Clarifying Administrative Closure and CAT Standards: Insights from Pineda-Calix v. Attorney General

Introduction

The case of Cindy Lisbeth Pineda-Calix v. Attorney General United States of America, adjudicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit on February 20, 2025, addresses two pivotal issues in immigration law: the discretionary denial of administrative closure and the stringent evidentiary requirements for establishing protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Ms. Pineda-Calix, a Honduran citizen who faced removal proceedings for unlawful entry into the United States, sought relief not only on the ground of CAT protection but also requested that her case be administratively closed to facilitate potential relief outside of removal proceedings. The judgment, delivered by Chief Judge Chagares and joined by Circuit Judges Bibas and Rendell, provides important clarifications regarding both administrative closure procedures and how claims of torture are evaluated.

The respondent in the case is the Attorney General, representing the federal government, while Ms. Pineda-Calix, as the petitioner, challenged both the Immigration Judge (IJ)'s denial of CAT protection and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)'s denial of her request for administrative closure.

Summary of the Judgment

The Third Circuit denied Ms. Pineda-Calix’s petition for review. The court upheld the decisions of both the Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals. Specifically:

The board properly denied administrative closure after considering the factors outlined in relevant jurisprudence, notably relying on the Avetisyan framework. It held that Ms. Pineda-Calix’s petition did not demonstrate that she was seeking any other form of relief outside of her removal proceedings.
Regarding her CAT claim, the court found that the evidence did not show that her past experiences or fears in Honduras qualified as "torture" as defined by legal precedents, nor did it indicate she was more likely than not to suffer future torture with government involvement.

In essence, the appellate court agreed with the BIA’s factual and legal analysis, noting that administrative closure was appropriately denied and that her evidence did not meet the CAT relief standards as defined in previous case law.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively relies on multiple precedents:

Arcos Sanchez v. Attorney General, 997 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2021): This case was pivotal in outlining the factors for evaluating administrative closure requests. The court in the present decision cited it to affirm that the BIA’s application of these factors was proper. Additionally, the reference underscores the requirement that any request for administrative closure should involve a pursuit of alternative relief outside of removal proceedings.
Inestroza-Tosta v. Attorney General, 105 F.4th 499 (3d Cir. 2024): This decision further refined the BIA’s discretion by explaining that while not every factor needs to be considered, the agency’s decision must remain within its constrained discretion. The current judgment leans on this precedent to validate the BIA’s reasoning when denying administrative closure.
Gomez-Zuluaga v. Attorney General, 527 F.3d 330 (3d Cir. 2008): This case provided the standard for CAT relief, particularly the “more likely than not” standard for establishing the risk of torture. The court utilized this precedent, along with others like Kang v. Attorney General and AUGUSTE v. RIDGE, to analyze whether the petitioner’s claims met the requisite evidentiary threshold.

Legal Reasoning

The court’s reasoning can be divided into two major strands:

Administrative Closure: The court emphasized that administrative closure is a discretionary power exercised by the BIA or an Immigration Judge. It clarified that Ms. Pineda-Calix failed to substantiate that she sought any form of relief separate from removal proceedings. The decision rested on the Avetisyan factors, which require an analysis of the reasons for closure, the absence of an alternative relief effort, and the anticipated outcome of the proceedings. Moreover, the court noted that the petitioner’s claim was based solely on her experiences related to CAT and did not satisfy the requirement to be pursuing external relief.
CAT Claim Analysis: The Court applied the “more likely than not” standard, thoroughly reviewing testimonial evidence regarding past violence by gangs and the absence of personal targeting that would elevate these experiences to the level of torture. The emphasis was on whether the harm experienced, which involved acts of robbery and intimidation, met the severe threshold of intentionally inflicted, grievous harm for an illicit purpose. The court found that while the petitioner’s experiences were traumatic, they did not qualify as torture under the well-established legal framework.

Impact

The decision in Pineda-Calix v. Attorney General potentially impacts future immigration proceedings in several ways:

Administrative Closure Standards: By affirming the application of the Avetisyan factors, the judgment reinforces the discretion of the BIA in evaluating requests for administrative closure. Future litigants must clearly demonstrate that they are concurrently pursuing alternative avenues of relief outside their removal proceedings.
Clarification of CAT Requirements: The affirmation of the “more likely than not” standard and the precise definitions of torture established in previous decisions will guide subsequent CAT claims. Petitioners must now carefully distinguish between experiences of general violence and those rises to the legal threshold of torture involving government complicity.
Procedural Considerations: The case underlines the importance of first challenging all relief claims in proper administrative forums. By not raising certain claims, such as asylum and withholding of removal, before the BIA, the petitioner limited the scope of judicial review in the appellate court.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Some legal concepts from the judgment are unpacked as follows:

Administrative Closure: Think of it as a “pause button” in removal proceedings. It temporarily halts the process, allowing a petitioner time to explore other legal relief options. However, to benefit from this pause, the petitioner must show they are actively pursuing these alternatives.
Convention Against Torture (CAT) Relief: This is a form of protection that prohibits the return of individuals to countries where they are likely to face torture. Importantly, establishing a CAT claim requires proving not only past mistreatment but also a high probability of future torture that must involve the complicity of government or its officials.
“More Likely Than Not” Standard: This is a burden of proof standard meaning that there is a greater than 50% chance that the claimed event—in this case, future torture—will occur. The court did not find sufficient evidence to meet this threshold.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Third Circuit’s decision in Pineda-Calix v. Attorney General stands as a significant affirmation of the BIA’s authority and its evidentiary standards in both administrative closure and CAT relief cases. The judgment reinforces that administrative closure is a discretionary tool that must be requested with a clear pursuit of alternative relief, and that claims of torture under the CAT require a stringent, evidence-based demonstration that goes beyond general acts of violence.

For legal practitioners and petitioners alike, the takeaways are clear: ensure that claims for administrative closure are robustly supported with evidence of alternative relief efforts, and meticulously meet the legal requirements when advancing claims under the CAT framework. This decision not only elucidates discrete procedural strategies but also reinforces established legal principles, offering guidance for future cases in immigration law.