Clarifying “Maintenance” Under U.S.S.G. §2D1.1(b)(12): Control, Duration, and Possessory Interest in Drug Premises Enhancement

Introduction

United States v. Day (10th Cir. May 2, 2025) addresses a sentencing dispute over the application of a two-level enhancement under the federal Sentencing Guidelines. Hatcher Ramon Day was convicted in the Northern District of Oklahoma of (1) possession with intent to distribute fentanyl pills (21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)), (2) possession of firearms in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i)), and (3) being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition (18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(8)). At sentencing, the district court applied U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12)—a two-level enhancement if “the defendant maintained a premises for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing a controlled substance.” Day challenged only the enhancement, arguing he neither “maintained” nor held any property interest in the short‐term rental used for his drug distribution.

Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit affirmed. Applying de novo review to the legal question and clear-error review to the factual findings, the court held:

“Maintain” under § 2D1.1(b)(12) is not limited to traditional “upkeep” (repairs, cleaning) but encompasses knowingly exercising control, duration, and possession or de facto control over premises used for drug manufacturing or distribution.
Defendant Day had exclusive use of the rental’s master bedroom, stored drugs, firearms and personal belongings there, controlled ingress and egress via keypad code, and stayed for over ten days.
Ownership or formal leasehold is not a prerequisite: de facto control suffices, even if the booking was in another’s name or in violation of Airbnb policy.

Based on these findings, the court concluded that § 2D1.1(b)(12) applied and affirmed Day’s 248-month aggregate sentence.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Stinson v. United States (508 U.S. 36, 1993): Guidance that Sentencing Guidelines commentary is authoritative unless plainly erroneous.
United States v. Verners (10th Cir. 1995): Interpreted 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1)’s “maintain” to require more than casual visitation—control, possession, duration, continuity.
United States v. Montano (10th Cir. 2024): Standard of review for guidelines questions—legal de novo, factual clear error.
United States v. Jones (1st Cir. 2015): § 2D1.1(b)(12) was adopted to mirror § 856(a)(1); formal ownership not required to trigger enhancement.
Additional circuits (3d, 5th, 6th, 8th) and cases (Lozano, Taylor, Carter) uniformly hold that de facto control, occupancy, and continuity suffice.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court began with Application Note 17 to § 2D1.1, which expressly instructs courts to consider (A) any possessory interest (e.g., ownership or rental) and (B) the extent of control over access and activities. Because the note is “authoritative,” the panel applied it to find Day’s exclusive bedroom occupancy, storage of fentanyl pills, firearms, scales, ammunition, cash, and personal effects over a multiple‐day period established “maintenance” for distribution.

Day’s arguments were rejected in turn:

Upkeep vs. Control: “Maintain” need not mean performing repairs or cleaning; it means to preserve or continue possession and control for the illicit purpose.
Duration & Continuity: Even a ten-day stay, with documented transactions over several days, satisfied the requirement of ongoing use.
Possessory Interest: A formal lease or booking in one’s name is not essential; courts look to de facto control—keys, codes, exclusive use.

3. Impact on Future Cases

This decision cements a broad, pragmatic interpretation of “maintain” in drug premises enhancements:

Squatters, hotel‐room dealers, or short‐term rental users who exercise dominion and control over space for drug distribution cannot evade enhancements by disclaiming ownership or letting co-conspirators book for them.
Future sentencing courts in the Tenth Circuit will apply the § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement where factual evidence shows exclusive or primary occupancy, control of access (keys, codes), storage of contraband, and continuity—even if formal property rights are absent.
Defense strategies challenging enhancements on technical grounds of “ownership” or “repair/upkeep” are significantly curtailed.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Sentencing Guidelines Enhancement: A rules-based increase to a defendant’s guideline range when certain aggravating facts are proved.
§ 2D1.1(b)(12): Two-level enhancement if the defendant knowingly “maintained a premises” for drug manufacture/distribution.
Application Notes: Explanatory text in the Guidelines Manual that courts treat as binding interpretations unless plainly erroneous.
Standard of Review: “Legal questions de novo” means the appeals court re-examines legal issues from scratch; “factual findings for clear error” gives deference to the district court’s view unless it is implausible in light of the record.

Conclusion

United States v. Day clarifies that “maintaining” a premises under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(12) demands an inquiry into de facto control, exclusive occupancy, continuity of use, and storage of contraband—even absent formal property interests or maintenance chores. This holding reinforces the scope of federal sentencing enhancements for drug trafficking by closing loopholes based on technical ownership or rental‐booking arguments. The ruling therefore represents a key precedent guiding future district courts in applying drug‐premises enhancements throughout the Tenth Circuit.