Clarifying Standing and Pleading Thresholds in § 1983 Equal Protection Claims: Bergnes v. Zayas

Introduction

In Bergnes v. Zayas, 24-2434 (2d Cir. May 23, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed two fundamental questions in civil rights litigation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) whether an advocacy organization has standing to bring a national-origin discrimination claim on behalf of its members, and (2) what minimum factual showing must be alleged to state an Equal Protection Clause violation based on national origin. Plaintiffs included New York Communities for Change (“NYCC”) and twenty-nine court interpreters employed by the New York State Unified Court System. They challenged state pay practices, claiming that court interpreters—who are predominantly non-Anglo—receive lower wages than court reporters, who are primarily white English speakers. The district court dismissed NYCC for lack of standing and the individual interpreters for failure to state a claim. The Second Circuit affirmed in a summary order, reaffirming the circuit’s strict standards on organizational standing under § 1983 and the need for concrete statistical and policy-level allegations to support a national-origin discrimination claim.

Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit’s terse ruling affirmed the district court’s order in all respects. With regard to standing, plaintiffs conceded—as required by binding Second Circuit precedent—that a § 1983 plaintiff organization may not assert the rights of its members on their behalf; NYCC was therefore dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Turning to the individual interpreters’ Equal Protection claims, the court held that allegations of (a) vague “majority vs. minority” statistics and (b) anecdotal incidents of hostility were insufficient to show discriminatory intent or a state policy or custom behind the pay disparity. The decision stands for two central propositions:

Organizations cannot sue on behalf of members under § 1983.
National-origin discrimination claims under the Equal Protection Clause require specific, quantitative allegations that rule out non-discriminatory explanations, and a clear link to a state policy or custom when suing officials in their official capacity.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited

Nnebe v. Daus, 644 F.3d 147 (2d Cir. 2011) – Holds that organizations lack standing to bring § 1983 claims on behalf of members.
Conn. Citizens Def. League, Inc. v. Lamont, 6 F.4th 439 (2d Cir. 2021) – Reiterates that § 1983 does not permit organizational standing to assert members’ rights.
In re 305 E. 61st St. Grp. LLC, 130 F.4th 272 (2d Cir. 2025) – Clarifies that failure-to-state-a-claim dismissals are reviewed de novo, accepting all well-pleaded facts as true.
Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42 (2d Cir. 1999) – Establishes that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits intentional discrimination based on national origin.
Burgis v. New York City Dep’t of Sanitation, 798 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2015) – Requires statistical evidence to be both mathematically significant and strong enough to exclude plausible non-discriminatory explanations.
Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64 (2d Cir. 2023) – Confirms the “minimal support” standard for pleading discriminatory intent at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985) – Specifies that official-capacity § 1983 suits require proof of a policy or custom that caused the violation.
Webb v. Goord, 340 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2003) – Rejects the aggregation of isolated incidents as proof of a policy or custom.
Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494 (2d Cir. 2001) – Emphasizes that comparators in Equal Protection claims must be “similarly situated” in relevant respects.

2. Legal Reasoning

The court began by reaffirming that, under binding Second Circuit authority, NYCC lacked standing to prosecute a § 1983 claim on behalf of its members. Plaintiffs did not challenge that rule, and thus the organizational claim was dismissed without further analysis.

On the merits of the interpreters’ individual claims, the court applied a de novo review of the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal. To state an Equal Protection violation, plaintiffs must allege both discriminatory intent and disparate treatment of similarly situated persons. The court identified two principal defects:

Insufficient statistical allegations. Plaintiffs alleged only that “the majority” of interpreters are foreign-born and “the majority” of court reporters are not. Such broad, conclusory percentages fail to meet the Burgis standard requiring precise numerical or percentage data that make non-discriminatory explanations unlikely.
No policy or custom tied to official-capacity defendants. Because Zayas and Grimaldi were sued in their official capacities, plaintiffs needed to show that a state policy or custom—attributable to those officials—produced the alleged pay disparity. Anecdotal hostility toward interpreters, without any link to a supervisory policy, falls short of Kentucky v. Graham and Webb’s requirement.

Additionally, the court noted that interpreters and reporters are not “similarly situated” for comparison: they have different educational prerequisites, Civil Service examination requirements, and job duties.

3. Impact on Future Cases

Bergnes v. Zayas consolidates and clarifies two important strands of Second Circuit doctrine:

Organizational Standing under § 1983. Advocacy groups cannot circumvent member standing requirements by asserting § 1983 claims on behalf of individual rights holders. Future plaintiffs must ensure each individual claimant has Article III standing.
Pleading Standards for Equal Protection. Discrimination complaints alleging national origin bias must include concrete, quantitative allegations that eliminate or render unlikely any legitimate, non-discriminatory explanation. Anecdotes alone—or loose assertions of majority/minority status—will not suffice. Official-capacity suits additionally must trace any alleged violation to a definable state policy or custom.

The decision reinforces rigorous application of Rule 8’s plausibility standard in civil rights cases and signals that courts will demand both precise statistical data and clear institutional connections before allowing discovery and trial on Equal Protection claims.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Section 1983: A federal statute that allows individuals to sue state actors for violations of constitutional rights.
Standing: The requirement that a plaintiff have a concrete injury that is traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.
Official-Capacity Suit: A lawsuit against a government official in their official role, effectively a suit against the government entity itself.
Discriminatory Intent: The purposeful targeting of individuals for different treatment based on a protected characteristic such as national origin.
Policy or Custom: Under Monell and Kentucky v. Graham, a plaintiff must show that a government’s established policy or widespread practice caused the constitutional violation when suing municipalities or officials in their official capacities.
Similarly Situated Comparators: In Equal Protection analysis, individuals compared must share key job functions, qualifications, and working conditions to demonstrate disparate treatment.

Conclusion

Bergnes v. Zayas delivers a clear directive to litigants in the Second Circuit: organizations may not sue under § 1983 on behalf of members, and individual plaintiffs alleging national-origin discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause must plead robust factual detail. Vague majority/minority assertions, bare anecdotes, or missing links to official policies will doom a complaint at the threshold. By affirming these standards, the court strengthens procedural safeguards against fishing expeditions and ensures that only well-supported constitutional claims proceed.