Clarifying Government Advocacy Limits in Rule 11(c)(1)(C) Plea Agreements: United States v. Bustos

1. Introduction

United States v. Bustos (10th Cir. May 20, 2025) addresses the boundaries of government advocacy when a plea agreement under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) stipulates a specific sentencing range. The appellant, Jabier Bustos, pleaded guilty to participating in a drug‐trafficking conspiracy involving over 100 kilograms of methamphetamine. The parties agreed that a sentence between 151 and 188 months was appropriate, notwithstanding a higher Guidelines range. At sentencing, the government asked the district court both to accept that plea agreement and to impose a 188‐month term. The court rejected the agreement and imposed a 324‐month sentence. On appeal, Bustos argued the government breached its promise by presenting arguments and characterizations that effectively undercut the agreed‐upon variance. The 10th Circuit, applying plain‐error review, rejected that contention and affirmed.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court of Appeals framed the issue as whether the government, having stipulated to a 151–188 month range, breached its contractual promise by advocating for an argumentation style that allegedly urged a within‐Guidelines sentence. The panel first identified the government’s promise—to ask for a sentence no higher than 188 months and to urge acceptance of the plea agreement. It then examined the government’s submissions and oral argument, concluding that the government consistently sought a 188‐month sentence and the court’s acceptance of the plea deal. The government’s emphasis on sentencing‐disparity avoidance and comparisons to Bustos’s co-defendant Flores fell squarely within its entitlement under the stipulation. Because no Supreme Court or 10th Circuit precedent held such advocacy a breach, Bustos failed to show “plain error.” The panel therefore affirmed the 324‐month sentence.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

United States v. Brye (10th Cir. 1998) – Establishes that plea agreements are contracts interpreted under ordinary contract principles and the defendant’s reasonable expectations.
United States v. Cachucha (10th Cir. 2007) – Holds government may not seek above a stipulated sentencing range; distinguishing “end-run” tactics from permissible maximum advocacy.
United States v. Hawley (10th Cir. 1996) – Finds breach when government argues facts with legal characterizations that directly contradict promises on acceptance and obstruction credits.
United States v. Villa-Vazquez (10th Cir. 2008) – Reiterates government must explain its plea‐agreement promises and then limit its arguments to what is contractually permitted.
United States v. Ruiz (10th Cir. 2025) – Suggests even a promise to recommend the low end of a Guidelines range can be breached by unasked‐for references to aggravating factors.
United States v. Jimenez (10th Cir. 1991) and United States v. Stemm (10th Cir. 1988) – Confirm that plea agreements do not bar the government’s ethical duty to present all relevant information at sentencing.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

The panel applied a two-step contract analysis: first, identify the government’s promise in the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement; second, assess whether the government’s conduct breached that promise, viewed in light of the defendant’s reasonable expectations. Here the promise permitted the government to ask for—and fully advocate—a sentence up to 188 months and to urge acceptance of the plea deal. The government repeatedly did both in written memoranda and at oral argument, focusing on §3553(a) factors—particularly unwarranted sentencing disparities. Unlike Hawley or Ruiz, it did not seek a higher sentence, nor did it contradict its promise with extraneous legal argument aimed solely at supporting a within-Guidelines or above-stipulated sentence. Because no controlling precedent established that such arguments were forbidden, there was no “plain error.”

3.3 Potential Impact

United States v. Bustos clarifies that when a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement stipulates a sentencing range, the government may advocate vigorously for the top of that range—including detailed comparisons to co-defendants and §3553(a) arguments—so long as it does not exceed the stipulated ceiling or overtly contradict its promise. Future counsel drafting plea agreements will thus focus on defining clearly what arguments remain off-limits and what factual or disparity‐based comparisons the government may reserve. Judges will be alert that rejection of a plea deal does not ipso facto convert permissible advocacy into breach.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 11(c)(1)(C) Plea Agreement: A plea deal where prosecution and defense agree on an appropriate sentence or sentencing range, binding the judge unless accepted.
Sentencing Guidelines Range vs. Stipulated Range: The Guidelines range is computed by applying the Sentencing Guidelines; a stipulated range may be lower if the parties agree to a variance.
Downward Variance: A sentence below the Guidelines range, based on factors under 18 U.S.C. §3553(a).
Plain-Error Review: Appellate standard when an issue was not objected to in district court; requires showing an obvious error that affects substantial rights and the fairness of proceedings.
§3553(a) Factors: The statutory factors (nature of offense, history of defendant, deterrence, disparity, etc.) that guide a court’s sentencing decision.
Leader-Organizer Enhancement: A two-level increase when the defendant organized or led others in the offense.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Bustos establishes that under a Rule 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement, the government permissibly may argue for the top of an agreed sentencing range—using §3553(a) factors and sentencing‐disparity arguments—without breaching its promise, so long as it neither seeks a sentence above the stipulated ceiling nor contradicts its commitment to ask for acceptance of the plea. The decision reaffirms the contract‐law framework for interpreting plea agreements, underscores the limited scope of “plain‐error” relief, and offers guidance on balancing prosecutorial advocacy with adherence to plea‐agreement obligations.