Clarifying Summary Judgment Standards and the Scope of Extrarecord Evidence: Insights from Sterling v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co.

1. Introduction

In Sterling v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reaffirmed core principles governing summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and clarified the narrow circumstances under which appellate courts may consider evidence not presented below. The plaintiff, Everton Sterling, proceeding pro se, challenged mortgage‐related foreclosure proceedings brought against property he acquired from the original mortgagor, Howard White. Sterling asserted civil RICO and fraud claims against a host of defendants—including Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, specialized loan servicers, attorneys handling the foreclosure, and related entities—alleging misrepresentation of property values when loans were issued. The district court dismissed various defendants under Rule 12(b)(6) and granted summary judgment for the remaining defendants. Sterling’s motions for reconsideration were denied, and he appealed. The Second Circuit, in a summary order, affirmed the district court’s decisions in full.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants on Sterling’s RICO and fraud claims, finding no genuine dispute of material fact and insufficient evidentiary support from Sterling.
Sterling’s attempt to introduce “land records” for the first time on appeal was rejected: the Court found no “extraordinary circumstances” warranting extrarecord evidence under Amara v. Cigna Corp.
The Court held that Rule 56 does not require summary judgment movants to submit affidavits negating the opponent’s claim but only admissible evidence demonstrating entitlement to judgment as a matter of law (Celotex Corp. v. Catrett).
Sterling’s procedural due process and local rule compliance arguments were deemed baseless: he had notice of all filings, opportunities to be heard, and no actual deprivation of constitutional rights.
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment and the denials of reconsideration in a non‐precedential summary order.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The Court’s decision drew upon several key precedents:

Kravitz v. Purcell (87 F.4th 111, 118 (2d Cir. 2023)) – Established that appellate review of summary judgment is de novo and reiterated the standard under Rule 56(a).
Hayes v. Dahlke (976 F.3d 259, 267 (2d Cir. 2020)) – Cited for the exact phrasing of Rule 56(a): summary judgment is proper if “no genuine dispute as to any material fact” exists and the movant is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Jeffreys v. City of New York (426 F.3d 549, 554 (2d Cir. 2005)) – Clarified that non‐movants must do more than raise speculative or conclusory allegations to defeat summary judgment.
Amara v. Cigna Corp. (53 F.4th 241, 257 n.8 (2d Cir. 2022)) – Defined “extraordinary circumstances” for introducing evidence not in the district‐court record; evidence must be outcome‐determinative.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)) – Held that Rule 56 does not explicitly require the movant to negate the non‐movant’s claims via affidavits; any admissible evidence suffices to establish entitlements.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The Second Circuit’s reasoning follows a strict application of Rule 56 and long‐standing summary judgment jurisprudence:

De Novo Review. The Court reiterated that it reviews summary judgment grants without deference to the district court’s factual findings, focusing directly on the Rule 56 standard.
Burden on Non‐Movant. Sterling’s pro se status did not relax the requirement that he produce admissible evidence creating a genuine issue for trial. Conclusory allegations of fraud or RICO violations, unsupported by affidavits, documents, or witness statements, fail to meet this burden.
Admission of Extrarecord Evidence. Courts may only consider evidence outside the district‐court record under truly extraordinary circumstances—circumstances absent here, as the “land records” did not address key factual disputes (e.g., White’s intent, defendants’ conduct in loan origination).
No Affidavit Mandate. Defendants met their Rule 56 obligations through documentary evidence, depositions, and other admissible material; no additional affidavits from personally knowledgeable agents were required.
Procedural Due Process and Local Rules. Notice and opportunity to be heard were unquestionably provided. Local Civil Rule 7.1 compliance alone cannot resurrect meritless claims of constitutional deprivation.

3.3 Impact

Although issued as a non‐precedential summary order, Sterling v. Deutsche Bank underscores important practical lessons for litigants and district courts:

Pro Se Litigants Must Present Evidence. Even self‐represented parties cannot rely on bare assertions; they must procure and submit admissible materials to survive summary judgment.
Extrarecord Evidence Remains Rare. Appellate courts will not admit new documents on appeal without a showing that they would alter the appeal’s outcome.
Flexibility in Rule 56 Compliance. Movants for summary judgment may use various forms of admissible evidence—not solely affidavits—to establish their entitlement to judgment.
Procedural Safeguards Upheld. Due process and local‐rule challenges must rest on concrete procedural deficiencies, not speculative accusations of influence or prestige.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Summary Judgment (Rule 56): A procedural device allowing the court to decide a case when there is no real dispute over important facts and one side is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Genuine Dispute of Material Fact: A real disagreement over a fact that could affect the case’s outcome; mere allegations or speculation do not qualify.
Extraordinary Circumstances Doctrine: A narrow exception letting an appellate court consider evidence not in the trial record, but only if it would decisively change the appeal’s resolution.
Affidavit Requirement: While affidavits can support or oppose summary judgment, Rule 56 does not mandate them; any admissible evidence (deposition excerpts, business records, expert reports) may suffice.
Procedural Due Process: The constitutional guarantee that a party receives fair notice of proceedings and an opportunity to present its case.

5. Conclusion

Sterling v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. reaffirms the Second Circuit’s unwavering commitment to Rule 56’s rigorous standards. It clarifies that non‐movants—even pro se litigants—must marshal admissible evidence to create genuine factual disputes, and that appellate courts will not consider new materials absent extraordinary circumstances. The decision also dispels misconceptions about mandatory affidavits and underscores the robustness of procedural due process protections in civil litigation. While non‐precedential, the summary order serves as a practical guide for practitioners and courts navigating the contours of summary judgment practice and the admissibility of extrarecord evidence.