should not replace the narrower legal conditions of the majority’s holding.

Specific objections will be especially important

The decision emphasizes the practical importance of identifying disputed PSI facts. A defendant seeking to limit attribution should distinguish an objection to the arithmetic from an objection to the alleged scope of the joint undertaking, the properties involved, the relevant time period, or the foreseeability of another participant’s conduct.

Likewise, an argument based on departure from the conspiracy must confront the affirmative-withdrawal standard rather than relying solely on arrest or inactivity.

Questions left open

The court did not resolve whether McLaurin personally maintained the 50th Avenue residence, establish a universal threshold for control of shared premises, or decide a separate substantive-reasonableness challenge. Its central precedential contribution is the legal availability of co-conspirator relevant conduct as a basis for § 2D1.1(b)(12).