Clarifying “Good Cause” for Continuances in Immigration Proceedings: Abuse-of-Discretion Standards Refined

Introduction

In Kevin Geovany Juarez-Espana v. U.S. Attorney General, 22-14340 (11th Cir. Dec. 10, 2024), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit confronted the circumstances under which the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) may properly deny a motion for continuance in removal proceedings. The petitioner, Kevin Juarez-Espana, an asylum applicant from Guatemala, sought additional time to secure and translate documentary evidence corroborating his fear of persecution. Both the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and the BIA denied his request, ultimately rejecting his applications for asylum and withholding of removal. On federal judicial review, a unanimous Eleventh Circuit panel held that the BIA abused its discretion in refusing the continuance and remanded for further proceedings.

This commentary analyzes the new precedent emerging from the Eleventh Circuit’s decision—namely, a more structured articulation of the “good cause” inquiry for continuance motions under the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”). We will summarize the facts, unpack the Court’s reasoning, survey key precedents, assess the decision’s likely impact on future immigration litigation, clarify complex legal concepts, and conclude with the broader significance of this ruling.

Summary of the Judgment

Juarez-Espana entered removal proceedings in 2017, conceding removability but applying for asylum under INA § 208(a) (8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)) and withholding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3) (8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)). He alleged a well-founded fear of persecution as a member of two proposed particular social groups: (1) Guatemalan male heirs of the Juarez agricultural family, and (2) heirs to a large plot of inherited land. Facing an individual merits hearing in July 2019, he moved twice for a continuance to obtain Guatemalan court documents—criminal indictments, trial records, and disposition orders—necessary to corroborate the murder and land-dispute narrative central to his claim. Both the IJ and the BIA denied his motion, finding he had not shown “good cause” and that his claims failed on the merits.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that the BIA abused its discretion by (1) ignoring evidence of Juarez-Espana’s diligence in securing and translating records abroad, (2) mischaracterizing the pendency period of his case, and (3) erroneously concluding he had not plausibly shown that the sought-after evidence could be obtained. The Court vacated the BIA’s decision and remanded with instructions to grant a reasonable continuance for Juarez-Espana to submit supplemental documentary proof. The Court expressly declined to resolve the asylum and withholding claims on the merits, instead focusing on the procedural question of whether the denial of a continuance was arbitrary or capricious.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Gonzalez v. U.S. Attorney General, 820 F.3d 399 (11th Cir. 2016): Establishes that this Court reviews BIA decisions as the final agency action and reviews adopted IJ opinions to the extent they inform the BIA’s reasoning.
Chacku v. U.S. Attorney General, 555 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2008): Holds that a denial of a motion for continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion, asking whether the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously.
Dos Santos v. U.S. Attorney General, 982 F.3d 1315 (11th Cir. 2020): Clarifies the arbitrary-and-capricious standard for reviewing BIA decisions denying continuances.
Mendoza v. Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, 851 F.3d 1348 (11th Cir. 2017): Enumerates the four hallmarks of arbitrary and capricious agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Hasan-Nayem v. U.S. Attorney General, 55 F.4th 831 (11th Cir. 2022): Reiterates the requirement that asylum applicants must provide “specific and credible evidence” of persecution or a well-founded fear thereof.
Matter of A-B-, 28 I. & N. Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021): Notes evolving standards for establishing persecution on account of membership in a particular social group.

2. Legal Reasoning

The centerpiece of the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis is its re‐invocation of the “good cause” inquiry for motions to continue immigration hearings. Under Chacku and Dos Santos, the BIA commits reversible error only if its denial reflects an arbitrary or capricious disregard of governing factors. The Court found three discrete errors in the BIA’s decision:

Failure to credit petitioner’s diligence. The BIA did not address Juarez-Espana’s sworn statements and counsel’s representations that they had actively pursued records in Guatemala, encountered translation delays, and faced unpredictable foreign bureaucracy.
Mischaracterization of case pendency. The BIA overstated the length of the proceedings by counting from the Notice to Appear (2017) rather than from the first master hearing (October 2018) and the agreed July 2019 merits date. This ignored that much of the interval was beyond the petitioner’s control.
Ignoring petitioner’s plausible showing of obtainable evidence. The IJ had accepted Juarez-Espana’s testimony that specific indictments and disposition orders existed, and counsel had identified the governmental source. Yet the BIA treated the evidentiary need as wholly speculative.

Under the Mendoza framework, these oversights constitute failure to consider “an important aspect of the problem” and are thus arbitrary and capricious. Because a continuance would not unduly prejudice the government and might materially affect the outcome, the Court vacated and remanded for the IJ to grant a reasonable adjournment for evidence collection and translation.

3. Impact on Immigration Practice

This decision recalibrates the procedural balance in removal proceedings:

Heightened scrutiny of BIA continuance denials. Immigration judges and the BIA must expressly address each factor of the “good cause” analysis—diligence, specificity of requested evidence, translation burdens, and overall delay.
Encouragement for detailed motion practice. Petitioners and counsel will be incentivized to document, in granular detail, their efforts abroad and the nature, location, and anticipated form of the evidence.
Potential for additional procedural rounds. Asylum and withholding applicants may secure more continuances to marshal foreign documents, potentially extending case timelines but fostering more complete fact-finding.
Clarification but not expansion of substantive relief. The Court remanded purely on procedure and did not opine on whether the petitioner ultimately qualifies for asylum or withholding of removal.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Continuance – A temporary postponement of a scheduled hearing, requested by a party who needs more time to prepare or gather evidence.
Abuse of discretion – A standard of review where a court will reverse an agency decision only if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”
Notice to Appear (NTA) – A charging document that initiates removal proceedings by listing the allegations against a non-citizen.
Withholding of removal – A form of relief that prohibits removal to a country where an applicant’s “life or freedom would be threatened” on specified grounds, requiring a higher burden than asylum.
Particular Social Group (PSG) – One of the five protected grounds for asylum; a PSG must be defined by immutable characteristics and perceived as distinct by the relevant society.

Conclusion

Kevin Geovany Juarez-Espana v. U.S. Attorney General refines the Eleventh Circuit’s procedural jurisprudence by underscoring that denial of a continuance in immigration court must rest on a careful, documented analysis of good-cause factors. The decision ensures that asylum seekers who diligently pursue critical foreign evidence—especially when translations and bureaucracy impose delays—receive a fair opportunity to present their claims. While the ruling does not guarantee relief on the merits, it reinforces due-process principles in the removal context and directs the BIA to articulate a more transparent rationale when denying motions to continue.