Clarifying Excludable Delay Under the Speedy Trial Act: From Filing to Hearing

Introduction

United States v. Kayla Fair and Zachariah Owens (3d Cir. Apr. 18, 2025) presented the Third Circuit with the question whether delays in scheduling a hearing on pretrial motions could be excluded entirely from the Speedy Trial Act’s 70-day clock. Both appellants, indicted on federal drug charges in April 2022 in the Western District of Pennsylvania, filed suppression motions late in 2022 and early 2023. When the district court took the motions “under advisement” but did not immediately hold hearings, Fair and Owens moved to dismiss their indictments under the Speedy Trial Act, arguing more than 70 days had run without trial. The district court denied relief, scheduled the hearings, and ultimately rejected both suppression motions. On appeal, the question was purely one of statutory interpretation: whether the time between filing the motions and the eventual hearing is wholly excludable under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D) or instead governed by the 30-day “under advisement” exclusion in § 3161(h)(1)(H).

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit, speaking through Judge Scirica, affirmed. The court held:

The statutory text of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D) plainly excludes “delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion.” No requirement exists that the district court promptly indicate an intent to hold a hearing.
Because appellants requested—and the court ultimately held—suppression‐motion hearings, the entire interval from motion filing to hearing (September 6, 2023) was excludable under § 3161(h)(1)(D).
The alternate exclusion provision (§ 3161(h)(1)(H)) for “proceedings under advisement” does not apply here, as the motions plainly required and received a hearing.
Appellants’ Speedy Trial Act dismissal motions therefore lacked merit, and the convictions and plea conditions were affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

Bloate v. United States, 559 U.S. 196 (2010): Established the baseline requirement that a federal criminal trial must begin within 70 days of indictment or initial appearance.
United States v. Hamilton, 46 F.3d 271 (3d Cir. 1995): Reaffirmed that certain periods of delay are “excluded” from the 70-day computation, including the period between motion filing and disposition.
Henderson v. United States, 476 U.S. 321 (1986): Confirmed the plain‐language interpretation of § 3161(h)(1)(D), that all time between motion filing and hearing is excludable, regardless of promptness.
United States v. Claxton, 766 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2014): Held that pretrial motions toll the Speedy Trial clock until the district court holds a hearing.
United States v. Adams, 36 F.4th 137 (3d Cir. 2022): Clarified that § 3161(h)(1)(D) applies when a motion “requires” or is granted a hearing.
United States v. Williams, 917 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2019): Established the standard of review—de novo for statutory interpretation, clear‐error for factual findings.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning proceeded in three steps:

Statutory Text: Section 3161(h)(1)(D) unambiguously states that delay “from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing …” is excluded. Nothing in the text conditions that exclusion on the promptness of scheduling a hearing.
Applicability of (h)(1)(D): Fair and Owens requested evidentiary hearings on their suppression motions, and the district court held those hearings. Under Adams and Claxton, this suffices to trigger the full § 3161(h)(1)(D) exclusion.
Rejection of (h)(1)(H): Appellants argued that once all briefs were filed, the motions were “under advisement” and § 3161(h)(1)(H)’s 30-day cap applied. The court rejected any per se “under advisement” status upon briefing alone, noting that additional information may be needed, and here the district court expressly sought further witness testimony at the hearing.

Impact

This decision clarifies that:

District courts may exclude the full interval from motion filing to motion hearing under § 3161(h)(1)(D), even if weeks or months elapse before the hearing is held.
Defendants cannot rely on an automatic 30-day “under advisement” exclusion upon completion of briefing if they request a hearing that the court holds.
Future litigants must advance concrete evidence that a district court’s scheduling of a hearing was a mere “pretense” to evade the Speedy Trial Act, a high bar recognized by sister circuits.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Speedy Trial Act (18 U.S.C. § 3161): Federal statute requiring trial within 70 days of indictment or initial appearance, subject to certain exclusions.
Excludable Time (§ 3161(h)(1)(D) vs. (h)(1)(H)):
- (h)(1)(D): Excludes all time from motion filing through hearing or prompt disposition of that motion.
- (h)(1)(H): Excludes up to 30 days when a proceeding is “under advisement” (i.e., the court has all necessary information to rule).
De Novo vs. Clear‐Error Review: Statutory interpretations receive fresh (de novo) review on appeal; factual findings are reviewed for clear error.
Waiver and Estoppel: A party must intentionally relinquish a known right to waive an argument. Here, the Government did not waive its right to argue § 3161(h)(1)(D) applied simply because it initially opposed a hearing.

Conclusion

United States v. Fair & Owens reinforces that the Speedy Trial Act’s “motion‐to‐hearing” exclusion (§ 3161(h)(1)(D)) applies in full once a district court holds—or even formally offers—a hearing on a pretrial motion. This decision dispels any notion of a default 30-day “under advisement” period after briefing closes when defendants have requested a hearing. The ruling thus preserves robust judicial discretion to manage the pace of pretrial proceedings without triggering Speedy Trial Act violations—and sets a clear standard for future challenges to courtroom scheduling practices.